ML15020A740

Petitioners' Combined Reply in Support of Amended Petition to Intervene and for a Public Adjudication Hearing of Entergy License Amendment Request for Authorization to Implement 10 CFR Section 50.61a, 'Alternate Fracture Toughness Requireme

ML15020A740
Person / Time
Site:	Palisades
Issue date:	01/20/2015
From:	Lodge T J Beyond Nuclear, Don't Waste Michigan, Michigan Safe Energy Future - Shoreline Chapter (MSEF), Nuclear Energy Information Service
To:	Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel
SECY RAS
References
50-255-LA, Pending, RAS 27097
Download: ML15020A740 (20)

Text

UNITED STATES OF AMERICANUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSIONBefore the Atomic Safety and Licensing BoardIn the Matter of:Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc.(Palisades Nuclear Plant)Operating License Amendment Request) Docket No. 50-255 )) January 20, 2015) *****PETITIONERS' COMBINED REPLY IN SUPPORT OF AMENDED PETITION TOINTERVENE AND FOR A PUBLIC ADJUDICATION HEARING OF ENTERGYLICENSE AMENDMENT REQUEST FOR AUTHORIZATION TO IMPLEMENT 10 CFR§50.61a, 'ALTERNATE FRACTURE TOUGHNESS REQUIREMENTS FORPROTECTION AGAINST PRESSURIZED THERMAL SHOCK EVENTS'Now come Beyond Nuclear ("BN"), Don't Waste Michigan ("DWM"), Michigan SafeEnergy Future - Shoreline Chapter ("MSEF"), and the Nuclear Energy Information Service("NEIS") (hereafter collectively called "Petitioners"), and reply in support of their "AmendedPetition to Intervene and for a Public Adjudication Hearing of Entergy License Request forAuthorization to Implement 10 C.F.R. § 50.61a, 'Alternate Fracture Toughness Requirements forProtection Against Pressurized Thermal Shock Events.'" Specifically, Petitioners respond inopposition to "Entergy's Answer Opposing Petition to Intervene and Request for Hearing"("Entergy Answer") and the "NRC Staff Answer to Petition to Intervene and Request for aHearing Filed by Beyond Nuclear, Don't Waste Michigan, Michigan Safe Energy Future-Shoreline Chapter, and the Nuclear Energy Information Service" ("NRC Answer").I. INTRODUCTIONThe NRC Staff and Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc. ("Entergy") have set forth by way of answer to the Petition, a threadbare tapestry of misrepresentations, unsupported attorney opinionspassed off as expert contradictions, and bare assertions of what the 10 C.F.R. § 50.61a alternatefracture toughness requirements for protection against pressurized thermal shock eventssupposedly mean, all as part of a strategy aimed at keeping Palisades Nuclear Plant ("PNP") inoperation as the most embrittled reactor pressure vessel in the American nuclear industry. It isnot a positive attribute to be identified as an outlier among the most thermal shock-endangeredreactor pressure vessels. Yet as this memorandum will show, Palisades is truly in a category of itsown, where it has become the butt of gallows humor at the Advisory Committee on ReactorSafeguards. Petitioners see nothing funny about Palisades as a laughingstock, and believe thatthey should be granted an opportunity to explore the dangers of Palisades' embrittlementproblem through sworn witnesses in an effort to avoid serious future drama.II. RESPONSES TO THE STAFF ANSWERA. Standing The NRC Staff agrees that Petitioners have established standing, although they advancethe quaint but bizarre argument that the one-page declarations submitted by individuals livingwithin the 50-mile danger radius around Palisades must articulate claims in the one-pagestanding declarations themselves which raise admissible contentions. Staff Answer p. 5 fn. 15. Given that Petitioners are represented by counsel who submitted on their behalves a 21-pageenumeration of grounds for a hearing, along with evidentiary attachments, including a serious,expert-supported contention, the ASLB can disregard the Staff's fussiness, resolve its dissonantpositions and find that Petitioners have demonstrated sufficient grounds for standing to allowthem to proceed to the admissibility question.

B. Claimed Impermissible Challenges to NRC Regulations The NRC Staff launches (Staff Answer p. 14) into the objection that Petitioners "fail[] tospecify any particular deficiency in the LAR, . . . raise[] numerous matters that are not thesubject of the instant LAR and are beyond the permissible scope of this proceeding, and . . .constitute[] an impermissible challenge to the Commission's regulations." To back up thisassertion, the Staff cites a host of statements made by Petitioners' expert, Arnold Gundersen,which it claims impermissibly challenge NRC regulations.1So the Staff attempts to shut down this license amendment intervention by arguing thatmere disagreement with the calculations, methods and assemblage of data being submitted for apresumably discretionary 10 C.F.R. § 50.61a ruling from the Director of Nuclear ReactorRegulation is heresy against the regulatory regime. The Staff's interpretation is a spoof of therule; 10 C.F.R. § 50.61a clearly contemplates a discretionary determination by the Director ofFor example, see Staff Answer at p. 17: "For example, a recurring theme in the Petitioners'1arguments is that Palisades should not be allowed to use § 50.61a because § 50.61a, unlike § 50.61, relieson 'estimates' and lacks 'scientific rigor.' This argument, however, challenges § 50.61a, not Entergy'sLAR." And Staff Answer at 18: "The Petitioners' expert, Dr. Gundersen, makes this argumentsuccinctly, 'Until a new capsule sample is removed and analyzed, the analytical assumptions created forthe proposed license amendment are unable to be validated and verified.' Nowhere, however, do thePetitioners point to any provision in the NRC's rules that impose such a requirement. To the contrary, byarguing that some additional requirement must be imposed to enable Palisades to use the alternaterequirements in § 50.61a, the Petitioners are, in fact, challenging the adequacy of the rule itself, ratherthan the adequacy of Entergy's license amendment request."And Staff Answer at pp. 18-19: "The Petitioners' argument that Entergy must removesurveillance capsules from the reactor before using § 50.61a thus challenges the rule, which does notrequire the removal of additional surveillance capsules beyond those withdrawn under the Part 50,Appendix H withdrawal schedule."And Staff Answer at p. 20: "The Petitioners' apparent challenge to the approved capsulewithdrawal schedule is inadmissible, as it relates to a prior approval pursuant to 10 C.F.R. Part 50,Appendix H, not the amendment at issue in this proceeding.The Petitioners may not use this amendmentproceeding as a backdoor to file a challenge to the approved modified withdrawal schedule."

NRR. Where there is discretion vested in the regulator, differences of opinion, interpretation,and expert analysis are legitimate bases for challenging the decision because the decision ispotentially arrived at in an adversarial manner. See, for example, § 50.61a( c)(1) (RTMAX-Xvalues assessment "must specify the bases for the projected value of RTMAX-X for each reactorvessel beltline material, including the assumptions regarding future plant operation"); § 50.61a( c)(2) ("Each licensee shall perform an examination and an assessment of flaws in the reactorvessel beltline as required by paragraph (e) of this section" - and (e) requires disclosure of testsperformed but, again, detailed explanation of the methodology underlying NDE uncertaintiesassumptions, and adjustments must be disclosed. This is merely a recognition that even2objective data, once interpreted, may be examined to ascertain the objectivity or inappropriatebias which may have occurred in the means of analysis which have been applied to it. Indeed, the final section of § 50.61a, subsection (f)(7), requires that "The licenseeshall report any information that significantly influences the RTMAX-X value to the Directorin accordance with the requirements of paragraphs (c)(1) and (d)(1) of this section." Therequirement clearly introduces subjective judgment and choice into the decision of what data isto be provided to the Director of NRR. Hence for Petitioners to provide their expert's critique ofthe means by which the § 50.61a investigation was conducted, and the weaknesses or biases inthe underlying data, assumptions and manipulations of information cannot be construed as a§ 50.61a says in part: "The methodology to account for NDE-related uncertainties must be based2on statistical data from the qualification tests and any other tests that measure the difference between theactual flaw size and the NDE detected flaw size. Licensees who adjust their test data to account for NDE-related uncertainties to verify conformance with the values in Tables 2 and 3 shall prepare and submit themethodology used to estimate the NDE uncertainty, the statistical data used to adjust the test data and anexplanation of how the data was analyzed for review and approval by the Director in accordance withparagraphs (c)(2) and (d)(2) of this section."

frontal assault on the regulatory citadel, but must instead be seen, for purposes of theadmissibility determination, as an expose' of the flaws caused by straying away from knowablescience.C. Surveillance Data DisputesThe Staff persists in the argument that "sister plant surveillance data," viz., scientificevidence of embrittlement from completely different types of nuclear reactors, can be compared,apples-to-apples, with destructive testing data gleaned from metal coupons retrieved from thePalisades RPV. The Staff urges that the § 50.61a(10) definition of "surveillance data" includesother plants' information within its sweep, and that every reference to surveillance dataautomatically means not just Palisades, but other plants. Only through such a misleading3insistence can the Staff proclaim (Staff Answer pp. 21-22) that "If these [§ 50.61a(f)(6)] criteriaare met, the rule requires the applicant to use the surveillance data to verify that its predictedreference temperatures are appropriate."But no matter how obfuscatory its arguments, the Staff cannot get around the fact that 10C.F.R. § 50.61a(f)(6)(i) requires that "(A) The surveillance material must be a heat-specificMAX-X match for one or more of the materials for which RT is being calculated." Gundersen hasattested to the lack of proof that the metals from the various RPVs match. The Staff manipulates engineer Gundersen's testimony by selectively citing (StaffAnswer p. 21) his observation that "an exhaustive review of NRC regulations has not unveiledany regulations that allow for such comparisons, and no record of scientific validation of suchStaff Answer p. 21: "Thus, whenever the term 'surveillance data' is used in § 50.61a, it includes3surveillance data from other plants."

methodology." The Staff then terms this an inappropriate challenge to NRC regulations and,adding injury to that insult, accuses Gundersen and Petitioners (Staff Answer p. 22) of saying"that Entergy should not be allowed to analyze sister-plant data at all."But the Staff omits to respond - deliberately, one must conclude - to Gundersen's furtheropinion, cited at Petitioners' Amended Petition p. 15, where in a section entitled "TheComparable Plants Are Not Apples-to-Apples Comparisons," Gundersen offers theseconclusions: These plants, which he says "thus far have not exhibited significant signs ofreactor metal embrittlement," are poor comparables because. . . the dramatically different nuclear core design and operational powercharacteristics make an accurate comparison impossible. The difference betweenthe Westinghouse nuclear cores and the Combustion Engineering nuclear coreimpacts the neutron flux on each reactor vessel, thus making an accuratecomparison of neutron bombardment and embrittlement impossible.Id. at p. 10, ¶ 27.It is thus misrepresentative for the Staff to maintain that Gundersen did not critique thesurveillance samples from other plants according to § 50.61a(f)(6) criteria.Even if the ASLB were to conclude that Arnold Gundersen was incorrect in asserting thatno rule governs the comparison of Palisades' embrittlement data with that from other nuclearreactors, a contention about a matter not covered by a specific rule need only allege that thematter poses a significant safety problem. That is sufficient to raise an issue under the generalrequirement for operating licenses, 10 C.F.R. § 50.57(a)(3), for a finding of reasonable assuranceof operation without endangering the health and safety of the public. Duke Power Co. (CatawbaNuclear Station, Units 1 & 2), LBP-82-116, 16 NRC 1937, 1946 (1982).Related to this dispute, the Staff points out (Staff Answer p. 19 fn. 80) that ArnoldGundersen incorrectly attributed to the ACRS these statements - "the use of all possible physical samples is important to an accurate outcome" . . . "the vehicle for doing that is doing a statisticalcomparison of a particular reactor's plant specific surveillance data with the general trends." Petitioners acknowledge that they mistakenly believed these were statements made by a memberof the Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards, and they admit their error. The speaker is theprincipal NRC staff expert on embrittlement, Mark Kirk of the NRC Office of RegulatoryResearch and longtime point person on this issue. Kirk is the primary author of § 50.61a, socoming from him, the acknowledgment that the use of "all possible physical samples isimportant to an accurate outcome" bolsters Petitioners' case even more than if it were a statementby an ACRS member being briefed by an NRC staff expert.D. Staff Pretensions At ExpertiseAfter dispensing with the Staff's disingenuous contention that every expert conclusionproffered by Petitioners is an impermissible challenge to NRC regulations, an underlyingweakness to the agency's arguments is exposed: the NRC Staff has not met Petitioners' expert'sconclusions with its own expert evidence. Presumably, qualified NRC engineers are vettingEntergy's License Amendment Request, but they're nowhere in sight in the Staff's Answer.Instead, the Staff's tactic is to float unsupported conclusions, faux expert representations,tendered via lawyers. For example, the Staff criticizes Arnold Gundersen's testimony on the subject of errorband overlap at its Answer, p. 25 in this way: The Petitioners assert that it is difficult to compare the data from Palisades withdata from four other plants, because of the need to assure that the "20% error band[s]"overlap. According to the Petitioners, 'To compare this different data without assurancethat the 1ó variance [sic] from each plant overlaps the other plants lacks scientificvalidity.' In addition, in discussing the differences in flux and fluence from cycle-to-cycleat Palisades, the Petitioners argue that it is 'mathematically implausible' that the needed deviation was obtained. The Petitioners therefore argue that additional testing andanalysis is needed to 'support relicensure.'But in fact, Gundersen stated a scientific criticism with regulatory-violation overtones, i.e., thatthere is a need for consistency in comparing the 20% error band among the sister plants and thatunder 10 C.F.R. §50.61a, Entergy has not made that showing. By its very construction,Gundersen's opinion is predicated on adequate facts taken from the License Amendment Request("LAR"):While '[a] 1ó analysis appears to be binding within the Palisades data, . . . theNRC lowers the bar when comparing data from similar sister plants that are included inEntergy's analysis of the Palisades reactor vessel without requiring the same 1ó variancewith Palisades.' Id. at p. 12, ¶ 32. Gundersen adds: 'There can be no assurance that the20% error band at Palisades encompasses the 20% error band at the Robinson or IndianPoint plants. To compare this different data without assurance that the 1ó variance fromeach plant overlaps the other plants lacks scientific validity.' Id. at p. 12, ¶ 33.Amended Petition p. 18.In support of the continuity and consistency of Petitioners' contention, their expertGundersen found that there is "extraordinary variability between the neutron flux acrossthe nuclear core in this Combustion Engineering reactor" because of a "flux variation of as muchas 300% between the 45-degree segment and the 75-degree segment," calling it "mathematicallyimplausible that a 20% deviation is possible when the neutron flux itself varies by 300%." Id. atp. 12, ¶ 34. Gundersen's final opinion on this point is:The Westinghouse Analysis delineates that a 20% variation is mandatory, yet theeffective fluence variability can be as high as 300%, therefore, the analytical data doesnot support relicensure without destructive testing and complete embrittlement analysisof additional capsule samples.Gundersen Report at p. 16, ¶ 39.At another place in the Staff Answer, at pp. 26-27, the Staff projects a scientificconclusion without going to the trouble of sponsoring it through an expert:

. . . [I]n their argument concerning flux variability at Palisades and the difficultyin assuring the necessary standard deviation, the Petitioners and Dr. Gundersen do notprovide any basis for their assertion that fluence cannot be predicted because the fluenceper cycle changes. Significantly, the Petitioners do not point to anything in the applicationwhich would indicate that Entergy failed to consider the variability between cycles whencomparing measured data with calculational data in the LAR.Which unidentified engineering expert lawyer for the NRC Staff is testifying here that "thefluence per cycle changes"? Technical analyses offered in evidence must be sponsored by an expert who can beexamined on the reliability of the factual assertions and soundness of the scientific opinionsfound in the documents. Southern Cal. Edison Co. (San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station,Units 2 & 3), ALAB-717, 17 NRC 346, 367 (1983), citing Duke Power Co. (William B.McGuire Nuclear Station, Units 1 & 2), ALAB-669, 15 NRC 453, 477 (1982). See ClevelandElec. Illuminating Co. (Perry Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1 & 2), ALAB-443, 6 NRC 741, 754-56 (1977); Philadelphia Elec. Co. (Limerick Generating Station, Units 1 & 2), ALAB-836, 23NRC 479, 494 n.22 (1986); Pub. Serv. Co. of N.H. (Seabrook Station, Units 1 & 2), ALAB-891,27 NRC 341, 350-51 (1988). The Staff has omitted to sponsor its expert opinions through abona fide expert witness, which undermines - not just at this point in their Answer, but at otherplaces - the validity of their arguments against admissibility.Testimony based upon "subjective belief or unsupported speculation" rather than the"methods and procedures of science," and not grounded upon sufficient facts or data to be theproduct of applying reliable principles and methods to the facts cannot suffice as evidence of themerits in a licensing dispute. Duke Cogema Stone & Webster (Savannah River Mixed Oxide FuelFabrication Facility), LBP-05-4, 61 NRC 71, 98-99 (2005). Neither mere speculation nor bare orconclusory assertions, even by an expert, which allege that a matter should be considered, can suffice to cause admission of a proffered contention. USEC, Inc. (Am. Centrifuge Plant), CLI-06-10, 63 NRC 451, 472 (2006); Fansteel, Inc. (Muskogee, Oklahoma Site), CLI-03-13, 58 NRC195, 203 (2003). Presumably the NRC Staff is likewise bound, in opposing proffered content-ions, to avoid mere speculation and bare/conclusory assertions, and worse for them, they identifyno expert making such assertions. Consequently, the penalty for the Staff's repeated uses oflawyers as proxy embrittlement experts in its Answer should be forfeiture of their arguments. E. Claimed Irrelevance/Unchallenged Earlier Licensing DecisionsThe Staff repeatedly engages in a ploy, treating Petitioners' evidentiary references whichtend to prove that 10 C.F.R. § 50.61a has been improvidently or incorrectly invoked, instead, asout-of-bounds facts which Petitioners may not use. For instance:Finally, in Section IV.C.3 of the Amended Petition, the Petitioners argue thatfluence data from Surveillance Capsule A-60, which was excluded from the licensee'ssurveillance program in the early 1980s, exceeded the "1ó variation" [sic] describedabove. The Petitioners maintain that this data would have shown that Palisades must beshut down, and that disregarding Capsule A-60 distorts the analytical basis for continuedoperation. However, as is the case with many of Petitioners' arguments, their concernswith Capsule A-60 have no relevance to the present proceeding. Entergy is not relying onCapsule A-60 at any point in its LAR. Capsule A-60 was deleted from the Reactor VesselSurveillance Capsule Program over 30 years ago, and the Reactor Vessel SurveillanceCoupon Removal Schedule was modified to provide the option of removing an equivalentcapsule instead of the primary capsule in a separate licensing action.Staff Answer p. 27. This is the Staff's attempt to transform a purely evidentiary observation intoa regulatory brick wall. By arguing that Capsule A-60 is "irrelevant" as having been "deleted"from the surveillance program 30 years ago, the Staff obviously hopes to conceal evidence. Thatevidence arguably showed that the degree of RPV embrittlement in the 1980's was greatlyadvanced, given the then-short operational age of the reactor. In a similar vein, Entergy proposesto proceed through the 16 years from 2003 to 2019 without testing a coupon, which is rather akin to throwing out an inconveniently revelatory test result that might prove the too-fragile-to-operate state of Palisades' RPV. By referring to Capsule A-60, Petitioners are both pointing toevidence that might be pertinent, as well as alerting the Licensing Board to an ongoing course byEntergy to evade scientific validation of the true circumstances of embrittlement of the PalisadesRPV. By concealing, or not pursuing, scientific evidence now, Entergy can move with lesscontroversy to the probabilistic assessment, mostly-theoretical path afforded by 10 C.F.R. §50.61a.E. Misconstrued Evidentiary Value Of The LAR-EMAThe NRC Staff often defends by taking a discursive view of Petitioners' evidence,piecemealing it down to disjoint facts, followed by the assertion that such anomie is beyond theregulatory pale. That remains true respecting the ruckus raised by the Staff from Petitioners'reference to a License Amendment Request pertaining to revisions of the Equivalent MarginsAnalysis for Palisades.Arnold Gundersen notes (Gundersen Declaration ¶ 46) that . . . prior evaluations suggest that three portions of the nuclear reactor vessel willnot meet the NRC required 50 ft-lb ductility stress limit. It also appears, from the fivedocuments attached to the LAR, that Westinghouse has re-analyzed and manipulated thePalisades data so that the final calculations keep the reactor vessel within the regulatoryacceptable range above the minimum 50 ft-lb ductility stress limit.Gundersen considers the LAR EMA request to be "red flag" evidence that "Entergy is proposingto operate its Palisades NPP well outside the norm by proposing to re-analyze the deterioratingmetallurgical conditions without using the readily available physical samples that are designedspecifically for this purpose." Id. at ¶ 48. And therein lies the distinction between Petitioners andthe Staff: it is of evidentiary value to point out that Entergy is engaged in a wider campaign to, once again, move the goal posts back by raising the permissible limits for embrittlement so thatthe astonishingly serious shatter capabilities of the Palisades RPV remain camouflaged in allegedregulatory protections. Irrespective of the "separate" pendency of the EMA license amendmentrequest, the request involves the very same RPV. Petitioners' expert may rightfully expose thefacts on which the request is based, and their pertinence to this hearing petition.F. The Lack Of Thermal Shield Is Relevant EvidencePetitioners have the same response concerning the Staff's bickering that mentioning thelack of a thermal shield is not relevant to whether superficial paperwork requirements have beenmet concerning 10 C.F.R. § 50.61a. Petitioners are urging none of what the Staff alleges - that is,Petitioners are not trying to predicate a contention on what Palisades' prior owner should havedone. The lack of a thermal shield emphasizes the unfettered neutron fluence to which the RPVhas been continuously exposed for over 43 years. It tends to prove that a science-based regulatorydetermination of Palisades' embrittlement may be preferable to the use of probabilistic riskassessment in the circumstances of this reactor.G. Prior License Amendments Enabling More Embrittlement Are Relevant EvidenceFor the Staff to seriously posit that the multiple past increases of the "trigger temperature"(the Staff's term) are not admissible evidence is laughable. Their objection pertains to theforthcoming adjudication of this matter which should be held. It is incumbent upon an expert todisclose the bases for his/her opinion. Quite rationally, Arnold Gundersen's analysis was that thedate at which the trigger temperature was exceeded kept getting longer. The rollbacks were of thedate and also the temperature. The pattern of those rollbacks is of importance to scrutinizing andunderstanding the pending § 50.61a application. Too, a 230 degrees F. increase in the trigger temperature over 43+ years is relevant information. The regulation - 10 C.F.R. § 50.61a(d)(1) -makes it relevant: Whenever there is a significant change in projected values of RTMAX-X, so thatthe previous value, the current value, or both values, exceed the screening criteria beforethe expiration of the plant operating license; or upon the licensee's request for a changein the expiration date for operation of the facility; a re-assessment of RTMAX-X valuesdocumented consistent with the requirements of paragraph (c)(1) and (c)(3) of this sectionmust be submitted in the form of a license amendment for review and approval by theDirector. (Emphasis added).III. Responses To Entergy's AnswerA. StandingEntergy hints that there is no meaningful relief that would follow a decision adverse to itsinterests on the License Amendment Request. Entergy Answer at p. 14/37 of .pdf. Given thestage of Palisades' operating life and the severe, undeniable embrittlement of the reactor pressurevessel, it is possible that the ASLB could overturn or deny recourse to Entergy under 10 C.F.R. §50.61a, which would force a decision on the utility to undertake the annealing of the RPV, orperhaps, if the economics of that remedy were prohibitive, for the reactor to be permanentlyshutdown, and decommissioned. If the former relief were ordered or followed from a denial of §50.61a amendment, Petitioners would benefit from safety enhancements to Palisades' operations. If the latter relief occurred, they would benefit even more since the risks from decommissioningwould principally attend management of spent fuel at the reactor site as well as the cleanup ofradioactive contamination.Entergy urges that the Petitioners are not entitled to rely on the "proximity presumption"to establish standing. Even if the ASLB were to accept the proposition that a through-wall crackor shattering of the Palisades RPV cannot conceivably form the heart of a dangerous nuclear reactor accident, residence or activities within 10 miles of a facility (and in one case 17 milesfrom a facility) have been found sufficient to establish standing in a case involving the proposedexpansion in capacity of a spent fuel pool. See Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. (VermontYankee Nuclear Power Station), LBP-87-7, 25 NRC 116, 118 (1987); see also Florida Power &Light Co. (St. Lucie Nuclear Power Plant, Unit 1), LBP-88-10A, 27 NRC 452-454-55 (1988),aff'd, ALAB-893, 27 NRC 627 (1988); Carolina Power & Light Co. (Shearon Harris NuclearPower Plant), LBP-99-25, 50 NRC 25, 29-31 (1999); Northeast Nuclear Energy Co. (MillstoneNuclear Power Station, Unit 3), LBP-00-2, 51 NRC 25 (2000). Maynard Kaufman, one of theindividuals who has provided a declaration and is represented by Michigan Safe Energy Future-Shoreline Chapter, lives within 10 miles of Palisades. Bette Pierman, represented by BeyondNuclear, lives within 15 miles. Gail Snyder, represented by Nuclear Energy Information Service,camps and picnics on property she owns about 15 miles from Palisades. At least these threeintervening organizations thus overcome a reduced radius (Alice Hirt, represented by Don'tWaste Michigan, lives 35 miles from the reactor). In a proceeding reviewing an extended poweruprate application, an organization had representational standing where its representativemembers each lived within 15 miles of the plant. Entergy Nuclear Vermont Yankee, L.L.C. andEntergy Nuclear Operations, Inc. (Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station), LBP-04-28, 60NRC 548, 553-54 (2004).Moreover, residence within 30-40 miles of a reactor site has been held to be sufficient toshow the requisite interest in raising safety questions. Virginia Electric & Power Co. (NorthAnna Power Station, Units 1 & 2), ALAB-146, 6 AEC 631, 633-634 (1973); Louisiana Power &Light Co. (Waterford Steam Electric Station, Unit 3), ALAB-125, 6 AEC 371, 372 n.6 (1973);

Northern States Power Co. (Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Plant, Units 1 & 2), ALAB-107, 6AEC 188, 190, 193, reconsid. den., ALAB-110, 6 AEC 247, aff'd, CLI-73-12, 6 AEC 241(1973); Florida Power and Light Co. (St. Lucie Nuclear Power Plant, Unit 1), LBP-88-10A, 27NRC 452, 454-55 (1988), aff'd on other grounds, ALAB-893, 27 NRC 627 (1988). Turning to Entergy's other standing objections, the utility suggests (Entergy Answer p. 13/37) that Petitioners are making a general objection to the plant's operations. That is incorrect. The contention raised by Petitioners is quite particular, in that it is an objection to any furtherweakening of pressurized thermal shock ("PTS") safety standards. The chain of causation whichEntergy maintains has not been made is that if there were a PTS event, it could cause RPV failureand core meltdown, accompanied by containment failure, followed by catastrophic radioactivityrelease. Safety concerns which carry the potential for offsite consequences enable standing.Cleveland Elec. Illuminating Co. (Perry Nuclear Power Plant, Unit 1), CLI-93-21, 38 NRC 87,95-96 (1993). In ruling on claims of "proximity standing," the Commission determines the radiusbeyond which it believes there is no longer an "obvious potential for offsite consequences" by"taking into account the nature of the proposed action and the significance of the radioactivesource." Entergy Nuclear Operations and Entergy Nuclear Palisades, LLC (Palisades NuclearPlant), CLI-08-19, 68 NRC 251, 254 (2008). Petitioners submit here that a pressurized thermal shock-caused failure of a reactorpressure vessel raises an "obvious potential for offsite consequences." Even in licenseamendment cases involving allegations of management's lack of the required character andcompetence, there is deemed to be an obvious potential for offsite cónsequences, so standing isanalogous to that in an operating license case. Florida Power and Light Co. (St. Lucie Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1 and 2), CLI-89-21, 30 NRC 325 (1989).IV. CONCLUSIONThere is no genuine issue but that Petitioners have successfully established standingbased on the prospects of a through-wall accident from the extraordinary state of embrittlementof the Palisades RPV. The NRC Staff has not sincerely proven that any of the opinions andconclusions proffered by Petitioners' expert witness comprise an impermissible attack on NRCregulations. The historical evidence of the increasingly severe and advance pressurized thermalshock concern at Palisades which is cited by Petitioners and through their expert constitutesfacially relevant evidence and may not be discarded merely because of earlier regulatorydecisions which touch upon it.Finally, two additional facts warrant the ASLB to note the severity of the PTS problem atPalisades and the companion matter of the still rather unsettled, inchoate nature of NRCregulations governing embrittlement, notwithstanding the existence of 10 C.F.R. §§ 50.61 and50.61a. A. ACRS Subcommittee MinutesOne is the dark view maintained by certain members of the Advisory Committee onReactor Safeguards, Metallurgy and Reactor Fuels subcommittee, manifested in recent officialtranscribed minutes of Subcommittee proceedings. On October 16, 2014, this colloquy tookplace:MEMBER BANERJEE: Yes, but I mean what is special about Palisades? That'swhat I was going to ask.MR. KIRK: Well, there are so many things that are special about Palisades.MEMBER BANERJEE: There's nothing special about Palisades, though, than you exposed it to a lot of risk?MR. KIRK: A higher level of embrittlement, yes.Official Transcript of Proceedings, ADAMS No. ML 14296A342, pp. 30-31 (pp. 31-32 of 168 on.pdf counter). Also:CHAIRMAN BALLINGER: Where is Palisades in 80 years if you can convertthat to fluence?MR. KIRK: Well, it's probably over hereish.CHAIRMAN BALLINGER: Okay.MR. KIRK: Right. I know that doesn't go well into the transcript but that'sprobably about the accuracy.CHAIRMAN BALLINGER: But it's less than one times ten to the minus six, letus hope.MR. KIRK: Yeah.Id., p. 32 (33 of 168 on .pdf counter).And additionally:MR. KIRK: We don't - we didn't incorporate a generic way to deal with flaws thatdon't meet the flaw tables.CHAIRMAN BALLINGER: That's why I was kind of pinging on you about thePalisades and Beaver Valley and how - where they were likely to get hung up.MR. STEVENS: Our experience, and we did look at better than a dozen flawevaluations or - I'm sorry, inspection results for plants that we were able to look atthrough submittals or part of the review of the NRR activity associated with extendingRPV inspection from 10 to 20 years, and our experiences we have yet to see any plantsthat challenge the flaw tables in this rule.So another reason I think we chose a realistic not to address that comment is first off is alot of different possibilities on flaws that could exist that might challenge those limits,and then second, we just didn't see - it seemed to us that to have a fair probability that thatwould occur so we didn't see the need to spend the resource to chase that because ourexperience was we don't see people having trouble satisfying the flaw regs.Id., pp. 54-55 (pp. 55-56 of .pdf counter).Finally:MR. KIRK: So, you know, that's the other thing and that's why we tend to defer tothe generic trends is there's really just not that much plant-specific data to go on, in most cases.If in some other universe, which we don't exist in, there was a hundredplant-specific data points I think, you know, quite clearly we'd just use that trend. Butthat's not what we have.So, really, we're looking here for the limited data - we're looking at the limiteddata that we have to flag big inconsistencies between the embrittlement trends in aparticular vessel weld plate forging with what we use. Id., p. 60 (61/168 of .pdf).B. The NRC Staff's Unannounced Succor For Embrittled Nuclear PowerPlant Owners When Compliance Even With § 50.61a Is A Bridge Too FarIn the end, for extremely-embrittled RPVs, 10 C.F.R. § 50.61a contains an obscure, little-noticed bypass provision whereby the NRC Director of NRR may allow selected embrittledreactors to operate beyond the PTS screening criteria. At the 619th Meeting of the AdvisoryCommittee on Reactor Safeguards, Mark Kirk of the Office of Nuclear Regulatory Research andthe principal author of 10 C.F.R. § 50.61a, presented a slide show, "Technical Brief onRegulatory Guidance on the Alternative PTS Rule (10 C.F.R. § 50.61a)." Official Transcript ofProceedings, ADAMS No. ML14321A542, commencing at p. 202/268 of .pdf. The slide at p.242 of the transcript contains the following information:Use of 10 CFR 50.61a PTS screening criteria requires submittal for review andapproval by Director, NRR.For plants that do not satisfy PTS Screening Criteria, plant-specific PTSassessment is required.Must be submitted for review and approval by Director, NRR.Guidance is not provided for this caseSubsequent requirements (i.e., after submittal) are defined in paragraph (d) of 10CFR 50.61a. (Emphasis supplied).Thus even as the NRC Staff and Entergy castigate Petitioners for not strictly followingpleading requirements and flay public representatives for "impermissibly" trampling onregulations which are "strict by design," the agency quietly maintains "pressurized thermal shock regulatory relief valve" therapy for deserving nuclear power plant corporations which appears tobe outside the Atomic Energy Act and unchallengeable by the public.. /s/ Terry J. Lodge Terry J. Lodge (OH #0029271)316 N. Michigan St., Ste. 520Toledo, OH 43604-5627(419) 255-7552Fax (419) 255-7552Tjlodge50@yahoo.comCounsel for Petitioners UNITED STATES OF AMERICANUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSIONBefore the Atomic Safety and Licensing BoardIn the Matter of:Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc.(Palisades Nuclear Plant)Operating License Amendment Request) Docket No. 50-255 )) January 20, 2015) *****CERTIFICATE OF SERVICEI hereby certify that copies of the foregoing "PETITIONERS' COMBINED REPLY INSUPPORT OF AMENDED PETITION TO INTERVENE AND FOR A PUBLICADJUDICATION HEARING OF ENTERGY LICENSE AMENDMENT REQUEST FORAUTHORIZATION TO IMPLEMENT 10 CFR §50.61a, 'ALTERNATE FRACTURETOUGHNESS REQUIREMENTS FOR PROTECTION AGAINST PRESSURIZEDTHERMAL SHOCK EVENTS" was served by me upon the parties to this proceeding via theNRC's Electronic Information Exchange system this 20th day of January, 2015. /s/ Terry J. Lodge Terry J. Lodge (OH #0029271)316 N. Michigan St., Ste. 520Toledo, OH 43604-5627(419) 255-7552Fax (419) 255-7552Tjlodge50@yahoo.comCounsel for Petitioners-20-