ENS 50754: Difference between revisions
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| event date = 11/26/2014 14:27 CST | | event date = 11/26/2014 14:27 CST | ||
| last update date = 01/23/2015 | | last update date = 01/23/2015 | ||
| title = Invalid Actuation | | title = Invalid Actuation of a General Containment Isolation Signal Affecting More than One System | ||
| event text = This 60-day telephone notification is being made per the reporting requirements specified by 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A) and 10 CFR 50.73(a)(1) to describe an invalid actuation of a general containment isolation signal affecting more than one system. | | event text = This 60-day telephone notification is being made per the reporting requirements specified by 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A) and 10 CFR 50.73(a)(1) to describe an invalid actuation of a general containment isolation signal affecting more than one system. | ||
On November 26, 2014, at approximately 1427 hours Central Standard Time (CST), the Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant (BFN), 1A Reactor Protection System (RPS) Motor-Generator (MG) Set Power Supply unexpectedly de-energized resulting in a BFN Unit 1 half scram and Primary Containment Isolation System (PCIS) Groups 1, 2, 3, 6, and 8 isolation signals. The PCIS Groups 1, 2, 3, 6, and 8 isolations caused the initiation of all three trains of the Standby Gas Treatment (SBGT) system and Control Room Emergency Ventilation (CREV) subsystem 'A', and isolations of the BFN, Unit 1, Reactor Zone ventilation and BFN, Units 1 and 2, Refuel Zone ventilation (Unit 3 Refuel Zone ventilation was tagged out under 3-TO-2014-0001 at the time of this event). Operations personnel responded to the PCIS initiation, ensured all equipment operated as designed, placed the BFN 1A RPS on alternate power, and reset the RPS logic and PCIS isolations. | On November 26, 2014, at approximately 1427 hours Central Standard Time (CST), the Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant (BFN), 1A Reactor Protection System (RPS) Motor-Generator (MG) Set Power Supply unexpectedly de-energized resulting in a BFN Unit 1 half scram and Primary Containment Isolation System (PCIS) Groups 1, 2, 3, 6, and 8 isolation signals. The PCIS Groups 1, 2, 3, 6, and 8 isolations caused the initiation of all three trains of the Standby Gas Treatment (SBGT) system and Control Room Emergency Ventilation (CREV) subsystem 'A', and isolations of the BFN, Unit 1, Reactor Zone ventilation and BFN, Units 1 and 2, Refuel Zone ventilation (Unit 3 Refuel Zone ventilation was tagged out under 3-TO-2014-0001 at the time of this event). Operations personnel responded to the PCIS initiation, ensured all equipment operated as designed, placed the BFN 1A RPS on alternate power, and reset the RPS logic and PCIS isolations. | ||
Latest revision as of 21:48, 1 March 2018
| Where | |
|---|---|
Browns Ferry  Alabama (NRC Region 2) | |
| Reporting | |
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(1), Submit an LER, Invalid Actuation | |
| Time - Person (Reporting Time:+1382.55 h57.606 days <br />8.229 weeks <br />1.894 months <br />) | |
| Opened: | Todd Bohanan 11:00 Jan 23, 2015 |
| NRC Officer: | Daniel Mills |
| Last Updated: | Jan 23, 2015 |
| 50754 - NRC Website
| |
| 60-Day Optional Telephonic Notification of an Invalid Actuation of a General Containment Isolation Signal Affecting More than One System | 60-Day Optional Telephonic Notification of an Invalid Specified System Actuation [Table view] | ||