05000237/FIN-2012002-06: Difference between revisions
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| identified by = Self-Revealing | | identified by = Self-Revealing | ||
| Inspection procedure = IP 71153 | | Inspection procedure = IP 71153 | ||
| Inspector = J Beavers, J Cameron, M Jones, N Valos, R Langstaff, T Briley, T Go, Z Falevits, A Dunlop, C Phillips, D Melendez, | | Inspector = J Beavers, J Cameron, M Jones, N Valos, R Langstaff, T Briley, T Go, Z Falevits, A Dunlop, C Phillips, D Melendez Colon, E Sanchez Santiago | ||
| CCA = H.7 | | CCA = H.7 | ||
| INPO aspect = WP.3 | | INPO aspect = WP.3 | ||
| description = A finding of very low safety significance was self-revealed for the failure to have adequate maintenance instructions to install the Unit 2 Control Rod Drive (CRD) Flow Control Valve A/B Selector Valve (2-302-6B) which resulted in the separation of the plastic instrument air tubing and the Unit 2 CRD flow control valves failing closed. The licensee made temporary repairs to 2-302-6B and wrote a work request to make final repairs. The licensee also wrote work requests to inspect the Unit 3 selector switch. The licensee also wrote a procedure change request to review DOA 0300-01, Control Rod Drive System Failure, to clarify the decision to scram upon flow control valve failure. The licensee generated a corrective action to tie procurement engineering (PE) document 56060 to the new 2-302-6B model number. The licensee planned to prepare an equipment apparent cause evaluation (EACE). Additional corrective actions should result from the EACE. A finding of very low safety significance was self-revealed for the failure to have adequate maintenance instructions to install the Unit 2 Control Rod Drive (CRD) Flow Control Valve A/B Selector Valve (2-302-6B) which resulted in the separation of the plastic instrument air tubing and the Unit 2 CRD flow control valves failing closed. The licensee made temporary repairs to 2-302-6B and wrote a work request to make final repairs. The licensee also wrote work requests to inspect the Unit 3 selector switch. The licensee also wrote a procedure change request to review DOA 0300-01, Control Rod Drive System Failure, to clarify the decision to scram upon flow control valve failure. The licensee generated a corrective action to tie procurement engineering (PE) document 56060 to the new 2-302-6B model number. The licensee planned to prepare an equipment apparent cause evaluation (EACE). Additional corrective actions should result from the EACE. resulted in the failure to include instructions to install plastic piping connectors in the work order that was used to replace 2-302-6B. | | description = A finding of very low safety significance was self-revealed for the failure to have adequate maintenance instructions to install the Unit 2 Control Rod Drive (CRD) Flow Control Valve A/B Selector Valve (2-302-6B) which resulted in the separation of the plastic instrument air tubing and the Unit 2 CRD flow control valves failing closed. The licensee made temporary repairs to 2-302-6B and wrote a work request to make final repairs. The licensee also wrote work requests to inspect the Unit 3 selector switch. The licensee also wrote a procedure change request to review DOA 0300-01, Control Rod Drive System Failure, to clarify the decision to scram upon flow control valve failure. The licensee generated a corrective action to tie procurement engineering (PE) document 56060 to the new 2-302-6B model number. The licensee planned to prepare an equipment apparent cause evaluation (EACE). Additional corrective actions should result from the EACE. A finding of very low safety significance was self-revealed for the failure to have adequate maintenance instructions to install the Unit 2 Control Rod Drive (CRD) Flow Control Valve A/B Selector Valve (2-302-6B) which resulted in the separation of the plastic instrument air tubing and the Unit 2 CRD flow control valves failing closed. The licensee made temporary repairs to 2-302-6B and wrote a work request to make final repairs. The licensee also wrote work requests to inspect the Unit 3 selector switch. The licensee also wrote a procedure change request to review DOA 0300-01, Control Rod Drive System Failure, to clarify the decision to scram upon flow control valve failure. The licensee generated a corrective action to tie procurement engineering (PE) document 56060 to the new 2-302-6B model number. The licensee planned to prepare an equipment apparent cause evaluation (EACE). Additional corrective actions should result from the EACE. resulted in the failure to include instructions to install plastic piping connectors in the work order that was used to replace 2-302-6B. | ||
}} | }} | ||
Latest revision as of 19:45, 20 February 2018
| Site: | Dresden  |
|---|---|
| Report | IR 05000237/2012002 Section 4OA3 |
| Date counted | Mar 31, 2012 (2012Q1) |
| Type: | Finding: Green |
| cornerstone | Initiating Events |
| Identified by: | Self-revealing |
| Inspection Procedure: | IP 71153 |
| Inspectors (proximate) | J Beavers J Cameron M Jones N Valos R Langstaff T Briley T Go Z Falevits A Dunlop C Phillips D Melendez Colon E Sanchez Santiago |
| CCA | H.7, Documentation |
| INPO aspect | WP.3 |
| ' | |