ML17258A637

Petition for Order to Show Cause Why OL Should Not Be Suspended or Why Permission to Restart Reactor Should Not Be Withheld.Affidavit,Factual Basis for Petition & Excerpt of Weekly Info Rept for Wk Ending 820212 Encl

ML17258A637
Person / Time
Site:	Ginna
Issue date:	03/11/1982
From:	CAPLAN R N Sierra Club
To:	NRC COMMISSION (OCM)
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ML17258A639	List: ML17258A637 ML17309A236
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NUDOCS 8203150127
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UNITEDSTATESORAMERICANUCLEARREGULATORYCOMMISSIONInCheMatterof))RochesterGasandElectr1cCorporation))R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant)DocketNo.50<<244SIERRACLUBPETITIONFORORDERTOSHOVCAUSEINTRODUCTIONThispetitionisbroughtbeforetheOfficeofNuclearReactorRegulationbytheSierraClub.Pursuantto10CRR2.206.,50.54,50.100and50.109,andforreasonssetforthbelow,theS1erraClubrequestsChatRochesterGasandElectricCompanybe.requiredtoshowcause,asprovidedin10CPR2.202,whyCheoperatinglicensefortheGinnanuclearreactorinOntario,NewYork,shouldnotbesuspended,orinChealternative,whypermissiontore-startChereactorshouldnotbewithheld,untilsuchtimeasessentialactionshavebeentakenbythelicenseeandtheCommissiontoassuretheprotectionofpublichealthandsafety.ThenecessityforsuchactionsarisesfromtheaccidentonJanuary25,1982,whichwas1nitiatedbyasteamgeneratortubebreakandwhichtriggeredasiteemergency.Inrequestingthisaction,theSierraClubwishestostress.'ourconcernregardingthepotentiallyserioussafety1mplicationsoftheGinnaaccident,notonlytoour500memberslivinginRochester.,butalsoCothegeneralpublic.Further,asanationalenvironmentalorganizationwithapproximately225,000membersacrossChecountryand18,000members1nNewYorkState,weareconcernedaboutthe82032PDR~ORWOCCW'~OOOŽn~

glt4" implicat1onsoftheGinnaaccidentforthesafeoperationofotherpressurizedwaterreactorsinNewYorkandacrossthecountry.GivenCheclearsafetyImplicationsofbothunder-andover-pressurizationwhichcanarisesubsequenttoasteamgeneratortubebreak,theSierraClubconcurswithCheNovember24,l98l,"Xnforma-tionReport-SteamGeneratorTubeExperience"byNRCstaffwhichs6ates:Thesetubes,likemanyInterfacecomponents,affectbothCprimaryandsecondary3systems,andtheirfaIlureis,anoperationalaswellasaotentialsafetconcern.Therefore,thesteamgeneratormustbeviewedaspartofChetotalsystemInwhichitoperates.Thus,maintainingtheintegrityoftheCubesrequiresasystemsapproachthatshouldencompassmechanical,structural,material,andchemicalconsiderations.(page35,emphasisadded)RELIEFREQUESTEDTheSierraClubrequeststhattheDirectorofNuclearReactorRegulationInitiateafullreviewbystaffofmatterspertainingtotheabilityofChelicens'eeCosafelyoperate.Chereactorso.astoprotectpublichealthandsafety,InlighbofCheJanuary25thacci-dent.Suchreviewshouldbemadepartofthereviewnowinprogressbystaffandshouldinclude,butneednotbelimitedCo,Chespecificareasdetailedbelow.Pendingcompletionofthisreviewbythestaff,theOperatIngLicenseforGinnashouldbesuspended,orinthealter-native,re-startofthereactorshouldnotbepe'rmitted.\l.ThecauseofthetubebreakinitiatingtheJanuary25,1982,'lsaccidentshouldbethoroughlyexplainedandcorrectiveactiontakenCopreventsuchbreaksinChefuture.ThemechanicaldamagearisingfromloosepiecesofmetalshouldbestudiedinthecontextofthegenericcorrosionproblemsatGinna.Specifically,corrosionarisingfromAVT(allvolatiletreatment)controlofsecondarywaterchemistryshouldbeaddressedinrelationtodentingoftubes,stressc~<'

corros1on,andintergranularattack.ThisshouldIncludecorros1oninthefeedwatersystemandcorrosive1mpuritiesintroducedbycondenserleaks.2.Theadequacyofthesteamgeneratortubetestingprogramshouldbeevaluatedandadeterminationmaderegardingthefollow1ngissues:a.Istheroutinemulti-frequencyeddycurrenttest1ngmethodbeingemployed'atGinnathebestavailablegivencurrentstate-of-the-art2Ifnot,whatJustificationistherefornotemployingthebestavailabletechnology,1nlightofchronictubedegredationproblemsatG1nnaandatotherPWR'sandtheexistenceoftechniquessuchasfiberoptIcexamination'?c.Doesthecurrenttest1ngprogram,whichonlytestsasampleoftubesandwhichdoesnottesttheirfulllength,providesuff1cientinformat1ontopreventtubefailure?3.Thetechnicalspecificat1onsdefiningtheextentofallowabletubedegredationforsteamgeneratortuberegectionsshouldbere-viewedinlightoftheGinnaaccidenttodeterminewhethertheyaresuffic1entlystringenttopreventatubebreak.4.Theincreasedriskofsteamgeneratortubebreaks/leaks,ifRGREoperatesthereactorwithouthavingproceed'edwiththepreventa-tivesleevingprogramoriginallyscheduledfortheSpring,1982,refuelingoutage,shouldbeassessedandadeterminationmadeastowhethertheoriginalscheduleshouldbeadheedto.5.Thesafetyimplicat1onsofcurentandproposedpluggingandsleevingofsteamgenerator'ubesandoffurtherrepairssuchasinsert1onofstabilizingcablesshouldbeexamInedinordertoassessadditionalstress,suchasfromchangesinfluiddynamics,which~;n=':g'"

0'Lbeinduced1ntubesremaininginuse.6.Anevaluationshouldbecompletedtodeterminethesafety1mplicationsofoperatoractioncurrentlyrequiredtore-establishtheinstrumentairsystemandtoopenthePORVmanually..7.ThesafetyimplicationsofthefailureofthePORVtoclose~~shouldbeassessedinlightoftheproblemswhichdevelopedduringpsC/R>8theG1nnaaccident,particularlywith'regardtothe.creationof.asteambubbleinthereactorvesselasaresultofdepressurization.Thepotent1alforuncoveringthe'core,duetoasteambubbleinthereactorvesselorelsewhereintheprimarysystemshouldbeaddressed.Adeterminationshouldbemadeastowhethersafetyfunctionsper-formedbythePORVrequirethatitbedesignatedassafetygradeandberequiredtomeetallNRCregulationsapplicabletosu'chsafetygradedesignation,inordertoassuresafeoperationofthe'reactor.8.Adeterminationshouldbemade,giventhedemonstratedunreliab111tyofthePORV,astowhetherareliablemethodexistsforremovingdecayheatbymeansofthesecondarysystem,withoutprov1d1ng,attheverymin1mum,onepathwayforremovingdecayheatwhichconsistsofsafetygradeequipment,Suchdeterminat1onshouldalsoincludeanassessmentofthereliab111tyofessentialauxiliarysupportsystemssuchasinstrumentair,andshouldconsiderthecon-sequencesoflossofoff-sitepowetodeterminewhetheGeneral((Cg,(O'esignCriteria817o10CFRPart50AppendixAismet.9..Adeterminationshouldbemadeastowhethertheemergencyopeatorproceduressetforthin"'rlestinghouseEmergencyOperatorGuidelinesforSteamGeneratorTubeRuptureEvents"areadequatetoprotectthepublichealthandsafety.Operatordelay,orapparenthesitancy,interminatingtheHPZ(highpressureinfection)isofpart1cular'concerninrelationtotheriskofover-pressurization I,~ofthereactorpressurevesselasreportedintheSpeismemorandum(seeinfra$11)andtotheincreasedrelianceonproperfunctioningofsteamgeneratorsafetyValves.Further,theGinnaemergencyproceduresshouldbeconformed'othewestinghouseguidelines.10.Theconditionsunderwhichthereactorvesselcanbecomeover-pressurizedinthecourseofoperatoractiontocontralanaccidentshouldbeclearlyspecifiedanda'.determinationmadeastowhetheranautomaticresponsesystemwoulddecreasethechanceofover-pressurizationproblemsfromdevelopingandwhethertheinstal-lationofsuchasystematGinnaisanactionthat"Mill'providesubstantial,additionalprotectionwhichisrequired.forthepublichealthandsafety...."asprovidedin10CFR50el09.ll.TheconcernsraisedintheSpeismemorandum(ThemisSpeistoRogerNattson,"PreliminaryEvaluationofOperatorActionforGinnaSGTubeRuptureEvent"datedJanuary28,1982,seeinfraAttachmentE)regardingproblemsandpotent1alproblemsincoolingthereactorfollowingthetubebreakshouldbe.addressed;adeter-minationmadeastotheirsafetysignificance;andnecessarycorrectivactiontaken.Theseincludethefollow1ngproblems:a.theapparentstratificationintheBsteamgeneratoranditseffectonslowingdepressurizationofthefaultedsteamgenerator;j'b.theconseauenceofanadditionalcoolantsystemfailure,includingaleakintheAsteamgeneratoror"asecondarysidesafety/reliefvalve"stickingopen;sc.thenec'essitytoremovedecayheatfromtheAsteamgeneatorbysteamingtotheatmosphereduetoimproperfunctioningofthecondensor;

~I8,d.theproblemsassociatedwiththeuseofthePORVfory+(Pcoblantdischargeduring"feedandbleed"cooling.12.AdeterminationshouldbemadeastotheextenttowhichfailuretoImplementtheTNXActionPlanrequirementforInstrumenta-tiontoallowdirectmeasurementofthewaterlevelinthereactorvessel.contributedtooperatorproblems,1ndeterminingpropertimingforoperatIngtheECCSpumpsandIndeterminingthesizeofthesteamhubble.13.Afullinvestigationshouldbemadetodeterminethestate,ofembrittlemhntoftheGinnareactorpressurevesseltodetermine~pPthelikelihoodthatover-pressurizatIonwillleadtovesselruptureasaconsequenceofpressurIzedthermalshock.14.TheNRCshoulddeterminewhetherthereactorcanoperatesafelywithoutreplacementofthesteamgeneratorandassocIatedpartsofthenuclearsteam.supp'lysystemand'hetherthenewestWestinghousesteamgeneratordesignwillamelioratetheproblems,giventherecentproblemswhichhavedevelopedwIththisdesignatNcGuireandatEuropeanreactors.15.Thetotalpro)ectedworkerexposureshouldbecalculatedinadvanceofNRCapprovalofRGRE'srepairsandaspecificplandevelopetokeepworkeexposureaslowasreasonablyachievable{ALARA).Thisshouldincludeadeterminationastowhethetimeshouldbeallowedforradioact"vedecay,particularlyofCobalt58,inthesteamgenera-/torpriortorepairs,inorderto'preventunnecessaryworkerexoosureandstillallowallnecessaryrepa'rstobemade.16.AnoverallsafetyassessmentshouldbepeformedbeforethereactorIsallowedtore-startinordertha"thecombinedriskopotentialfailuremodescanbedetermined,inrelationtotheprotectionofpublichealthandsafety.Ataminimumsuchanassessmenentshould IIaddressthefollowing:a.thedegredationoftheGinnasteamgenerators,1ncludingtheplugging,sleevingandotherrepairsrequ1redtodateandplanned;b.theon-goingcontr1butiontotubedegredat1onofcorrosionarisingfromAVTcontrol,fromcondenserleakage,andfromthefeedwatersystem(asopposedtothesuspecteddamagefromloose.piecesof.metalin.theBsteamgenerator);c.thelackofasafetygradepathwayinthesecondarysystemto5<Jc.8'.removedecayheat;d.thechancethatoperatorerrorwillleadtoover-orunder-J)5>$8pressurizationofthereactorvessel;e.thestateofreactorvesselembrittlement.Thefactswhichconstitutethebas1sforourrequestaresetforthinAttachmentsA,8,C,DandE.Merespectfullyrequestthatadecisiononourpetitionberenderedforthwith.Onbehalf'ftheSIerraClub,Respectfullysubmittedby,RuthN.Caplan,ChairSierraClubNationalEnergyCommittee278washingtonBlvd.Oswego,New'ork13126315-343-2412Iherebyaffimthatthefactsallegedhee1nartrueandcorrecttothebestofmyknowledgeandbelief.DATED:Marchll,1982RutJ.Caplan AFFIDAVITOFBEATRICEANDERSSNl.MynameisBeatriceAnderson.Iliveat12SpinetDrive,Rochester,NewYork14625,whichisabout~milesfromtheGinnareactorownedbyRochesterGasandElectric.2.IamamemberoftheSierraClubandIchairtheRochesterGroupofbheSierraClubwhichhas~$0membersinbheRochesterarea.3.OnbehalfofmyselfandtheRochesterGroup,IauthorisetheSierraClubtorepresentmyInterestsintherequestforshowcauseactionbeforetheU.S.NuclearRegulatoryCommission.Theseinterestsincludethepotentialdangertomy:.healthandsafetyiftheGinnareactorisallowedtorestartpriortosuchactionsasarecalledforintheSierraClubshowcauserequest.Swornandsubscribedtobeforemethis~re~dayof,l982.rEP~RIESJR,'.CterYposEcintheState".fNearYork-~MONROECOt.'I'llY,iGVYORKCommissionEroiresMarch30,14@wMycommissionexpires

~'0rLATTACHMENTA.FACTUALBASISFORSHOWCAKEPETITION1.OnJanuary25,2.982,asteamgeneratortuberuptureattheGInnanuclearplantInOntario,NewYork,occurred..TheruptureoccurredinatubewhichwaslastInspectedInMay,1981,atwhichtimethetubeshowedlessthan20$wa~ofChetubewall,accordingto"WeeklyInformationReport,February18,1982,fromT.A.Rehn,AssistantforOperatIonsOfficeofCheEDOCoCheCommissioners",IncludedhereinasAttachmentB.2.ItisourunderstandingthatRG&EhasnotyetbeenabletoprovideasatisfactoryexplanationforCheruptureofthesteamgeneratortube.Upon.InformatIonandbelief,aclearrelationshiphasnot-beenestab-lishedbetweenloosepiecesof'metaldiscoveredin';thesteamgenerator,thedamagedperIpheralCubes,andtherupturedtube.AnalternateexplanationlinkingtherupturetostresscorrosionhasbeenadvancedbyRG&E.(SeeRehmmemo,page2ofEnclosureB)3.Uponinformationandbelief,CheGinnaCubetestingprogramhasbeenbasedonmulti-frequencyeddycurrenttestingatthetimeofrefueling.SuchtestinghasIncludedonlyasampleofCubesandonlypartofChetubelengthhasbeenexamined.AccordingCoNuclearSafet,FmosttubesweretestedCothef'irstsupportplate,sometothesixthsupportplate,andafewovertheU-bend."(NuclearSafet,V.22,N.5,Sept.-Oct.,1981.IncludedinfraasAttachmentO.UponInformationandbelief,the"QualityAssuranceManual,GInnaStation-InserviceInspectionProgramforthe1980-1989Interval"allowsChetubeInspectionintervalCobeextandedCoonceevery40monthsundercertainconditions.Section2.5ofthisdocumentstates:TheinserviceInspectionintervalsfortheexaminationofsteamgeneratortubesshallnotbemorethan24months.However,ifoveranominaltwoyearperIod(e.g.,twonormalfuelcycles)atleasttwoexaminationsofCheseparatelegsresultinlessChan10$ofthetubeswithdetectablewallpenetration(WChan20%)andnosignificant(0than10~~)furtherpenetrationofCubeswithpreviousIndications,theInspecCIonIntervaloftheindividuallegsmaybeextendedCoonceevery40months.(page5of22)5.Uponinformationandbelief,RG&EreportedtotheNRCstaffonFebruarv10,1982,thattestsaftertheaccident.didnotrevealseIousproblemswithChesteamgeneratotubeswhichwouldpreventRG&Efromre-startingthereactor.YetAfterfiberoptic'xaminationwasrequiredbystaff,seriousproblemswerefoundIntubespreviouslyplugged..JohnMaier,RG8EVice-presidentfor-ElectricandSteamGeneration,commentedtothepressthenextday:"Thepicturesare.verydramatic....Itlookslikesomebodywentinwithahacksaw.Someofthetubesshowseveredentingandexternaldearedation."(APquotedInPalladium-.imes,Peb.12,1982)Furtherexaminationrevealedtwopiecesofmezalweighing"'acoupleofpounds'...withoneofChemaslargeas6.5x4.Inchesandseven-sixteenthsInchesthIck."{NucleonicsWeek'eb.18,1982)AsreportedInNucleonicsWeek,Peb.25,1872,oneRG&Esourcestated:"'Somearecorroded,someareImploded,someare,fustsheared.'"~\'

AttachmentA.page2~I~~~z6.UponInformationandbelief,RGhEwasplanninganextensivesleevingprogramCoremedycorrosionproblemsregardingthesteamgeneratortubes.In'aletterfromJohnMaiertoDennisCrutchfield,January15,1982,RGEErequestedpermissionCo"deletethe25sleevelimitation"sothatmoresleevescouldbeinstalledduringeachsteamgeneratorInspection.{Seeinfra,AttachmentD.)7.AsrecentlyasSeptember21,1981,Ginnawasnotlistedasoneof.Che11unitswithChemostserioussteamgeneratorproblems(NewYorkTimes,Sept.21,1981,S-10).Itisouzopinionthatthisfactemphasizestheunpredictablenatureoftheruptuz'eandreinforcestheneedformuchmorestringenttestprocedures.8.Uponinformationandbelief,theIntroductionofAVTcontrolofsecondarywaterchemistryatGinnahasledCoproblemsofintergranularattackandtubecorrosIon,requiringChepluggIngofsteamgeneratortubes.(NuclearSafet,Ibid.)9.AsindicatedInChePointBeachproceedings,AVTcontroldoesnotfunctiontoprecipitateoutso11dImpuritiesthatleakintothegeneratoranddoesnotpreventbuild-upofhardnessscaleontheheattransfersurfaces.BothconditIonsdegradesteamgeneratortubes.(Docket6630,ER-10,Exhibit16Eat14-15)10.AsobservedbyNRCstaff,"denting"ofsteamgeneratorCubesoccur-redinseveralPWRfacilities,includingTurkeyPoint,Units3and4,andSurry,Units1and2,after4to14monthsofoperatIon,followingCheconversionfromasodiumphophatetreatmenttoAVTchemIstryforthesteamgeneratorsecondarycoolant.("InformationReport-SteamGeneratorTubeExperience,November24,1981,SECX81-664,"AppendixB,page3.)Wenotehtereport!sobservationthat:."TubedentingismostsevereIntherigidregionsorso-called'hardspots'nthetubesupportplates.Thesehardspotsarelocated...aroundtheperipherallocationsofthesupportplatewheretheplateiswedgedtothewrapperandshell."(Ibid.,page3)Uponinformationandbelief,thestaffhasalreadyrequestedthatRGAEhaveVestinghouseprepareareportzegardingthismatter.11.TheNRC"InformationReport-SteamGeneratorTubeExperience"con-cludes:"copperalloysshouldbeeliminatedfromallareasofthecondensate/feedwater/steamcondensationcycle.SubstantialevidenceexiststhatcopperoxidesinChesteamgeneratorsareanimportantcatalystinacceleratingtherateocorrosionprocessesw"thinthesteamgenerators."(Ibid.,p.22)12.Conden.erleakageisalsorelevantCotheactionathand.Staffstates:"Withtheexceptionofafewreactorswhicharesitedwherenoacidproducingspeciesexistsinthecondenser'coolingwater,allcurrentlyopeatingplantsaresusceptibletodentIng,Ifsu¹icientcondenserleakageoccurs.Becausecopper.oxidehasbeendemonstratedtobeacatalyst,thoseplantswithcooperintheir.secondarycyclesareevenmoresusceptible."(Ibid.,ApoendixA,page6)13.SteamgeneratorproblemsarenotautomaticallysolvedbyinstallingnewsteamgeneratorsasevidencedbytheproblemsfacedbyPrairieIsland2andbyNorthAnna1.Brookhav~NationalLaboratorycommented AttaehmyntA,page3~~~eC41N~t1'Le~AL','tAJLAeV~MO'Itt~AI~4lastyearasfollows:ItseemsironicalthatPrairieIsland2,whichhasnocopperinthesystem,stainlesssteelcondensers,andmeticulousmonitoringofwaterchemistry,shouldbeCheoneunittohavesufferedfromthisparticularph'enomenon(oftubecorrosion):ChePrairieIslandUnitshavetodatebeena..;shining.example,eofwhatwethoughtwastheproperwaytoavoidcorrosionproblems.(Docket6630,CE-20,Exhibit40,p.3)SuchexperiencesmakeitallChemore.imperativeto.haveastringenttestingscheduleforCubesandstrict'standardsforremov1ngtubesfromserv1ce.14.Upon1nformationandbel1ef,Chesequenceofeventsdur1ngtheJanuary25accidentclearlyindicatetheinterdependencyofthenuclearsteamsupplysystemandthereactorsafetysystem.ReactorCr1pinresponseCothetubebreak1nit1atedcontainment1solat1onwh1chresultedinlossof1nstrumenta1r.ThisrequiredoperatoractiontoopenthePORVmanually,whenChevalvewasrequ1redtorelieveover-pressurization.Thereactorvesselbecameunder-pressurizedwhenChePORVstuckop'nandtheblockvalvehadCobeclosed.LoweredpressureproducedasteambubbleinChetopofChereactorvesselwhenwaterflashedtosteam.Aseconddropinpressureabout30min-uteslateragainledtowaterinChereactorvesselflashingtosteam.(Source:"PreliminaryEvaluationofOperatorActionsforGinnaSGTubeRuptureEvent"byThemisSpeis.SeeinfraAttachmentE.)I15:Uponinformationandbelief,theSpeismemoalsoindicatesthatover-pressurizationofthereactorvesselwasofconcerndur1ngthesequenceofeventsduringwh1choperators.Criedtostabilizethe.reactor.First,chargingpumpswererestartedbeforeCheBsteamgeneratorwasisolated,leadingtoabuild-upofreactorpressure.Second,theSIpumpwasrestartedwithoutapparentneedtodoso,whichhaselicitedconcernregardingoperatorhesitanceCoterm1nateHPIandCheconsequenceforpressurizedthermalshock.16.Accordingtothe"InformationReport-SteamGeneratorTubeExper-ience,"thetotalman-remsexposurecanbequitesignificant.Thereportstates:"'r/herema)orrepairorreplacementeffortsarere-quired,doseexpendituresmayrangefrom2000Co"3500man-rems."(Ibid,pane51)Thelargestdosagereportedresultsfromsteat'eneratorrepairatSanOnofreUnitl,where3493man-rmsexposureisreportedforthe273-dayoutageduring1980-1981.(Ibid,Table6)Thisismorethanthe1759man-rmsforsteamgeneratorreplacementatSury,Unit1orChe2140man-remsforSurry,Unit2replacement.(Ibid,Appendix"B,page13andTable6)Itisourbeliefthatthesedoselevels@ointtotheneedtoevaluatetotalman-remsexposure1ndeterminingthebestcourseoactiontobefollowedatGinna.