05000528/FIN-2009002-02: Difference between revisions
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| CCA = H.14 | | CCA = H.14 | ||
| INPO aspect = DM.2 | | INPO aspect = DM.2 | ||
| description = The inspectors identified a non-cited violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings, for the failure of operations personnel to follow procedures to declare the essential spray pond inoperable. Specifically, on November 13, 2008, operations personnel failed to follow procedures to declare Unit 2 essential spray Pond A inoperable and perform a 10 CFR 50.59screening when a compensatory measure, such as acid addition, was required to restore operability of the spray pond. This resulted in the performance of a calculation and an evaporative test to verify operability of essential spray Pond A for the mission time without taking credit for compensatory measures. This issue was entered into the licensee's corrective action program as Palo Verde Action Request 3258988. The finding is more than minor because it is associated with the equipment performance attribute of the mitigating systems cornerstone and affects the cornerstone objective of ensuring the reliability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. Using Manual Chapter 0609.04, Phase 1 Initial Screening and Characterization of Findings, the finding was determined to have a very low safety significance because the finding did not result in a loss of system safety function, an actual loss of safety function of a single train for greater than its technical specification allowed outage time, or screen as potentially risk significant due to a seismic, flooding, or severe weather initiating event. This finding has a crosscutting aspect in the area of human performance associated with decision-making because safety-significant decisions were not verified to validate underlying assumptions and identify unintended consequences | | description = The inspectors identified a non-cited violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings, for the failure of operations personnel to follow procedures to declare the essential spray pond inoperable. Specifically, on November 13, 2008, operations personnel failed to follow procedures to declare Unit 2 essential spray Pond A inoperable and perform a 10 CFR 50.59screening when a compensatory measure, such as acid addition, was required to restore operability of the spray pond. This resulted in the performance of a calculation and an evaporative test to verify operability of essential spray Pond A for the mission time without taking credit for compensatory measures. This issue was entered into the licensee\'s corrective action program as Palo Verde Action Request 3258988. The finding is more than minor because it is associated with the equipment performance attribute of the mitigating systems cornerstone and affects the cornerstone objective of ensuring the reliability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. Using Manual Chapter 0609.04, Phase 1 Initial Screening and Characterization of Findings, the finding was determined to have a very low safety significance because the finding did not result in a loss of system safety function, an actual loss of safety function of a single train for greater than its technical specification allowed outage time, or screen as potentially risk significant due to a seismic, flooding, or severe weather initiating event. This finding has a crosscutting aspect in the area of human performance associated with decision-making because safety-significant decisions were not verified to validate underlying assumptions and identify unintended consequences | ||
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Latest revision as of 20:37, 20 February 2018
Site: | Palo Verde |
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Report | IR 05000528/2009002 Section 1R15 |
Date counted | Mar 31, 2009 (2009Q1) |
Type: | NCV: Green |
cornerstone | Mitigating Systems |
Identified by: | NRC identified |
Inspection Procedure: | IP 71111.15 |
Inspectors (proximate) | G Guerra R Treadway P Elkmann J Melfi M Hay J Bashore E Uribe M Catts |
CCA | H.14, Conservative Bias |
INPO aspect | DM.2 |
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