05000220/FIN-2008003-01: Difference between revisions
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| CCA = H.12 | | CCA = H.12 | ||
| INPO aspect = QA.4 | | INPO aspect = QA.4 | ||
| description = A self-revealing non-cited violation (NCV) of Technical Specification (TS) 6.1, "Responsibility," was identified on April 26, 2008, when the Unit 1 shift manager (SM) left the control room without designating another senior reactor operator (SRO) qualified individual to assume the control room command function. When the condition was identified, the SM promptly returned to the control room. The finding was greater than minor because it could reasonably be viewed as a precursor to a significant event. Specifically, the absence of SRO oversight during licensed control room activities increases the likelihood of human performance errors, which in turn, increases the likelihood of an initiating event and reduces the effectiveness of event mitigation. The finding has been reviewed by NRC management in accordance with IMC 0609, Appendix M, "Significance Determination Process Using Qualitative Criteria," and was determined to be of very low safety significance because of the short period that the SM was not present in the control room, and because no initiating events occurred during that time. The finding had a cross-cutting aspect in the area of human performance because of the ineffective use of human error prevention techniques (H.4.a per IMC 0305). (Section 1R13 | | description = A self-revealing non-cited violation (NCV) of Technical Specification (TS) 6.1, \"Responsibility,\" was identified on April 26, 2008, when the Unit 1 shift manager (SM) left the control room without designating another senior reactor operator (SRO) qualified individual to assume the control room command function. When the condition was identified, the SM promptly returned to the control room. The finding was greater than minor because it could reasonably be viewed as a precursor to a significant event. Specifically, the absence of SRO oversight during licensed control room activities increases the likelihood of human performance errors, which in turn, increases the likelihood of an initiating event and reduces the effectiveness of event mitigation. The finding has been reviewed by NRC management in accordance with IMC 0609, Appendix M, \"Significance Determination Process Using Qualitative Criteria,\" and was determined to be of very low safety significance because of the short period that the SM was not present in the control room, and because no initiating events occurred during that time. The finding had a cross-cutting aspect in the area of human performance because of the ineffective use of human error prevention techniques (H.4.a per IMC 0305). (Section 1R13 | ||
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Latest revision as of 20:34, 20 February 2018
Site: | Nine Mile Point ![]() |
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Report | IR 05000220/2008003 Section 1R13 |
Date counted | Jun 30, 2008 (2008Q2) |
Type: | NCV: Green |
cornerstone | Mitigating Systems |
Identified by: | Self-revealing |
Inspection Procedure: | IP 71111.13 |
Inspectors (proximate) | D Dempsey J Furia A Rosebrook E Knutson R Cureton B Bickett |
CCA | H.12, Avoid Complacency |
INPO aspect | QA.4 |
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