05000424/FIN-2012004-04: Difference between revisions
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{{finding | {{finding | ||
| title = Failure | | title = Failure to Assess Maintenance Activities for Risk Causes an Inadvertent Loss of a Boration Flow Path and a Unplanned Risk Change | ||
| docket = 05000424, 05000425 | | docket = 05000424, 05000425 | ||
| inspection report = IR 05000424/2012004 | | inspection report = IR 05000424/2012004 | ||
| Line 12: | Line 12: | ||
| identified by = Licensee | | identified by = Licensee | ||
| Inspection procedure = | | Inspection procedure = | ||
| Inspector = A Vargas, | | Inspector = A Vargas Mendez, F Ehrhardt, G Croon, M Cain, R Williams, T Chandler | ||
| CCA = N/A for ROP | | CCA = N/A for ROP | ||
| INPO aspect = | | INPO aspect = | ||
| description = 10 CFR 50.65(a)(4) requires the licensee to assess and manage risk that may result from proposed maintenance activities. Contrary to the above, on September 29, while performing engineered safety features actuation system (ESFAS) testing, the licensee identified that the boric acid injection tank inlet valves (1HV8803A/B) were closed which isolated a secondary boration flow path they had credited in their outage risk assessment. Without that credited boration flow path, the unit was in a Yellow risk condition, versus the Green risk condition that had been vetted and published. The licensee documented this event in their corrective action program as CR 526195. Using Checklist 4 of IMC 0609 Appendix G Attachment 1, the inspectors concluded that the violation was of very low safety significance. | | description = 10 CFR 50.65(a)(4) requires the licensee to assess and manage risk that may result from proposed maintenance activities. Contrary to the above, on September 29, while performing engineered safety features actuation system (ESFAS) testing, the licensee identified that the boric acid injection tank inlet valves (1HV8803A/B) were closed which isolated a secondary boration flow path they had credited in their outage risk assessment. Without that credited boration flow path, the unit was in a Yellow risk condition, versus the Green risk condition that had been vetted and published. The licensee documented this event in their corrective action program as CR 526195. Using Checklist 4 of IMC 0609 Appendix G Attachment 1, the inspectors concluded that the violation was of very low safety significance. | ||
}} | }} | ||
Latest revision as of 19:46, 20 February 2018
| Site: | Vogtle  |
|---|---|
| Report | IR 05000424/2012004 Section 4OA7 |
| Date counted | Sep 30, 2012 (2012Q3) |
| Type: | NCV: Green |
| cornerstone | Mitigating Systems |
| Identified by: | Licensee-identified |
| Inspection Procedure: | |
| Inspectors (proximate) | A Vargas Mendez F Ehrhardt G Croon M Cain R Williams T Chandler |
| INPO aspect | |
| ' | |