L-MT-12-095, Emergency Preparedness (EP) Communications Assessment Requested by NRC Letter, Request for Information Pursuant to Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations 50.54(f) Regarding Recommendations 2.1, 2.3, and 9.3, of the Near-Term Task Fo: Difference between revisions

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{{#Wiki_filter:October 29, 2012 Monticello Nuclear Generating Plant 2807 W County Road 75 Monticello, MN 55362 L-MT-12-095 10 CFR 50.54(f) U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ATTN: Document Control Desk Washington, DC 20555-0001 Monticello Nuclear Generating Plant Docket No.
{{#Wiki_filter:Monticello Nuclear Generating Plant 2807 W County Road 75 Monticello, MN 55362 October 29, 2012                                                            L-MT-12-095 10 CFR 50.54(f)
50-263 Renewed Facility Operating License No. DPR-22 Emergency Preparedness (EP) Communications Assessment Requested bv NRC Letter, Request for lnformation Pursuant to Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations 50.54(f) Regarding Recommendations 2.1, 2.3, and 9.3, of the Near-Term Task Force Review of Insights from the Fukushima Dai-ichi Accident, dated March 12, 201 2
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ATTN: Document Control Desk Washington, DC 20555-0001 Monticello Nuclear Generating Plant Docket No. 50-263 Renewed Facility Operating License No. DPR-22 Emergency Preparedness (EP) Communications Assessment Requested bv NRC Letter, Request for lnformation Pursuant to Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations 50.54(f) Regarding Recommendations 2.1, 2.3, and 9.3, of the Near-Term Task Force Review of Insights from the Fukushima Dai-ichi Accident, dated March 12, 2012


==References:==
==References:==
: 1. NRC letter, "Request for lnformation Pursuant to Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations 50.54(f) Regarding Recommendations 2.1, 2.3, and 9.3, of the Near-Term Task Force Review of lnsights from the Fukushima Dai-ichi Accident," dated March 12, 2012, ADAMS Accession No.
: 1. NRC letter, "Request for lnformation Pursuant to Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations 50.54(f) Regarding Recommendations 2.1, 2.3, and 9.3, of the Near-Term Task Force Review of lnsights from the Fukushima Dai-ichi Accident," dated March 12, 2012, ADAMS Accession No. M L I2056A046.
MLI 2056A046.
: 2. NSPM letter, T.J. O'Connor to NRC Document Control Desk, "60-Day Response to NRC Letter, Request for lnformation Pursuant to Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations 50.54(0 Regarding Recommendations 2.7, 2.3, and 9.3, of the Near-Term Task Force Review of lnsights from the Fukushima Dai-ichi Accident, dated March 12,2012," dated May 11, 2012, ADAMS Accession No.
: 2. NSPM letter, T.J. O'Connor to NRC Document Control Desk, "60- Day Response to NRC Letter, Request for lnformation Pursuant to Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations 50.54(0 Regarding Recommendations 2.7, 2.3, and 9.3, of the Near-Term Task Force Review of lnsights from the Fukushima Dai-ichi Accident, dated March 12,2012," dated May 11, 2012, ADAMS Accession No.
ML12135A396.
ML12135A396. 3. NSPM letter, T.J. O'Connor to NRC Document Control Desk, "Emergency Preparedness lnformation Requested by NRC Letter, Request for lnformation Pursuant to Title 70 of the Code of Federal Regulations 50.54(f) Regarding Recommendations 2.7, 2.3, and 9.3, of the Near-Term Task Force Review of Insights from the Fukushima Dai-ichi Accident, dated March 12, 2012," dated June 11,2012, ADAMS Accession No. ML12164A435. This letter provides the EP Communications Assessment for the Monticello Nuclear Generating Plant (MNGP), as requested by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission Document Control Desk L-MT-I 2-095 Page 2 (NRC) in Recommendation 9.3 of Reference
: 3. NSPM letter, T.J. O'Connor to NRC Document Control Desk, "Emergency Preparedness lnformation Requested by NRC Letter, Request for lnformation Pursuant to Title 70 of the Code of Federal Regulations 50.54(f) Regarding Recommendations 2.7, 2.3, and 9.3, of the Near-Term Task Force Review of Insights from the Fukushima Dai-ichi Accident, dated March 12, 2012," dated June 11,2012, ADAMS Accession No.
: 1. Northern States Power Company, a Minnesota Corporation (NSPM), doing business as Xcel Energy, committed to provide this assessment and a schedule for implementation of the results of the communications assessment by October 31, 2012 (Reference 2).
ML12164A435.
This letter and its enclosure provide the requested information and are submitted in accordance with 10 CFR 50.54(f). The MNGP EP Communications Assessment identified essential communications capabilities to be maintained following a beyond design basis natural disaster impacting the plant and causing an extended loss of offsite power, considering the assumptions of NEI 10-05, "Assessment of On-Shift Emergency Response Organization Staffing and Capabilities." As an aspect of its overall and ongoing Fukushima response initiatives, NSPM will determine the means to ensure required communications functions will be maintained. Options to enhance the communications capabilities and to meet the functional communications requirements post-event are being identified. Currently, the primary option being considered and evaluated is the use of stand-alone and plant infrastructure-integrated satellite phones.
This letter provides the EP Communications Assessment for the Monticello Nuclear Generating Plant (MNGP), as requested by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission
It is assumed that satellite phone communication will be an integral aspect of maintaining critical communications functions with the Offsite Response Organizations for the 10-mile Emergency Planning Zone (EPZ) and the NRC under the assumptions of NEI 10-05. Backup power supplies for the satellite phones are described in NSPM letter dated June 11, 2012 (Reference 3). Internal communications within the plant (i.e., Emergency Response Facility to Emergency Response Facility) are planned to be assured through the implementation of actions (both communications and power supply) that will maintain a reliable internal phone network. Key offsite response organizations in the impacted area have been or will be provided satellite phone capability. The following is a summary of actions under development to enhance EP communications:  
 
/ 1 1 4.1 .I Communications from I Communications will be maintained post event 1 Function Roll-up Table - NEI 12-01 Communications Capabilities the Control Room, TSC and EOF with Offsite Response Facilities Action through the use of satellite phone technologies until normal systems are restored.
Document Control Desk L-MT-I2-095 Page 2 (NRC) in Recommendation 9.3 of Reference 1. Northern States Power Company, a Minnesota Corporation (NSPM), doing business as Xcel Energy, committed to provide this assessment and a schedule for implementation of the results of the communications assessment by October 31, 2012 (Reference 2). This letter and its enclosure provide the requested information and are submitted in accordance with 10 CFR 50.54(f).
2 Communications with the NRC via the ENS line will be supported by a satellite communications phone (in addition to the phone used for EPZ 4.1.2 NRC Communications with the Control Room OROs) within the Control Room.
The MNGP EP Communications Assessment identified essential communications capabilities to be maintained following a beyond design basis natural disaster impacting the plant and causing an extended loss of offsite power, considering the assumptions of NEI 10-05, "Assessment of On-Shift Emergency Response Organization Staffing and Capabilities." As an aspect of its overall and ongoing Fukushima response initiatives, NSPM will determine the means to ensure required communications functions will be maintained. Options to enhance the communications capabilities and to meet the functional communications requirements post-event are being identified.
Document Control Desk L-MT-12-095 Page 3 EP communications enhancements will be coordinated with the development of the FLEX strategies four months prior to the beginning of MNGP R27 refueling outage or December 31, 201 6, whichever comes first. Until the enhancements to EP communications at MNGP can be completed, interim corrective actions are being taken as described in Reference
Currently, the primary option being considered and evaluated is the use of stand-alone and plant infrastructure-integrated satellite phones. It is assumed that satellite phone communication will be an integral aspect of maintaining critical communications functions with the Offsite Response Organizations for the 10-mile Emergency Planning Zone (EPZ) and the NRC under the assumptions of NEI 10-05. Backup power supplies for the satellite phones are described in NSPM letter dated June 11, 2012 (Reference 3). Internal communications within the plant (i.e., Emergency Response Facility to Emergency Response Facility) are planned to be assured through the implementation of actions (both communications and power supply) that will maintain a reliable internal phone network. Key offsite response organizations in the impacted area have been or will be provided satellite phone capability.
: 3. Action Communications with the NRC via the ENS line will be supported by a satellite communications phone (in addition to the phone used for EPZ OROs) within the Technical Support Center.
The following is a summary of actions under development to enhance EP communications:
Communications between the site and the NRC will be supported by satellite communications capabilities in both the TSC and near site EOF. Communications between site ERFs will be maintained post event through the enhanced reliability of the site PBX system. The Key Site functions with offsite officials (Management links, Radiological support, etc) will be maintained through the use of satellite phone capabilities in the site ERFs. Environmental Field Monitoring Teams will be provided with satellite phone capabilities to backup the normal radio links. Team direction from the EOF will similarly be supported by satellite capabilities.
Function                                Action Roll-up Table - NEI 12-01 Communications Capabilities
3 4 5 6 7 If there are any questions or if additional information is needed, please contact Ms. Jennie Eckholt, Licensing Engineer, at 61 2-330-5788.
    /  1  1 4.1.ICommunications from I Communications will be maintained post event 1 the Control Room, TSC and     through the use of satellite phone technologies EOF with Offsite Response    until normal systems are restored.
Function Roll-up Table - NEI 12-01 Communications Capabilities 4.1.2 NRC Communications with the Technical Support Center 4.1.2 NRC Communications via the HPN Network 4.1.3 Emergency Response Facility Communications (Site ERFs) 4.1.3 ERF Communications with Offsite Response Organizations 4.1.4 Field Team Communications Summary of Commitments Submittal of the enclosed information completes a commitment in Enclosure 1 of Reference 2. This letter makes the following new commitment: NSPM will implement recommendations from the Emergency Preparedness Communications Assessment in coordination with development of FLEX mitigating strategies four months prior to the beginning of the MNGP R27 refueling outage or December 31, 2016, whichever comes first.
Facilities 2     4.1.2 NRC Communications      Communications with the NRC via the ENS line with the Control Room        will be supported by a satellite communications phone (in addition to the phone used for EPZ OROs) within the Control Room.
Document Control Desk L-MT-12-095 Page 4 I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct. Executed on October 29, 2012
 
' Plant Manager, Monticello Nuclear Generating Plant Northern States Power Company - Minnesota Enclosure cc: Administrator, Region Ill, USNRC Director of Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR), USNRC NRR Project Manager, MNGP, USNRC Senior Resident Inspector, MNGP, USNRC ENCLOSURE Communications Assessment Monticello Nuclear Generating Plant 19 Pages, Follow Communications Assessment Monticello Nuclear Generating Plant Revision 0: September 28, 201 2 Revision 1 : October 17, 201 2 Revision 2: October 23, 2012 Page 1 of 19 Revision 2 Communications Assessment for Monticello Nuclear Generating Plant Index Purpose References Background Planned Actions Schedule ATTACHMENT 1: Communication Equipment - Location and Current Configuration 7 ATTACHMENT 2: Communication Equipment - Power Sources 12 ATTACHMENT 3: Communication Equipment - Summary and Improvements 16 Page 2 of 19 Revision 2 Communications Assessment for Monticello Nuclear Generating Plant Purpose In response to the NRC Near-Term task force recommendations a Request for lnformation pursuant to Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations was issued. Included in that request was information pertaining to communications capabilities following a beyond design basis event. Northern States Power Company - Minnesota (NSPM) responded to this request for information in a letter dated May 1 I, 2012 with a plan to respond to the various components of the request. This assessment provides the response to the following commitments.
Document Control Desk L-MT-12-095 Page 3 Function                                    Action Roll-up Table - NEI 12-01 Communications Capabilities 3  4.1.2 NRC Communications      Communications with the NRC via the ENS line with the Technical Support    will be supported by a satellite communications Center                        phone (in addition to the phone used for EPZ OROs) within the Technical Support Center.
By October 31, 2012: Provide an assessment of the current communications systems and equipment used during an emergency event to identify any enhancements that may be needed to ensure communications are maintained during a large scale natural event meeting the conditions described for Recommendation 9.3. Provide an implementation schedule of the time needed to implement the results of the communications assessment. This report documents the communications assessment required to be performed as a result of the March 2012 USNRC Request for lnformation pertaining to insights from the Fukushima Dai-ichi nuclear event. Attachments I and 2 provide the details on the current communications capabilities. Attachment 3 and the body of this assessment discuss enhancements and proposed schedules.
4  4.1.2 NRC Communications      Communications between the site and the NRC via the HPN Network            will be supported by satellite communications capabilities in both the TSC and near site EOF.
References 1. NRC Letter, "Request for lnformation Pursuant to Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations 50.54(f) Regarding Recommendations 2.1, 2.3, and 9.3, of the Near-Term Task Force Review of lnsights from the Fukushima Dai-ichi Accident dated March 12, 2012, ADAMs Accession No.
5  4.1.3 Emergency Response      Communications between site ERFs will be Facility Communications (Site  maintained post event through the enhanced ERFs)                          reliability of the site PBX system.
ML12056A046 2. Monticello Nuclear Generating Plant (MNGP) letter dated May 11, 2012 (L-MT-12-044), 60-Day Response to NRC Letter, Request for lnformation Pursuant to Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations 50.54(f) regarding Recommendations
6  4.1.3 ERF Communications      The Key Site functions with offsite officials with Offsite Response          (Management links, Radiological support, etc)
: 2. 1, 2.3, and 9.3, of the Near-Term Task Force Review of Insights from the Fukushima Dai-ichi Accident, dated March 12,2012 3. Nuclear Energy Institute, Guideline for Assessing Beyond Design Basis Accident Response Staffing and Communications Capabilities (NEI 12-01)
Organizations                  will be maintained through the use of satellite phone capabilities in the site ERFs.
: 4. MNGP letter dated June I I, 2012 (L-MT-12-057), Emergency Preparedness lnformation Requested by NRC Letter, Request for lnformation Pursuant to Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations 50.54(f) regarding Recommendations
7  4.1.4 Field Team              Environmental Field Monitoring Teams will be Communications                provided with satellite phone capabilities to backup the normal radio links. Team direction from the EOF will similarly be supported by satellite capabilities.
: 2. 1, 2.3, and 9.3, of the Near- Term Task Force Review of lnsights from the Fukushima Dai-ichi Accident, dated March 12,2012 Backaround Pursuant to the USNRC Request for lnformation
EP communications enhancements will be coordinated with the development of the FLEX strategies four months prior to the beginning of MNGP R27 refueling outage or December 31, 2016, whichever comes first.
(~eference
Until the enhancements to EP communications at MNGP can be completed, interim corrective actions are being taken as described in Reference 3.
: 1) Northern States Power Company - Minnesota (NSPM) committed in Reference 2 to perform an assessment of communications capabilities using the methodology outlined in NEI 12-01 (Reference 3). Page 3 of 19 Revision 2 Communications Assessment for Monticello Nuclear Generating Plant The assessment involved reviewing pertinent documents, such as the Emergency Plan, associated Emergency Plan Implementing Procedures, the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report, and responses to INPO IER L1-11-4 (Near-Term Actions to Address the Effects of an Extended Loss of All Power in Response to the Fukushima Dai-ichi Event). The NRC information request indicates that the communications assessment must assume a total loss of all AC power with severe impact on the infrastructure within a 25 mile radius of the site. The current communications systems were designed and installed to assure reliability of communications, both on-site and off-site, during normal and emergency conditions, The potential on-site issues are related to the required assumption that all AC power is lost. Off-site impact assumptions outlined in NEI 12-01 assumed failure of key infrastructure (e.g. phone lines, radio towers) out to a radius of 25 miles. The assumed off-site issues stem from the assumption that public infrastructure, including public telephone networks, microwave towers, and cellular phone towers/networks are unavailable. Observations and recommendations for technology solutions to various challenges were discussed as the project progressed.
If there are any questions or if additional information is needed, please contact Ms.
Jennie Eckholt, Licensing Engineer, at 612-330-5788.
Summary of Commitments Submittal of the enclosed information completes a commitment in Enclosure 1 of Reference 2. This letter makes the following new commitment:
NSPM will implement recommendations from the Emergency Preparedness Communications Assessment in coordination with development of FLEX mitigating strategies four months prior to the beginning of the MNGP R27 refueling outage or December 31, 2016, whichever comes first.
 
Document Control Desk L-MT-12-095 Page 4 I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct.
Executed on October 29, 2012
'
Plant Manager, Monticello Nuclear Generating Plant Northern States Power Company - Minnesota Enclosure cc:    Administrator, Region Ill, USNRC Director of Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR), USNRC NRR Project Manager, MNGP, USNRC Senior Resident Inspector, MNGP, USNRC
 
ENCLOSURE Communications Assessment Monticello Nuclear Generating Plant 19 Pages, Follow
 
Communications Assessment Monticello Nuclear Generating Plant Revision 0: September 28, 2012 Revision 1: October 17, 2012 Revision 2: October 23, 2012 Page 1of 19       Revision 2
 
Communications Assessment for Monticello Nuclear Generating Plant Index Purpose References
 
===Background===
Planned Actions Schedule ATTACHMENT 1: Communication Equipment - Location and Current Configuration       7 ATTACHMENT 2: Communication Equipment - Power Sources                           12 ATTACHMENT 3: Communication Equipment - Summary and Improvements                 16 Page 2 of 19                             Revision 2
 
Communications Assessment for Monticello Nuclear Generating Plant Purpose In response to the NRC Near-Term task force recommendations a Request for lnformation pursuant to Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations was issued.
Included in that request was information pertaining to communications capabilities following a beyond design basis event. Northern States Power Company - Minnesota (NSPM) responded to this request for information in a letter dated May 1I , 2012 with a plan to respond to the various components of the request. This assessment provides the response to the following commitments. By October 31, 2012:
Provide an assessment of the current communications systems and equipment used during an emergency event to identify any enhancements that may be needed to ensure communications are maintained during a large scale natural event meeting the conditions described for Recommendation 9.3.
Provide an implementation schedule of the time needed to implement the results of the communications assessment.
This report documents the communications assessment required to be performed as a result of the March 2012 USNRC Request for lnformation pertaining to insights from the Fukushima Dai-ichi nuclear event. Attachments Iand 2 provide the details on the current communications capabilities. Attachment 3 and the body of this assessment discuss enhancements and proposed schedules.
References
: 1. NRC Letter, "Request for lnformation Pursuant to Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations 50.54(f) Regarding Recommendations 2.1, 2.3, and 9.3, of the Near-Term Task Force Review of lnsights from the Fukushima Dai-ichi Accident dated March 12, 2012, ADAMs Accession No. ML12056A046
: 2. Monticello Nuclear Generating Plant (MNGP) letter dated May 11, 2012 (L-MT-12-044),
60-Day Response to NRC Letter, Request for lnformation Pursuant to Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations 50.54(f) regarding Recommendations 2. 1, 2.3, and 9.3, of the Near-Term Task Force Review of Insights from the Fukushima Dai-ichi Accident, dated March 12,2012
: 3. Nuclear Energy Institute, Guideline for Assessing Beyond Design Basis Accident Response Staffing and Communications Capabilities (NEI 12-01)
: 4. MNGP letter dated June II , 2012 (L-MT-12-057), Emergency Preparedness lnformation Requested by NRC Letter, Request for lnformation Pursuant to Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations 50.54(f) regarding Recommendations 2. 1, 2.3, and 9.3, of the Near-Term Task Force Review of lnsights from the Fukushima Dai-ichi Accident, dated March 12,2012 Backaround Pursuant to the USNRC Request for lnformation (~eference1) Northern States Power Company - Minnesota (NSPM) committed in Reference 2 to perform an assessment of communications capabilities using the methodology outlined in NEI 12-01 (Reference 3).
Page 3 of 19                             Revision 2
 
Communications Assessment for Monticello Nuclear Generating Plant The assessment involved reviewing pertinent documents, such as the Emergency Plan, associated Emergency Plan Implementing Procedures, the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report, and responses to INPO IER L1-11-4 (Near-Term Actions to Address the Effects of an Extended Loss of All Power in Response to the Fukushima Dai-ichi Event).
The NRC information request indicates that the communications assessment must assume a total loss of all AC power with severe impact on the infrastructure within a 25 mile radius of the site. The current communications systems were designed and installed to assure reliability of communications, both on-site and off-site, during normal and emergency conditions, The potential on-site issues are related to the required assumption that all AC power is lost. Off-site impact assumptions outlined in NEI 12-01 assumed failure of key infrastructure (e.g. phone lines, radio towers) out to a radius of 25 miles. The assumed off-site issues stem from the assumption that public infrastructure, including public telephone networks, microwave towers, and cellular phone towers/networks are unavailable. Observations and recommendations for technology solutions to various challenges were discussed as the project progressed.
Assessment of Existina Communication Equipment Public Address Svstem The public address (PA) system and the evacuation siren are supplied from off-site power which is backed up by on-site essential batteries and emergency diesel generators.
Assessment of Existina Communication Equipment Public Address Svstem The public address (PA) system and the evacuation siren are supplied from off-site power which is backed up by on-site essential batteries and emergency diesel generators.
Telephone Svstem The on-site telephone system for the plant and the technical support center are supplied from non-essential station batteries which are backed up by the non-essential diesel generator.
Telephone Svstem The on-site telephone system for the plant and the technical support center are supplied from non-essential station batteries which are backed up by the non-essential diesel generator. The equipment is not located in safety related buildings.
The equipment is not located in safety related buildings. The telephone system supplies normal off-site communications capability. Off-site communications with the telephone system are dependent on the functionality of the equipment powered off-site and within the 25 mile radius of the plant.
The telephone system supplies normal off-site communications capability. Off-site communications with the telephone system are dependent on the functionality of the equipment powered off-site and within the 25 mile radius of the plant.
Radio Svstem The site 800 MHz radio equipment is located at the neighboring Sherco Power Plant (a coal plant owned and operated by Xcel Energy Inc., Northern States Power - Minnesota) and is supplied by normal off-site power and backed up by a dedicated liquid propane generator.
Radio Svstem The site 800 MHz radio equipment is located at the neighboring Sherco Power Plant (a coal plant owned and operated by Xcel Energy Inc., Northern States Power - Minnesota) and is supplied by normal off-site power and backed up by a dedicated liquid propane generator. MNGP also has local repeaters for the radio system which are supplied by the security batteries and security diesel generator.
MNGP also has local repeaters for the radio system which are supplied by the security batteries and security diesel generator.
Sound Powered Phones Sound powered phone jacks are located in the reactor building and the control room and provide alternates to the radios.
Sound Powered Phones Sound powered phone jacks are located in the reactor building and the control room and provide alternates to the radios.
Page 4 of 19 Revision 2 Communications Assessment for Monticello Nuclear Generating Plant Assessment of Existinq Communications Equipment to Meet the Guidance in NEI 12-01. Attachment 3 provides details of the specific functions supported by the communications enhancements. Off-site Communications Communications with the off-site response organizations (OROs) depend on the on-site telephone system and the PBX system. Some of these telephones are direct lines and do not pass through the PBX; however, they do pass through the local phone company central office. Per the assessment assumptions, all such lines are assumed to be non-functional. Similarly, based on the assumptions of NEI 12-01, cell phones are assumed to be non-functional due to the impact on cell towers in the impacted 25-mile area. Ten-mile EPZ Off-site Response Organizations are required to receive timely (within1 5-minute) notifications of Classifications and/or Protective Action Recommendations. For MNGP, the EOF for the assumed event is expected to be the approved back- up EOF located in downtown Minneapolis, outside the 25-mile impact zone. Dose Assessment and communication of key radiological data and any required Protective Action Recommendations will be performed from the fully functional back-up EOF. Field Teams are dispatched from the site and use the 800 MHz radio system to communicate with the EOF with cell phone back-up. The radios in the vehicles are powered by the vehicle's electrical system. With the postulated loss of AC power to the on-site repeater, these radios will be limited to line of sight effectiveness. Satellite phones will be provided as a tertiary means of communication. Planned actions: The MNGP Communications Assessment identified essential communications capabilities to be maintained following a beyond design basis natural disaster impacting the plant and causing an extended loss of off-site power, considering the assumptions of NEI 10-05. As an aspect of its overall and ongoing Fukushima response initiatives, NSPM will determine the means to ensure required communications functions will be maintained. Options to enhance the communications capabilities and to meet the functional communications requirements post-event are being identified.
Page 4 of 19                                 Revision 2
 
Communications Assessment for Monticello Nuclear Generating Plant Assessment of Existinq Communications Equipment to Meet the Guidance in NEI 12-01.
Attachment 3 provides details of the specific functions supported by the communications enhancements.
Off-site Communications Communications with the off-site response organizations (OROs) depend on the on-site telephone system and the PBX system. Some of these telephones are direct lines and do not pass through the PBX; however, they do pass through the local phone company central office. Per the assessment assumptions, all such lines are assumed to be non-functional. Similarly, based on the assumptions of NEI 12-01, cell phones are assumed to be non-functional due to the impact on cell towers in the impacted 25-mile area. Ten-mile EPZ Off-site Response Organizations are required to receive timely (within15-minute) notifications of Classifications and/or Protective Action Recommendations.
For MNGP, the EOF for the assumed event is expected to be the approved back-up EOF located in downtown Minneapolis, outside the 25-mile impact zone. Dose Assessment and communication of key radiological data and any required Protective Action Recommendations will be performed from the fully functional back-up EOF.
Field Teams are dispatched from the site and use the 800 MHz radio system to communicate with the EOF with cell phone back-up. The radios in the vehicles are powered by the vehicle's electrical system. With the postulated loss of AC power to the on-site repeater, these radios will be limited to line of sight effectiveness. Satellite phones will be provided as a tertiary means of communication.
Planned actions:
The MNGP Communications Assessment identified essential communications capabilities to be maintained following a beyond design basis natural disaster impacting the plant and causing an extended loss of off-site power, considering the assumptions of NEI 10-05. As an aspect of its overall and ongoing Fukushima response initiatives, NSPM will determine the means to ensure required communications functions will be maintained. Options to enhance the communications capabilities and to meet the functional communications requirements post-event are being identified.
Following a station blackout and loss of all power in the surrounding 25 miles, the plant telephone system will only be available for approximately 90 minutes, based on battery capacity. Procedural guidance will be developed to supply critical plant telephone system components from portable diesel generators. Existing satellite capabilities may be enhanced. An improvement being evaluated to the plant telephone system could allow the site telephone system to call off-site during a station blackout by integrating a satellite phone into the telephone system.
Following a station blackout and loss of all power in the surrounding 25 miles, the plant telephone system will only be available for approximately 90 minutes, based on battery capacity. Procedural guidance will be developed to supply critical plant telephone system components from portable diesel generators. Existing satellite capabilities may be enhanced. An improvement being evaluated to the plant telephone system could allow the site telephone system to call off-site during a station blackout by integrating a satellite phone into the telephone system.
Page 5 of 19 Revision 2 Communications Assessment for Monticello Nuclear Generating Plant Currently, the primary option being considered and evaluated is the use of stand-alone and plant infrastructure-integrated satellite phones.
Page 5 of 19                                     Revision 2
It is assumed that satellite phone communication will be an integral aspect of maintaining critical communications functions with the Off-site Response Organizations for the 10-mile Emergency Planning Zone (EPZ) and the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission under the assumptions of NEI 10-05. Backup power supplies for the satellite phones are described in NSPM letter dated June 11, 2b12 (Reference 4). Internal communications within the plant (i.e., Emergency Response Facility to Emergency Response Facility) is planned to be assured through the implementation of actions (both communications and power supply) that will maintain a reliable internal phone network.
 
Key off-site response organizations in the impacted area have been or will be provided satellite phone capability.
Communications Assessment for Monticello Nuclear Generating Plant Currently, the primary option being considered and evaluated is the use of stand-alone and plant infrastructure-integrated satellite phones. It is assumed that satellite phone communication will be an integral aspect of maintaining critical communications functions with the Off-site Response Organizations for the 10-mile Emergency Planning Zone (EPZ) and the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission under the assumptions of NEI 10-05. Backup power supplies for the satellite phones are described in NSPM letter dated June 11, 2b12 (Reference 4). Internal communications within the plant (i.e.,
Emergency Response Facility to Emergency Response Facility) is planned to be assured through the implementation of actions (both communications and power supply) that will maintain a reliable internal phone network. Key off-site response organizations in the impacted area have been or will be provided satellite phone capability.
A summary of actions under development include:
A summary of actions under development include:
Function                                            Action Roll-up Table - NEI 12-01 Communications Capabilities 1    4.1.1 Communicationsfrom the      Communications will be maintained post event through the use of Control Room, TSC and EOF with    satellite phone technologies until normal systems are restored.
Off-site Response Facilities 2    4.1.2 NRC Communications with the  Communications with the NRC via the ENS line will be supported by a Control Room                      satellite communications phone (in addition to the phone used for EPZ OROs) within the Control Room.
3    4.1.2 NRC Communications with the  Communications with the NRCvia the ENS line will be supported by a Technical Support Center            satellite communications phone (in addition to the phone used for EPZ OROs) within the Technical Support Center.
4    4.1.2 NRC Communicationsvia the    Communications between the site and the NRC will be supported by HPN Network                        satellite communications capabilities in both the TSC and near site EOF.
5    4.1.3 Emergency Response Facility  Communications between site ERFs will be maintained post event Communications (Site ERFs)          through the enhanced reliability of the site PBX system.
6    4.1.3 ERF Communications with      The Key Site functions with off-site officials (Management links, Off-site Response Organizations    Radiological support, etc) will be maintained through the use of satellite phones capabilities in the site ERFs.
7    4.1.4 Field Team Communications    Environmental Field Monitoring Teams will be provided with satellite phone capabilities to backup the normal radio links. Team direction from the EOF will similarly be supported by satellite capabilities.
Schedule The actions addressed above will be coordinated with the development of the FLEX strategies four months prior to the beginning of MNGP R27 refueling outage or December 31, 2016, whichever comes first.
Schedule The actions addressed above will be coordinated with the development of the FLEX strategies four months prior to the beginning of MNGP R27 refueling outage or December 31, 2016, whichever comes first.
Action Communications will be maintained post event through the use of satellite phone technologies until normal systems are restored.
Page 6 of 19                                              Revision 2
Communications with the NRC via the ENS line will be supported by a satellite communications phone (in addition to the phone used for EPZ OROs) within the Control Room. Communications with the NRCvia the ENS line will be supported by a satellite communications phone (in addition to the phone used for EPZ OROs) within the Technical Support Center. Communications between the site and the NRC will be supported by satellite communications capabilities in both the TSC and near site EOF. Communications between site ERFs will be maintained post event through the enhanced reliability of the site PBX system. The Key Site functions with off-site officials (Management links, Radiological support, etc) will be maintained through the use of satellite phones capabilities in the site ERFs. Environmental Field Monitoring Teams will be provided with satellite phone capabilities to backup the normal radio links. Team direction from the EOF will similarly be supported by satellite capabilities.
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Page 6 of 19 Function Roll-up Table - NEI 12-01 Communications Capabilities 4.1.1 Communications from the Control Room, TSC and EOF with Off-site Response Facilities 4.1.2 NRC Communications with the Control Room 4.1.2 NRC Communications with the Technical Support Center 4.1.2 NRC Communications via the HPN Network 4.1.3 Emergency Response Facility Communications (Site ERFs) 4.1.3 ERF Communications with Off-site Response Organizations 4.1.4 Field Team Communications Revision 2 Communications Assessment for Monticello Nuclear Generating Plant Page 7 of 19 Revision 2 ATTACHMENT 1: Communications Equipment - Location and Current Configuration SystemlEquipment Plant Public Address System (PA) Plant Private Branch Exchange (PBX) Telephone System Local Commercial Telephone System TSC - OSC Emergency Work Status Primary System Component Location Distributed, the handsets, amplifiers and speakers are located in various areas of the plant Plant Communications Room in the Plant Administration Building Distributed Plant Communications Room in the Plant Administration Building Communications Room in the Plant Engineering Building Protected from Seismic as defined in this document Yes The essential part of the system resides in seismic structures No The communications room has not been seismically analyzed No No PAB Communications Room has not been seismically analyzed PEB Communications Room has not been seismically analyzed Equipment protected Protected from Flooding as defined in this document Yes The essential part of the system is housed in flood protected buildings Yes The Plant Administration Building is within the flood protection zone No No The Plant Administration Building is within the flood protection zone The Plant Engineering Building is outside the flood protection zone from the below Protected from Wind as defined in this document Yes The essential part of the system is inside of reinforced solid concrete structures No The communications room is located in an interior room of the building but has not been analyzed for wind No No The PAB Communications Room has not been analyzed for wind The Plant Engineering Building has not been analyzed for wind hazards Comments The plant evacuation siren is located on top of the reactor building and is therefore protected from flooding but has not been analyzed for seismic or wind. None The connection to the local commercial telephone is in an unprotected building and the rest of the commercial network is outside of the plant's control None Communications Assessment for Monticello Nuclear Generating Plant Page 8 of 19 ATTACHMENT I: Communications Equipment - Location and Current Configuration Revision 2 SystemlEquipment CR - TSC OGL (Ops Group Leader) TSC EGL (Engineering Group Leader) - EOF TSS (Technical Support Supervisor)
Communications Assessment for Monticello Nuclear Generating Plant
Primary System Component Location Plant Communications Room in the Plant Administration Building Communications Room in the Plant Engineering Building Plant Communications Room in the Plant Administration Building Communications Room in the Plant Engineering Building Communications Room in the Monticello Training Center Protected from Seismic as defined in this document No PAB Communications Room has not been seismically analyzed PEB Communications Room has not been seismically analyzed No PAB Communications Room has not been seismically analyzed PEB Communications Room has not been seismically analyzed MTC Communications Room has not been seismically analyzed from the below Protected from Wind as defined in this document No The PAB Communications Room has not been analyzed for wind The Plant Engineering Building has not been analyzed for wind No The PAB Communications Room has not been analyzed for wind The PEB has not been analyzed for wind The MTC has not been analyzed for wind Equipment protected Protected from Flooding as defined in this document No The Plant Administration Building is within the flood protection zone The Plant Engineering Building is outside the flood protection zone No The Plant Administration Building is within the flood protection zone The Plant Engineering Building is outside the flood protection zone The Training Center is outside the flood protection zone hazards Comments None None Communications Assessment for Monticello Nuclear Generating Plant Page 9 of 19 Revision 2 ATTACHMENT I: Communications Equipment - Location and Current Configuration SystemlEquipment TSC ED - EOF ED - SM - JIC Voice Over Internet Protocol (NIA if Not Applicable) On-site Portable Telephones (Spectralink) (Not currently in EP Plan) N/A if not applicable Primary System Component Location Plant Communications Room in the Plant Administration Building Communications Room in the Plant Engineering Building Communications Room in the Monticello Training Center N A N A hazards Comments None None Protected from Seismic as defined in this document No PAB Communications Room has not been seismically analyzed PEB Communications Room has not been seismically analyzed MTC Communications Room has not been seismically analyzed N A Equipment protected Protected from Flooding as defined in this document No The Plant Administration Building is within the flood protection zone The Plant Engineering Building is outside the flood protection zone The Training Center is outside the flood protection zone N A from the below Protected from Wind as defined in this document No The PAB Communications Room has not been analyzed for wind The PEB has not been analyzed for wind The MTC has not been analyzed for wind N A Communications Assessment for Monticello Nuclear Generating Plant Page 10 of 19 Revision 2 ATTACHMENT 1: Communications Equipment - Location and Current Configuration SystemlEquipment NRC Communications (ENS & HPN) Phone LineICircuit Off-site Cellular Telephones Satellite Telephones 450/800/900 MHz Radio System Primary System Component Location Phones are in the Technical Support Center in the Plant Engineering Buildihg The phone lines are routed through the Plant Communications Room in the Plant Administration Building The lines are routed through the Microwave House where they connect to the commercial telephone system Distributed Distributed Sherburne County Generating Station Security Building (Trunking) and Monticello Security Building (Repeaters)
                                                                                -
Protected from Seismic as defined in this document No No No No Neither of these buildings have been seismically analyzed Equipment protected Protected from Flooding as defined in this document No No No No The buildings are outside the flood protection zone from the below Protected from Wind as defined in this document No No No No Neither of these buildings have been analyzed for wind hazards Comments Much of the communication circuits are not housed in protected structures and the commercial portion of the system is unprotected and outside of the site's control The off-site cellular system is unprotected and is outside of the site's control None The trunking controls for the system are housed in the security building at the neighboring coal generating plant and the repeaters at the site are housed in the security building Communications Assessment for Monticello Nuclear Generating Plant Page 11 of 19 Revision 2 ATTACHMENT I: Communications Equipment - Location and Current Configuration SystemlEquipment Sound Powered Telephone System Field Monitoring Team Communications Diesel Fuel Oil Storage used for fueling portable equipment used for communications Technical Support Center (TSC) Emergency Operations Facility (EOF) If within 25 miles of the station Primary System Component Location Distributed within the Reactor Building, Turbine Building, and Control RoomICable Spreading Room 800 MHz Radio System and Off-site Cellular Telephones Emergency Diesel Day Tank Rooms in the Emergency Diesel Generator Building Plant Engineering Building Monticello Training Center hazards Comments None See the 800 MHz Radio System and Off-site Cellular Telephones Above None The TSC is in an interior location of the Plant Engineering Building but has not been analyzed for any of these criteria The EOF is in an interior location of the Training Center but has not been analyzed for any of these criteria Protected from Seismic as defined in this document Yes This system resides in seismic structures No Yes This system resides in a seismic structure No The Plant Engineering Building has not been seismically analyzed No The Training Center has not been seismically
ATTACHMENT 1: Communications Equipment Location and Current Configuration Equipment protected from the below hazards Protected from          Protected from          Protected from                Comments Primary System          Seismic                  Flooding                  Wind SystemlEquipment        Component          a s defined in this      a s defined in this      a s defined in this Location              document                document                document Distributed, the                 Yes                      Yes                      Yes        The plant evacuation siren is Plant Public Address handsets, amplifiers                                                                          located on top of the reactor System (PA)         and speakers are      The essential part of  The essential part of    The essential part of  building and is therefore located in various    the system resides in the system is housed in the system is inside of  protected from flooding but has areas of the plant    seismic structures    flood protected          reinforced solid        not been analyzed for seismic or buildings                concrete structures    wind.
Plant Private Branch Plant                            No                      Yes                      No          None Exchange (PBX)       Communications Telephone System    Room in the Plant    The communications    The Plant                The communications Administration        room has not been      Administration Building  room is located in an Building              seismically analyzed  is within the flood      interior room of the protection zone          building but has not been analyzed for wind Distributed                      No                      No                      No          The connection to the local Local Commercial                                                                                                    commercial telephone is in an Telephone System                                                                                                    unprotected building and the rest of the commercial network is outside of the plant's control No                      No                        No        None TSC - OSC Emergency Work Status            Plant                PAB                    The Plant                  The PAB Communications       Communications        Administration            Communications Room in the Plant    Room has not          Building is within the     Room has not been Administration        been seismically      flood protection zone      analyzed for wind Building              analyzed              The Plant                  The Plant Communications       PEB                    Engineering Building      Engineering Room in the Plant    Communications         is outside the flood      Building has not Engineering          Room has not          protection zone            been analyzed for Building              been seismically                                  wind analyzed Page 7 of 19                                                        Revision 2
 
Communications Assessment for Monticello Nuclear Generating Plant
                                                                            -
ATTACHMENT I:Communications Equipment Location and Current Configuration Equipment protected from the below hazards Protected from        Protected from        Protected from          Comments Primary System        Seismic                Flooding                Wind SystemlEquipment       Component        a s defined in this    a s defined in this  a s defined in this Location            document              document              document No                    No                    No          None CR - TSC OGL (Ops Group Leader)         Plant              PAB                  The Plant              The PAB Communications      Communications      Administration          Communications Room in the Plant   Room has not        Building is within the Room has not been Administration     been seismically    flood protection zone  analyzed for wind Building            analyzed            The Plant              The Plant Communications      PEB                  Engineering Building   Engineering Room in the Plant   Communications      is outside the flood    Building has not Engineering        Room has not        protection zone        been analyzed for Building            been seismically                            wind analyzed No                    No                    No         None TSC EGL (Engineering Group Leader) - EOF    Plant              PAB                  The Plant              The PAB TSS (Technical Support Communications      Communications       Administration          Communications Supervisor)            Room in the Plant  Room has not        Building is within the  Room has not been Administration      been seismically     flood protection zone  analyzed for wind Building            analyzed             The Plant              The PEB has not Communications      PEB                  Engineering Building    been analyzed for Room in the Plant   Communications      is outside the flood   wind Engineering        Room has not        protection zone         The MTC has not Building           been seismically    The Training Center    been analyzed for Communications      analyzed            is outside the flood   wind Room in the        MTC                  protection zone Monticello Training Communications Center              Room has not been seismically analyzed Page 8 of 19                                          Revision 2
 
Communications Assessment for Monticello Nuclear Generating Plant
                                                                              -
ATTACHMENT I:Communications Equipment Location and Current Configuration Equipment protected from the below hazards Protected from        Protected from        Protected from         Comments Primary System        Seismic                Flooding                Wind SystemlEquipment          Component        a s defined in this    a s defined in this   a s defined in this Location            document              document              document No                     No                   No         None TSC ED - EOF ED -
SM - JIC                  Plant              PAB                  The Plant              The PAB Communications      Communications      Administration          Communications Room in the Plant  Room has not         Building is within the  Room has not been Administration      been seismically    flood protection zone  analyzed for wind Building            analyzed            The Plant              The PEB has not Communications      PEB                  Engineering Building    been analyzed for Room in the Plant  Communications      is outside the flood    wind Engineering        Room has not        protection zone        The MTC has not Building            been seismically    The Training Center    been analyzed for Communications     analyzed            is outside the flood    wind Room in the        MTC                  protection zone Monticello Training Communications Center              Room has not been seismically analyzed Voice Over Internet    NA                            NA                    NA                    NA          None Protocol (NIA if Not Applicable)
On-site Portable        NA Telephones (Spectralink)
(Not currently in EP Plan)
N/A if not applicable Page 9 of 19                                          Revision 2
 
Communications Assessment for Monticello Nuclear Generating Plant
                                                                              -
ATTACHMENT 1: Communications Equipment Location and Current Configuration Equipment protected from the below hazards Protected from       Protected from          Protected from                Comments Primary System          Seismic               Flooding                Wind SystemlEquipment        Component        a s defined in this    a s defined in this    a s defined in this Location              document              document               document NRC Communications       Phones are in the            No                    No                    No         Much of the communication (ENS & HPN) Phone        Technical Support                                                                      circuits are not housed in LineICircuit            Center in the                                                                          protected structures and the Plant Engineering                                                                      commercial portion of the system Buildihg                                                                              is unprotected and outside of the The phone lines                                                                        site's control are routed through the Plant Communications Room in the Plant Administration Building The lines are routed through the Microwave House where they connect to the commercial telephone system Distributed                    No                    No                    No         The off-site cellular system is Off-site Cellular                                                                                              unprotected and is outside of the Telephones                                                                                                      site's control Distributed                      No                    No                    No          None Satellite Telephones Sherburne County                No                    No                    No         The trunking controls for the 450/800/900 MHz Radio Generating Station                                                                        system are housed in the System                Security Building       Neither of these  The buildings are      Neither of these      security building at the (Trunking) and        buildings have been  outside the flood     buildings have been    neighboring coal generating plant Monticello            seismically analyzed protection zone       analyzed for wind      and the repeaters at the site are Security Building                                                                         housed in the security building (Repeaters)
Page 10 of 19                                                      Revision 2
 
Communications Assessment for Monticello Nuclear Generating Plant
                                                                                          -
ATTACHMENT I:Communications Equipment Location and Current Configuration Equipment protected from the below hazards Protected from            Protected from            Protected from                    Comments Primary System            Seismic                  Flooding                    Wind SystemlEquipment               Component          a s defined in this      a s defined in this        as defined in this Location                document                  document                  document Distributedwithin the            Yes                      Yes                        Yes          None Sound Powered              Reactor Building, Telephone System            Turbine Building, and  This system resides      This system is located      This system resides in Control RoomICable    in seismic structures    in structures within the   re-enforced solid Spreading Room                                  flood protection zone      concrete structures 800 MHz Radio System              No                        No                        No           See the 800 MHz Radio System and Field Monitoring Team      and Off-site Cellular                                                                                Off-site Cellular Telephones Above Communications             Telephones Diesel Fuel Oil Storage    Emergency Diesel Day              Yes                      Yes                        Yes          None used for fueling portable  Tank Rooms in the equipment used for          Emergency Diesel      This system resides in a This system is located in  This system resides in a communications              Generator Building    seismic structure        structures within the flood re-enforced solid protection zone             concrete structure Technical Support Center   Plant Engineering                  No                        No                        No           The TSC is in an interior location of (TSC)                      Building                                                                                            the Plant Engineering Building but The Plant Engineering    The Plant Engineering      The Plant Engineering    has not been analyzed for any of Building has not been   Building is outside the    Building has not been    these criteria seismically analyzed    flood protection zone      analyzed for wind Emergency Operations        Monticello Training                No                        No                        No          The EOF is in an interior location of Facility (EOF) If within 25 Center                                                                                              the Training Center but has not been miles of the station                              The Training Center has  The Training Center is      The Training Center has  analyzed for any of these criteria not been seismically    outside the flood          not been analyzed for analyzed                  protection zone            wind Page 11of 19                                                              Revision 2
 
Communications Assessment for Monticello Nuclear Generating Plant ATTACHMENT 2: Communication Equipment Power Sources            -
Equipment Power Source(s)
Primary Power          Alternate Power          Backup power                                Comments Supply (List the  Supply (List the power      availability (e.g.,
power source)            source)            batteries, portable      Will interim actions be taken to enhance the power SystemlEquipment                                                    generators, etc.)                            supplies?
YeslNo Plant Public      Most of the local    The PA system can      Y-10 is also backed up  No Address System    speakers and          alternatively be      by the # I 3 Essential (PA)              amplifiers are        supplied by Y-10.      Battery normally supplied      L-34 and Y-10 are from L-34 (Plant      backed up by Off-site Power)        Emergency Diesel Generators.
Primary (Plant    Y-90 Non-Essential    Y-90 can also be      Y-90 is backed up by    A communications portable diesel has been purchased Admin Building)  UninterruptableAC      supplied from # I 3    # I 7 Non-essential      and will be available as an alternate supply to the PBX Private Branch    Power Panel is        Non-Essential Diesel  Batteries Exchange (PBX)    normally supplied      Generator Telephone System  from LC-108 (Plant Off-site Power)
TSC (Plant        Y-94 Non-Essential    12.5 KV Commercial    Y-94 is also supplied    No Engineering      UninterruptableAC      (Non-Plant) Off-site   by # I 7 Non-essential Building)        Power Panel (Plant     Power                  Batteries Plant Private    Off-site Power)        0r Branch Exchange                          # I 3 Non-Essential (PBX) Telephone                         Diesel Generator System EOF (Monticello  Off-site Power (this  13.8 KV Plant Power    None                      No Training Center) power source is        via sub-yard breaker Plant Private    different from the     1N3 Branch Exchange  normal off-site (PBX) Telephone  source for the plant System           and is fed from the local community distribution grid)
Page 12 of 19                                                          Revision 2
 
Communications Assessment for Monticello Nuclear Generating Plant ATTACHMENT 2: Communication Equipment Power Sources              -
Equipment Power Source(s)
Primary Power          Alternate Power          Backup power                                  Comments Supply (List the    Supply (List the power      availability (e.g.,
power source)              source)            batteries, portable        Will interim actions be taken to enhance the power SystemlEquipment                                                      generators, etc.)                              supplies?
YeslNo Local Commercial  Unknown                Unknown                Unknown                  The local commercial telephone system is not owned or Telephone System                                                                          operated by the site and is therefore outside of the site's control Voice Over        NIA                    NIA                    NIA Internet Protocol (NIA if Not Applicable)
On-site Portable  NIA                    NIA                    NIA Telephones (Spectralink)
(Not currently in EP Plan)
NIA if not applicable NRC                Unknown                Unknown                Unknown                  The NRC phone lines and circuits rely on commercial Communications                                                                            equipment which is not owned or operated by the site and (ENS & HPN)                                                                                is therefore outside of the site's control Phone LineICircuit Off-site Cellular  Unknown                Unknown                Unknown                  Off-site cellular telephones rely on commercial equipment Telephones                                                                                which is not owned or operated by the site-andis therefore outside of the site's control Satellite          Local Battery          None                    Spare batteries are      No Telephones        (attached to the unit)                        located in each facility which has these devices 45018001900 MHz        Trunking relies on Local Repeater is      The Trunking system is  No Radio System          off-site power    backed by security      backed by a dedicated (local community  UPS which is supplied liquid propane distribution grid) by the security diesel  generator Local backup      generator (backup repeater relies on repeater only provides plant power        a single channel if off-site power is lost)
Page 13 of 19                                                            Revision 2
 
Communications Assessment for Monticello Nuclear Generating Plant ATTACHMENT 2: Communication Equipment Power Sources          -
Equipment Power Source(s)
Primary Power        Alternate Power        Backup power                                Comments Supply (List the  Supply (List the power    availability (e.g.,
power source)            source)          batteries, portable      Will interim actions be taken to enhance the power SystemlEquipment                                                      generators, etc.)                            supplies?
YeslNo Sound Powered        NIA (This system      NIA                    NIA                    No Telephone System    does not require any external power)
Field Monitoring    See 800 MHz Radio    See 800 MHz Radio      See 800 MHz Radio      No Team                and Off-site Cellular and Off-site Cellular  and Off-site Cellular Communications      Telephone System      Telephone System      Telephone System Y-94 Non-Essential    12.5 KV Commercial    Y-94 is also supplied  No Technical support    UninterruptableAC    (Non-Plant) Off-site  by #  7INon-essential Center (TSC)        Power Panel (Plant    Power                  Batteries Off-site Power)      or
                                          #  3INon-Essential Diesel Generator Emergency            1N3 or Off-site      None                  None                    No Operations Facility  Power (EOF) If within 25 miles of the station Page 14 of 19                                                        Revision 2
 
Communications Assessment for Monticello Nuclear Generating Plant ATTACHMENT 3: Communication Equipment Summary and Improvements      -
Emergency                Minimum              Primary            Primary              Backup        Backup      Planned or      Refer to Response Facility        Communications          Method            Method              Method(s)      Method(s)    Potential      Following Links          Described in        Available          Described in    Available  Improvement      Section for site E-Plan        following          site E-Plan    following    Identified?    Additional Assumed                          Assumed NEI                  Information NEI 12-01 2.2                        12-01 2.2 4.1.1 Notifications to, and communications with, w      s [per 10 CFR 50 Appendix E.1V.D and E.9.a]
Control Room              e  Shift Emergency    Direct Phone      800 MHz radios      800 MHz radios  Satellite    Integrate        Note 1 Communicator        Line 1 Fax Line                                        Telephone    Satellite Phones (SEC)                                                                                  into Protected Plant PBX System Technical Support
* Emergency            Direct Phone      800 MHz radios      800 MHz radios Satellite    Integrate        Note 1 Center (TSC)                Communicators      Line I Fax Line                                        Telephone    Satellite Phones into Protected Plant PBX System Emergency Operations        Emergency          Direct Phone      800 MHz radios      800 MHz radios Satellite    Integrate        Note 1 Facility (EOF)              Communicators      Line/ Fax Line                                        Telephone    Satellite Phones into Protected Plant PBX System for Primary EOF Back-up EOF 4.1.2 Notifications to, and communications with, the Nuclear Requlatow Commission (NRC) Headquarters Incident Response Center and the appropriate NRC Regional Office Operations Center [per 10 CFR 50 Appendix E.1V.D and E.9.d]
Control Room
* Emergency            Federal            Satellite            Satellite      Satellite    Integrate        Note 1 Notification System Telephone          Telephone          Telephone      Telephone    Satellite Phones (ENS)              System                                                              into Protected
* Emergency                                                                                Plant PBX Response Data                                                                          System System (ERDS)
Page 15 of 19                                            Revision 2
 
Communications Assessment for Monticello Nuclear Generating Plant ATTACHMENT 3: Communication Equipment Summary and Improvements    -
Emergency                Minimum              Primary        Primary              Backup        Backup          Planned or          Refer to Response Facility      Communications            Method        Method              Method(s)    Method(s)          Potential          Following Links          Described in    Available          Described in    Available        Improvement        Section for site E-Plan    following          site E-Plan    following        Identified?        Additional Assumed                          Assumed NEI                          Information NEI 12-01 2.2                        12-01 2.2 Technical Support          Emergency            Federal        Satellite          Satellite      Satellite          lntegrate          Note 1 Center (TSC)                Notification System Telephone      Telephone          Telephone      Telephone          Satellite Phones (ENS)                System                                                              into Protected a  Health Physics                                                                            Plant PBX Network (HPN)                                                                            System 4.1.3 Communications between licensee emerqencv response facilities [per 10 CFR 50 Appendix E.9.c. Additional links that support performance of critical response functions are also specified.] The minimum communications links to support this function are listed below by facility. For example, if the normally used telephone system cannot be restored to service, these links could rely upon some combination of radio, sound-powered and satellite-based communications systems.
Control Room            1 per unit              Direct Phone  No                  Portable Cell  No                Integrate          Note 1 Line                                Plant Page                      Satellite Phones  Monticello ERFs system                            into Protected    will be Plant Radio                      Plant PBX          supported by System                          System            the enhanced Sound Powered                                      PBX system.
CR to TSC                                          ERO responders requiring communication with off-site responders will be provided an integrated capability.
Page 16 of 19                                                      Revision 2


analyzed Equipment protected Protected from Flooding as defined in this document Yes This system is located in structures within the flood protection zone No Yes This system is located in structures within the flood protection zone No The Plant Engineering Building is outside the flood protection zone No The Training Center is outside the flood protection zone from the below Protected from Wind as defined in this document Yes This system resides in re-enforced solid concrete structures No Yes This system resides in a re-enforced solid concrete structure No The Plant Engineering Building has not been analyzed for wind No The Training Center has not been analyzed for wind Communications Assessment for Monticello Nuclear Generating Plant Page 12 of 19 ATTACHMENT 2: Communication Equipment - Power Sources Revision 2 SystemlEquipment Plant Public Address System (PA) Primary (Plant Admin Building) Private Branch Exchange (PBX) Telephone System TSC (Plant Engineering Building) Plant Private Branch Exchange (PBX) Telephone System EOF (Monticello Training Center) Plant Private Branch Exchange (PBX) Telephone System Primary Power Supply (List the power source)
Communications Assessment for Monticello Nuclear Generating Plant ATTACHMENT 3: Communication Equipment Summary and Improvements -
Most of the local speakers and amplifiers are normally supplied from L-34 (Plant Off-site Power) Y-90 Non-Essential Uninterruptable AC Power Panel is normally supplied from LC-1 08 (Plant Off-site Power) Y-94 Non-Essential Uninterruptable AC Power Panel (Plant Off-site Power)
Emergency             Minimum              Primary        Primary            Backup        Backup     Planned or          Refer to Response Facility    Communications           Method        Method            Method(s)     Method(s)     Potential        Following Links          Described in     Available        Described in   Available    Improvement        Section for site E-Plan    following        site E-Plan   following     Identified?        Additional Assumed                       Assumed NEI                      Information NEI 12-01 2.2                       12-01 2.2 Technical Support    I each for:            Direct Phone      Limited            Satellite     Satellite Integrate         Note 1 Center (TSC)           SeniorILead TSC    Line              Satellite          Telephone     Telephone multiple Satellite Manager                              Telephone           Cell Phone   Plant Page Phones into Operations                            Plant Page          Plant Page   system     Protected Plant Coordination                          system              system                  PBX System Maintenance                                               800 MHz Coordination                                             Radio
Off-site Power (this power source is different from the normal off-site source for the plant and is fed from the local community distribution grid) Alternate Power Supply (List the power source) The PA system can alternatively be supplied by Y-10. L-34 and Y-10 are backed up by Emergency Diesel Generators.
* Engineering                                               System
Y-90 can also be supplied from #I 3 Non-Essential Diesel Generator 12.5 KV Commercial (Non-Plant)
                    -  Coordination Radiological Support Operational Support  1 each for:           Direct Phone   No                Plant Page   No           Integrate          Note 1 Center (OSC)           SeniorILead OSC      Line                              system                       Satellite Phones   Monticello Manager                                                  Plant Radio                into Protected     ERFs will be Radiological                                          System                      Plant PBX          supported by Support                                                                              System            the enhanced PBX system.
Off-site Power 0 r #I 3 Non-Essential Diesel Generator 13.8 KV Plant Power via sub-yard breaker 1 N3 Equipment Power Backup power availability (e.g., batteries, portable generators, etc.) YeslNo Y-10 is also backed up by the #I 3 Essential Battery Y-90 is backed up by #I7 Non-essential Batteries Y-94 is also supplied by #I 7 Non-essential Batteries None Source(s)
Additional response                                                                                      ERO coordination links for                                                                                  responders multi-unit sites:                                                                                        requiring 1 for each position                                                                                    communication providing Unit In-                                                                                      with off-site Plant Team                                                                                              responders will Coordination.                                                                                            be provided an integrated capability.
Comments Will interim actions be taken to enhance the power supplies?
Page 17 of 19                                               Revision 2
No A communications portable diesel has been purchased and will be available as an alternate supply to the PBX No No Communications Assessment for Monticello Nuclear Generating Plant Page 13 of 19 Revision 2 ATTACHMENT 2: Communication Equipment - Power Sources SystemlEquipment Local Commercial Telephone System Voice Over Internet Protocol (NIA if Not Applicable) On-site Portable Telephones (Spectralink) (Not currently in EP Plan) NIA if not applicable NRC Communications (ENS & HPN) Phone LineICircuit Off-site Cellular Telephones Satellite Telephones 45018001900 MHz Radio System Source(s)
Comments Will interim actions be taken to enhance the power supplies?
The local commercial telephone system is not owned or operated by the site and is therefore outside of the site's control The NRC phone lines and circuits rely on commercial equipment which is not owned or operated by the site and is therefore outside of the site's control Off-site cellular telephones rely on commercial equipment which is not owned or operated by the site-and is therefore outside of the site's control No No Equipment Power Backup power availability (e.g., batteries, portable generators, etc.) YeslNo Unknown NIA NIA Unknown Unknown Spare batteries are located in each facility which has these devices The Trunking system is backed by a dedicated liquid propane generator Primary Power Supply (List the power source)
Unknown NIA NIA Unknown Unknown Local Battery (attached to the unit) Trunking relies on off-site power (local community distribution grid) Local backup repeater relies on plant power Alternate Power Supply (List the power source) Unknown NIA NIA Unknown Unknown None Local Repeater is backed by security UPS which is supplied by the security diesel generator (backup repeater only provides a single channel if off-site power is lost)
Communications Assessment for Monticello Nuclear Generating Plant Page 14 of 19 ATTACHMENT 2: Communication Equipment - Power Sources Revision 2 SystemlEquipment Sound Powered Telephone System Field Monitoring Team Communications Technical support Center (TSC) Emergency Operations Facility (EOF) If within 25 miles of the station Primary Power Supply (List the power source) NIA (This system does not require any external power) See 800 MHz Radio and Off-site Cellular Telephone System Y-94 Non-Essential Uninterruptable AC Power Panel (Plant Off-site Power) 1 N3 or Off-site Power Alternate Power Supply (List the power source) NIA See 800 MHz Radio and Off-site Cellular Telephone System 12.5 KV Commercial (Non-Plant)
Off-site Power or #I 3 Non-Essential Diesel Generator None Equipment Power Backup power availability (e.g., batteries, portable generators, etc.) YeslNo NIA See 800 MHz Radio and Off-site Cellular Telephone System Y-94 is also supplied by #I 7 Non-essential Batteries None Source(s)
Comments Will interim actions be taken to enhance the power supplies?
No No No No Communications Assessment for Monticello Nuclear Generating Plant Page 15 of 19 Revision 2 ATTACHMENT 3: Communication Equipment - Summary and Improvements Emergency Response Facility Minimum Communications Links 4.1.1 Notifications to, and communications with, ws [per 10 CFR 50 Appendix E.1V.D and E.9.a] Primary Method Described in site E-Plan Control Room Technical Support Center (TSC) Emergency Operations Facility (EOF) Primary Method Available following Assumed NEI 12-01 2.2 e Shift Emergency Communicator (SEC)
* Emergency Communicators Emergency Communicators 4.1.2 Notifications to, and communications with, the Nuclear Requlatow Commission (NRC) Headquarters Incident Response Center and the appropriate NRC Regional Office Operations Center [per 10 CFR 50 Appendix E.1V.D and E.9.d] Backup Method(s)
Described in site E-Plan Direct Phone Line 1 Fax Line Direct Phone Line I Fax Line Direct Phone Line/ Fax Line Control Room Backup Method(s)
Available following Assumed NEI 12-01 2.2 800 MHz radios 800 MHz radios 800 MHz radios
* Emergency Notification System (ENS)
* Emergency Response Data System (ERDS) Planned or Potential Improvement Identified?
800 MHz radios 800 MHz radios 800 MHz radios Federal Telephone System Refer to Following Section for Additional Information Satellite Telephone Satellite Telephone Satellite Telephone Satellite Telephone Integrate Satellite Phones into Protected Plant PBX System Integrate Satellite Phones into Protected Plant PBX System Integrate Satellite Phones into Protected Plant PBX System for Primary EOF Back-up EOF Satellite Telephone Note 1 Note 1 Note 1 Satellite Telephone Integrate Satellite Phones into Protected Plant PBX System Note 1 Communications Assessment for Monticello Nuclear Generating Plant Page 16 of 19 Revision 2 ATTACHMENT 3: Communication Equipment - Summary and Improvements Emergency Response Facility Technical Support Center (TSC) Minimum Communications Links Emergency Notification System (ENS) a Health Physics Network (HPN) 4.1.3 Communications between licensee emerqencv response facilities
[per 10 CFR 50 Appendix E.9.c. Additional links that support performance of critical response functions are also specified.]
The minimum communications links to support this function are listed below by facility.
For example, if the normally used telephone system cannot be restored to service, these links could rely upon some combination of radio, sound-powered and satellite-based communications systems. Primary Method Described in site E-Plan Federal Telephone System Control Room Primary Method Available following Assumed NEI 12-01 2.2 Satellite Telephone 1 per unit Backup Method(s)
Described in site E-Plan Satellite Telephone Direct Phone Line Backup Method(s)
Available following Assumed NEI 12-01 2.2 Satellite Telephone No Planned or Potential Improvement Identified?
l ntegrate Satellite Phones into Protected Plant PBX System Portable Cell Plant Page system Plant Radio System Sound Powered CR to TSC Refer to Following Section for Additional Information Note 1 No Integrate Satellite Phones into Protected Plant PBX System Note 1 Monticello ERFs will be supported by the enhanced PBX system. ERO responders requiring communication with off-site responders will be provided an integrated capability.
Communications Assessment for Monticello Nuclear Generating Plant Page 17 of 19 Revision 2 ATTACHMENT 3: Communication Equipment - Summary and Improvements Emergency Response Facility Technical Support Center (TSC) Operational Support Center (OSC) Minimum Communications Links I each for: SeniorILead TSC Manager Operations Coordination Maintenance Coordination
* Engineering Coordination - Radiological Support 1 each for: SeniorILead OSC Manager Radiological Support Additional response coordination links for multi-unit sites:
1 for each position providing Unit In- Plant Team Coordination.
Primary Method Described in site E-Plan Direct Phone Line Direct Phone Line Primary Method Available following Assumed NEI 12-01 2.2 Limited Satellite Telephone Plant Page system No Backup Method(s)
Described in site E-Plan Satellite Telephone Cell Phone Plant Page system 800 MHz Radio System Plant Page system Plant Radio System Backup Method(s)
Available following Assumed NEI 12-01 2.2 Satellite Telephone Plant Page system No Planned or Potential Improvement Identified?
Integrate multiple Satellite Phones into Protected Plant PBX System Integrate Satellite Phones into Protected Plant PBX System Refer to Following Section for Additional Information Note 1 Note 1 Monticello ERFs will be supported by the enhanced PBX system. ERO responders requiring communication with off-site responders will be provided an integrated capability.
Communications Assessment for Monticello Nuclear Generating Plant Page 18 of 19 Revision 2 ATTACHMENT 3: Communication Equipment - Summary and Improvements Emergency Response Facility Emergency Operations Facility (EOF) Back-up Emergency Operations Facility Joint Information Center (JIC) . Minimum Communications Links 1 each for: SeniorILead Manager Key Protective Measures Operations or Technical Support (as needed to support performance of dose projections, formulation of PARS and plant status updates to OR0 authorities).
There are no enhanced functional requirements for the Back-up Facility (Greater than 25 miles from the site) 1 for Senior Manager Primary Method Described in site E-Plan Direct Phone Line Normal Means are Available The Joint Information Center is located outside the 25 miles zone and is protected by back-up power. Direct Phone Line Primary Method Available following Assumed NEI 12-01 2.2 No Yes NIA Backup Method@) Described in site E-Plan Portable Cell Plant Page system Plant Radio System Any normally available means Portable Cell or other direct dial lines Backup Method(s)
Available following Assumed NEI 12-01 2.2 No Yes NIA Planned or Potential Improvement Identified?
Integrate multiple Satellite Phones into Protected Plant PBX System Install additional Satellite capability in Back-up EOF Integrate Satellite Phones into Protected Plant PBX System (this


commitment provides a line from on-site ERFs to support information ,flow to the JIC Refer to Following Section for Additional Information Note 1 Monticello ERFs will be supported by the enhanced PBX system. ERO responders requiring communication with off-site responders will be provided an integrated capability.
Communications Assessment for Monticello Nuclear Generating Plant ATTACHMENT 3: Communication Equipment Summary and Improvements  -
NIA Note 1 Communications Assessment for Monticello Nuclear Generating Plant NOTE 1: Proposed satellite system provides satellite telephone access while PBX is on backup power. If the PBX has loss of power a direct satellite telephone line is routed to specific areas. The satellite telephone docking station will have backup power to maintain this secondary function.
Emergency              Minimum            Primary        Primary            Backup          Backup      Planned or          Refer to Response Facility    Communications          Method          Method            Method@)          Method(s)    Potential          Following Links          Described in      Available        Described in      Available  Improvement        Section for site E-Plan      following          site E-Plan      following    Identified?        Additional Assumed                            Assumed NEI                      Information NEI 12-01 2.2                          12-01 2.2 Emergency Operations  1 each for:          Direct Phone    No                Portable Cell    No          Integrate          Note 1 Facility (EOF)          SeniorILead        Line                                Plant Page                    multiple Satellite Monticello ERFs Manager                                                  system                          Phones into        will be Key Protective                                          Plant Radio                    Protected Plant    supported by Measures                                                  System                        PBX System        the enhanced Operations or                                                                                            PBX system.
If the direct line between the satellite telephone dock and the specific areas is lost, the satellite telephone can be removed from the docking station and used outside on built-in battery source. ATTACHMENT 3: Communication Equipment - Summary and Improvements Page 19 of 19 Emergency Response Facility Revision 2 Minimum Communications Links 4.1.4 Communications with fieldloff-site monitorinq teams [per 10 CFR 50 Appendix E.9.c] Primary Method Described in site E-Plan a Technical Support Center (TSC) Emergency Operations Facility (EOF) Field Team 1 Field Team 2 Primary Method Available following Assumed NEI 12-01 2.2 e TSC Field Team Communicator e TSC Field Team Communicator Field Team I Field Team 2 4.1.5 Communications with other Federal aqencies as described in the site emergency plan (e.g., the US Coast Guard)
Technical Support (as                                                                                      ERO needed to support                                                                                          responders performance of dose                                                                                        requiring projections,                                                                                                communication formulation of PARS                                                                                        with off-site and plant status                                                                                            responders will updates to OR0                                                                                              be provided an authorities).                                                                                              integrated capability.
[per 10 CFR 50 Appendix E.9.b] Backup Method(s)
Back-up Emergency    There are no          Normal Means    Yes                Any normally      Yes          Install additional NIA Operations Facility  enhanced functional  are Available                      available means                Satellite requirements for the                                                                     capability in Back-up Facility                                                                         Back-up EOF (Greater than 25 miles from the site)
Described in site E-Plan 800 MHz Radio 800 MHz Radio Emergency Operations Facility (EOF) Backup Method(s)
Joint Information                          The Joint        NIA                Portable Cell or  NIA        Integrate          Note 1 Center (JIC) .       1 for Senior Manager  Information                        other direct dial              Satellite Phones Center is                          lines                          into Protected located outside                                                    Plant PBX the 25 miles                                                      System (this zone and is                                                        commitment protected by                                                      provides a line back-up power.                                                     from on-site Direct Phone                                                      ERFs to support Line                                                              information ,flow to the JIC Page 18 of 19                                                    Revision 2
Available following Assumed NEI 12-01 2.2 Cell Phone Cell Phone EOF Off-site Communicator Planned or Potential Improvement Identified?
No backup for cell phone No backup for cell phone There are no commitments in the Monticello Emergency Plan for direct contact with other agencies. Refer to Following Section for Additional Information No backup for cell phone No backup for cell phone There are no commitments in the Monticello Emergency Plan for direct contact with


other agencies.
Communications Assessment for Monticello Nuclear Generating Plant ATTACHMENT 3: Communication Equipment - Summary and Improvements Emergency                  Minimum                Primary              Primary            Backup          Backup        Planned or            Refer to Response Facility        Communications              Method              Method            Method(s)      Method(s)          Potential          Following Links            Described in            Available        Described in      Available      Improvement          Section for site E-Plan            following        site E-Plan      following        Identified?          Additional Assumed                          Assumed NEI                            Information NEI 12-01 2.2                        12-01 2.2 4.1.4 Communications with fieldloff-site monitorinq teams [per 10 CFR 50 Appendix E.9.c]
Portable satellite phones Portable satellite phones There are no commitments in the Monticello Emergency Plan for direct contact with other agencies. There are no commitments in the Monticello Emergency Plan for direct contact with other agencies.
a    Technical Support    e  TSC Field Team        800 MHz Radio        Cell Phone        No backup for    No backup for    Portable Center (TSC)            Communicator                                                  cell phone      cell phone      satellite phones Emergency            e  TSC Field Team Operations Facility      Communicator (EOF)
Proposed satellite phone system would provide communication as required.
Field Team 1            Field Team I          800 MHz Radio        Cell Phone          No backup for  No backup for    Portable Field Team 2            Field Team 2                                                  cell phone      cell phone      satellite phones 4.1.5 Communications with other Federal aqencies as described in the site emergency plan (e.g., the US Coast Guard) [per 10 CFR 50 Appendix E.9.b]
Note 1}}
Emergency Operations EOF Off-site                  There are no          There are no       There are no    There are no    Proposed              Note 1 Facility (EOF)            Communicator            commitments in commitments in commitments in commitments in satellite phone the Monticello        the Monticello    the Monticello  the Monticello   system would Emergency Plan Emergency Plan Emergency Plan Emergency Plan provide for direct            for direct         for direct      for direct      communication contact with          contact with       contact with    contact with    as required.
other agencies.      other agencies. other agencies. other agencies.
NOTE 1: Proposed satellite system provides satellite telephone access while PBX is on backup power. If the PBX has loss of power a direct satellite telephone line is routed to specific areas. The satellite telephone docking station will have backup power to maintain this secondary function. If the direct line between the satellite telephone dock and the specific areas is lost, the satellite telephone can be removed from the docking station and used outside on built-in battery source.
Page 19 of 19                                                        Revision 2}}

Revision as of 20:44, 11 November 2019

Emergency Preparedness (EP) Communications Assessment Requested by NRC Letter, Request for Information Pursuant to Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations 50.54(f) Regarding Recommendations 2.1, 2.3, and 9.3, of the Near-Term Task Force
ML12305A381
Person / Time
Site: Monticello Xcel Energy icon.png
Issue date: 10/29/2012
From: Grubb J
Northern States Power Co, Xcel Energy
To:
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation, Document Control Desk
References
L-MT-12-095
Download: ML12305A381 (24)
v • d • e


Text

Monticello Nuclear Generating Plant 2807 W County Road 75 Monticello, MN 55362 October 29, 2012 L-MT-12-095 10 CFR 50.54(f)

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ATTN: Document Control Desk Washington, DC 20555-0001 Monticello Nuclear Generating Plant Docket No. 50-263 Renewed Facility Operating License No. DPR-22 Emergency Preparedness (EP) Communications Assessment Requested bv NRC Letter, Request for lnformation Pursuant to Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations 50.54(f) Regarding Recommendations 2.1, 2.3, and 9.3, of the Near-Term Task Force Review of Insights from the Fukushima Dai-ichi Accident, dated March 12, 2012

References:

1. NRC letter, "Request for lnformation Pursuant to Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations 50.54(f) Regarding Recommendations 2.1, 2.3, and 9.3, of the Near-Term Task Force Review of lnsights from the Fukushima Dai-ichi Accident," dated March 12, 2012, ADAMS Accession No. M L I2056A046.
2. NSPM letter, T.J. O'Connor to NRC Document Control Desk, "60-Day Response to NRC Letter, Request for lnformation Pursuant to Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations 50.54(0 Regarding Recommendations 2.7, 2.3, and 9.3, of the Near-Term Task Force Review of lnsights from the Fukushima Dai-ichi Accident, dated March 12,2012," dated May 11, 2012, ADAMS Accession No.

ML12135A396.

3. NSPM letter, T.J. O'Connor to NRC Document Control Desk, "Emergency Preparedness lnformation Requested by NRC Letter, Request for lnformation Pursuant to Title 70 of the Code of Federal Regulations 50.54(f) Regarding Recommendations 2.7, 2.3, and 9.3, of the Near-Term Task Force Review of Insights from the Fukushima Dai-ichi Accident, dated March 12, 2012," dated June 11,2012, ADAMS Accession No.

ML12164A435.

This letter provides the EP Communications Assessment for the Monticello Nuclear Generating Plant (MNGP), as requested by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission

Document Control Desk L-MT-I2-095 Page 2 (NRC) in Recommendation 9.3 of Reference 1. Northern States Power Company, a Minnesota Corporation (NSPM), doing business as Xcel Energy, committed to provide this assessment and a schedule for implementation of the results of the communications assessment by October 31, 2012 (Reference 2). This letter and its enclosure provide the requested information and are submitted in accordance with 10 CFR 50.54(f).

The MNGP EP Communications Assessment identified essential communications capabilities to be maintained following a beyond design basis natural disaster impacting the plant and causing an extended loss of offsite power, considering the assumptions of NEI 10-05, "Assessment of On-Shift Emergency Response Organization Staffing and Capabilities." As an aspect of its overall and ongoing Fukushima response initiatives, NSPM will determine the means to ensure required communications functions will be maintained. Options to enhance the communications capabilities and to meet the functional communications requirements post-event are being identified.

Currently, the primary option being considered and evaluated is the use of stand-alone and plant infrastructure-integrated satellite phones. It is assumed that satellite phone communication will be an integral aspect of maintaining critical communications functions with the Offsite Response Organizations for the 10-mile Emergency Planning Zone (EPZ) and the NRC under the assumptions of NEI 10-05. Backup power supplies for the satellite phones are described in NSPM letter dated June 11, 2012 (Reference 3). Internal communications within the plant (i.e., Emergency Response Facility to Emergency Response Facility) are planned to be assured through the implementation of actions (both communications and power supply) that will maintain a reliable internal phone network. Key offsite response organizations in the impacted area have been or will be provided satellite phone capability.

The following is a summary of actions under development to enhance EP communications:

Function Action Roll-up Table - NEI 12-01 Communications Capabilities

/ 1 1 4.1.ICommunications from I Communications will be maintained post event 1 the Control Room, TSC and through the use of satellite phone technologies EOF with Offsite Response until normal systems are restored.

Facilities 2 4.1.2 NRC Communications Communications with the NRC via the ENS line with the Control Room will be supported by a satellite communications phone (in addition to the phone used for EPZ OROs) within the Control Room.

Document Control Desk L-MT-12-095 Page 3 Function Action Roll-up Table - NEI 12-01 Communications Capabilities 3 4.1.2 NRC Communications Communications with the NRC via the ENS line with the Technical Support will be supported by a satellite communications Center phone (in addition to the phone used for EPZ OROs) within the Technical Support Center.

4 4.1.2 NRC Communications Communications between the site and the NRC via the HPN Network will be supported by satellite communications capabilities in both the TSC and near site EOF.

5 4.1.3 Emergency Response Communications between site ERFs will be Facility Communications (Site maintained post event through the enhanced ERFs) reliability of the site PBX system.

6 4.1.3 ERF Communications The Key Site functions with offsite officials with Offsite Response (Management links, Radiological support, etc)

Organizations will be maintained through the use of satellite phone capabilities in the site ERFs.

7 4.1.4 Field Team Environmental Field Monitoring Teams will be Communications provided with satellite phone capabilities to backup the normal radio links. Team direction from the EOF will similarly be supported by satellite capabilities.

EP communications enhancements will be coordinated with the development of the FLEX strategies four months prior to the beginning of MNGP R27 refueling outage or December 31, 2016, whichever comes first.

Until the enhancements to EP communications at MNGP can be completed, interim corrective actions are being taken as described in Reference 3.

If there are any questions or if additional information is needed, please contact Ms.

Jennie Eckholt, Licensing Engineer, at 612-330-5788.

Summary of Commitments Submittal of the enclosed information completes a commitment in Enclosure 1 of Reference 2. This letter makes the following new commitment:

NSPM will implement recommendations from the Emergency Preparedness Communications Assessment in coordination with development of FLEX mitigating strategies four months prior to the beginning of the MNGP R27 refueling outage or December 31, 2016, whichever comes first.

Document Control Desk L-MT-12-095 Page 4 I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct.

Executed on October 29, 2012

'

Plant Manager, Monticello Nuclear Generating Plant Northern States Power Company - Minnesota Enclosure cc: Administrator, Region Ill, USNRC Director of Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR), USNRC NRR Project Manager, MNGP, USNRC Senior Resident Inspector, MNGP, USNRC

ENCLOSURE Communications Assessment Monticello Nuclear Generating Plant 19 Pages, Follow

Communications Assessment Monticello Nuclear Generating Plant Revision 0: September 28, 2012 Revision 1: October 17, 2012 Revision 2: October 23, 2012 Page 1of 19 Revision 2

Communications Assessment for Monticello Nuclear Generating Plant Index Purpose References

Background

Planned Actions Schedule ATTACHMENT 1: Communication Equipment - Location and Current Configuration 7 ATTACHMENT 2: Communication Equipment - Power Sources 12 ATTACHMENT 3: Communication Equipment - Summary and Improvements 16 Page 2 of 19 Revision 2

Communications Assessment for Monticello Nuclear Generating Plant Purpose In response to the NRC Near-Term task force recommendations a Request for lnformation pursuant to Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations was issued.

Included in that request was information pertaining to communications capabilities following a beyond design basis event. Northern States Power Company - Minnesota (NSPM) responded to this request for information in a letter dated May 1I , 2012 with a plan to respond to the various components of the request. This assessment provides the response to the following commitments. By October 31, 2012:

Provide an assessment of the current communications systems and equipment used during an emergency event to identify any enhancements that may be needed to ensure communications are maintained during a large scale natural event meeting the conditions described for Recommendation 9.3.

Provide an implementation schedule of the time needed to implement the results of the communications assessment.

This report documents the communications assessment required to be performed as a result of the March 2012 USNRC Request for lnformation pertaining to insights from the Fukushima Dai-ichi nuclear event. Attachments Iand 2 provide the details on the current communications capabilities. Attachment 3 and the body of this assessment discuss enhancements and proposed schedules.

References

1. NRC Letter, "Request for lnformation Pursuant to Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations 50.54(f) Regarding Recommendations 2.1, 2.3, and 9.3, of the Near-Term Task Force Review of lnsights from the Fukushima Dai-ichi Accident dated March 12, 2012, ADAMs Accession No. ML12056A046
2. Monticello Nuclear Generating Plant (MNGP) letter dated May 11, 2012 (L-MT-12-044),

60-Day Response to NRC Letter, Request for lnformation Pursuant to Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations 50.54(f) regarding Recommendations 2. 1, 2.3, and 9.3, of the Near-Term Task Force Review of Insights from the Fukushima Dai-ichi Accident, dated March 12,2012

3. Nuclear Energy Institute, Guideline for Assessing Beyond Design Basis Accident Response Staffing and Communications Capabilities (NEI 12-01)
4. MNGP letter dated June II , 2012 (L-MT-12-057), Emergency Preparedness lnformation Requested by NRC Letter, Request for lnformation Pursuant to Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations 50.54(f) regarding Recommendations 2. 1, 2.3, and 9.3, of the Near-Term Task Force Review of lnsights from the Fukushima Dai-ichi Accident, dated March 12,2012 Backaround Pursuant to the USNRC Request for lnformation (~eference1) Northern States Power Company - Minnesota (NSPM) committed in Reference 2 to perform an assessment of communications capabilities using the methodology outlined in NEI 12-01 (Reference 3).

Page 3 of 19 Revision 2

Communications Assessment for Monticello Nuclear Generating Plant The assessment involved reviewing pertinent documents, such as the Emergency Plan, associated Emergency Plan Implementing Procedures, the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report, and responses to INPO IER L1-11-4 (Near-Term Actions to Address the Effects of an Extended Loss of All Power in Response to the Fukushima Dai-ichi Event).

The NRC information request indicates that the communications assessment must assume a total loss of all AC power with severe impact on the infrastructure within a 25 mile radius of the site. The current communications systems were designed and installed to assure reliability of communications, both on-site and off-site, during normal and emergency conditions, The potential on-site issues are related to the required assumption that all AC power is lost. Off-site impact assumptions outlined in NEI 12-01 assumed failure of key infrastructure (e.g. phone lines, radio towers) out to a radius of 25 miles. The assumed off-site issues stem from the assumption that public infrastructure, including public telephone networks, microwave towers, and cellular phone towers/networks are unavailable. Observations and recommendations for technology solutions to various challenges were discussed as the project progressed.

Assessment of Existina Communication Equipment Public Address Svstem The public address (PA) system and the evacuation siren are supplied from off-site power which is backed up by on-site essential batteries and emergency diesel generators.

Telephone Svstem The on-site telephone system for the plant and the technical support center are supplied from non-essential station batteries which are backed up by the non-essential diesel generator. The equipment is not located in safety related buildings.

The telephone system supplies normal off-site communications capability. Off-site communications with the telephone system are dependent on the functionality of the equipment powered off-site and within the 25 mile radius of the plant.

Radio Svstem The site 800 MHz radio equipment is located at the neighboring Sherco Power Plant (a coal plant owned and operated by Xcel Energy Inc., Northern States Power - Minnesota) and is supplied by normal off-site power and backed up by a dedicated liquid propane generator. MNGP also has local repeaters for the radio system which are supplied by the security batteries and security diesel generator.

Sound Powered Phones Sound powered phone jacks are located in the reactor building and the control room and provide alternates to the radios.

Page 4 of 19 Revision 2

Communications Assessment for Monticello Nuclear Generating Plant Assessment of Existinq Communications Equipment to Meet the Guidance in NEI 12-01.

Attachment 3 provides details of the specific functions supported by the communications enhancements.

Off-site Communications Communications with the off-site response organizations (OROs) depend on the on-site telephone system and the PBX system. Some of these telephones are direct lines and do not pass through the PBX; however, they do pass through the local phone company central office. Per the assessment assumptions, all such lines are assumed to be non-functional. Similarly, based on the assumptions of NEI 12-01, cell phones are assumed to be non-functional due to the impact on cell towers in the impacted 25-mile area. Ten-mile EPZ Off-site Response Organizations are required to receive timely (within15-minute) notifications of Classifications and/or Protective Action Recommendations.

For MNGP, the EOF for the assumed event is expected to be the approved back-up EOF located in downtown Minneapolis, outside the 25-mile impact zone. Dose Assessment and communication of key radiological data and any required Protective Action Recommendations will be performed from the fully functional back-up EOF.

Field Teams are dispatched from the site and use the 800 MHz radio system to communicate with the EOF with cell phone back-up. The radios in the vehicles are powered by the vehicle's electrical system. With the postulated loss of AC power to the on-site repeater, these radios will be limited to line of sight effectiveness. Satellite phones will be provided as a tertiary means of communication.

Planned actions:

The MNGP Communications Assessment identified essential communications capabilities to be maintained following a beyond design basis natural disaster impacting the plant and causing an extended loss of off-site power, considering the assumptions of NEI 10-05. As an aspect of its overall and ongoing Fukushima response initiatives, NSPM will determine the means to ensure required communications functions will be maintained. Options to enhance the communications capabilities and to meet the functional communications requirements post-event are being identified.

Following a station blackout and loss of all power in the surrounding 25 miles, the plant telephone system will only be available for approximately 90 minutes, based on battery capacity. Procedural guidance will be developed to supply critical plant telephone system components from portable diesel generators. Existing satellite capabilities may be enhanced. An improvement being evaluated to the plant telephone system could allow the site telephone system to call off-site during a station blackout by integrating a satellite phone into the telephone system.

Page 5 of 19 Revision 2

Communications Assessment for Monticello Nuclear Generating Plant Currently, the primary option being considered and evaluated is the use of stand-alone and plant infrastructure-integrated satellite phones. It is assumed that satellite phone communication will be an integral aspect of maintaining critical communications functions with the Off-site Response Organizations for the 10-mile Emergency Planning Zone (EPZ) and the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission under the assumptions of NEI 10-05. Backup power supplies for the satellite phones are described in NSPM letter dated June 11, 2b12 (Reference 4). Internal communications within the plant (i.e.,

Emergency Response Facility to Emergency Response Facility) is planned to be assured through the implementation of actions (both communications and power supply) that will maintain a reliable internal phone network. Key off-site response organizations in the impacted area have been or will be provided satellite phone capability.

A summary of actions under development include:

Function Action Roll-up Table - NEI 12-01 Communications Capabilities 1 4.1.1 Communicationsfrom the Communications will be maintained post event through the use of Control Room, TSC and EOF with satellite phone technologies until normal systems are restored.

Off-site Response Facilities 2 4.1.2 NRC Communications with the Communications with the NRC via the ENS line will be supported by a Control Room satellite communications phone (in addition to the phone used for EPZ OROs) within the Control Room.

3 4.1.2 NRC Communications with the Communications with the NRCvia the ENS line will be supported by a Technical Support Center satellite communications phone (in addition to the phone used for EPZ OROs) within the Technical Support Center.

4 4.1.2 NRC Communicationsvia the Communications between the site and the NRC will be supported by HPN Network satellite communications capabilities in both the TSC and near site EOF.

5 4.1.3 Emergency Response Facility Communications between site ERFs will be maintained post event Communications (Site ERFs) through the enhanced reliability of the site PBX system.

6 4.1.3 ERF Communications with The Key Site functions with off-site officials (Management links, Off-site Response Organizations Radiological support, etc) will be maintained through the use of satellite phones capabilities in the site ERFs.

7 4.1.4 Field Team Communications Environmental Field Monitoring Teams will be provided with satellite phone capabilities to backup the normal radio links. Team direction from the EOF will similarly be supported by satellite capabilities.

Schedule The actions addressed above will be coordinated with the development of the FLEX strategies four months prior to the beginning of MNGP R27 refueling outage or December 31, 2016, whichever comes first.

Page 6 of 19 Revision 2

Communications Assessment for Monticello Nuclear Generating Plant

-

ATTACHMENT 1: Communications Equipment Location and Current Configuration Equipment protected from the below hazards Protected from Protected from Protected from Comments Primary System Seismic Flooding Wind SystemlEquipment Component a s defined in this a s defined in this a s defined in this Location document document document Distributed, the Yes Yes Yes The plant evacuation siren is Plant Public Address handsets, amplifiers located on top of the reactor System (PA) and speakers are The essential part of The essential part of The essential part of building and is therefore located in various the system resides in the system is housed in the system is inside of protected from flooding but has areas of the plant seismic structures flood protected reinforced solid not been analyzed for seismic or buildings concrete structures wind.

Plant Private Branch Plant No Yes No None Exchange (PBX) Communications Telephone System Room in the Plant The communications The Plant The communications Administration room has not been Administration Building room is located in an Building seismically analyzed is within the flood interior room of the protection zone building but has not been analyzed for wind Distributed No No No The connection to the local Local Commercial commercial telephone is in an Telephone System unprotected building and the rest of the commercial network is outside of the plant's control No No No None TSC - OSC Emergency Work Status Plant PAB The Plant The PAB Communications Communications Administration Communications Room in the Plant Room has not Building is within the Room has not been Administration been seismically flood protection zone analyzed for wind Building analyzed The Plant The Plant Communications PEB Engineering Building Engineering Room in the Plant Communications is outside the flood Building has not Engineering Room has not protection zone been analyzed for Building been seismically wind analyzed Page 7 of 19 Revision 2

Communications Assessment for Monticello Nuclear Generating Plant

-

ATTACHMENT I:Communications Equipment Location and Current Configuration Equipment protected from the below hazards Protected from Protected from Protected from Comments Primary System Seismic Flooding Wind SystemlEquipment Component a s defined in this a s defined in this a s defined in this Location document document document No No No None CR - TSC OGL (Ops Group Leader) Plant PAB The Plant The PAB Communications Communications Administration Communications Room in the Plant Room has not Building is within the Room has not been Administration been seismically flood protection zone analyzed for wind Building analyzed The Plant The Plant Communications PEB Engineering Building Engineering Room in the Plant Communications is outside the flood Building has not Engineering Room has not protection zone been analyzed for Building been seismically wind analyzed No No No None TSC EGL (Engineering Group Leader) - EOF Plant PAB The Plant The PAB TSS (Technical Support Communications Communications Administration Communications Supervisor) Room in the Plant Room has not Building is within the Room has not been Administration been seismically flood protection zone analyzed for wind Building analyzed The Plant The PEB has not Communications PEB Engineering Building been analyzed for Room in the Plant Communications is outside the flood wind Engineering Room has not protection zone The MTC has not Building been seismically The Training Center been analyzed for Communications analyzed is outside the flood wind Room in the MTC protection zone Monticello Training Communications Center Room has not been seismically analyzed Page 8 of 19 Revision 2

Communications Assessment for Monticello Nuclear Generating Plant

-

ATTACHMENT I:Communications Equipment Location and Current Configuration Equipment protected from the below hazards Protected from Protected from Protected from Comments Primary System Seismic Flooding Wind SystemlEquipment Component a s defined in this a s defined in this a s defined in this Location document document document No No No None TSC ED - EOF ED -

SM - JIC Plant PAB The Plant The PAB Communications Communications Administration Communications Room in the Plant Room has not Building is within the Room has not been Administration been seismically flood protection zone analyzed for wind Building analyzed The Plant The PEB has not Communications PEB Engineering Building been analyzed for Room in the Plant Communications is outside the flood wind Engineering Room has not protection zone The MTC has not Building been seismically The Training Center been analyzed for Communications analyzed is outside the flood wind Room in the MTC protection zone Monticello Training Communications Center Room has not been seismically analyzed Voice Over Internet NA NA NA NA None Protocol (NIA if Not Applicable)

On-site Portable NA Telephones (Spectralink)

(Not currently in EP Plan)

N/A if not applicable Page 9 of 19 Revision 2

Communications Assessment for Monticello Nuclear Generating Plant

-

ATTACHMENT 1: Communications Equipment Location and Current Configuration Equipment protected from the below hazards Protected from Protected from Protected from Comments Primary System Seismic Flooding Wind SystemlEquipment Component a s defined in this a s defined in this a s defined in this Location document document document NRC Communications Phones are in the No No No Much of the communication (ENS & HPN) Phone Technical Support circuits are not housed in LineICircuit Center in the protected structures and the Plant Engineering commercial portion of the system Buildihg is unprotected and outside of the The phone lines site's control are routed through the Plant Communications Room in the Plant Administration Building The lines are routed through the Microwave House where they connect to the commercial telephone system Distributed No No No The off-site cellular system is Off-site Cellular unprotected and is outside of the Telephones site's control Distributed No No No None Satellite Telephones Sherburne County No No No The trunking controls for the 450/800/900 MHz Radio Generating Station system are housed in the System Security Building Neither of these The buildings are Neither of these security building at the (Trunking) and buildings have been outside the flood buildings have been neighboring coal generating plant Monticello seismically analyzed protection zone analyzed for wind and the repeaters at the site are Security Building housed in the security building (Repeaters)

Page 10 of 19 Revision 2

Communications Assessment for Monticello Nuclear Generating Plant

-

ATTACHMENT I:Communications Equipment Location and Current Configuration Equipment protected from the below hazards Protected from Protected from Protected from Comments Primary System Seismic Flooding Wind SystemlEquipment Component a s defined in this a s defined in this as defined in this Location document document document Distributedwithin the Yes Yes Yes None Sound Powered Reactor Building, Telephone System Turbine Building, and This system resides This system is located This system resides in Control RoomICable in seismic structures in structures within the re-enforced solid Spreading Room flood protection zone concrete structures 800 MHz Radio System No No No See the 800 MHz Radio System and Field Monitoring Team and Off-site Cellular Off-site Cellular Telephones Above Communications Telephones Diesel Fuel Oil Storage Emergency Diesel Day Yes Yes Yes None used for fueling portable Tank Rooms in the equipment used for Emergency Diesel This system resides in a This system is located in This system resides in a communications Generator Building seismic structure structures within the flood re-enforced solid protection zone concrete structure Technical Support Center Plant Engineering No No No The TSC is in an interior location of (TSC) Building the Plant Engineering Building but The Plant Engineering The Plant Engineering The Plant Engineering has not been analyzed for any of Building has not been Building is outside the Building has not been these criteria seismically analyzed flood protection zone analyzed for wind Emergency Operations Monticello Training No No No The EOF is in an interior location of Facility (EOF) If within 25 Center the Training Center but has not been miles of the station The Training Center has The Training Center is The Training Center has analyzed for any of these criteria not been seismically outside the flood not been analyzed for analyzed protection zone wind Page 11of 19 Revision 2

Communications Assessment for Monticello Nuclear Generating Plant ATTACHMENT 2: Communication Equipment Power Sources -

Equipment Power Source(s)

Primary Power Alternate Power Backup power Comments Supply (List the Supply (List the power availability (e.g.,

power source) source) batteries, portable Will interim actions be taken to enhance the power SystemlEquipment generators, etc.) supplies?

YeslNo Plant Public Most of the local The PA system can Y-10 is also backed up No Address System speakers and alternatively be by the # I 3 Essential (PA) amplifiers are supplied by Y-10. Battery normally supplied L-34 and Y-10 are from L-34 (Plant backed up by Off-site Power) Emergency Diesel Generators.

Primary (Plant Y-90 Non-Essential Y-90 can also be Y-90 is backed up by A communications portable diesel has been purchased Admin Building) UninterruptableAC supplied from # I 3 # I 7 Non-essential and will be available as an alternate supply to the PBX Private Branch Power Panel is Non-Essential Diesel Batteries Exchange (PBX) normally supplied Generator Telephone System from LC-108 (Plant Off-site Power)

TSC (Plant Y-94 Non-Essential 12.5 KV Commercial Y-94 is also supplied No Engineering UninterruptableAC (Non-Plant) Off-site by # I 7 Non-essential Building) Power Panel (Plant Power Batteries Plant Private Off-site Power) 0r Branch Exchange # I 3 Non-Essential (PBX) Telephone Diesel Generator System EOF (Monticello Off-site Power (this 13.8 KV Plant Power None No Training Center) power source is via sub-yard breaker Plant Private different from the 1N3 Branch Exchange normal off-site (PBX) Telephone source for the plant System and is fed from the local community distribution grid)

Page 12 of 19 Revision 2

Communications Assessment for Monticello Nuclear Generating Plant ATTACHMENT 2: Communication Equipment Power Sources -

Equipment Power Source(s)

Primary Power Alternate Power Backup power Comments Supply (List the Supply (List the power availability (e.g.,

power source) source) batteries, portable Will interim actions be taken to enhance the power SystemlEquipment generators, etc.) supplies?

YeslNo Local Commercial Unknown Unknown Unknown The local commercial telephone system is not owned or Telephone System operated by the site and is therefore outside of the site's control Voice Over NIA NIA NIA Internet Protocol (NIA if Not Applicable)

On-site Portable NIA NIA NIA Telephones (Spectralink)

(Not currently in EP Plan)

NIA if not applicable NRC Unknown Unknown Unknown The NRC phone lines and circuits rely on commercial Communications equipment which is not owned or operated by the site and (ENS & HPN) is therefore outside of the site's control Phone LineICircuit Off-site Cellular Unknown Unknown Unknown Off-site cellular telephones rely on commercial equipment Telephones which is not owned or operated by the site-andis therefore outside of the site's control Satellite Local Battery None Spare batteries are No Telephones (attached to the unit) located in each facility which has these devices 45018001900 MHz Trunking relies on Local Repeater is The Trunking system is No Radio System off-site power backed by security backed by a dedicated (local community UPS which is supplied liquid propane distribution grid) by the security diesel generator Local backup generator (backup repeater relies on repeater only provides plant power a single channel if off-site power is lost)

Page 13 of 19 Revision 2

Communications Assessment for Monticello Nuclear Generating Plant ATTACHMENT 2: Communication Equipment Power Sources -

Equipment Power Source(s)

Primary Power Alternate Power Backup power Comments Supply (List the Supply (List the power availability (e.g.,

power source) source) batteries, portable Will interim actions be taken to enhance the power SystemlEquipment generators, etc.) supplies?

YeslNo Sound Powered NIA (This system NIA NIA No Telephone System does not require any external power)

Field Monitoring See 800 MHz Radio See 800 MHz Radio See 800 MHz Radio No Team and Off-site Cellular and Off-site Cellular and Off-site Cellular Communications Telephone System Telephone System Telephone System Y-94 Non-Essential 12.5 KV Commercial Y-94 is also supplied No Technical support UninterruptableAC (Non-Plant) Off-site by # 7INon-essential Center (TSC) Power Panel (Plant Power Batteries Off-site Power) or

  1. 3INon-Essential Diesel Generator Emergency 1N3 or Off-site None None No Operations Facility Power (EOF) If within 25 miles of the station Page 14 of 19 Revision 2

Communications Assessment for Monticello Nuclear Generating Plant ATTACHMENT 3: Communication Equipment Summary and Improvements -

Emergency Minimum Primary Primary Backup Backup Planned or Refer to Response Facility Communications Method Method Method(s) Method(s) Potential Following Links Described in Available Described in Available Improvement Section for site E-Plan following site E-Plan following Identified? Additional Assumed Assumed NEI Information NEI 12-01 2.2 12-01 2.2 4.1.1 Notifications to, and communications with, w s [per 10 CFR 50 Appendix E.1V.D and E.9.a]

Control Room e Shift Emergency Direct Phone 800 MHz radios 800 MHz radios Satellite Integrate Note 1 Communicator Line 1 Fax Line Telephone Satellite Phones (SEC) into Protected Plant PBX System Technical Support

  • Emergency Direct Phone 800 MHz radios 800 MHz radios Satellite Integrate Note 1 Center (TSC) Communicators Line I Fax Line Telephone Satellite Phones into Protected Plant PBX System Emergency Operations Emergency Direct Phone 800 MHz radios 800 MHz radios Satellite Integrate Note 1 Facility (EOF) Communicators Line/ Fax Line Telephone Satellite Phones into Protected Plant PBX System for Primary EOF Back-up EOF 4.1.2 Notifications to, and communications with, the Nuclear Requlatow Commission (NRC) Headquarters Incident Response Center and the appropriate NRC Regional Office Operations Center [per 10 CFR 50 Appendix E.1V.D and E.9.d]

Control Room

  • Emergency Federal Satellite Satellite Satellite Integrate Note 1 Notification System Telephone Telephone Telephone Telephone Satellite Phones (ENS) System into Protected
  • Emergency Plant PBX Response Data System System (ERDS)

Page 15 of 19 Revision 2

Communications Assessment for Monticello Nuclear Generating Plant ATTACHMENT 3: Communication Equipment Summary and Improvements -

Emergency Minimum Primary Primary Backup Backup Planned or Refer to Response Facility Communications Method Method Method(s) Method(s) Potential Following Links Described in Available Described in Available Improvement Section for site E-Plan following site E-Plan following Identified? Additional Assumed Assumed NEI Information NEI 12-01 2.2 12-01 2.2 Technical Support Emergency Federal Satellite Satellite Satellite lntegrate Note 1 Center (TSC) Notification System Telephone Telephone Telephone Telephone Satellite Phones (ENS) System into Protected a Health Physics Plant PBX Network (HPN) System 4.1.3 Communications between licensee emerqencv response facilities [per 10 CFR 50 Appendix E.9.c. Additional links that support performance of critical response functions are also specified.] The minimum communications links to support this function are listed below by facility. For example, if the normally used telephone system cannot be restored to service, these links could rely upon some combination of radio, sound-powered and satellite-based communications systems.

Control Room 1 per unit Direct Phone No Portable Cell No Integrate Note 1 Line Plant Page Satellite Phones Monticello ERFs system into Protected will be Plant Radio Plant PBX supported by System System the enhanced Sound Powered PBX system.

CR to TSC ERO responders requiring communication with off-site responders will be provided an integrated capability.

Page 16 of 19 Revision 2

Communications Assessment for Monticello Nuclear Generating Plant ATTACHMENT 3: Communication Equipment Summary and Improvements -

Emergency Minimum Primary Primary Backup Backup Planned or Refer to Response Facility Communications Method Method Method(s) Method(s) Potential Following Links Described in Available Described in Available Improvement Section for site E-Plan following site E-Plan following Identified? Additional Assumed Assumed NEI Information NEI 12-01 2.2 12-01 2.2 Technical Support I each for: Direct Phone Limited Satellite Satellite Integrate Note 1 Center (TSC) SeniorILead TSC Line Satellite Telephone Telephone multiple Satellite Manager Telephone Cell Phone Plant Page Phones into Operations Plant Page Plant Page system Protected Plant Coordination system system PBX System Maintenance 800 MHz Coordination Radio

  • Engineering System

- Coordination Radiological Support Operational Support 1 each for: Direct Phone No Plant Page No Integrate Note 1 Center (OSC) SeniorILead OSC Line system Satellite Phones Monticello Manager Plant Radio into Protected ERFs will be Radiological System Plant PBX supported by Support System the enhanced PBX system.

Additional response ERO coordination links for responders multi-unit sites: requiring 1 for each position communication providing Unit In- with off-site Plant Team responders will Coordination. be provided an integrated capability.

Page 17 of 19 Revision 2

Communications Assessment for Monticello Nuclear Generating Plant ATTACHMENT 3: Communication Equipment Summary and Improvements -

Emergency Minimum Primary Primary Backup Backup Planned or Refer to Response Facility Communications Method Method Method@) Method(s) Potential Following Links Described in Available Described in Available Improvement Section for site E-Plan following site E-Plan following Identified? Additional Assumed Assumed NEI Information NEI 12-01 2.2 12-01 2.2 Emergency Operations 1 each for: Direct Phone No Portable Cell No Integrate Note 1 Facility (EOF) SeniorILead Line Plant Page multiple Satellite Monticello ERFs Manager system Phones into will be Key Protective Plant Radio Protected Plant supported by Measures System PBX System the enhanced Operations or PBX system.

Technical Support (as ERO needed to support responders performance of dose requiring projections, communication formulation of PARS with off-site and plant status responders will updates to OR0 be provided an authorities). integrated capability.

Back-up Emergency There are no Normal Means Yes Any normally Yes Install additional NIA Operations Facility enhanced functional are Available available means Satellite requirements for the capability in Back-up Facility Back-up EOF (Greater than 25 miles from the site)

Joint Information The Joint NIA Portable Cell or NIA Integrate Note 1 Center (JIC) . 1 for Senior Manager Information other direct dial Satellite Phones Center is lines into Protected located outside Plant PBX the 25 miles System (this zone and is commitment protected by provides a line back-up power. from on-site Direct Phone ERFs to support Line information ,flow to the JIC Page 18 of 19 Revision 2

Communications Assessment for Monticello Nuclear Generating Plant ATTACHMENT 3: Communication Equipment - Summary and Improvements Emergency Minimum Primary Primary Backup Backup Planned or Refer to Response Facility Communications Method Method Method(s) Method(s) Potential Following Links Described in Available Described in Available Improvement Section for site E-Plan following site E-Plan following Identified? Additional Assumed Assumed NEI Information NEI 12-01 2.2 12-01 2.2 4.1.4 Communications with fieldloff-site monitorinq teams [per 10 CFR 50 Appendix E.9.c]

a Technical Support e TSC Field Team 800 MHz Radio Cell Phone No backup for No backup for Portable Center (TSC) Communicator cell phone cell phone satellite phones Emergency e TSC Field Team Operations Facility Communicator (EOF)

Field Team 1 Field Team I 800 MHz Radio Cell Phone No backup for No backup for Portable Field Team 2 Field Team 2 cell phone cell phone satellite phones 4.1.5 Communications with other Federal aqencies as described in the site emergency plan (e.g., the US Coast Guard) [per 10 CFR 50 Appendix E.9.b]

Emergency Operations EOF Off-site There are no There are no There are no There are no Proposed Note 1 Facility (EOF) Communicator commitments in commitments in commitments in commitments in satellite phone the Monticello the Monticello the Monticello the Monticello system would Emergency Plan Emergency Plan Emergency Plan Emergency Plan provide for direct for direct for direct for direct communication contact with contact with contact with contact with as required.

other agencies. other agencies. other agencies. other agencies.

NOTE 1: Proposed satellite system provides satellite telephone access while PBX is on backup power. If the PBX has loss of power a direct satellite telephone line is routed to specific areas. The satellite telephone docking station will have backup power to maintain this secondary function. If the direct line between the satellite telephone dock and the specific areas is lost, the satellite telephone can be removed from the docking station and used outside on built-in battery source.

Page 19 of 19 Revision 2

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