05000313/FIN-2009004-08: Difference between revisions
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{{finding | {{finding | ||
| title = | | title = Licensee-Identified Violation | ||
| docket = 05000313, 05000368 | | docket = 05000313, 05000368 | ||
| inspection report = IR 05000313/2009004 | | inspection report = IR 05000313/2009004 | ||
Latest revision as of 10:38, 30 May 2018
Finding | |
|---|---|
| Title | Licensee-Identified Violation |
| Description | 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings, requires, in part, that activities affecting quality shall be prescribed by documented instructions, procedures, or drawings, of a type appropriate to the circumstances and shall be accomplished in accordance with these instructions, procedures, or drawings. Procedure OP-1015.008, Unit 2 SDC Control, Revision 29, required, in part, All containment breaches will have the capability of being closed within 30 minutes and within the estimated time to boiling. Contrary to the above requirement, the licensee failed to adequately follow procedures which resulted in an open containment pathway that was not being monitored so that it could be closed if required. Specifically, on September 7, 2009, operations personnel identified that some of the containment penetration valves associated with containment air monitoring unit A 2RITS-8231-01, were open and created an open path to the Unit 2 auxiliary building. This created a containment breach that was not evaluated in accordance with Procedure OP-1015.008, Attachment G, nor tracked as a containment impairment in accordance with Procedure OP-1015.008A. The valves remained open for 28 hours3.240741e-4 days <br />0.00778 hours <br />4.62963e-5 weeks <br />1.0654e-5 months <br /> without the tracking required to close the opening within 30 minutes or time to boil if required. This was licensee identified because the inadequate valve lineup and the inadequate control of containment penetration valves was noted by the operating shift and immediate action taken to verify all containment air monitoring unit valves closed. Using Manual Chapter 0609, Significance Determination Process, Phase 1 Worksheets, for the containment barrier cornerstone, it was determined that the finding represented an actual open pathway in the physical integrity of reactor containment and required evaluation using Manual Chapter 0609, Appendix H, Containment Integrity Significance Determination Process. The finding was determined to be a Type B finding because it affected only large early release frequency, not core damage frequency, at shutdown. Using Manual Chapter 0609, Appendix H, Table 6.3, Phase 1 Screening - Type B Findings at Shutdown, it was determined that a Phase 2 evaluation was required because the licensee intended to maintain an intact containment and the structure, system, and component affected by the finding were containment isolation valves. This finding was determined to have very low safety significance because using Manual Chapter 0609, Appendix H, Table 6.4, Phase 2 Risk significance - Type B Findings at Shutdown, the plant was determined to be in POS 2E, but leakage from containment to environment was estimated to be less than 100 percent containment volume/day through the open containment isolation valves. This issue was entered into the licensees corrective action program as Condition Report CR-ANO-2-2009-2329 |
| Site: | Arkansas Nuclear  |
|---|---|
| Report | IR 05000313/2009004 Section 4OA7 |
| Date counted | Sep 30, 2009 (2009Q3) |
| Type: | NCV: Green |
| cornerstone | Mitigating Systems |
| Identified by: | Licensee-identified |
| Inspection Procedure: | |
| Inspectors (proximate) | C Graves T Mckernon A Sanchez J Josey J Clark B Larson M Bloodgood T Pate S Hedger J Rotton |
| INPO aspect | |
| ' | |
Finding - Arkansas Nuclear - IR 05000313/2009004 | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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Finding List (Arkansas Nuclear) @ 2009Q3
Self-Identified List (Arkansas Nuclear)
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