ENS 54560: Difference between revisions

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| NRC officer = Jeffrey Whited
| NRC officer = Jeffrey Whited
| event date = 03/03/2020 20:50 MST
| event date = 03/03/2020 20:50 MST
| last update date = 03/04/2020
| last update date = 05/04/2020
| title = Reactor Trip Due to Low Steam Generator Level
| title = En Revision Imported Date  5/5/2020
| event text = At 2050 MST on March 3, 2020, Unit 2 reactor automatically tripped on Low Steam Generator (SG) Number 1 level signal from the Reactor Protection System. The low SG level occurred as the result of a trip of both Main Feedwater Pumps, which tripped during restoration of power to the Main Feedwater Pump Lube oil control panel. Auxiliary Feedwater (AFAS-1 and AFAS-2) actuated due to low SG levels in both SG post reactor trip as designed. This event is being reported as a reactor protection system and a specified system actuation in accordance with the reporting criteria of 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) and 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A).
| event text = EN Revision Text: REACTOR TRIP DUE TO LOW STEAM GENERATOR LEVEL
Following the reactor trip, all [control element assemblies] CEAs inserted fully into the core. All systems operated as expected. No emergency plan classification was required per the Emergency Plan. Safety related busses remained powered during the event from offsite power and the offsite power grid is stable. Unit 2 is stable and in Mode 3. Steam Generators are being fed via the class 1 E powered motor driven auxiliary feedwater pump.
At 2050 MST on March 3, 2020, Unit 2 reactor automatically tripped on Low Steam Generator (SG) Number 1 level signal from the Reactor Protection System. The low SG level occurred as the result of a trip of both Main Feedwater Pumps, which tripped during restoration of power to the Main Feedwater Pump Lube oil control panel. Auxiliary Feedwater (AFAS-1 and AFAS-2) actuated due to low SG levels in both SG post reactor trip as designed. This event is being reported as a reactor protection system and a specified system actuation in accordance with the reporting criteria of 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) and 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A).
Following the reactor trip, all [control element assemblies] CEAs inserted fully into the core. All systems operated as expected. No emergency plan classification was required per the Emergency Plan. Safety related busses remained powered during the event from offsite power and the offsite power grid is stable. Unit 2 is stable and in Mode 3. Steam Generators are being fed via the class 1E powered motor driven auxiliary feedwater pump.
The NRC Senior Resident Inspector has been informed.
The NRC Senior Resident Inspector has been informed.
Units 1 and 3 were unaffected by the trip and remain at 100 percent power.
Units 1 and 3 were unaffected by the trip and remain at 100 percent power.
| URL = https://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/event-status/event/2020/20200305en.html#en54560
* * * UPDATE FROM ALLAN BRIEFE TO DONALD NORWOOD AT 1231 EDT ON 5/4/2020 * * *
The event reported on March 4, 2020 (EN 54560) also included actuations of the Emergency Diesel Generators in response to the AFAS-1 and AFAS-2 actuations. The Class 4.16kV buses remained energized from off-site power.
The NRC Senior Resident Inspector has been informed.
Notified R4DO (Drake).
| URL = https://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/event-status/event/2020/20200505en.html#en54560
}}{{unit info
}}{{unit info
| Unit =  2  
| Unit =  2  

Revision as of 07:30, 5 May 2020

ENS 54560 +/-
Where
Palo Verde Arizona Public Service icon.png
Arizona (NRC Region 4)
Reporting
10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B), RPS Actuation

10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A), System Actuation
Time - Person (Reporting Time:+-1.72 h-0.0717 days <br />-0.0102 weeks <br />-0.00236 months <br />)
Opened: Anton Pestka
02:07 Mar 4, 2020
NRC Officer: Jeffrey Whited
Last Updated: May 4, 2020
54560 - NRC Website
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