05000382/FIN-2008002-01: Difference between revisions
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| CCA = H.12 | | CCA = H.12 | ||
| INPO aspect = QA.4 | | INPO aspect = QA.4 | ||
| description = The inspectors identified a violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, Corrective Actions, for the failure to implement corrective actions for a condition adverse to quality. Specifically, the licensee developed a corrective action to evaluate the condition of existing boric acid leaks. However, the effort failed to identify and evaluate multiple existing boric acid leaks on safety-related components, including some that had deteriorated since initial discovery. The licensee entered this deficiency into their corrective action program as Condition Report CR-WF3-2007-3951. This finding was more than minor because, if left uncorrected, it would have become a more significant safety concern. Specifically, some unchecked boric acid leaks may have worsened and corroded safety-related equipment. Using the Manual Chapter 0609, "Significance Determination Process," Phase 1 Screening Worksheet, the finding had very low risk significance because it was a qualification deficiency confirmed not to result in loss-of-operability in accordance with NRC Manual Chapter Part 9900, Technical Guidance, "Operability Determination Process for Operability and Functional Assessments." This finding had a crosscutting aspect in the Human Performance area, Work Practices component, because engineers failed to implement proper error prevention techniques when identifying boric acid leaks for additional review [H.4(a)] (Section 1R04) | | description = The inspectors identified a violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, Corrective Actions, for the failure to implement corrective actions for a condition adverse to quality. Specifically, the licensee developed a corrective action to evaluate the condition of existing boric acid leaks. However, the effort failed to identify and evaluate multiple existing boric acid leaks on safety-related components, including some that had deteriorated since initial discovery. The licensee entered this deficiency into their corrective action program as Condition Report CR-WF3-2007-3951. This finding was more than minor because, if left uncorrected, it would have become a more significant safety concern. Specifically, some unchecked boric acid leaks may have worsened and corroded safety-related equipment. Using the Manual Chapter 0609, \"Significance Determination Process,\" Phase 1 Screening Worksheet, the finding had very low risk significance because it was a qualification deficiency confirmed not to result in loss-of-operability in accordance with NRC Manual Chapter Part 9900, Technical Guidance, \"Operability Determination Process for Operability and Functional Assessments.\" This finding had a crosscutting aspect in the Human Performance area, Work Practices component, because engineers failed to implement proper error prevention techniques when identifying boric acid leaks for additional review [H.4(a)] (Section 1R04) | ||
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Latest revision as of 20:32, 20 February 2018
| Site: | Waterford  |
|---|---|
| Report | IR 05000382/2008002 Section 1R04 |
| Date counted | Mar 31, 2008 (2008Q1) |
| Type: | NCV: Green |
| cornerstone | Mitigating Systems |
| Identified by: | NRC identified |
| Inspection Procedure: | IP 71111.04 |
| Inspectors (proximate) | J Clark R Azua D Overland |
| CCA | H.12, Avoid Complacency |
| INPO aspect | QA.4 |
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