ENS 43910: Difference between revisions
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| event date = 12/11/2007 16:45 EST | | event date = 12/11/2007 16:45 EST | ||
| last update date = 01/17/2008 | | last update date = 01/17/2008 | ||
| title = 60-Day Notification | | title = 60-Day Notification of an Invalid Actuation of Units 2 and 3 Primary Containment Isolation Systems | ||
| event text = This 60-day report, as allowed by 10 CFR 50.73(a)(1), is being made under the reporting requirement in 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A) to describe an unplanned, invalid actuation of specified systems, specifically the Units 2 and 3 Primary Containment Isolation Systems (PCIS). | | event text = This 60-day report, as allowed by 10 CFR 50.73(a)(1), is being made under the reporting requirement in 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A) to describe an unplanned, invalid actuation of specified systems, specifically the Units 2 and 3 Primary Containment Isolation Systems (PCIS). | ||
On 12/11/07, at approximately 1645 hours, the 13 Kv non-safety related AS4 feeder breaker tripped as a result of an electrical fault downstream of the breaker. The electrical fault resulted in a momentary voltage dip on the offsite power source (3SU). The momentary voltage dip resulted in PCIS Group II and III isolations on Units 2 and 3. Unit 2 experienced inboard PCIS isolations, while Unit 3 experienced outboard PCIS isolations. The isolations involved various process lines including Reactor Water Cleanup (RWCU), Containment Atmospheric Control (CAC) / Containment Atmospheric Dilution (CAD), Drywell Sumps, and Containment Instrument Nitrogen. The Units 2 and 3 PCIS isolations were reset by approximately 1715 hours in accordance with procedures. All required isolation valves operated as designed. | On 12/11/07, at approximately 1645 hours, the 13 Kv non-safety related AS4 feeder breaker tripped as a result of an electrical fault downstream of the breaker. The electrical fault resulted in a momentary voltage dip on the offsite power source (3SU). The momentary voltage dip resulted in PCIS Group II and III isolations on Units 2 and 3. Unit 2 experienced inboard PCIS isolations, while Unit 3 experienced outboard PCIS isolations. The isolations involved various process lines including Reactor Water Cleanup (RWCU), Containment Atmospheric Control (CAC) / Containment Atmospheric Dilution (CAD), Drywell Sumps, and Containment Instrument Nitrogen. The Units 2 and 3 PCIS isolations were reset by approximately 1715 hours in accordance with procedures. All required isolation valves operated as designed. | ||
Latest revision as of 22:15, 1 March 2018
| Where | |
|---|---|
Peach Bottom  Pennsylvania (NRC Region 1) | |
| Reporting | |
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(1), Submit an LER, Invalid Actuation | |
| Time - Person (Reporting Time:+876.42 h36.518 days <br />5.217 weeks <br />1.201 months <br />) | |
| Opened: | David Foss 10:10 Jan 17, 2008 |
| NRC Officer: | Bill Huffman |
| Last Updated: | Jan 17, 2008 |
| 43910 - NRC Website
| |