05000263/FIN-2007002-04: Difference between revisions
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{{finding | {{finding | ||
| title = Operator Performance During Division Ii | | title = Operator Performance During Division Ii RHR Logic Testing | ||
| docket = 05000263 | | docket = 05000263 | ||
| inspection report = IR 05000263/2007002 | | inspection report = IR 05000263/2007002 | ||
| Line 12: | Line 12: | ||
| identified by = NRC | | identified by = NRC | ||
| Inspection procedure = IP 71153 | | Inspection procedure = IP 71153 | ||
| Inspector = M Holmberg, N Shah, J Jandovitz, S Sheldon, S Thomas, L Haeg, T Goj, | | Inspector = M Holmberg, N Shah, J Jandovitz, S Sheldon, S Thomas, L Haeg, T Goj, Cassidys Sheldon, T Bilik, S Thomas, J Neurauter, L Haeg, T Go | ||
| CCA = N/A for ROP | | CCA = N/A for ROP | ||
| INPO aspect = | | INPO aspect = | ||
| description = The inspectors identified an unresolved item (URI) associated with the operators performance and troubleshooting activities associated with the conduct of OSP-RHR-0545-02, RHR Containment Spray/Cooling Logic Test - Division II, on February 7, 2007. The inspectors identified that the surveillance test, FP-COO-OP-01, Conduct of Operations,, and management expectations were not adhered to by several licensed operators subsequent to the identification of the misplaced jumpers. During the performance of OSP-RHR-0545-02, the control room supervisor (CRS, a senior-licensed operator), and a licensed balance-of-plant (BOP) operator, were assigned to install test jumpers across various terminals in the cable spreading room to simulate different plant conditions for logic testing. Prior to performing the test, both individuals performed a walkdown of the cable spreading room where the majority of the duties within the test were to take place. After declaring the Division II RHR system inoperable, the testing commenced. During Step 38 of the procedure, a test jumper wire was incorrectly landed in panel C-33 by the operators. The purpose of this jumper was to simulate high drywell pressure on the D RPS logic channel. The operators, not knowing that the jumper was incorrectly landed, proceeded to Step 39, which included a note stating that the jumper installation in Step 39 was to be installed in panel C-32 (a different panel), and that installation of the jumper would result in receipt of a control room annunciator. The BOP operator did not acknowledge the need to change panels, nor did the CRS verify this requirement. The BOP operator proceeded to land the jumper across similarly-labeled terminals in the wrong panel, C-33. The CRS contacted the control room to verify receipt of the annunciator noted in the procedure; however, the lead control room reactor operator (RO) replied that an annunciator was not received. At this time, the CRS and BOP operator left the cable spreading room to review RHR logic prints. During this review, they discovered that the jumper, installed in Step 39, had been installed in the wrong electrical panel. The CRS then independently determined that the misplaced jumper had no immediate adverse configuration implication and both individuals returned to the cable spreading room. The BOP operator, as instructed by the CRS, removed the jumper from panel C-33, and installed it in the correct location in panel C-32. The control room was again contacted to determine whether the noted annunciator was received; it was, and the surveillance test was continued. Later in the test procedure, during Step 50, a control room operator attempted to open valve MO-2011 per the procedure and it did not respond. At this point, the surveillance test was discontinued and the CRS and BOP operator reported to the control room. Shortly thereafter, senior management was notified of the issues and circumstances surrounding the testing and troubleshooting efforts began. The licensee initiated a human performance investigation and removed the involved licensed individuals from duty. The licensee also entered the issue into the corrective action program as CAPs 01075924 and 01075923 and an apparent cause evaluation was conducted. At the conclusion of the inspection period, the NRC was continuing evaluation and review of the issues surrounding the operators performance. Therefore, this issue will be considered an URI pending further NRC review (URI 05000263/2007002-04). | | description = The inspectors identified an unresolved item (URI) associated with the operators performance and troubleshooting activities associated with the conduct of OSP-RHR-0545-02, RHR Containment Spray/Cooling Logic Test - Division II, on February 7, 2007. The inspectors identified that the surveillance test, FP-COO-OP-01, Conduct of Operations,, and management expectations were not adhered to by several licensed operators subsequent to the identification of the misplaced jumpers. During the performance of OSP-RHR-0545-02, the control room supervisor (CRS, a senior-licensed operator), and a licensed balance-of-plant (BOP) operator, were assigned to install test jumpers across various terminals in the cable spreading room to simulate different plant conditions for logic testing. Prior to performing the test, both individuals performed a walkdown of the cable spreading room where the majority of the duties within the test were to take place. After declaring the Division II RHR system inoperable, the testing commenced. During Step 38 of the procedure, a test jumper wire was incorrectly landed in panel C-33 by the operators. The purpose of this jumper was to simulate high drywell pressure on the D RPS logic channel. The operators, not knowing that the jumper was incorrectly landed, proceeded to Step 39, which included a note stating that the jumper installation in Step 39 was to be installed in panel C-32 (a different panel), and that installation of the jumper would result in receipt of a control room annunciator. The BOP operator did not acknowledge the need to change panels, nor did the CRS verify this requirement. The BOP operator proceeded to land the jumper across similarly-labeled terminals in the wrong panel, C-33. The CRS contacted the control room to verify receipt of the annunciator noted in the procedure; however, the lead control room reactor operator (RO) replied that an annunciator was not received. At this time, the CRS and BOP operator left the cable spreading room to review RHR logic prints. During this review, they discovered that the jumper, installed in Step 39, had been installed in the wrong electrical panel. The CRS then independently determined that the misplaced jumper had no immediate adverse configuration implication and both individuals returned to the cable spreading room. The BOP operator, as instructed by the CRS, removed the jumper from panel C-33, and installed it in the correct location in panel C-32. The control room was again contacted to determine whether the noted annunciator was received; it was, and the surveillance test was continued. Later in the test procedure, during Step 50, a control room operator attempted to open valve MO-2011 per the procedure and it did not respond. At this point, the surveillance test was discontinued and the CRS and BOP operator reported to the control room. Shortly thereafter, senior management was notified of the issues and circumstances surrounding the testing and troubleshooting efforts began. The licensee initiated a human performance investigation and removed the involved licensed individuals from duty. The licensee also entered the issue into the corrective action program as CAPs 01075924 and 01075923 and an apparent cause evaluation was conducted. At the conclusion of the inspection period, the NRC was continuing evaluation and review of the issues surrounding the operators performance. Therefore, this issue will be considered an URI pending further NRC review (URI 05000263/2007002-04). | ||
}} | }} | ||
Latest revision as of 20:32, 20 February 2018
| Site: | Monticello  |
|---|---|
| Report | IR 05000263/2007002 Section 4OA3 |
| Date counted | Mar 31, 2007 (2007Q1) |
| Type: | URI: |
| cornerstone | Other |
| Identified by: | NRC identified |
| Inspection Procedure: | IP 71153 |
| Inspectors (proximate) | M Holmberg N Shah J Jandovitz S Sheldon S Thomas L Haeg T Goj Cassidys Sheldon T Bilik S Thomas J Neurauter L Haeg T Go |
| INPO aspect | |
| ' | |