Information Notice 1984-42, Equipment Availability for Conditions During Outages Not Covered by Technical Specifications: Difference between revisions

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{{#Wiki_filter:SSINS No. 6835 IN 84-42 UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY
{{#Wiki_filter:SSINS No. 6835 IN 84-42 UNITED STATES


COMMISSION
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION


OFFICE OF INSPECTION
OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT


===AND ENFORCEMENT===
WASHINGTON, DC 20555 June 5, 1984 IE INFORMATION NOTICE NO. 84-42:  EQUIPMENT AVAILABILITY FOR CONDITIONS
WASHINGTON, DC 20555 June 5, 1984 IE INFORMATION


NOTICE NO. 84-42: EQUIPMENT
DURING OUTAGES NOT COVERED BY TECHNICAL


AVAILABILITY
SPECIFICATIONS
 
===FOR CONDITIONS===
DURING OUTAGES NOT COVERED BY TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS


==Addressees==
==Addressees==
:
:
All holders of a nuclear power plant operating
All holders of a nuclear power plant operating license (OL) or construction
 
license (OL) or construction


permit (CP).
permit (CP).


==Purpose==
==Purpose==
: This information
:
This information notice is provided to alert licensees to the importance of


notice is provided to alert licensees
controlling equipment availability for conditions. during outages not covered


to the importance
by Technical Specifications. It is expected that recipients will review the


of controlling
information for applicability to their facilities and consider actions, if


equipment
appropriate, to preclude similar problems occurring at their facilities.


availability
However, suggestions contained in this information notice do not constitute


for conditions.
NRC requirements and, therefore, no specific action or written response is


during outages not covered by Technical
required.


Specifications.
==Description of Circumstances==
 
:
It is expected that recipients
On January 8, 1984, the Palisades Nuclear Plant experienced a complete loss of
 
will review the information
 
for applicability
 
to their facilities
 
and consider actions, if appropriate, to preclude similar problems occurring
 
at their facilities.
 
However, suggestions
 
contained
 
in this information
 
notice do not constitute
 
NRC requirements
 
and, therefore, no specific action or written response is required.Description
 
of Circumstances:
On January 8, 1984, the Palisades
 
Nuclear Plant experienced
 
a complete loss of offsite and onsite ac power. The event was precipitated
 
by the need to isolate a faulty swit:hyard
 
breaker. To isolate the breaker, it was necessary
 
to interrupt
 
the offsite power supply to the plant. At the time of the event, Palisades
 
was in a refueling
 
outage with all fuel removed from the.reactor
 
and the 2 diesel generator (DG) inoperable.
 
The service water pump powered from the no. 1 (operable)
DG also was inoperable
 
as a result of maintenance.
 
When the shift supervisor
 
interrupted
 
the offsite power supply to the plant, the operators
 
did not realize cooling water to the operable DG was not available.
 
The control room alarm indication, which should have warned the operators, was apparently
 
masked by the large number of simultaneous
 
alarms received when the offsite power was interrupted.
 
Approximately
 
50 minutes later the DG overheated
 
and was manually tripped. Once the DG was tripped, all station power was lost, with the exception
 
of the station batteries
 
and their associated
 
dc and preferred
 
ac buses. The loss of ac power caused a loss of plant communications, fire protection, security, and habitability
 
systems as well as the fuel pool cooling system. (Compensatory
 
measures were promptly taken-upon
 
loss of the normal security systems.)
The loss of.communications
 
is considered
 
the most serious consequence
 
of this event. This loss of communications
 
will be further addressed
 
in a separate Information
 
840805CO 4C)012 ~hI~1 a IN 84-42 June 5, 1984 notice (IN). The restoration
 
of ac power was delayed as a result of an Inoperable
 
main transformer (out for maintenance)
and a malfunction
 
of one of the startup supply breakers.While operating
 
procedures
 
required two operable diesel generators
 
before removing offsite power, operating
 
procedures
 
did not specifically
 
delineate equipment
 
availability
 
requirements
 
for this defueled condition.
 
The shift supervisor
 
violated the procedure
 
and proceeded
 
with the evolution


after evaluating
offsite and onsite ac power. The event was precipitated by the need to isolate


fuel cooling. The fuel pool was known to heat up very slowly and to require days without active cooling before the high temperature
a faulty swit:hyard breaker. To isolate the breaker, it was necessary to


alarm would be reached. The shift supervisor, however, failed to fully recognize
interrupt the offsite power supply to the plant. At the time of the event, Palisades was in a refueling outage with all fuel removed from the.reactor and


the importance
the *o. 2 diesel generator (DG) inoperable. The service water pump powered


of the other support systems (e.g., communication, fire protection)
from the no. 1 (operable) DG also was inoperable as a result of maintenance.
to the overall safety of the plant. The procedural


requirements
When the shift supervisor interrupted the offsite power supply to the plant, the operators did not realize cooling water to the operable DG was not


were reviewed as part of the evaluation
available. The control room alarm indication, which should have warned the


of fuel cooling and it was determined
operators, was apparently masked by the large number of simultaneous alarms


their intent was to minimize risk to fuel integrity
received when the offsite power was interrupted. Approximately 50 minutes


when the fuel was in the reactor vessel.Following
later the DG overheated and was manually tripped. Once the DG was tripped, all station power was lost, with the exception of the station batteries and


the loss of onsite and offsite ac power, the Emergency
their associated dc and preferred ac buses. The loss of ac power caused a


Procedures
loss of plant communications, fire protection, security, and habitability


were not implemented
systems as well as the fuel pool cooling system. (Compensatory measures were


in a timely manner because the importance
promptly taken-upon loss of the normal security systems.) The loss of.


of the various support systems had not been recognized.
communications is considered the most serious consequence of this event. This


The licensee initiated
loss of communications will be further addressed in a separate Information


many corrective
840805CO


actions as a result of this event (see Palisades
4C)012        ~hI~1


Licensee Event Report (LER) 84-001). Some of the more important
a


cor-rective actions by the licensee include: 1. A review of the management
IN 84-42 June 5, 1984 notice (IN).   The restoration of ac power was delayed as a result of an


control of equipment
Inoperable main transformer (out for maintenance) and a malfunction of one of


for plant conditions
the startup supply breakers.


not covered by the requirements
While operating procedures required two operable diesel generators before


of the Technical
removing offsite power, operating procedures did not specifically delineate


Specifications.
equipment availability requirements for this defueled condition. The shift


The review will specifically
supervisor violated the procedure and proceeded with the evolution after


address electrical
evaluating fuel cooling. The fuel pool was known to heat up very slowly and


system requirements
to require days without active cooling before the high temperature alarm would


during cold shutdown to ensure sufficient
be reached. The shift supervisor, however, failed to fully recognize the


equipment
importance of the other support systems (e.g., communication, fire protection)
to the overall safety of the plant. The procedural requirements were reviewed


remains available
as part of the evaluation of fuel cooling and it was determined their intent


to maintain the plant in a safe condition
was to minimize risk to fuel integrity when the fuel was in the reactor vessel.


and to meet the commitments
Following the loss of onsite and offsite ac power, the Emergency Procedures


of the Site Emer-gency, Security, and Fire Protection
were not implemented in a timely manner because the importance of the various


Plans.2. *Establishing
support systems had not been recognized.


minimum equipment
The licensee initiated many corrective actions as a result of this event (see


availability
Palisades Licensee Event Report (LER) 84-001). Some of the more important cor- rective actions by the licensee include:
1.    A review of the management control of equipment for plant conditions not


for specific conditions
covered by the requirements of the Technical Specifications. The review


not covered by the Technical
will specifically address electrical system requirements during cold


Specifications.
shutdown to ensure sufficient equipment remains available to maintain the


3. Provide classroom
plant in a safe condition and to meet the commitments of the Site Emer- gency, Security, and Fire Protection Plans.


training for all operators
2.    *Establishing minimum equipment availability for specific conditions not


on the use and intent of the Site Emergency
covered by the Technical Specifications.


Plan.4. Integrate
3.   Provide classroom training for all operators on the use and intent of the


the use of the Site Emergency
Site Emergency Plan.


Plan into simulator
4.    Integrate the use of the Site Emergency Plan into simulator training.


training.5. Discuss the need for strict adherence
5.   Discuss the need for strict adherence to operating procedures with all


to operating
operations personnel.


procedures
NRC has previously identified concerns with operability of required equipment


with all operations
in IE.IN 83-56, "Operability of Required Auxiliary Equipment," and IN 80-20,
"Loss of Decay Heat Removal Capability at Davis-Besse Unit I While in a


personnel.
Refueling Mode."    If you have any questions regarding this matter, please


NRC has previously
IN 84-42 June 5 , 1984 contact the Regional Administrator of the appropriate NRC Regional Office or


identified
this office.


concerns with operability
Edward    'Jordan, Director


of required equipment in IE. IN 83-56, "Operability
Divisi    of Emergency Preparedness


of Required Auxiliary
and    gineering Response


Equipment," and IN 80-20,"Loss of Decay Heat Removal Capability
Office of Inspection and Enforcement


at Davis-Besse
===Technical Contact:===


Unit I While in a Refueling
===H. Bailey, IE===
                    (301) 492-7078 Attachment:


Mode." If you have any questions
===List of Recently Issued IE Information Notices===


regarding
I


this matter, please
Attachment


IN 84-42 June 5 , 1984 contact the Regional Administrator
IN 84-42 June 5, 1984 LIST OF RECENTLY ISSUED


of the appropriate
IE INFORMATION NOTICES


NRC Regional Office or this office.Edward ' Jordan, Director Divisi of Emergency
Information                                    Date of


===Preparedness===
Notice No.      Subject                        Issue      Issued to
and gineering


Response Office of Inspection
84-41          IGSCC in BWR Plants            06/01/84  All BWR reactor


and Enforcement
facilities holding


Technical
an OL or CP


Contact: H. Bailey, IE (301) 492-7078 Attachment:
84-40          Emergency Worker Doses        05/30/84  All power reactor
List of Recently Issued IE Information


Notices
facilities holding


===I Attachment===
an OL or CP; research.
IN 84-42 June 5, 1984 LIST OF RECENTLY ISSUED IE INFORMATION


NOTICES Information
and test reactor and


Date of Notice No. Subject Issue Issued to 84-41 84-40 83-66 84-39 IGSCC in BWR Plants Emergency
fuel cycle licensees


Worker Doses Fatality at Argentine Critical Facility Inadvertent
83-66          Fatality at Argentine         05/25/84  All power reactor


Isolation
Critical Facility                        facilities holding


of Spray Systems Problems With Design, Maintenance, and Operation of Offsite Power Systems Use of Lifted Leads and Jumpers During Maintenance
an OL or CP; non- power reactor, critical facility,
                                                          & fuel cycle


or Surveillance
licensees


Testing Loosening
84-39          Inadvertent Isolation of      05/25/84  All power reactor


of Locking Nut on Limitorque
Spray Systems                            facilities holding


===Operator BWR Post Scram Drywell Pressurization===
an OL or CP
Respirator


Users Warning: Defective
84-38          Problems With Design,          05/17/84  All power reactor


Self-Contained
Maintenance, and Operation                facilities holding


Breathing
of Offsite Power Systems                  an OL or CP


Apparatus
84-37          Use of Lifted Leads and        05/10/84  All power reactor


Air-Cylinders
Jumpers During Maintenance                facilities holding


06/01/84 05/30/84 05/25/84 05/25/84 05/17/84 05/10/84 05/01/84 04/23/84 04/23/84 All BWR reactor facilities
or Surveillance Testing                  an OL or CP


holding an OL or CP All power reactor facilities
84-36            Loosening of Locking Nut on  05/01/84  All power reactor


holding an OL or CP; research.and test reactor and fuel cycle licensees All power reactor facilities
Limitorque Operator                      facilities holding


holding an OL or CP; non-power reactor, critical facility,& fuel cycle licensees All power reactor facilities
an OL or CP


holding an OL or CP All power reactor facilities
84-35            BWR Post Scram Drywell        04/23/84  All power reactor


holding an OL or CP All power reactor facilities
Pressurization                            facilities holding


holding an OL or CP All power reactor facilities
an OL or CP


holding an OL or CP All power reactor facilities
84-34            Respirator Users Warning:      04/23/84  All power reactor


holding an OL or CP All power reactor facilities
Defective Self-Contained                  facilities holding


holding.an OL'or CP; research and test; fuel cycle;and Priority 1 84-38 84-37 84-36 84-35 84-34 OL =Operating
Breathing Apparatus Air                .an OL'or CP; research


License CP = Construction
-Cylinders                                and test; fuel cycle;
                                                          and Priority 1 OL =Operating License


Permit}}
CP = Construction Permit}}


{{Information notice-Nav}}
{{Information notice-Nav}}

Latest revision as of 11:26, 23 November 2019

Equipment Availability for Conditions During Outages Not Covered by Technical Specifications
ML070180078
Person / Time
Issue date: 06/05/1984
From: Jordan E
NRC/IE
To:
References
IN-84-042, NUDOCS 8406050012
Download: ML070180078 (4)
v • d • e


SSINS No. 6835 IN 84-42 UNITED STATES

NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT

WASHINGTON, DC 20555 June 5, 1984 IE INFORMATION NOTICE NO. 84-42: EQUIPMENT AVAILABILITY FOR CONDITIONS

DURING OUTAGES NOT COVERED BY TECHNICAL

SPECIFICATIONS

Addressees

All holders of a nuclear power plant operating license (OL) or construction

permit (CP).

Purpose

This information notice is provided to alert licensees to the importance of

controlling equipment availability for conditions. during outages not covered

by Technical Specifications. It is expected that recipients will review the

information for applicability to their facilities and consider actions, if

appropriate, to preclude similar problems occurring at their facilities.

However, suggestions contained in this information notice do not constitute

NRC requirements and, therefore, no specific action or written response is

required.

Description of Circumstances

On January 8, 1984, the Palisades Nuclear Plant experienced a complete loss of

offsite and onsite ac power. The event was precipitated by the need to isolate

a faulty swit:hyard breaker. To isolate the breaker, it was necessary to

interrupt the offsite power supply to the plant. At the time of the event, Palisades was in a refueling outage with all fuel removed from the.reactor and

the *o. 2 diesel generator (DG) inoperable. The service water pump powered

from the no. 1 (operable) DG also was inoperable as a result of maintenance.

When the shift supervisor interrupted the offsite power supply to the plant, the operators did not realize cooling water to the operable DG was not

available. The control room alarm indication, which should have warned the

operators, was apparently masked by the large number of simultaneous alarms

received when the offsite power was interrupted. Approximately 50 minutes

later the DG overheated and was manually tripped. Once the DG was tripped, all station power was lost, with the exception of the station batteries and

their associated dc and preferred ac buses. The loss of ac power caused a

loss of plant communications, fire protection, security, and habitability

systems as well as the fuel pool cooling system. (Compensatory measures were

promptly taken-upon loss of the normal security systems.) The loss of.

communications is considered the most serious consequence of this event. This

loss of communications will be further addressed in a separate Information

840805CO

4C)012 ~hI~1

a

IN 84-42 June 5, 1984 notice (IN). The restoration of ac power was delayed as a result of an

Inoperable main transformer (out for maintenance) and a malfunction of one of

the startup supply breakers.

While operating procedures required two operable diesel generators before

removing offsite power, operating procedures did not specifically delineate

equipment availability requirements for this defueled condition. The shift

supervisor violated the procedure and proceeded with the evolution after

evaluating fuel cooling. The fuel pool was known to heat up very slowly and

to require days without active cooling before the high temperature alarm would

be reached. The shift supervisor, however, failed to fully recognize the

importance of the other support systems (e.g., communication, fire protection)

to the overall safety of the plant. The procedural requirements were reviewed

as part of the evaluation of fuel cooling and it was determined their intent

was to minimize risk to fuel integrity when the fuel was in the reactor vessel.

Following the loss of onsite and offsite ac power, the Emergency Procedures

were not implemented in a timely manner because the importance of the various

support systems had not been recognized.

The licensee initiated many corrective actions as a result of this event (see

Palisades Licensee Event Report (LER)84-001). Some of the more important cor- rective actions by the licensee include:

1. A review of the management control of equipment for plant conditions not

covered by the requirements of the Technical Specifications. The review

will specifically address electrical system requirements during cold

shutdown to ensure sufficient equipment remains available to maintain the

plant in a safe condition and to meet the commitments of the Site Emer- gency, Security, and Fire Protection Plans.

2. *Establishing minimum equipment availability for specific conditions not

covered by the Technical Specifications.

3. Provide classroom training for all operators on the use and intent of the

Site Emergency Plan.

4. Integrate the use of the Site Emergency Plan into simulator training.

5. Discuss the need for strict adherence to operating procedures with all

operations personnel.

NRC has previously identified concerns with operability of required equipment

in IE.IN 83-56, "Operability of Required Auxiliary Equipment," and IN 80-20,

"Loss of Decay Heat Removal Capability at Davis-Besse Unit I While in a

Refueling Mode." If you have any questions regarding this matter, please

IN 84-42 June 5 , 1984 contact the Regional Administrator of the appropriate NRC Regional Office or

this office.

Edward 'Jordan, Director

Divisi of Emergency Preparedness

and gineering Response

Office of Inspection and Enforcement

Technical Contact:

H. Bailey, IE

(301) 492-7078 Attachment:

List of Recently Issued IE Information Notices

I

Attachment

IN 84-42 June 5, 1984 LIST OF RECENTLY ISSUED

IE INFORMATION NOTICES

Information Date of

Notice No. Subject Issue Issued to

84-41 IGSCC in BWR Plants 06/01/84 All BWR reactor

facilities holding

an OL or CP

84-40 Emergency Worker Doses 05/30/84 All power reactor

facilities holding

an OL or CP; research.

and test reactor and

fuel cycle licensees

83-66 Fatality at Argentine 05/25/84 All power reactor

Critical Facility facilities holding

an OL or CP; non- power reactor, critical facility,

& fuel cycle

licensees

84-39 Inadvertent Isolation of 05/25/84 All power reactor

Spray Systems facilities holding

an OL or CP

84-38 Problems With Design, 05/17/84 All power reactor

Maintenance, and Operation facilities holding

of Offsite Power Systems an OL or CP

84-37 Use of Lifted Leads and 05/10/84 All power reactor

Jumpers During Maintenance facilities holding

or Surveillance Testing an OL or CP

84-36 Loosening of Locking Nut on 05/01/84 All power reactor

Limitorque Operator facilities holding

an OL or CP

84-35 BWR Post Scram Drywell 04/23/84 All power reactor

Pressurization facilities holding

an OL or CP

84-34 Respirator Users Warning: 04/23/84 All power reactor

Defective Self-Contained facilities holding

Breathing Apparatus Air .an OL'or CP; research

-Cylinders and test; fuel cycle;

and Priority 1 OL =Operating License

CP = Construction Permit


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