05000440/FIN-2005006-08: Difference between revisions

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{{finding
{{finding
| title = Unreported SAFETY-STREAM Unavailability for RHR
| title = Unreported Safety-Stream Unavailability for RHR
| docket = 05000440
| docket = 05000440
| inspection report = IR 05000440/2005006
| inspection report = IR 05000440/2005006
Line 12: Line 12:
| identified by = NRC
| identified by = NRC
| Inspection procedure =  
| Inspection procedure =  
| Inspector = G Roach, C Acosta, J Rutkowski, M Franke, R Powell, C Lipa
| Inspector = G Roachc Acosta, J Rutkowski, M Franke, R Powell, C Lipa,
| CCA = N/A for ROP
| CCA = N/A for ROP
| INPO aspect =  
| INPO aspect =  
| description = Severity Level IV. The inspectors identified a Severity Level IV Non-Cited Violation associated with the failure to report residual heat removal (RHR) train 'B' unavailability from May 29, 2004, through June 3, 2004, while the emergency service water train B was inoperable for pump repairs. The second quarter 2004 data reported to the NRC included RHR 'A' unavailability following failure of the ESW 'A' pump on May 21, 2004, but did not include the subsequent RHR 'B' unavailability. Prior to removing the ESW 'B' pump from service, the licensee developed a reactor pressure vessel feed and bleed method which they subsequently credited as an alternate decay heat removal system when calculating RHR system unavailability. The inspectors, however, reviewed the definitions and guidance contained in Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) 99-02, Regulatory Assessment Indicator Guideline, Rev. 2, and could not conclude that the licensees method met the NRC approved method of decay heat removal. Due to the inspectors' concerns, the licensee submitted a Frequently Asked Question. On May 19, 2005, the NRC determined that NRC approval means a specific method or methods described in the technical specifications. As a result, the licensee recalculated and resubmitted RHR system unavailability on June 17, 2005. Had the performance indicator (PI) data been properly reported in the second quarter of 2004, the PI color would have been White. The failure to properly report the PI was considered a Severity Level IV Non- Cited Violation of 10 CFR 50.9.
| description = Severity Level IV. The inspectors identified a Severity Level IV Non-Cited Violation associated with the failure to report residual heat removal (RHR) train 'B' unavailability from May 29, 2004, through June 3, 2004, while the emergency service water train B was inoperable for pump repairs. The second quarter 2004 data reported to the NRC included RHR 'A' unavailability following failure of the ESW 'A' pump on May 21, 2004, but did not include the subsequent RHR 'B' unavailability. Prior to removing the ESW 'B' pump from service, the licensee developed a reactor pressure vessel feed and bleed method which they subsequently credited as an alternate decay heat removal system when calculating RHR system unavailability. The inspectors, however, reviewed the definitions and guidance contained in Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) 99-02, Regulatory Assessment Indicator Guideline, Rev. 2, and could not conclude that the licensees method met the NRC approved method of decay heat removal. Due to the inspectors' concerns, the licensee submitted a Frequently Asked Question. On May 19, 2005, the NRC determined that NRC approval means a specific method or methods described in the technical specifications. As a result, the licensee recalculated and resubmitted RHR system unavailability on June 17, 2005. Had the performance indicator (PI) data been properly reported in the second quarter of 2004, the PI color would have been White. The failure to properly report the PI was considered a Severity Level IV Non- Cited Violation of 10 CFR 50.9.
}}
}}

Revision as of 20:22, 20 February 2018

08
Site: Perry FirstEnergy icon.png
Report IR 05000440/2005006 Section 4OA5
Date counted Jun 30, 2005 (2005Q2)
Type: TEV: Severity level IV
cornerstone Mitigating Systems
Identified by: NRC identified
Inspection Procedure:
Inspectors (proximate) G Roachc Acosta
J Rutkowski
M Franke
R Powell
C Lipa
INPO aspect
'