05000293/FIN-2009005-03: Difference between revisions
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| CCA = H.7 | | CCA = H.7 | ||
| INPO aspect = WP.3 | | INPO aspect = WP.3 | ||
| description = A self-revealing, non-cited violation (NCV) of very low safety significance (Green) of Technical Specification (TS) 5.4.1, Procedures, was identified for inadequate procedural guidance which resulted in repeated lifting of the A Standby Liquid Control (SBlC) system relief valve and the subsequent failure of the A SBlC system. Specifically, the SBlC system test procedure did not provide precautions or identify methods to avoid exceeding the pressure set point of the system relief valve during testing. The issue was entered into the corrective action program and the surveillance procedure was revised to add cautions against exceeding 1300 psig and to reduce the test pressure window upper limit. In addition, if 1350 psig is exceeded, a condition report must be written to evaluate the impact on the system. Corrective actions are also planned to increase the relief valve design set point and to replace the test throttle valve with one more suited to adjusting system pressure. The performance deficiency was that Entergy did not specify adequate test controls to ensure that SBLC system relief valve set points were not challenged during test performance. This led to repeated relief valve lifts which over time contributed to the degradation of the relief valve that rendered the A SBLC train inoperable. The inspectors determined that the finding was more than minor because the finding was associated with the Procedure Quality attribute of the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone and adversely affected the cornerstone's objective to ensure the availability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences (i.e., core damage). Specifically, one train of SBLC was unavailable for several days. Using Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, Significance Determination Process, Attachment0609.04, Phase 1-lnitial Screening and Characterization of Findings, the inspectors determined that the finding is of very low safety significance because it is not a design or qualification deficiency, did not represent a loss of system safety function, did not represent an actual loss of a single train for greater than its TS allowed outage time and was not made risk significant because of external events. This finding has a crosscutting aspect in the Human Performance cross-cutting area, Resources component, because Entergy did not provide complete procedures. Specifically, the procedure did not include precautions and/or techniques to avoid exceeding the relief valve set point during testing. H.2(c | | description = A self-revealing, non-cited violation (NCV) of very low safety significance (Green) of Technical Specification (TS) 5.4.1, Procedures, was identified for inadequate procedural guidance which resulted in repeated lifting of the A Standby Liquid Control (SBlC) system relief valve and the subsequent failure of the A SBlC system. Specifically, the SBlC system test procedure did not provide precautions or identify methods to avoid exceeding the pressure set point of the system relief valve during testing. The issue was entered into the corrective action program and the surveillance procedure was revised to add cautions against exceeding 1300 psig and to reduce the test pressure window upper limit. In addition, if 1350 psig is exceeded, a condition report must be written to evaluate the impact on the system. Corrective actions are also planned to increase the relief valve design set point and to replace the test throttle valve with one more suited to adjusting system pressure. The performance deficiency was that Entergy did not specify adequate test controls to ensure that SBLC system relief valve set points were not challenged during test performance. This led to repeated relief valve lifts which over time contributed to the degradation of the relief valve that rendered the A SBLC train inoperable. The inspectors determined that the finding was more than minor because the finding was associated with the Procedure Quality attribute of the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone and adversely affected the cornerstone\'s objective to ensure the availability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences (i.e., core damage). Specifically, one train of SBLC was unavailable for several days. Using Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, Significance Determination Process, Attachment0609.04, Phase 1-lnitial Screening and Characterization of Findings, the inspectors determined that the finding is of very low safety significance because it is not a design or qualification deficiency, did not represent a loss of system safety function, did not represent an actual loss of a single train for greater than its TS allowed outage time and was not made risk significant because of external events. This finding has a crosscutting aspect in the Human Performance cross-cutting area, Resources component, because Entergy did not provide complete procedures. Specifically, the procedure did not include precautions and/or techniques to avoid exceeding the relief valve set point during testing. H.2(c | ||
}} | }} | ||
Latest revision as of 20:38, 20 February 2018
| Site: | Pilgrim |
|---|---|
| Report | IR 05000293/2009005 Section 1R22 |
| Date counted | Dec 31, 2009 (2009Q4) |
| Type: | NCV: Green |
| cornerstone | Mitigating Systems |
| Identified by: | Self-revealing |
| Inspection Procedure: | IP 71111.22 |
| Inspectors (proximate) | G Johnson D Jackson S Barr B Smith M Schneider D Everhart M Halter S Rich D Molteni |
| CCA | H.7, Documentation |
| INPO aspect | WP.3 |
| ' | |