05000387/FIN-2015001-03: Difference between revisions
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| identified by = NRC | | identified by = NRC | ||
| Inspection procedure = IP 71111.15 | | Inspection procedure = IP 71111.15 | ||
| Inspector = A Turilin, F Bower, J Grieves, N Graneto, T Daun, T O | | Inspector = A Turilin, F Bower, J Grieves, N Graneto, T Daun, T O'Hara | ||
| CCA = P.2 | | CCA = P.2 | ||
| INPO aspect = PI.2 | | INPO aspect = PI.2 | ||
| description = The inspectors identified a finding of very low safety significance (Green) and associated NCV of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, Corrective Action, for failure to correct a condition adverse to quality. Specifically, despite identifying a condition adverse to quality on January 31, 2015 associated with vibration induced fretting of the B emergency diesel generator (EDG) fuel oil flowing vent line, implementation of the corrective action program (CAP) did not assure that the condition adverse to quality was promptly corrected, and subsequently during the next monthly surveillance run the EDG was declared inoperable when the through wall leak worsened. To maintain operability of the other EDGs, which exhibited the same vibration induced fretting that rendered the B EDG inoperable, PPL instituted a compensatory action to initiate a fire watch if any of the EDGs were started to ensure that leakage could be promptly identified and mitigated without causing a fire. Additionally, PPL replaced the piping that exhibited signs of fretting. Inspectors determined that the finding was more than minor because it was associated with the Equipment Performance attribute of the Mitigating Systems cornerstone and adversely affected the cornerstone objective of ensuring the reliability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. Specifically, the failure to correct the fuel oil tube leak on the B EDG resulted in an unplanned shutdown of the diesel and declaration of inoperability when the leak worsened during subsequent surveillance testing. In accordance with IMC 0609.04, Initial Characterization of Findings, and Exhibit 2 of IMC 0609, Appendix A, The SDP for Findings At-Power, the inspectors determined that this finding is of very low safety significance (Green) because the performance deficiency was not a design or qualification deficiency, did not involve an actual loss of safety function, did not represent the actual loss of a safety function of a single train for greater than its TS allowed outage time, and did not screen as potentially risk-significant due to a seismic, flooding, or severe weather initiating event. This finding had a cross-cutting aspect in the area of Problem Identification and Resolution, Evaluation, because PPL did not thoroughly evaluate the issue of vibration induced fretting of the B EDG fuel oil flowing vent line to ensure that resolutions address causes and extent of conditions commensurate with their safety significance. Specifically, PPLs assessment of the condition with regard to operability and the potential impact on the other EDGs was inadequate, which prevented PPL from taking adequate corrective actions to maintain operability [P.2]. | | description = The inspectors identified a finding of very low safety significance (Green) and associated NCV of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, Corrective Action, for failure to correct a condition adverse to quality. Specifically, despite identifying a condition adverse to quality on January 31, 2015 associated with vibration induced fretting of the B emergency diesel generator (EDG) fuel oil flowing vent line, implementation of the corrective action program (CAP) did not assure that the condition adverse to quality was promptly corrected, and subsequently during the next monthly surveillance run the EDG was declared inoperable when the through wall leak worsened. To maintain operability of the other EDGs, which exhibited the same vibration induced fretting that rendered the B EDG inoperable, PPL instituted a compensatory action to initiate a fire watch if any of the EDGs were started to ensure that leakage could be promptly identified and mitigated without causing a fire. Additionally, PPL replaced the piping that exhibited signs of fretting. Inspectors determined that the finding was more than minor because it was associated with the Equipment Performance attribute of the Mitigating Systems cornerstone and adversely affected the cornerstone objective of ensuring the reliability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. Specifically, the failure to correct the fuel oil tube leak on the B EDG resulted in an unplanned shutdown of the diesel and declaration of inoperability when the leak worsened during subsequent surveillance testing. In accordance with IMC 0609.04, Initial Characterization of Findings, and Exhibit 2 of IMC 0609, Appendix A, The SDP for Findings At-Power, the inspectors determined that this finding is of very low safety significance (Green) because the performance deficiency was not a design or qualification deficiency, did not involve an actual loss of safety function, did not represent the actual loss of a safety function of a single train for greater than its TS allowed outage time, and did not screen as potentially risk-significant due to a seismic, flooding, or severe weather initiating event. This finding had a cross-cutting aspect in the area of Problem Identification and Resolution, Evaluation, because PPL did not thoroughly evaluate the issue of vibration induced fretting of the B EDG fuel oil flowing vent line to ensure that resolutions address causes and extent of conditions commensurate with their safety significance. Specifically, PPLs assessment of the condition with regard to operability and the potential impact on the other EDGs was inadequate, which prevented PPL from taking adequate corrective actions to maintain operability [P.2]. | ||
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Latest revision as of 23:22, 21 February 2018
| Site: | Susquehanna  |
|---|---|
| Report | IR 05000387/2015001 Section 1R15 |
| Date counted | Mar 31, 2015 (2015Q1) |
| Type: | NCV: Green |
| cornerstone | Mitigating Systems |
| Identified by: | NRC identified |
| Inspection Procedure: | IP 71111.15 |
| Inspectors (proximate) | A Turilin F Bower J Grieves N Graneto T Daun T O'Hara |
| Violation of: | 10 CFR 50 Appendix B Criterion XVI Technical Specification |
| CCA | P.2, Evaluation |
| INPO aspect | PI.2 |
| ' | |