05000346/FIN-2014003-05: Difference between revisions
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| identified by = NRC | | identified by = NRC | ||
| Inspection procedure = IP 71153 | | Inspection procedure = IP 71153 | ||
| Inspector = L Rodriguez, T Briley, A Shaikh, D Kimble, G O, | | Inspector = L Rodriguez, T Briley, A Shaikh, D Kimble, G O'Dwyer, J Cameron, J Corujo Sandin, J Rutkowski | ||
| CCA = P.3 | | CCA = P.3 | ||
| INPO aspect = PI.3 | | INPO aspect = PI.3 | ||
| description = The Inspectors identified a finding of very low safety significance following review of licensee corrective actions for a previous occurrence of a reportable condition that took place on May 26, 2014. Specifically, on November 17, 2013, the licensee's control room overhead annunciator system suffered a malfunction similar to the May condition. That event was reported to the NRC as required (Event Notification 49546), and the licensee developed applicable corrective actions within their CAP. Several of corrective actions, however, were assigned the lowest possible priority within the licensee's work prioritization system, contrary to the licensee's established procedure guidance. No violation of NRC requirements was identified. This finding was of more than minor significance because it directly impacted the cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. Specifically, as a result of the low priority assigned to a licensee work order, the work wasn't performed and additional significant malfunctions of the control room overhead annunciator system were incurred. The inspectors evaluated the finding using IMC 0609, Appendix A, The Significance Determination Process for Findings At-Power. Using Exhibit 2, which contains the screening questions for the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone of Reactor Safety, the inspectors determined that the finding screened as very low safety significance (Green) because all questions were answered as No. This finding has a cross-cutting aspect in the area of problem identification and resolution, resolution aspect, because the licensee failed to take effective corrective actions to address issues in a timely manner commensurate with their safety significance. | | description = The Inspectors identified a finding of very low safety significance following review of licensee corrective actions for a previous occurrence of a reportable condition that took place on May 26, 2014. Specifically, on November 17, 2013, the licensee's control room overhead annunciator system suffered a malfunction similar to the May condition. That event was reported to the NRC as required (Event Notification 49546), and the licensee developed applicable corrective actions within their CAP. Several of corrective actions, however, were assigned the lowest possible priority within the licensee's work prioritization system, contrary to the licensee's established procedure guidance. No violation of NRC requirements was identified. This finding was of more than minor significance because it directly impacted the cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. Specifically, as a result of the low priority assigned to a licensee work order, the work wasn't performed and additional significant malfunctions of the control room overhead annunciator system were incurred. The inspectors evaluated the finding using IMC 0609, Appendix A, The Significance Determination Process for Findings At-Power. Using Exhibit 2, which contains the screening questions for the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone of Reactor Safety, the inspectors determined that the finding screened as very low safety significance (Green) because all questions were answered as No. This finding has a cross-cutting aspect in the area of problem identification and resolution, resolution aspect, because the licensee failed to take effective corrective actions to address issues in a timely manner commensurate with their safety significance. | ||
}} | }} | ||
Latest revision as of 00:21, 22 February 2018
| Site: | Davis Besse  |
|---|---|
| Report | IR 05000346/2014003 Section 4OA3 |
| Date counted | Jun 30, 2014 (2014Q2) |
| Type: | Finding: Green |
| cornerstone | Mitigating Systems |
| Identified by: | NRC identified |
| Inspection Procedure: | IP 71153 |
| Inspectors (proximate) | L Rodriguez T Briley A Shaikh D Kimble G O'Dwyer J Cameron J Corujo Sandin J Rutkowski |
| CCA | P.3, Resolution |
| INPO aspect | PI.3 |
| ' | |