ML091330453: Difference between revisions

From kanterella
Jump to navigation Jump to search
(Created page by program invented by StriderTol)
 
(Created page by program invented by StriderTol)
 
Line 30: Line 30:
S8 1&2 PSAR Amendmen t 56 November 1985 It is necessary to demonstrate that equipaent used to perfora a required safety function for Seabrook Nuclear Station-Units 1&2 are capable of function1.ng properly in the nOnla!.abnormal, or accident enviromaental conditions to which they could be exposed.As stated in NUUG-0588(1), 8IDOng these enviroDliental conditions are the elevated teaperature, huaidi t.y., and/or pres8ure which could result from the postulated rup.ture of high energy lines which may be in the vicinity of this equipment.
S8 1&2 PSAR Amendmen t 56 November 1985 It is necessary to demonstrate that equipaent used to perfora a required safety function for Seabrook Nuclear Station-Units 1&2 are capable of function1.ng properly in the nOnla!.abnormal, or accident enviromaental conditions to which they could be exposed.As stated in NUUG-0588(1), 8IDOng these enviroDliental conditions are the elevated teaperature, huaidi t.y., and/or pres8ure which could result from the postulated rup.ture of high energy lines which may be in the vicinity of this equipment.
The purpo8e of this study 1s to evaluate the consequences of high energy line breaks outside containaent and develop the enviro1Ul8ntal envelopes for Class IE equipment.
The purpo8e of this study 1s to evaluate the consequences of high energy line breaks outside containaent and develop the enviro1Ul8ntal envelopes for Class IE equipment.
31-1 2.0 METHOD OF ANALYSIS SB 1&2 PSAR AmendlDen t 56 Nove.ber 1985 Each of the high energy lines and all of the Class IE equipment outside containment were identified and located.Based on this information, the various plant buildings were nodallz:ed and the high energy line break (BELB)locations chosen in such a way as to provide an accurate representation of the environmental conditions that would result in the vicinity of the Class IE equip.ent following a postulated HELB.2.1 Mass and Energy Releases Each high energy line was evaluated on the basis of the methods of Standard Review Plans 3.6.1 and 3.6.2(2)to deteraine the types.areas, and locations of postulated ruptures that would result in the most severe environmental conditions at each of the Class IE equip-mente The break releases were calculated using the Moody critical flow model (3)and accounting for physical restrictions within the system (e.g.flow and pressure control valves)and the frictional effects of the piping systea.These release rates were taken to be constant.i.e.no decay of the reservoir pressure was assu.ed.until isolation of the ruptured line was initiated or.as in the case of the closed Bot Water Beating Systems.until the piping inventory was depleted.t:he methods and 88suaptions employed in calculating the...s and energy release rates for each high energy l1ne are outlined in Table 2.1-1.As noted in this table.isolation of many of these lines will be accomplished by the use of redundant teaperature detectors in various plant areas that.in the event of elevated temperaturei.
31-1  
 
===2.0 METHOD===
OF ANALYSIS SB 1&2 PSAR AmendlDen t 56 Nove.ber 1985 Each of the high energy lines and all of the Class IE equipment outside containment were identified and located.Based on this information, the various plant buildings were nodallz:ed and the high energy line break (BELB)locations chosen in such a way as to provide an accurate representation of the environmental conditions that would result in the vicinity of the Class IE equip.ent following a postulated HELB.2.1 Mass and Energy Releases Each high energy line was evaluated on the basis of the methods of Standard Review Plans 3.6.1 and 3.6.2(2)to deteraine the types.areas, and locations of postulated ruptures that would result in the most severe environmental conditions at each of the Class IE equip-mente The break releases were calculated using the Moody critical flow model (3)and accounting for physical restrictions within the system (e.g.flow and pressure control valves)and the frictional effects of the piping systea.These release rates were taken to be constant.i.e.no decay of the reservoir pressure was assu.ed.until isolation of the ruptured line was initiated or.as in the case of the closed Bot Water Beating Systems.until the piping inventory was depleted.t:he methods and 88suaptions employed in calculating the...s and energy release rates for each high energy l1ne are outlined in Table 2.1-1.As noted in this table.isolation of many of these lines will be accomplished by the use of redundant teaperature detectors in various plant areas that.in the event of elevated temperaturei.
will send closure signals to redundant isolation valves present in the 31-2 SB 1&2 PSAR Amendment 56 November 1985 high energy lines.The locations of these temperature detectors are provided in Figures 2.1-1, 2.1-2, and 2.1-3.The 1I&8S and energy release rates used in evaluating the pressure, temperature, and huaiclity responses throughout the various plant: areas are calculated and defined in References 6, 7, and 8.2.2 Pressure/Temperature/Humidity Transients The environmental conditions that result due to postulated high energy line ruptures were determined' for the following areas: 1.Primary Auxiliary Building (PAB)2.Containment Enclosure Area (CEA)3.Fuel Storage Building (PSB)4.Main Pipe Chase 5.Tank Farm Area (TFA)6.Waste Processing Building/Primary Auxiliary Building (WPB/PAB)Chase For BEL!other than Bot Water beating Line Breaks (BWBLB), the envir-oDllental Responses of the PAB, CEA, TFA, WPB/PAB Chase, and KS/FW Pipe Chase were calculated using the COMPRESS (4)coaputer program.Using the break IIIlSS and energy releases and the building nodaliza-tions discussed previously, COMPRESS calculates the transient pres-Bures, temperatures, and humidities that would occur throughout the plant building following these ruptures.The aethods and assumptions used in these pressure/temperature calculations agree with those of NUREG-oS88(1)*Table 2.2-1 lists the ambient conditions, building initial conditions, and other pertinent design basis information used in analyzing these environmental transients.
will send closure signals to redundant isolation valves present in the 31-2 SB 1&2 PSAR Amendment 56 November 1985 high energy lines.The locations of these temperature detectors are provided in Figures 2.1-1, 2.1-2, and 2.1-3.The 1I&8S and energy release rates used in evaluating the pressure, temperature, and huaiclity responses throughout the various plant: areas are calculated and defined in References 6, 7, and 8.2.2 Pressure/Temperature/Humidity Transients The environmental conditions that result due to postulated high energy line ruptures were determined' for the following areas: 1.Primary Auxiliary Building (PAB)2.Containment Enclosure Area (CEA)3.Fuel Storage Building (PSB)4.Main Pipe Chase 5.Tank Farm Area (TFA)6.Waste Processing Building/Primary Auxiliary Building (WPB/PAB)Chase For BEL!other than Bot Water beating Line Breaks (BWBLB), the envir-oDllental Responses of the PAB, CEA, TFA, WPB/PAB Chase, and KS/FW Pipe Chase were calculated using the COMPRESS (4)coaputer program.Using the break IIIlSS and energy releases and the building nodaliza-tions discussed previously, COMPRESS calculates the transient pres-Bures, temperatures, and humidities that would occur throughout the plant building following these ruptures.The aethods and assumptions used in these pressure/temperature calculations agree with those of NUREG-oS88(1)*Table 2.2-1 lists the ambient conditions, building initial conditions, and other pertinent design basis information used in analyzing these environmental transients.
The ambient and initial conditions were 31-3 58162 rsAi AmendlDen t S6 November 1985 chosen so as to maximize the temperature response that would result from these postulated HELB.In addition, the Uchida condensing steam heat transfer correlation 1s used during the condensing mode while a convective beat transfer coefficient of 2.0 Btu/hr-ft2-°r is used otherwise.
The ambient and initial conditions were 31-3 58162 rsAi AmendlDen t S6 November 1985 chosen so as to maximize the temperature response that would result from these postulated HELB.In addition, the Uchida condensing steam heat transfer correlation 1s used during the condensing mode while a convective beat transfer coefficient of 2.0 Btu/hr-ft2-°r is used otherwise.
Line 103: Line 106:
0 1.-------.-II I,n, r r n;;;-_T 2 345678910<<'
0 1.-------.-II I,n, r r n;;;-_T 2 345678910<<'
2 TIME rSEC)3-45&#xa3;3-789 1 1.0)z It tot CI:s-""'0 (X)\Jl\n 0' 5B 1&2 PSAR Amendment 56 November 1985 temperature detection system is use, the peak pressures correspond to approxiaately 95 seconds after the break.These peak pressures are listed in Table 3.2-2.The relative hwrldity throughout all CEA compartaents would reach 100%.3.3 Main Steam/Feedwater Pipe Chase The breaks ev&1uated for tbe Main Steam/Peedwater Pipe Chase are listed in Table 3.3-1.It was concluded that the MS line breaks will result in IIOre severe environmental conditions tban the FW line breaks.Figures 3.3-1A and 3.3-1B define the KS/FW Pipe Chase arrangement and nodalization.
2 TIME rSEC)3-45&#xa3;3-789 1 1.0)z It tot CI:s-""'0 (X)\Jl\n 0' 5B 1&2 PSAR Amendment 56 November 1985 temperature detection system is use, the peak pressures correspond to approxiaately 95 seconds after the break.These peak pressures are listed in Table 3.2-2.The relative hwrldity throughout all CEA compartaents would reach 100%.3.3 Main Steam/Feedwater Pipe Chase The breaks ev&1uated for tbe Main Steam/Peedwater Pipe Chase are listed in Table 3.3-1.It was concluded that the MS line breaks will result in IIOre severe environmental conditions tban the FW line breaks.Figures 3.3-1A and 3.3-1B define the KS/FW Pipe Chase arrangement and nodalization.
The MS/FW Pipe Chase reaches a 1IAX11DWIl of 325&deg;'for a spectrum of MS line break sizes from 0.10 ft 2 to 1.0 ft 2*Theperature transient resulting from a 0.10 ft 2 break 1s provided in Figure and the results are summarized in Table 3.3-2.3.4 Tank Farm Area The break evaluated for the rank Fara Area is listed in Table 3.4-1.Since no HELB temperature detectors are located in the Tank.Farm Area.the Auxiliary Steam line break releases will continue until the operator detects the break and isolates the line.Figure 3.4-1A defines the nodal parame ters used for the Tank P arm Area HELB analysis.The resulting te-.perature aDd pressure transients are provided in Figures 3.4-1B and 3.4-1C, respectively, and the peak values summarized in Table 3.4-2.31-7 5B 1&2 FSAB.Amendment 56 November 1985 3.5 Waste processing Building/Primary Auxillary Building Chase The WPB/PAB Chase.which is located between the WPB and Column Line A'I of the PAD.contains both Class IE equipment and several Auxiliary Steam and Condensate lines.The line ruptures which have been eval-uated are listed in Table 3.5-1.Pigure 3.5-1A defines the nodal parameters used for evaluation of the WPB/PAB Chase response to postulated BEL!.Figures 3.5-1B and 3.5-1C prOVide the temperature and pressure transients that result for the enveloping BEL!.The peak values for pressure and teaperature are summarized in Table 3.5-2.31-8 4.0 BWHLB ANALYSES AND RESULTS SB1,2 FSAR Amendment 56 November 1985 The environmental response following postulated HWHLB has been calculated for those plant buildings with Bot Water Beating (HWH)systems which operate in the high energy region.i.e.pressure greater than 275 psig or temper-ature greater thao 200 0 r.The HWHLB postulated are listed in Table 4.0-1.The results of these HWHLB analyses are presented individually io the follow-ing sections and are summarized 1n Table 4.0-2.4.1 Primary Auxiliary Building The peak environmental conditions at the 53'elevation of the PA!due to postulated HWBLB were found to be 110&deg;'with a relative humidity of 100%.These conditions are enveloped by the consequences resulting from other HELB postulated to occur in the PAS.4.2 Containment Enclosure Area The BWH system piping which serves the PAS and PSB passes through the CEA.A postulated rupture of one of these l1nel results in tempera-tures and relative humidities throughout the CEA of approximately 106&deg;F and 100%.respectively.
The MS/FW Pipe Chase reaches a 1IAX11DWIl of 325&deg;'for a spectrum of MS line break sizes from 0.10 ft 2 to 1.0 ft 2*Theperature transient resulting from a 0.10 ft 2 break 1s provided in Figure and the results are summarized in Table 3.3-2.3.4 Tank Farm Area The break evaluated for the rank Fara Area is listed in Table 3.4-1.Since no HELB temperature detectors are located in the Tank.Farm Area.the Auxiliary Steam line break releases will continue until the operator detects the break and isolates the line.Figure 3.4-1A defines the nodal parame ters used for the Tank P arm Area HELB analysis.The resulting te-.perature aDd pressure transients are provided in Figures 3.4-1B and 3.4-1C, respectively, and the peak values summarized in Table 3.4-2.31-7 5B 1&2 FSAB.Amendment 56 November 1985 3.5 Waste processing Building/Primary Auxillary Building Chase The WPB/PAB Chase.which is located between the WPB and Column Line A'I of the PAD.contains both Class IE equipment and several Auxiliary Steam and Condensate lines.The line ruptures which have been eval-uated are listed in Table 3.5-1.Pigure 3.5-1A defines the nodal parameters used for evaluation of the WPB/PAB Chase response to postulated BEL!.Figures 3.5-1B and 3.5-1C prOVide the temperature and pressure transients that result for the enveloping BEL!.The peak values for pressure and teaperature are summarized in Table 3.5-2.31-8  
 
===4.0 BWHLB===
ANALYSES AND RESULTS SB1,2 FSAR Amendment 56 November 1985 The environmental response following postulated HWHLB has been calculated for those plant buildings with Bot Water Beating (HWH)systems which operate in the high energy region.i.e.pressure greater than 275 psig or temper-ature greater thao 200 0 r.The HWHLB postulated are listed in Table 4.0-1.The results of these HWHLB analyses are presented individually io the follow-ing sections and are summarized 1n Table 4.0-2.4.1 Primary Auxiliary Building The peak environmental conditions at the 53'elevation of the PA!due to postulated HWBLB were found to be 110&deg;'with a relative humidity of 100%.These conditions are enveloped by the consequences resulting from other HELB postulated to occur in the PAS.4.2 Containment Enclosure Area The BWH system piping which serves the PAS and PSB passes through the CEA.A postulated rupture of one of these l1nel results in tempera-tures and relative humidities throughout the CEA of approximately 106&deg;F and 100%.respectively.
Due to the location of this piping.very localized conditions may be slightly more severe although the large recirculation air flows will tend to mitigate these effects to a certain extent.With the exception of these localized effects the environmental conditions that result from a eves letdown line break will envelope those resulting from a HWBLB.4.3 Fuel Storage Building Since the hot water heating piping are the only high energy lines present in the FSB.the environmental conditions that result fro.a postulated HWHLB will define the enveloping conditions for high 3I-9 S8 1&2 PSAR A1Dendment S6 November 1985 energy line ruptures.The resulting envlrol1lleotal conditions are lOODF with a 100%relative humidity.4.4 Emergency Feemwgter Pumphouse Since the hot water heating piping are the only high energy lines.present in the EFWPH, the environmental conditions that result from a postulated HWBLB nil define the enveloping conditions for high energy line ruptures.The resulting enviro11lM!Dtal conditions are 88&deg;F with a 100%relative hUBddity.4.5 Service W!!er Pumphouse Since the hot water heating piping are the only high energy lines present in the SWPH, the environmental conditions that result from a postulated HWHLB*will define the enveloping conditions for high energy line ruptures.The maximum temperature that would be expected to result in the SWPH is 90&deg;F.Due to the relatively large room volume and small volume of hot water heating piping for the SWPB, the maximum relative humidity that is expected to result following a BWHLB 1s 90%3I-IO  
Due to the location of this piping.very localized conditions may be slightly more severe although the large recirculation air flows will tend to mitigate these effects to a certain extent.With the exception of these localized effects the environmental conditions that result from a eves letdown line break will envelope those resulting from a HWBLB.4.3 Fuel Storage Building Since the hot water heating piping are the only high energy lines present in the FSB.the environmental conditions that result fro.a postulated HWHLB will define the enveloping conditions for high 3I-9 S8 1&2 PSAR A1Dendment S6 November 1985 energy line ruptures.The resulting envlrol1lleotal conditions are lOODF with a 100%relative humidity.4.4 Emergency Feemwgter Pumphouse Since the hot water heating piping are the only high energy lines.present in the EFWPH, the environmental conditions that result from a postulated HWBLB nil define the enveloping conditions for high energy line ruptures.The resulting enviro11lM!Dtal conditions are 88&deg;F with a 100%relative hUBddity.4.5 Service W!!er Pumphouse Since the hot water heating piping are the only high energy lines present in the SWPH, the environmental conditions that result from a postulated HWHLB*will define the enveloping conditions for high energy line ruptures.The maximum temperature that would be expected to result in the SWPH is 90&deg;F.Due to the relatively large room volume and small volume of hot water heating piping for the SWPB, the maximum relative humidity that is expected to result following a BWHLB 1s 90%3I-IO  


Latest revision as of 12:22, 14 October 2018

Seabrook - Updated Final Safety Analysis Report, Revision 12, Appendix 3I, Report on Analysis of High Energy Line Breaks Outside Containment
ML091330453
Person / Time
Site: Seabrook NextEra Energy icon.png
Issue date: 11/03/2008
From:
Florida Power & Light Energy Seabrook
To:
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
References
SBK-L-08172
Download: ML091330453 (77)
v • d • e


Text

SEABROOK STATIONUFSARDesign of Structures, Components Equipment and SystemsReport On Analysis Of High Energy Line BreaksOutside Containment Revision 8Appendix 3IPage 3I-1APPENDIX 3IREPORT ON ANALYSIS OF HIGH ENERGY LINE BREAKSOUTSIDE CONTAINMENTThe information contained in this appendix was not revised, but has been extracted from theoriginal FSAR and is provided for historical information.

SB 1&2 FSAR APPENDIX 31 REPORT ON ANALYSES OF HIGH ENERGY LINE BREAKS OUTSIDE CONTAINMENT Prepared for PUBLIC SERVICE COMPANY OF NEW BAMSPHIRE SEABROOK STATION Prepared by A.........CaT1Jarrt Amen drae n t 56 November 1985 Report No.9763-006-S-N-2 SECTION 51 1&2 PSAR TABLE OF CONTENTS mg LIST OF TABLES LIST OF FIGlJRES

SUMMARY

Mend.ent 56 November 1985 1.0 2.0 2.1 2.2 3.0 3.1 3.2 3.3 3.4 3.5 4.0 4.1 4.2 4.3 4.4 4.5 5.0 6.0 IBTIODUCTION METHOD OF ANALYSIS Has s and Energy Releases Pressure/Temperature/Humidity Transients HELB ANALYSES AND RESULTS Primary Auxiliary Building Containment Enclo8ure Area Main Steaa/Peedwater Pipe Chase Tank Parm Area Waste Processing Building/Primary Auxiliary Building Chase.BWBLB ANALYSES AND RESULTS Primary Auxiliary Building Containment Enclosure Area Fuel Storage"Building ElIergency Peedwater Ptmphouse Service Water Pumpbouse CONCLUSIONS REFERENCES 3I-i TABLE NO.2.1-1 2.2-1 51 1 , 2 PSAI LIST OF TABLES TITLE Determination of Mass/Energy Release Design Basi8 lnfor-ation Amendment 56 November 1985 3.1-1 3.1-2 3.2-1 3.2-2 3.3-1 3.3-2 3.4-1 3.4-2 3.5-1 3.5-2 4.0-1 4.0-2 Primary Auxiliary Building-High Energy Line Break Locations Primary Auxiliary Building-Sumaary of Results Containment Enclosure Area-High Energy Line Break Locations Contaiu.ent Enclo8ure Area-Suamary of Results Main Steam/Feedwater Pipe Chase-High Energy Line Break Locations Main Steam/Feedwater Pipe Chase-Summary of Results TaD1t Fara Area-High Energy Line Break Locations Tank lara Area-SUDDary of Results Waste Processing Buildlng/Pr1aary Auziliary Building Chase-High Energy Line Jr.eat Locations Waste Proce8sing Building/Primary Auxiliary Building Chase-Su.aary of Results Bot Water Beating Line Break Locations Hot Water Heating Line Breaks-*Su.aary of Results 3I-ii FIGURE NO.S8 1&2 FSAR LIST OF FIGURES TITLE Amendment 56 November 1985 2.1-1 2.1-2 2.1-3 3.1-1 3.1-2B 3.1-2C 3.1-2D 3.1-3A 3.1-31 3.1-3C 3.l-3D 3.1-4A 3.1-4B 3.1-4C 3.1-4D Primary Auxiliary Building Showing Locations of BELB Temperature Detection Thermocouples Containment Enclosure Area Showing Locations of HELD Temperature Detection Thermocouples Containment Enclosure Area Showing Locations of HELB Temperature Detection Thermocouples Zone Designations of Pri..ry Auxiliary Building at Various Elevations tiodal Arrangement of Primary Auxiliary Building at Various Elevations for Steam Generatordown Line Break Analysis Nodal Parameters of PAR for Steam Generatordown Line Break Temperature Responses in PAB Following a Rupture of 3" Steam Generator Blowdown Line Pressure Responses in PAB Following a Rupture of 3" Steam Generator BlowdoWD Line Nodal Arrangement of Primary Auxiliary Building at Various Elevations for Auxiliary Steam Line AS-2302-2-S" Break Analysis Nodal Parameters of PAB for Auxiliary Steam Line AS-2302-2-S" Break Analysis Temperature Responses in PAB Following a Rupture of 8" AuxiLiary Steam Line Pressure Responses in PAl Following a Rupture of S" Auxiliary Steam Line Nodal Arrangement of Pri..ry Auxiliary Building at Various Elevations for Auxiliary Stu.Line AS-230J-!-6" Break Analysis Nodal Parameters of PAD for Auxiliary Steam Line AS-2303-1-6" Break Analysis Temperature Responses in PAB Following a Rupture of 6" Auxiliary Steam Line Pressure Responses in PAB Following a Rupture of 6" Auxiliary Steam Line 3I-iii FIGURE NO.SB 1&2 PSAR LIST OF FIGURES (Continued)

TITLE Amend.en t 56 November 1985 3.l-SA 3.1-SB 3.1-5C 3.1-SD 3.1-6A 3.1-6C 3.1-6D 3.1-7A 3.1-7B 3.l-7C 3.1-7D 3.2-1A (Sheets 1&2)3.2-1B 3.2-1C 3.2-1D Nodal Arrangement of Primary Auxiliary Building at Various Elevations for Auxiliary Steamsate Line ASC-2404-2-3" Break Analysis Nodal Parameters of PAD for Auxiliary Steam Line ASC-2404-2-3" Break Analysis Temperature Responses in PAB Following a Rupture of 3" Auxiliary Steam Condensate Line Pressure Responses in PAB Following a Rupture of 3" Auxiliary Steam Condensate Line Nodal Arrangement of Primary Auxiliary Building at Various Elevations for Auxiliary Steamsate Line ASC-2406-1-4" Break Analysis Nodal Parameters of.PAB for Auxiliary Steamdensate Line AsC-2406-1-4" Break Analysis Temperature Responses in PA!Following a Rupture of 4" Auxiliary Steam Condensate Line Pressure Responses in PAl Following a Rupture of 4" Auxiliary Steam Condensate Line Nodal Arrangement of Primary Auxiliary Building at Various Elevations for eves Letdown Line Break Analysis Nodal Paraaeters of PAD for eves Letdown Line Break Analysis.Temperature Responses in PAD Following a Rupture of evcs Letdown Line Pressure Responses in PAD Following a Rupture of eves Letdown Line Containment Enclosure Area Showing Nodal Arrange-*.ent for eves Letdown Line Break Analysis Nodal Parameters of Contain.ent Enclosure Area for eves Letdown Line Break Analysis Temperature Responses in Containment Enclosure Area Following a R.upture of 3" eves Letdown Line Pressure Responses in Containment Enclosure Area Following a Rupture of 3" evcs Letdown Line 3I-iv FIGURE NO.SB 1&2 PSAR LIST OF FIGURES (Continued)

TITLE Amendment 56 November 1985 J.2-IE 3.3-1A 3.3-1B 3.3-1C 3.4-1A 3.4-1B 3.4-1C 3.5-1A 3.5-1B 3.5-1C Maximized Pressure Responses in Containment Enclosure Area Following a Rupture of 3" eves letdown Line Nodal Arrangement of Main Steam!Feedwater Pipe Chase Nodal Parameters of Main Steam/Feedwater Pipe Chase for Main Steam Line Break Analysis Temperature Response of MS/FW Pipe Chaseing a SlII1ll (0.10 Sq.Ft.)Rupture of Main Steam Line Nodal Parameters of Tank Farm Area for Auxiliary Steam Line AS-2302-32-S" Break Analysis Temperature Response of Tant Farm Areaing a Rupture of 8" Auxiliary Steam Line Pressure Response of Tank Farm Area Following a Rupture of 8" Auxiliary Ste811 Line Nodal Parameters of Waste Processing Building!Primary Auxiliary Building Chase for Auxiliary Steam Line AS-2339-1-1 1/2" Break Analysis Temperature Response of WPB/pAB Chase Following a Rupture of 1 112" Auxiliary Steam Line Pressure Response of WPB/pAB Chase Following a Rupture of 1 112" Auxiliary Steam Line 3I-v 58 1 , 2 PSAR SUMKUY AlDendaent 56 November 1985 The environmental envelopes that the safety related Class IE equipment will exper-ience following postul.ted.high energy line breaks outside containaent have been determined.

SystellS containing high energy lines for which breaks have been evaluated.

include the Main Steam, Feedwater, Auxiliary Ste..and Condensate, Chemical and Volume Control.Ste..Generator Blowdowu, and Bot Water Beating.3I-vi

1.0 INTRODUCTION

S8 1&2 PSAR Amendmen t 56 November 1985 It is necessary to demonstrate that equipaent used to perfora a required safety function for Seabrook Nuclear Station-Units 1&2 are capable of function1.ng properly in the nOnla!.abnormal, or accident enviromaental conditions to which they could be exposed.As stated in NUUG-0588(1), 8IDOng these enviroDliental conditions are the elevated teaperature, huaidi t.y., and/or pres8ure which could result from the postulated rup.ture of high energy lines which may be in the vicinity of this equipment.

The purpo8e of this study 1s to evaluate the consequences of high energy line breaks outside containaent and develop the enviro1Ul8ntal envelopes for Class IE equipment.

31-1

2.0 METHOD

OF ANALYSIS SB 1&2 PSAR AmendlDen t 56 Nove.ber 1985 Each of the high energy lines and all of the Class IE equipment outside containment were identified and located.Based on this information, the various plant buildings were nodallz:ed and the high energy line break (BELB)locations chosen in such a way as to provide an accurate representation of the environmental conditions that would result in the vicinity of the Class IE equip.ent following a postulated HELB.2.1 Mass and Energy Releases Each high energy line was evaluated on the basis of the methods of Standard Review Plans 3.6.1 and 3.6.2(2)to deteraine the types.areas, and locations of postulated ruptures that would result in the most severe environmental conditions at each of the Class IE equip-mente The break releases were calculated using the Moody critical flow model (3)and accounting for physical restrictions within the system (e.g.flow and pressure control valves)and the frictional effects of the piping systea.These release rates were taken to be constant.i.e.no decay of the reservoir pressure was assu.ed.until isolation of the ruptured line was initiated or.as in the case of the closed Bot Water Beating Systems.until the piping inventory was depleted.t:he methods and 88suaptions employed in calculating the...s and energy release rates for each high energy l1ne are outlined in Table 2.1-1.As noted in this table.isolation of many of these lines will be accomplished by the use of redundant teaperature detectors in various plant areas that.in the event of elevated temperaturei.

will send closure signals to redundant isolation valves present in the 31-2 SB 1&2 PSAR Amendment 56 November 1985 high energy lines.The locations of these temperature detectors are provided in Figures 2.1-1, 2.1-2, and 2.1-3.The 1I&8S and energy release rates used in evaluating the pressure, temperature, and huaiclity responses throughout the various plant: areas are calculated and defined in References 6, 7, and 8.2.2 Pressure/Temperature/Humidity Transients The environmental conditions that result due to postulated high energy line ruptures were determined' for the following areas: 1.Primary Auxiliary Building (PAB)2.Containment Enclosure Area (CEA)3.Fuel Storage Building (PSB)4.Main Pipe Chase 5.Tank Farm Area (TFA)6.Waste Processing Building/Primary Auxiliary Building (WPB/PAB)Chase For BEL!other than Bot Water beating Line Breaks (BWBLB), the envir-oDllental Responses of the PAB, CEA, TFA, WPB/PAB Chase, and KS/FW Pipe Chase were calculated using the COMPRESS (4)coaputer program.Using the break IIIlSS and energy releases and the building nodaliza-tions discussed previously, COMPRESS calculates the transient pres-Bures, temperatures, and humidities that would occur throughout the plant building following these ruptures.The aethods and assumptions used in these pressure/temperature calculations agree with those of NUREG-oS88(1)*Table 2.2-1 lists the ambient conditions, building initial conditions, and other pertinent design basis information used in analyzing these environmental transients.

The ambient and initial conditions were 31-3 58162 rsAi AmendlDen t S6 November 1985 chosen so as to maximize the temperature response that would result from these postulated HELB.In addition, the Uchida condensing steam heat transfer correlation 1s used during the condensing mode while a convective beat transfer coefficient of 2.0 Btu/hr-ft2-°r is used otherwise.

The environmental response of the PAB, CEA, and FSB to postulated HWRLB was calculated using a reasonable, yet still conservative, hand calculation method which accounted for mass and heat transfer between the hot water and the room air.Since the BWH subsyste.s are closed systems which will not be isolated and these plant areas are supplied with ventilation air by non-elass IE systems, the maxilllUll temperatures and humidities that result from BWBL!are calculated by releasing the total KWH subsystem fluid mass into the initial rooa air.aBs.The building initial conditions were determined based on the h1stor-lcal distribution of ambient conditions which occur during the t1_of the year when the BWH system 1s in operation (September through May).These conditions are defined in Table 2.2-1.31-4 3.0 BELB ANALYSES AND RESULTS 51 1 , 2 PSAR Amendment 56 November 1985 The environmental response of the plant buildings to postulated high energy line ruptures were calculated us1.ng the methods outlined in Section 2.0.The results of these BELB analyses (other than BWBLB)are presented in the following sections.3.1 Primary Auxiliary Building FrOil an evaluation of each of the high energy lines in the PAB and their operating conditioDS, it was concluded that the break locations listed in Table 3.1-1 would provide environmental envelopes for the Class IE equipment.

Figure 3.1-1 shows the layout of the PAB and the zone designations which were useful in defining the environmental parameters throughout the PAB.Zone 32A, which is not shown, represents the PAB below the the (-)6'elevation and includes the piping tunnels, Zone 328 repre-sents the 2'and (-)6'elevations.

and Zones 32 and 33C, 32 and 33D.and 32 and 33E represent the 7',25', and 53'elevations.

respective-

\ly.Zones 47 and 48 represent the Chemical andControl System (cves)equipment vaults and contain no Class IE equipment.

Table 3.1-2 summarizes the peak and enveloping and pres-sures that would occur in each of these zones for each postulated high energy line rupture.All area..can be taken to experience 100%relative humidity.condensing environments, however.air displacement and thus essentially P\J:re ste..envlroDllents would be expected to occur only in the general vicinity of the postulated breaks.31-5 5B 1 6 2 PSAR Amendment 56 November 1985 For each of the ruptures considered in these tables there follows a series of four figures, lettered A though D.The A series of these figures (e.g.Figure 3.1-2A, 3.1-3A)physically defines the nodal arrangement which was chosen to analyze the rupture'8 effect on the PAl environment.

The B series provides the flow diagrams and physical parameters (volumes, heat sink areas, flow areas)for this nodal arrangement.

Figures e and D provide the calculated temperature and pressure transients for each of the nodes defined in the A and B series figures.3.2 Containment Enclosure Area The Containaent Enclosure Area contains several high energy (eves)lines, however, only the letdown line operates at an elevated tem-perature.Therefore, only a rupture of this line has been considered as stated in Table 3.2-1.The layout of the Containment Eucosure Area, which includes the Mechanical Penetration Area, the Charging P\mp Cubicles, and the Residual Beat Removal (RBR.), Safety Injection (51), and Containment Spray (CBS)Vaults, is shown in Figure 3.2-1A, Sheets 1 and 2.These figures also show the nodal arrangement used, while Figure 3.2-11 provides the corresponding flow diagram and physical parameters.

Table 3.2-2 summarizes the pressures and temperatures experienced in the various areas of the enclosure volume following a postulated eves letdown line break.Figures 3.2-1C and 3.2-1D show the transient temperatures and pressures in the CEA.By a variation of the assu.ed initial conditions (l0%VI.95%relative an additional investigation was made which determined the maximum pressure response of the CEA.This result il shown in Figure 3.2-1E.For the HELB 31-6

2.1-3: Containment Enclosure Area Showing Locations of HELB Temperature Detection Thermocouples In c.I...to'N ft ag"B"'1";:3_r9\I)OOUt\A 0'....., II VAULTS ZClIf[)0 A.I, t,*D 1:1.(-)1"*0*te (f)U'.,-*.C..n'.I_".hl1.....Spn,"".,.....s.'due'II.., Ir_**,......*Thermocouple Location.HECMWICAL Pt:NF.1UTlbie A.FA ZBIr.It A 1:1.(-)".0"" te (f)I'-O"..eMail:...PPnaATJOII AlIA II.(-))6'.'-te H)1'-0" I.I I

-I-J rn'"-, ex....='" N-,-.D c Iln.tt...I".,"*A I w Ir-Ip-WiI*sac , D c: 1I....tlo" 7'T e Ii D e e I****tlaa 15" 00*A..I D c I l'nn." n" c e*00*Ii]-,_,__-I__,_",., ,-1-1..--__.....AI ,-,-Figure 3.1-1: Zone Designations of Auxiliary BUilding at Various Elevations I 9.IIftC o,.=la.w.lor..I"Jlctl_T...**Chiller lur,1 ,...'I.A***It...Coll4l ut.,".I.'I,.tfiftCh**C D ,.A..rccv**t luh****,.r.'"Iet"..tl"".11-.1_r...h T.nIl**t.l.t rtltn.c.'A'I.....u r.a 1_h.aAACf'I,.a.****Air Lee'I.**1" Ailil..'AI I.l.t , Collt.l_at J.au T.all"Ir***C D A*C D I k.411'Leek ,...ric Ael',**b..It.r**_An&r*CfCl ,**Iu..fl.nrlCiI ChI**..Cher.i......,...tu e..;.;;:'c..t....t.Let'.,.....lflu ,.&*****IAACf ,.,.ON**I*c*:1 B='" It='-,..l,Q 00"" VI 0-

-I-t en C"-.C1...N D-.c ,-_.--,-, Il,wlllon 2*-, rT lJit A I F 1,.--,...----.i...I I D*C 1:11Y'.t101l7" Ii D[J*I I II.10I I I I tlnnlOIl nI C I'I c()1):J Q]'(p0 00.LIM"D.II-nto-s-]**

St*.C.n.110ft""" , Ii I,I*c I*e0 o E1IYu,u:.SJ n o 00*Ii 2-1-1"==*"" ,_"=='L...-II

]-,-I..-q ,._.1.-I Figure 3.l-2A: Nodal Arrangement of Auxiliary Building at Various Elevations for Steam Blowdown Line Break Analysis Air l.ocll Itorll'An*Ileeule.l 0.***..0 Y.w'c."t.,.PCtv.....".lorle let'T...u r.ever ,**tu**Cher'..,'.lIlt.t.Let DI,I**Uler u."on-MAn ripe Ch***Y.""AC 0,.**"1 w.lor..IIlJIlI tlOII Tank a.Chnt...'ara'tl,,11 ,.A***'t CoM'ltl

,**a.'I,.T_h zr ct" e.g." II'1 II:I-"\D 00 VI\.It 0'D c*A D c*" D I I C I ILJ., w._J p*1 I I r A t.Inlat!leUn.I.1"lat rUt.n h.wcr PI,.Ge**I...1".101.1.J.CYCI ,.,,11 D I C I.PCCII Nut I.ch****t.,.Ilowdown rl**h T**ll c.'AI bhau.t F**a_*.It'"....ell**'AI ,.Iu..Coat.l_at Pu..."a.A 1 2.....3 1 II5 6 KIt\VOLUKE BEAT Sth"lAREAUt 2)1*95.490 11.000 2 23.520 560]53.930 8.000" 243.400 42.670 S 108.010 11.500 6 38.235 15.900 7 AntOSPlIEIlE Finure 3.l-2B: Nodal Parameters of Primary Auxiliary BUilding for Steam Generator Blowdown Line Break Analysis I COMPRRTMf-Nl N$.------I 3 I 2 ,-,-.,..,.i I., 4[,678910 L rSf:CJ 1 2 3 4 S 6 7 Figure 3.l-2C: Temperature' Responses in Primary Auxiliary Building Following A Rupture of 3" Steam Generator Line----------"._-

--,-'-r-'-l'--,-'r--rrl----

'-,--I J cf 2 3 4[)678':)10 123 TIME o o C1 C'J o C)c., C)....a D Q)lL D LJJ 0 0 t./(0"","l a...u (, I n r

\I n 1/'C)..\I" ir*q..'-3 II": ClII c.:'I u:o o lC 11)_ COMPRR1MFNT 1 23<t 4 ,p 5 611 , It ,'.'If)_.z..atrp.rD B"1 ft_n'C 00 VI VI 0'H Figure 3.l-2D: Pressure Responses in Primary Auxiliary Building Following a Rupture of 3" Steam Generator Blowdown Line

... T i-(j-;?

11}oJ TIME (SEC)(I:'...:-r-J cr..\--I 10....I en (J)'" Q......=..w-:11 1\,.,,-.J7'"'" N Ck:::J Lf)--l (f)(f)UJ a::: 0...00:r z 11 oo.i....,,".",'-C.....<<...LQ" (.'J c.., Q;Q.2'u: u.............J er::>>'" I-lI.O:I: IL....:;)o...1 N{n at..-2-J-6-.*I e I 1----'1 J 11...&1..Z*-," , I'tnt A I o f"Ioo---.op--..o D D o o D o o o Ir-'I pc II I 1-, , 11 c: o*1 El....tI**7" , c::J CJ.CJ o o D CJ c:::J Cl D o A I*D*(j:.IE]-e*1 tlnnl.1 25" Q)I):J QJ'IP 0 00*A , I , I c: I o tie-niH n"*I 00*Q A l-I-IF 1'M Pz.....1J-1-*,_..dl-Jl ,-,-A*c: I r A I e*A*c: D A*c:*Figure 3.1-JA: Nodal Arrangement of Primary Auxiliary Building at Various Elevations for Auxiliary Steam Line AS-2302-2-S" Break Analysis*.ra:u".t lu"'"pt.,**1...._rl....I...c.'A.I......u ,_I_,.Air'"**.AI I",.,..CDwtel_.t hr..,....r.****t"..t.rl I.'.'et filter.h.IlAACT PI,.0..**I...1..AI", J.CVCI ,....**Air.....6.Itl"I'Are.**II.urlc,'a.***e.410 Y.LN'e..ter.p.PCar........lerh Ad.,....I.c:YCS ,**Iu**Cheri I..", y**It.t.IAt'_"...dUer II.'**-MAn.1,.a.***'I."Ae 0,..''**..,..I"JuU..,**t**Qlltb,.,,,,.,....,.A.e.It_c:..I***u.r****'1,.T"Mh zr (t rD Brt Pi tI='-"'"\D COV'l V1 0' VOLUKE BEAT StRl ROO!AUA(ft 2)1 53.930 1.000 2 95."90 18.000 3 23.520 560 , 243.400 42.610 5 146.300 34.400 6 ATHOSPBDE n.ou PATHS ClWtACTDISTICB Figure 3.l-3B: Nodal Parameters of Primary Auxiliary Building for Auxiliary Steam Line AS-2302-2-8" Break Analysis N toll.AC'ftIt K c I.exp It'de: I.total.42.85.17 1.4".78 1.0 2.22 4.00.78 1.0.01 1.79.18 1.0.20 1.91.1'1.0:01 1.79.7'1.0 3.50 5.2'.78 1.0.30 2.01.78 1.0 1.60 3.31 z:: f S:J et'Do rt B'1 rt:3_rtQ)VI VI 0-n.oK TO AUA(ft 2)lREllTIA (f t-1)Iml"ODI 1 2 128.7."5 1 4 10.6 5.40 2 3 15.0.05 2 4 9.4..88 3" 31.5.09 3 6 20.0 5.00" S 44.8.80..6 20.0.50 I]-2 r-6 4.5 HIE\

Figure 3.l-3C: Temperature Responses in Primary Auxiliary Building Following a Rupture of 8" Auxiliary Steam Line gJ..CJ...=..N fr;='rt ti ft='_rt\D co\I'0'o o o--1 1 1-1-0-0

......

e'I 0 13 4 5 6 1 a 9'1 0 2 2 3 4 5 6-1 8 9'I oJ TIME (SECJ o o N o aCOMPARTME.NT 1,., C)L 3a 4 X[)<!>6I 0.D m--I li-D w ao.C)(Q W 0::::::)IT a::: W CL L W..-r z II C.l lC o;".,I-1 II U q:tII t.J W r:l II U en C')"', (,.,".,..r....t.I L u:to)n Cl" Q..2'-.r w.........J (£':::J o.....Z I&.l a: Q.......:J o.....'a.

II ty en C" L.o II"'" C')II U'" C" L.o 1 COMPRRTMENT 12 (!)34X 56II (.J (Co o 0 u')_01 IT-..4-.;r en (f)tlII{J...(L t...N W Q)cr::::J oo:t"_(f)(f)w cr n..r--.::-r 7".,..<D

.......,,-_=_--,_-_,-_r-r_,_._r_t.

-10°Figure 3.1-3D: Pressure Responses in Primary Auxiliary Building Following a Ibpture of 8" Auxiliary Steam Line

..;,J_>,.,..N-2-,*-4-, c J al...u_J..-I n*lrlt A I.,-.1 I r D......"1 I"'al1br, It...U....0.2'03-1-1" c o Iln.tlDII , rt o o o riD D 0 1*D 08 CJ Cl Cl o o o CJ CJ o CJ o A D o[):JEJ---c Iinul**U" I I QJ 1P 0 , 0Q)()J 00*A I F I D c IluetlJ.JJ" c 00*A I I-IF*'M_wswl J-1-*1_

,-,-,-Figure 3.l-4A: Nodal Arrangement of Primary Auxiliary Building at Various Elevations for Auxiliary Steam Line AS-2303-1-6" Break Analysis f.J.l.t IIUn.**Jal.t rUter.,.MACT PI,.a.**I.,.1..AI.I.J.CYCI T*****h......6..t Ar**a.IlecUlcll 0...**410 Y.t.e'c..tu.,.real....,.

    • lacla Ael'T..lI.r.CtCl t**h.I.CbUI'.vlt.t.tU'CMI IUn**"lIfI-WCT PI..Ch***..It CI ft'1 It::I_f"t o,Q 00 VI*c*A w.II'fAC....1**w.lar..I.J.crl-,...a.CIllllu......t.,.a...It".t, t...I.PI,.Tr****c*A D e*A r D c I.**rttV lieU lac.,.11",",_" f...c.PAl r.ll..n F**a_**Air toe.e.rAI lain.eo.tal....t Pur**r....A HIE\" I 6 ,*1 2 5REAT Ilf MOO!.ID.!L Al!AUt.)1 31,200',500 2 49.700 10,000 3 241."00 U.670" 112.940 26.560 5 31,U5 15,900 6 ATHOS.HEIlE fn lit;1_CR6Mctp IU1 CS=ctt now PATIIS N LOll'Actea"n" TO AItEA(ft t)IIIDTIA (ft-1)It c It.zp Itlde Ittotal.R.<Ja Q!--I , 60.0.O'.7'1.0.02 1.10 2 3 U.I.10.71 1.0.30 2.01 2 5'.9'1.50.71 1.0 3.20 4.91]4 51.5 1.33.11 1.0.J]2.11], 20.0.50.71 1.0 1.60 3.31" 6 20.0 5.00.18 1.0 3.50'.21 Figure 3.1-4B: Nodal Parameters of Primary Auxiliary Building for Auxiliary Steam Line AS-2J03-1-6" Break Analysis I 2 Figure 3.1-4C: Temperature Responses in Primary Auxiliary Building Following a Rupture of 6" Auxiliary Steam Line a.o.a-+-1-O-o----2-r-j--Ar-T 5 6 7 a 9'1 0 1-----r*-3*1---5

£3-}a 9if TIME"Sf-C)CJ o N I COMPRRTMENT 12 C9 3c:1 a 4 X 0 5(oJ 60 0 (0 1.L (j W 0 0 0 (Q\,'J II n"" o

1C).1 L c:J;r'}3 c'6....1 4 X" i.D_iT'C)II 5-<!>u<l'n G-II U (t:'0 C)in_01 cr t---f(f)fn tilt 0-...=...W N (I)0:::.=:J"'1" (f)(f)w cr 0-r-..-j-Figure 3.1-4D: Pressure Responses in Primary Auxiliary Building Following a Rupture of 6" Auxiliary Steam Line r%a.II23 TIME7 89 11 0 2 rSEC), 2 I 3 I 4

!lultlo.." Iln.tlon n n.!I...U_2 ,-I" A*c I D , I A*c II A£1"'11_J rt c D t I A I*I C*N en at...=..-I-I-, r-A**Ul.", It...LI_1'0.240'-2-:-

, lrtr 1..--.__c...:w: 1 I o o CJ Cl o o o CJ CJ c:J o o o (j Q]1):J0 QJ'(P 00*o o 00 ,'-IF.Id__I....*__'Fe dL-lI t-4-,-,-Figure 3.1-5A: Nodal Arrsgement of Primary Auxiliary Building at Various Elevations for Auxiliary SteaM Condensate Line Break Analysis ,.10,,11 Ael.'I" r.etCS ,..Iu*.a........'VIp ,**Iu t.IAt.CM1 tll...UI.r 1'_-IAACT PI,.ella****IYAC Ope_I...w.lor..I_JuU" ,...**Chi Un'.r,.'IfI".,.A***lu**CO....n**t.,****"pI T"**h A c*.rear...t I.e'........._,***h'I...I.rAt I."'u.t P_**Air 1.oell I.'AI I_letr-tel__*.."..r***D.1 , A f.1.'lt....t.".I.*1.'lt rll.e",**aAACf PI,.a.**I.,.1..Alai.J.c:¥CI ,...I c*A It.Al" l.oelt I.It.",..Au.**111.&&,1**1 Ch...e.410 Y.toe.c::e.UrI p.rear......*C D A*c , z CD CD ri"C AI='-"\0 00"'"\on 0" HI!\6 I 7 S 4 3...1 2 IIODEIlEATWAUt)1',665 4.110 2 29.JOO 11,700 3 49,700 10,000" 31,200 1,500 5 241,400 42,670 6 17Z.940 26,"0 7 AntOSPIIEItE tn CII....>"..FUN'At'II CRAUCTDllnCl LOI.rACTOI.nOtI-=J AUA(ft Z)IIIDTlA (It-I)Ie I.ap Ifde I tot*1-----I 2 2.1 15.0.7'1.0 1.5 3.Z'1:J 3.0 10.3.7'1.0 1.4 3.11 2 3 5.1.5.71 1.0 3.20 4.91 3 5 44.1.10.7'1.0.30 2.01 4 5 6.3.32.71 1.0.10 1.11 5.6 U.5 I.U.7'1.0.33 2.11 5 7 ZO.O.50.7'1.0 1.60 3.31 6 7 ZO.O 5.00.7'1.0 3.50 5.21 Figure 3.1-58: Nodal Parameters of Primary Auxiliary Building for Auxiliary Steam Condensate Line ASC-2404-2-3" Break AnalysisaC'D EI'1 f9='-,..\Q 00 V'VI 0' 46 789 (SE C JCOl1PRRTMENT 1[:]2 C)3 A4X 5<!>6+7Z Figure 3.l-5C: Temperature Responses in Primary Auxiliary Building Following a Rupture of 3"Auxiliary Steam Condensate Line C)o lD fT:l a (""J o C'.,J a c."J (."')0 CY")LL D w 0 0lD N w a::::::>1-.ITW 0..L WII tl U'o II n It:["l L."O II n Cl'o:r%.&.l...

l'C0 11 rRRT tIl fNT 1 2 (!)3 A4X 5l'Z o tr:'_r.l IT en...........*if)C1...CL=ctt N.,"D I n (.r.C-I

  • ..-t UJ rr cr.-:J"or_(f)f r.D_----------.,....---
.UJct: CL ,.....Figure 3.1-5D: Pressure Responses in Primary Auxiliary Building Following a Rupture of 3" Auxiliary Steam Condensate Line:r z-,,,I T'""T1'):3 4 f)7 tJ<)'1 0 I 2 ,.-.-JIIII I..234..J678 9 1 a-TIME rSECJ , 2 D en.....=..N-2-4-.-, D I c I.'-, linn len 2**," o o o o D o o D o ltIt A I Ir--I pc.,***.1 1 ,*D c*Ilnu***7" D CJ CJ o CJ D CJ CJ CJ CJ o" D*(J:JD---c lin.elva U"*I q)():J0 qJ'(p 00*A r I*c I o Iinettva JJ"*I o 00*A)-I-IF_,..__I.--.,_..-.1--1',-,-Figure 3.l-6A: Nodal Arrangement of Primary Auxiliary Building at Various Elevations for Auxiliary Steam Condensate Line ASC-2406-1-4" Break Analysis r.1.let...un I.1.I.t rUt.,.h.WCT PI,.cu**I."....A**I.J.eva ,...k.AIl'teelt..It.UI'Ar**a.II.ctrlul a..**....0 c..t.,.,.PCCII.....**ft"C Openl_.w.lor..InJ.etlon ,".**Chi Un In**Tou ,.A...It.....t.,....**"" Treneh zt a a 0-0.S'1 to='-"\D CD VI\It 0'*c*A D c".

Aet',....r.CYCS ,..ltI**Cher.t**,...,...ltI t."t'_......Uler**'1,,-IAACT

'1,.Ch...A D c*r It.1 D*C*.rear lut**e.Il.*......_FI To"" C.'U!aha.1t r lee.I.Air....c'" I.'A.lalet*CoIit.I_.t hr**'."1" Figure 3.l-6B: Nodal Parameters of Primary Auxiliary Building for Auxiliary Steam Condensate Line ASC-2406-l-4" Break Analysis 6 I 7 5 4],;/1 2 NOD!VOWHE REATAU.AUt)]8.645 4.110 2 29,700 11,700 3 49,700 10.000 ,.31,200 8,500 5 243,400 42,670 6 172,940 26,560 7 At1mSPRERE (I)c.->,.,.N now PA'l'IIS CllAUCTDIIT1CS LOll fACTOR.nOH AREA(ft 2)lHEKTU (ft-1)Ie Kexp Kfrlc KtoUl1 2 2.1 15.0.78 1.0 1.5 3.21 1]3.0 10.3.71 1.0 1.4 3.11 2 3 5.9'8.5.7.1.0 3.20 4." 3 5 44.1.80.7.1.0.30 2.01 4 5'.3.32.78 1.0.10 1.81 5 6 51.5 1.33.78 1.0.33 2.11 5 7 20.0.50.78 1.0 1.60 3.3'6 7 20.0 5.00.71 1.0 3.50 5.21 N 3 , 2 Line 2 357 a 9'I IT TIME (SE.C)Responses in Primary Auxiliary Building Rupture of 4" Auxiliary Steam Condensate

"-,-,.,'I 1 45678910 COMPRRTM[NT 1 (!J 23 A4X[)6+7Z Figure 3.1-6C: Temperature Fallowing a 0 L'0 I ,-]{J....3 L L'1 L"J (I).....LL D W t."J L"J I..c., II"'o:.Co., II" C)...L"I A.J.;u::u o II.: Q..%*u: u....:r%

!l U a:: o II c..,'" C,.COMPRRTMENT 12 C)3 A4X 567Z_

J": t£D'en (.)a: 0 en-...'" IL-....z (f)(L=..U'U...N"-....l&.l-..lLJ rr 5 fr:'....:J(J)------f----vJ----

LLJ0
(L r-Figure 3.l-6D: Pressure Responses in Primary Auxiliary BUilding Following a Rupture of 4 11 Auxiliary Steam Condensate Line r%GII 2 3 TIMES(SECJ i 2 I 3 4 tn......t.N-I-t-6-, It c I'--I'--A',*11***tto.I..-," lrlt A I , It c*Et.-ul_a , Ft A D DI I I c El...U..IS"*I o Q](P , QJ(P 00*A , I D c o U***U,n n n c I o 00.A...-_...,-** ,-,-,-*-'re:!***_.1 ,-Figure 3.l-7A: Nodal Arrangementl of Primary Auxiliary Building at Various for eves Letdown Line Break Analysis**tear f1ut**cll'.**UlMCMI r***h,..t.'AI bUliat ,...I_**Air toe.**,AI I.let..Otwtll_nt......,...f.relet...t.n I.r.let rlheu h.MAC!PI,.Che**I.'el".AI.l.J.CftI T.nl k.Alh Lock 6.'ton**A....a.Illeenll:.'

CII...o.410 Y.Lo.'c..t...,.rCot.....z..It It 8og, It B'1 C't:s_rY\D (>>VI VI 0" D c*A Y."'AI: o,.ellil w."ro.I_J.ctl..T....-.Chlll.r......T.ll'7.A...Ie***eo.......c.TI.a.,.,.'fnllClt D c ,.Iorl.Aci.,....r.net ,..tt.*.a.n.I**....,....t.IAt.OVII D.....Uler o..,,,-WeT PI,.Ch****A I c:*A r D c I A

3.1-7B: Nodal Parameters of Primary Auxiliary Building for eves LetdownBreak Analysis fr CI CI B::J:a-'1:::I-"Ql)\I'VI 0'BEAT 5INt HODE I.!!.LL AIlEAUt 2)1 47 ,100 23,000 2 38,235 15,900 3 49,700 10,00038,200 8.500 5 243.400 42.670 6 172,940 26,560 7 AntOSPBERE..{J....nov PAtU CllUACTDISTICS i=..N IDS."cmB rem 1\121 A1lU.(ft 2)IREIlTIA (f t-1)Ie lC.exp lC.fdc

---I 2.80 U.O.11.11.22.44 1 7 1.4 37.5.34.20.67 1.21 2 3 2.3 41.0.78 1.0 1.80 3.51 3 5 ,U.8.80.18 1.0.30 2.08 ,.5 6.3.32.78 1.0.10 1.88 5 6 SloS 1.33.78 1.0.33 2.11 5 7 20.0.50.78 1.0 1.6 3.38 6 7 20.0 5.00.78 1.0 3.5 5.286 I 7 5 4 3 2 1 if c*...a a ne I.: u:lJ L Zut-E L§la.,..tl d COMPARTMENT 1£!]2 (!)o 3 A gl4X (W1 56+o*7 Z.o lIJ N lJ..o W 0 o 01 fA o*N=: t-0 a:*0-=:W_0-x.: W l-t.?o o-z::It tr.L o.I***************************" TIME Figure 3.l-7C: Temperature Responses in Prtmary Auxiliary Building Following a Rupture of eves Letdown Line!t ft ft Sg"a-tot='_f'?\0 (X)VI VI 0' a"..R A n....II U D o.CDin.COMPARTMENT 1 l!J 2 (!)3 A4X 5<!>6+7 2.UJ..N en a:f=..zr;ag't 11 10:s-,..\0 00\It"" 0" an..;I****

£§

£§l HnHo'£§TIME (SEC)Figure 3.1-7D: Pressure Responses 1n Primary Auxiliary Building Following a Rupture of eves Letdown Line (J)a..w UJ.::l(1)(1)wa...0-o cr.;,.....-X::lr'"-'l.1*...'7 r L§1&1 I;CI: g II!'L Z t*i.:...iI.i1...

N I'" , IJ VADLn ZlME]0 A.It C.*D It.(*)61'*0*to (+)n'.,**.Cont.l_at lulldlnl..)'ru., at."**dual Rut a._.......I---D 0 II........0--I 11--tlECIIAIIJCAL PltfnUnbit AHA tOIl 2t A 11.(-)1'*0" to (+)1'.0" Containment Enclosure Area Showing Nodal Arrangement for evcs Letdown Line Br..ak Analysis Figure 3.2-1A: (Sheet 1 of 2)ttECHANICAL PEIlETlAn<<*

ARIA tOIl!28 A**Ii.(.)34'*'" to (+)1'.0"*I I@I 0 I I I I I I eves IAt.CIIft'I i I liM 110.I t

  • )

.e.OInltftl.......II.Contd.-nt CooU...Unlll D o CIIAlGIIIC PUIft ARIA ICIfI n*JJ e EI.7'.0" tCll 23'*0" Figure 3.2-lA (Sheet 2 of 2)COln'AIIntElfI ftIITllATIOR DlCLOSaR AItIA I(JII 41.II.21'*6" to 4"-0" Containment Enclo8ure Area Showing Nodal Arrangement for evcs Letdown Line Break Analysis 1 5 I" 2 3 Figure 3.2-1B: Nodal Parameters of Containment Enclosure Area for eves Letdown Line Break Analysis II n..'" ,1Jt ld n....o*o an COMPARTMENT 1[!]2 (!)34X 5<!>o*o-TI ME (SEC)Figure 3.2-1C: Temperature Responses in Containment Enclosure Area Following a Rupture of 3" CVCS Letdown Line o*o o

__r_r_.__---_r_-_T-........___r___.__r__r_.,._" 1 0'-o w 0 Cl 0.p).-o w a::::::l t--0 0: 0::W 0..L W t-z::z.....LIt.a=l-ii......-.a.: 5 D L::z..&I&oJ.......J 8 n n*o" n*1:_...an.....COMPARTMENT 1 (!J 2 Q)3 A4X 5¢...nC an......a.II:C'JL::Ill..IC lei....II.::a n (f)CL r,.N ci d*Figure 3.2-1D: Pressure Responses in Containment Enclosure Area Following a Rupture of 3" CVCS Letdown I..ine CD*rfA TIME!iTIflf (SEC)

I 2 (SEC)Figure 3.2-lE: Maximized Pressure Responses in Containment Enclosure Area Following a Rupture of 3" cves Letdown Line c Ii').....In6 A 1\oJ-a: ID t--t COl1PARTMENT 1[TJ" 2 (!)f.I lIS 3 A rJ...0:1.4 X., f"-a....5<!>:1 III n ,I c.el'u-:t 0 W...*......C,'a: u::'.;I;'II: L Z t*.r u t:::),...Z&.1&1......

CoDtrol Bu11d1D1 SB 1&2 PSAR'....ter Pipe CU**'Amendment 56 November 1985

-;..I-J...

  • Of ,.Figure 3.3-lA: Nodal Arrangement of Main Steam/Feedwater Pipe Chase WE NODE HOD!69.270 At.,_pher.

REAr SI.An, Ut 2)16.930 FLOW PAD CllAUCtlUlnCS

.7'1.0\1 2 nOlf JOO!1 t.J MO::n;2 AlIA Ut 2)856 l11!aT1A (ft-1).01 Ie LOII1ACroU Iteq I fric.10 I rDt*1 1.1'en till.....N Figure 3.3-1B: Nodal Parameters of Main Steam/Feedwater Pipe Chase for Main Steam Line Break Analysis*!r Jg.tI B"1":I_rY\D 00\,It V1 0' COMPARTI1FNT 1[!]23-1£f (.")...('"l 0 cYJ U-n w 0 0-.c..."l t,., C'" T I HE (SEC J Figure 3.3-IC: Temperature Response of Main Steam/Feedwater Pipe Chase Following a Small (0.10 Square Feet)Rupture of Main Steam Line c...'"l U.,.....o.W 0::::J t--0 a:*g w'" Q.llJ0 It n., D L i tc L HAT_I AllAUt)HIE 1 240,000 11,000\2 1 en'"...=..N nov rAD CRAUCTDlInca J.OI'rActOU noH 10 MEA Utt)lRDTlA (ft-1)Ie I..,".I'de: I tau1 2-.&.ItmE 1 2 10.00.006.18 1.0 0.01 1.79 Figure 3.4-1A: Nodal Parameters of Tank Farm Area for Auxiliary SteUl Line AS-2J02-32-8" Break Analysis COMPRRTMENT 1[!]II tJ lO CJ....II t., u;CJ" (]co C1 o o\.f)IT)!..tI tI ft'1 fI='_M'\0 (J)""\.I'Q\o CJ°1 1[f3 TIME (SEC)Figure 3.4-lB: Temperature Response of Tank Farm Area Following a Rupture of 8" Auxiliary Steam Line 0 0 0 (T)LL 0 W a 0/en*...wcr:::>N r-0 er-n::-0 0 W N 0..L W t-o.<.:)If)" tl co o o&J"., n\l:..J (J:I:%..., 0.." L U'0:'t:1 o CY A-%to\C W...v.......J\C'='CJ....:r I&J a.: a..o....

c 0 PRRT MEN T 1u')(0 0 IT..-..(0 en (f)*Q.=..N W t.n cr:::>In (f)(J)W cr: Q...0.U').-4 lIJ....cr (,)D 0" CL:r:cr u...:r:z: t"l Q let Figure 3.4-1C: Pressure Response of Tank Farm Area Following a Rupture of 8" AUXiliary Steam Line HIE"\1 2 3 Figure J.5-1A: Nodal Parameters of Waste Processing Building/Primary Auxiliary Building Chase for Auxiliary Steam Line AS-2339-1-1 1/2" Break Analysis:iI!: g.='t t1 C9='-,..\0 00\It Ute-

  • II oClII U U" o II U U" Cl....o o C)N COMPRR1MENT 1[!J')ffi t..".".....'r"" s='got f1":s-,.,.\0 00\,It VI 0'Figure 3.5-1B: Temperature Response of WPB/PAB Chase Following a Ruptur.e of 1 1/2" Auxiliary Steam Line_.?,...,.*.

..-E9-*****..**_*'***_*T--*T"'-*.**1-T**l'r-**---:---,---,.-.-.*..,.-

r1 n---;---....--,--.--,-,-ru-t-----

1.0°234 S678 q 1 oj23456789 1 0"234 56789 1 oj TIME (SEC]o o o 0 C)W.-.ll..D tJJ 0 C).0 to.., lJ..!a:::://en..-CIf CJcr..=..0:::: 0 LJ.J'W;J" N Q.L..UJ.-0 CJ c" II U U" Cl%'Z l.')Q.7...J'et" (.)o et" 11..;;z:...U U"",,\.")oS U......J or:J...7'I&.i11..:J o.....;u..

COMPRR1MrNl

][1:]2 (T)II';:,...1\c.J It'tl'Cl'1" U" C1 II (.,0 111_en IT(J)-...I a...OJ r.o I en cr*.:J.:r_(J)-..(J)N lLJQ..l'-.UJ (,"1", oX..J;'1.......-J::>...'7 IlJ r II......:J..j L U II.(.J Cl 0: Q.Z&1.W..-Figure 3.5-lC: Pressure Response of WPB/PAB Chase Following a Rupture of 1 1/2" Auxiliary Steam Line 3: Z l.")II.(£)

0 1.-------.-II I,n, r r n;;;-_T 2 345678910<<'

2 TIME rSEC)3-45£3-789 1 1.0)z It tot CI:s-""'0 (X)\Jl\n 0' 5B 1&2 PSAR Amendment 56 November 1985 temperature detection system is use, the peak pressures correspond to approxiaately 95 seconds after the break.These peak pressures are listed in Table 3.2-2.The relative hwrldity throughout all CEA compartaents would reach 100%.3.3 Main Steam/Feedwater Pipe Chase The breaks ev&1uated for tbe Main Steam/Peedwater Pipe Chase are listed in Table 3.3-1.It was concluded that the MS line breaks will result in IIOre severe environmental conditions tban the FW line breaks.Figures 3.3-1A and 3.3-1B define the KS/FW Pipe Chase arrangement and nodalization.

The MS/FW Pipe Chase reaches a 1IAX11DWIl of 325°'for a spectrum of MS line break sizes from 0.10 ft 2 to 1.0 ft 2*Theperature transient resulting from a 0.10 ft 2 break 1s provided in Figure and the results are summarized in Table 3.3-2.3.4 Tank Farm Area The break evaluated for the rank Fara Area is listed in Table 3.4-1.Since no HELB temperature detectors are located in the Tank.Farm Area.the Auxiliary Steam line break releases will continue until the operator detects the break and isolates the line.Figure 3.4-1A defines the nodal parame ters used for the Tank P arm Area HELB analysis.The resulting te-.perature aDd pressure transients are provided in Figures 3.4-1B and 3.4-1C, respectively, and the peak values summarized in Table 3.4-2.31-7 5B 1&2 FSAB.Amendment 56 November 1985 3.5 Waste processing Building/Primary Auxillary Building Chase The WPB/PAB Chase.which is located between the WPB and Column Line A'I of the PAD.contains both Class IE equipment and several Auxiliary Steam and Condensate lines.The line ruptures which have been eval-uated are listed in Table 3.5-1.Pigure 3.5-1A defines the nodal parameters used for evaluation of the WPB/PAB Chase response to postulated BEL!.Figures 3.5-1B and 3.5-1C prOVide the temperature and pressure transients that result for the enveloping BEL!.The peak values for pressure and teaperature are summarized in Table 3.5-2.31-8

4.0 BWHLB

ANALYSES AND RESULTS SB1,2 FSAR Amendment 56 November 1985 The environmental response following postulated HWHLB has been calculated for those plant buildings with Bot Water Beating (HWH)systems which operate in the high energy region.i.e.pressure greater than 275 psig or temper-ature greater thao 200 0 r.The HWHLB postulated are listed in Table 4.0-1.The results of these HWHLB analyses are presented individually io the follow-ing sections and are summarized 1n Table 4.0-2.4.1 Primary Auxiliary Building The peak environmental conditions at the 53'elevation of the PA!due to postulated HWBLB were found to be 110°'with a relative humidity of 100%.These conditions are enveloped by the consequences resulting from other HELB postulated to occur in the PAS.4.2 Containment Enclosure Area The BWH system piping which serves the PAS and PSB passes through the CEA.A postulated rupture of one of these l1nel results in tempera-tures and relative humidities throughout the CEA of approximately 106°F and 100%.respectively.

Due to the location of this piping.very localized conditions may be slightly more severe although the large recirculation air flows will tend to mitigate these effects to a certain extent.With the exception of these localized effects the environmental conditions that result from a eves letdown line break will envelope those resulting from a HWBLB.4.3 Fuel Storage Building Since the hot water heating piping are the only high energy lines present in the FSB.the environmental conditions that result fro.a postulated HWHLB will define the enveloping conditions for high 3I-9 S8 1&2 PSAR A1Dendment S6 November 1985 energy line ruptures.The resulting envlrol1lleotal conditions are lOODF with a 100%relative humidity.4.4 Emergency Feemwgter Pumphouse Since the hot water heating piping are the only high energy lines.present in the EFWPH, the environmental conditions that result from a postulated HWBLB nil define the enveloping conditions for high energy line ruptures.The resulting enviro11lM!Dtal conditions are 88°F with a 100%relative hUBddity.4.5 Service W!!er Pumphouse Since the hot water heating piping are the only high energy lines present in the SWPH, the environmental conditions that result from a postulated HWHLB*will define the enveloping conditions for high energy line ruptures.The maximum temperature that would be expected to result in the SWPH is 90°F.Due to the relatively large room volume and small volume of hot water heating piping for the SWPB, the maximum relative humidity that is expected to result following a BWHLB 1s 90%3I-IO

5.0 CONCLUSION

S S8162 PSAR AIIendmen t 56 November 1985 The analysis of high energy line ruptures outside containment has yielded a realistic evaluation of the elevated temperatures, pressures, and humidities that can result in the various buildings of Units 1 and 2.These results provide the HELl enviromaental envelopes for evaluation of the Class 1E equipment.

These envelopes should be evaluated along with the condl tiona that result following postulated aoderate energy line breaks, 10s8 of ventilation air flow, and any otber events whicb aa, cause adverse envir-onmental condielons to develop.31-11

6.0 REFERENCES

5B 1&2 PSAR AmendIDent 56 November 1985 1.NUREG-0588,"Interim Staff Position on.Env1rormental Qualification of Safety-Related Electrical Equipment", August, 1979.2.NUREG-0800.

U.S.NRC Standard Review Plans 3.6.1 and 3.6.2, July, 1981.3.Moody t F.J.,"Maxi1lWDl Two-Phase Vessel Blowdown froll Pipes", Journal of Beat Transfer, August 1966.4*UEC-n.-004-1,"COMPRESS-A Code for Calculating SubcOIIlpartaent Pressure Responses", July, 1976.5.Appendix E attached to ANSI Standard N176,"Design Basis for Protection of Nuclear Power Plants Against Effects of Postulated Pipe Rupture".6.Calculation Set No.4.3.35-F03 7.Calculation Set No.MSVCS-FAG-07 8.Calculation Set No.4.3.35-FOI 31-12 TABU 2.1-1 DETERMINATION 0'IlASS/DERet RELEASE Line Auxiliary Stea.and evcs Letdown Line Ste**Generator'lowdown Conden.at.

Line.Hain Stea.Line F**dwater Line Rot Water"eat Ins Line Plant H**tup'has.Hot Standby rul1 Pover'ull Pover rull Power rull Power Condition Un@p*435 pdlP*1100 pllaP*165 pdlP*1000 pd.P*1100 PI1&P*1:i7 pI (,I Condition.

T*380*'T*550*'T-358*'T-54'*'T*440*'r*250*'Hoody critlc.l flow with R.le....calculated Rel***e.c.lculated Break LI.lted by eves plplnl a,atea frictional LI.lted by upstr.a.uIln, Weltlnshous.

ullnl We.tln,house Hood, Critical'.ow rio" Letdown Line Con-.effectl Included (Hethod-pr***ure control Infor.ation packale Infor.atlon packase Hodel trol V.l.,**oioSY of!attached.,.l.,e._thocloloSY.ethodololY to ANSI Btd.K176 C'>>Dependent on Loe-Oependeat on Loca-Reactor Proteetion hohtlon aUon: HELl Tellp-nELl TtI.perature Detec-tion: HILIT*.,er.-Systell and Baergency Reactor ProtecUon No holatlon Occllre Hech"nh.ature Detection tlon SYlt**ture Deteetlon 9yl-Feed".ter Dllcon-SYlte.Syete.or Operator tea Or operator ac-tlnued.t 30.in.Action at 30tion at 30 alnutee.laoletlon lsolatlon Valye In I.olatton V.lve In No leolatton Occurs Valve Clo.ure 10 Second.5 Seconds 15 Seconds..aulted Loop..ails.'aulted Loop Fall*Ttae SB 1&2 PSAR TABLE 2.2-1 Design Basis Information A.Ambient Conditions1*HELB.other than BWHLB: 2.IMILB: B.Building Initial Conditions 1.BELB, other than BWHLB: 2.HWHLB: co-RELB Temperature Detection System 1.Temperature at Isolation Signal Initiation: (Intended to cover setpoint plus instrument error margins of up to 10°F)2.System Response Time-time delay: until signal at isolation valves D.Ventilation System Operation 1.No credits are taken for energy removal or air exchange by non-Class IE ventilation systems.2.Credits are taken for Class IE ventilation according to their performance characteristics following postulated BELB.E.Unit Trip 1.A concurrent loss of offsite power or unit trip has not been assuaed.AIIencbaent 56 November 1985 14.7 psia/88°F/IOO%

RH 14.7 psia/70°F/95%

RB 14.7 psia/104°F/95%

RB 14.7 psia!86°F/56%

RB 8.1 Seconds 51 1 , 2 PSAR TABLE 3.1-1 Prill8ry Auxiliary Builcl1ng 81gh Energy Line Break Locations Amendment 56 November 1985 1.Steam Generator Blowdown Line (Lines No.SG-1301-5-3", SG1304-S-3", SG-1307-5-3-, or SG-1310-5-3")

a.At 53'elevation of PAB 1.n vicinity of blowdown flash tank.2.'Auxiliary Ste..and Condensate Lines a.Line No.2302-2-8"-At 53'elevation of PAB along Colwm Line 5 between Columns A&B.b.Line No.2303-1-6--At 7'elevat:l.on of PAB between Col\mD Lines 5&6.c..Line No.2404-2-3"-At (-)6'elevation of PAB along Colwan Line C.d.Line No.2406-1-4"-At (-)6'elevation of PAB along Colwan Line 2.3.Chemic.al and Volume Control System Letdown Line (Line No.CS-36o-9-3")

a.At 7'elevation of PAB in the eves eq\dpment vault area.

TABLE 3.1-2 Primary Auxiliary Building Summary of Results SG-1310-5-3" AS-2302-2-S" AS-2303-1-6" AS-2404-2-3" AS-2406-1-4" CS-360-9-3" ZONE Break@Break@Break@Break@Break@Break@Enveloping DESIGNATION Zone 32E Zone 33E Zone 33C Zone 328 Zone 328 Zone 47 Conditions Temp.Press.Temp.Press.Temp.Press.Temp.Press.Temp.Press.Temp.Press.Temp.Press.of psiR of paig of paig of paig*F I psig of psig of psig 32A 108.0.4 104.04 104.0.1 220 0.4 190.0.3 114*05 220*0.4 32B 108.0.4 104..04 104.0.1 220 0.4 190.0.3 114..05 220.0.4 32C 108.0.4 104..04 104.0.1 132 0.1 136.0.1 112..05 136.0.4 33C 108.0.4 104..04 163.0.1 105 0.1 104.0.1 107.*05 163*0.4 320 Ill.0.4 105..04 113.0.1 105 0.1 104.0.1 108..05 113.0.4 330 Ill.0.4 105..04 113.0.1 105 0.1 104.0.1 108.*05 113*0.4 328 165.0.5 112.*04 104*0.1 105 0.1 104.0.1 107..05 165.0.5 33£131.0.5 158.*06 104*0.1 105 0.1 104.0.1 107..05 158.0.5 47 108.0.4 104..04 134.0.1 105 0.1 120.0.1 185..15 185.0.4 48 108.0.4 104..04 134.0.1 105 0.1 120.0.1 185..15 lS5.0.4{II eat...=..N zil ft*'1 CI::J-"\Q 00""\.I'0' SB1,2 PSAR TABLE 3.2-1 Containment Enclosure Area Higb Energy Line Break Locations 1.Chemical and VolUlle Control Syata Letdown Line (Line No.

AJDendmen t 56 Noveuaber 1985 a.In Mechanical Penetration Area (MfA)at (-)34'-6.elevation near containment wall penetration.

SB 1 It 2 PSAR'fABLE 3.2-2 Containment Enclosure Area Summary of Results Amendment 56 November 1985..evcs Letdown Line R.u:lture (CS-360-9-3-)

CompartlU!Dt Peak'fuaperature

("F)Peak Pressure (psig)Mechanical Penetration 134 0.35 Area Reuinder of Enclosure Volume (Including Charging 108 0.35 Pump Cubicles&Ventilation Equipment Area)

SB 1&2 FSAR TABLE 3.3-1 Hain Stea./Feedwater Pipe Chase Higb Energy Line Break.Locations 1.Main Ste..Line a.At 21'elevation of MS/FW Pipe Chase 2.Feedwater Line a.At 3'elevation of MS/FW Pipe Chase Amendment 56 November 1985 581,2 lSAR TABLE 3.3-2 Main Steam/Feedwater Pipe Chase Sullllary of Resu1 ts Amendment 56 November 1985 Main Stem Line Rupture Peak Temperature (DF)Peak Pre.sure (ps!g)Preslure Varies dependent upon location with respect 325 to break location and bas been studied in detail in-*separate analysis.

Pressure: 4.8 51 1 6 2 PSAR TABLE 3.4-1 Tank Fara Area High Energy Line Break Locations 1.Auxiliary Steam and Condensate Lines a.Line No.!S-2302-32-S-AIIendlDent 56 Nove.ber 1985 sa 1&2 PSAR TABLE 3.4-2 Tank rarm Area of lesults Auxiliary Steam Line]luDture Peak Teaoerature COF)Peak Pressure (J)sig)290 1.1-" AJaencbaen t 56 Noveuaber 1985 SB 1 , 2 PSAR TABLE 3.5-1 Amendment 56 November 1985 Waste Processing Building/Primary Auxiliary Building Chase High Energy Line Break Locations' 1.Auxiliary Steam and Conde.nsate LiDes a.Line No.2339-1-1 1/2"-At 53'elevation of WPB/PAB Chase B.Line No.2341-1-1 1/2"-At 25'elevation of WPB/PAB Chase SI 1 , 2!SAl TABLE 3.5-2 Alaendment 56 November 1985 Waste Processing Building/Prlaary Auxiliary Building Chase Summary of Results 1/2" Break AS-2341-1-1 1/2" Break Ccnapart1lent

@53'elevation@25'elevation Teap.(VP)Pressure (psig)reap.(lOP)Pressure (psig)WPB/PAB Chase 175 0.05 168 0.05 53'elevation WPB/PAB Chase 25'elevation 168 0.05 175 0.05 and 15'S*elevation NOTE: Due to the general arrangement of the WPB/pAB Chase area.the results obtained a break of Line Ho.

1/2*have been extrapolated to besentative of the environmental conditions that would result from a break of Line No.AS-2341-1-1 1/2".

SB 1&2 PSAR TABLE 4.0-1 Hot Water Beating Line Break Locations 1.Primary Auxiliary Building a.At 53'elevation of PAB 2.Containment Enclosure Area a.At 21'-6" elevation of CEA 3.Fuel Storage Building a'.At 21'-6" elevation of FSB 4.Emergency Feedwater Pumphouse a.At 27'elevation of EFWPB 5.Service Water Pumphouse a.At 21'elevation of SWPH Amendment 56 November 1985 58 1&2 PSAR TABLE 4.0-2 Hot Water Heating Line Breaks Sumury of Results1*Primary Auxiliary Building: (53'elevation) 2.Containment Enclosure Area: 3.Puel Storage Building: 4.Emergency Feedwater Pumpbouse:

5.Service Water Pumpbouse:

Amendmen t 56 Noveaber 1985 88-'/100%RB

'SNII SUtu: ITATlOtC tJlIlARY AUllILJAIlY

"'IWltte....n........-..::z...-=a

__.4_-1-I-J en at eJ...=..-It N-,-.*I*c I c I*11.".11..J"*.," A I I ,'f I r*I D c I e**I EluUlon l" A I I"*c I*I A ,.*c*A 1-lIn....,.5J r.11...lI..U" A*C D r I*C*I I I III I I I'-'1 0.0.0 11 II 11°P J-*II IIII OOt:J J-U I II-II U ,-CD IP ,-,-Figure 2.1-1: Primary Auxiliary Buiiding Showing Locations of HELB Temperature Detection Thermocouples

    • ICC;...."'."ult T....e.PI.,!ah.....re.1_.t.Air t.ee, I.PAl'.1**" c.."..._...r.I.."."'.le.I.I.'.t Flh.**WCT"" 0..".I.9.1...'hi.J.CYCS T....IL.Jh__***It......A*****Elect,ace' a..****"10 9.....t c.***,.,.PCaf r-,.**lerle".1'f."h...evCl***It.I.a.....',**ttl t."'1'_.,**1t".-Il\_Cr

"" 0....y."\"AC 0,."'"**Ieor..l..Jlct I..T....**Chlner'.1".T."'I.A***II,..

T...i.'I,."lItclt*Denotes Thermocouple Location zr II II tJ Pi"='-"\0 CI)VI"'" (J\

Figure 2.1-2: Containment Enclosure Area Showing Locations of HELD Temperature Detection Thermocouples CMIIC.IIC......lrA lOllln.UC II.J'*r to""-r 1:.Ch"a tn.......4.Con,at_pnl

[_rlnav...Coo.....*Unlt.EJ No Temperature Detectors Located in These Areas COIfTAIIIHI:ItT YF.N,iUTlOli IItC1.05t_t AlitA le-r",.1:1.n'*," to"'-0" N

Retrieved from "https://kanterella.com/w/index.php?title=ML091330453&oldid=1108741"