05000346/FIN-2014002-01
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Finding | |
|---|---|
| Title | Failure to Implement Fire Protection Plan Requirements Related to Control of Ignition Sources |
| Description | The Inspectors identified a finding of very low safety significance and associated non-cited violations of Technical Specification (TS) 5.4.1(d) when the licensee failed to properly implement station procedures for control of ignition sources. Specifically, the inspectors identified two examples where the licensee did not adequately protect work areas containing combustible material from welding and grinding sparks generated in containment. The finding was determined to be of more than minor significance because if left uncorrected would have the potential to lead to a more significant safety concern. In particular, uncontrolled ignition sources have the potential to start a fire that could impact risk significant plant equipment. The inspectors evaluated the finding using IMC 0609, Attachment 4, Phase 1 - Initial Screening and Characterization of Findings. Because the finding involved reactor shutdown operations and conditions, the inspectors transitioned to IMC 0609, Appendix G, Attachment 1, Shutdown Operations Significance Determination Process - Phase 1 Operational Checklists for Both Pressurized Water Reactors (PWRs) and Boiling Water Reactors (BWRs). Since the finding was associated with an issue that occurred during the time the reactor was in a defueled condition, the inspectors conservatively consulted all four pressurized water reactor PWR checklists (i.e., Checklists 1 4). The inspectors determined that the finding did not adversely impact any shutdown defense-in-depth or mitigation attributes on any checklist, nor did it meet any of the checklist specific requirements for a Phase 2 or Phase 3 Significance Determination Process (SDP) analysis. Consequently, the finding was determined to be of very low safety significance. This finding had a cross-cutting aspect in the area of human performance associated with teamwork such that individuals and work groups communicate and coordinate their activities within and across organizational boundaries to ensure nuclear safety is maintained. In particular, the licensees standards and expectations for control of ignition sources were not adequately communicated to ensure adequate protection of combustible material. In the first example, the fire watch was unaware of the condition of the area below the welding activity. In the second example, the fire watch was generally unfamiliar with control of ignition source procedural requirements. In both cases, personnel passing by the work area observed hot sparks coming in contact with combustible material but did not communicate the condition to either the worker generating the sparks or the assigned fire watch to have the condition corrected. |
| Site: | Davis Besse  |
|---|---|
| Report | IR 05000346/2014002 Section 1R05 |
| Date counted | Mar 31, 2014 (2014Q1) |
| Type: | NCV: Green |
| cornerstone | Initiating Events |
| Identified by: | NRC identified |
| Inspection Procedure: | IP 71111.05 |
| Inspectors (proximate) | D Kimble J Cameron J Neurauter J Rutkowski M Marshfield M Mitchell T Briley |
| Violation of: | Technical Specification - Procedures Technical Specification |
| INPO aspect | |
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Finding - Davis Besse - IR 05000346/2014002 | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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Finding List (Davis Besse) @ 2014Q1
Self-Identified List (Davis Besse)
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