05000289/FIN-2010007-02: Difference between revisions
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| identified by = NRC | | identified by = NRC | ||
| Inspection procedure = IP 71153 | | Inspection procedure = IP 71153 | ||
| Inspector = W Schmidt, R Nimitz, J Brand, D Kern, D Spindler, E Burket, J R, Whit | | Inspector = W Schmidt, R Nimitz, J Brand, D Kern, D Spindler, E Burket, J R, Whit | ||
| CCA = H.9 | | CCA = H.9 | ||
| INPO aspect = CL.4 | | INPO aspect = CL.4 | ||
| description = A self-revealing NCV of Technical Specification 6.8 was identified because Exelon did not properly establish and implement procedures for control of radioactivity to limit materials released to the environment and limit personnel exposure as' specified in Appendix A of Regulatory Guide 1.33, 1978. Specifically, from November 12 to November 21, 2009, Exelon did not effectively manage Unit 1 Containment openings and ventilation system flows, following removal of a section of the Containment liner, to maintain inward airflow and promptly detect and minimize the release of radioactivity from the construction opening as required by Engineering Change Request TM-06-00816. As a result, an uncontrolled airborne radioactivity release occurred from the construction opening on November 21 at about 3:45 p.m. Further, airborne radioactivity was released from the opening during periods of outward airflow following the removal of a section of the Containment construction opening liner on November 12 through the time of the uncontrolled release, until midnight on November 21 when inward airflow was re-established. Exelon documented this issue in its corrective action program. (ARs 994989 and 1000819) This finding is more than minor because, if left uncorrected the issue had the potential to lead to a more significant safety concern. Using the Public Radiation Safety Significance Determination Process (IMC 0609, Appendix D), the finding was of very low safety significance because the licensee was able to assess the dose impact to members of the public and the dose impact to a member of the public from the radiological release was less than the dose values specified in both Appendix I, to 10 CFR Part 50, and 10 CFR 20.1301 (e). The cause of the finding is related to the cross-cutting area of Human Performance, Resources aspect H.2(b), because procedures developed for both control and timely detection of radioactive effluents from the Containment construction opening were inadequate. (Section 40A3.3.6) | | description = A self-revealing NCV of Technical Specification 6.8 was identified because Exelon did not properly establish and implement procedures for control of radioactivity to limit materials released to the environment and limit personnel exposure as\' specified in Appendix A of Regulatory Guide 1.33, 1978. Specifically, from November 12 to November 21, 2009, Exelon did not effectively manage Unit 1 Containment openings and ventilation system flows, following removal of a section of the Containment liner, to maintain inward airflow and promptly detect and minimize the release of radioactivity from the construction opening as required by Engineering Change Request TM-06-00816. As a result, an uncontrolled airborne radioactivity release occurred from the construction opening on November 21 at about 3:45 p.m. Further, airborne radioactivity was released from the opening during periods of outward airflow following the removal of a section of the Containment construction opening liner on November 12 through the time of the uncontrolled release, until midnight on November 21 when inward airflow was re-established. Exelon documented this issue in its corrective action program. (ARs 994989 and 1000819) This finding is more than minor because, if left uncorrected the issue had the potential to lead to a more significant safety concern. Using the Public Radiation Safety Significance Determination Process (IMC 0609, Appendix D), the finding was of very low safety significance because the licensee was able to assess the dose impact to members of the public and the dose impact to a member of the public from the radiological release was less than the dose values specified in both Appendix I, to 10 CFR Part 50, and 10 CFR 20.1301 (e). The cause of the finding is related to the cross-cutting area of Human Performance, Resources aspect H.2(b), because procedures developed for both control and timely detection of radioactive effluents from the Containment construction opening were inadequate. (Section 40A3.3.6) | ||
}} | }} | ||
Latest revision as of 20:41, 20 February 2018
| Site: | Three Mile Island  |
|---|---|
| Report | IR 05000289/2010007 Section 4OA3 |
| Date counted | Mar 31, 2010 (2010Q1) |
| Type: | NCV: Green |
| cornerstone | Pr Safety |
| Identified by: | NRC identified |
| Inspection Procedure: | IP 71153 |
| Inspectors (proximate) | W Schmidt R Nimitz J Brand D Kern D Spindler E Burket J R Whit |
| CCA | H.9, Training |
| INPO aspect | CL.4 |
| ' | |