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| the next {30) days outlining the action taken, the cause of the 'non-functional penetration and . plans and schedule for restoring the fire barrier penetration (s) -; to functional status." Technical Specification Surveillance states: *"Each of the above required penetration fire barriers shall be | | the next {30) days outlining the action taken, the cause of the 'non-functional penetration and . plans and schedule for restoring the fire barrier penetration (s) -; to functional status." Technical Specification Surveillance states: *"Each of the above required penetration fire barriers shall be |
| * | | * |
| * LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION Salem Generating Station Unit 1 DOCKET NUMBER 5000272 LER NUMBER 88-016-00 PAGE 3 of 5 DESCRIPTION OF OCCURRENCE: (cont'd) verified to be functional: | | * LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION Salem Generating Station Unit 1 DOCKET NUMBER 5000272 LER NUMBER 88-016-00 PAGE 3 of 5 DESCRIPTION OF OCCURRENCE: (cont'd) verified to be functional: |
| : a. At least once per 18 months by a visual inspection, and b. Prior to returning a penetration fire barrier to functional status following repairs or maintenance by the performance of a visual inspection of the affected penetration fire barrier(s}." Note -Unit 1 Technical Specification 3.7.11 differs from Unit 2. The Unit 1 words "functional" and "non-functional" are replaced by the words "OPERABLE" and "inoperable" respectively. | | : a. At least once per 18 months by a visual inspection, and b. Prior to returning a penetration fire barrier to functional status following repairs or maintenance by the performance of a visual inspection of the affected penetration fire barrier(s}." Note -Unit 1 Technical Specification 3.7.11 differs from Unit 2. The Unit 1 words "functional" and "non-functional" are replaced by the words "OPERABLE" and "inoperable" respectively. |
| The fire areas in which the dampers were not surveilled include: Unit Area Number of Dampers 1 Battery Rooms 8 1 84' El. Switchgear Room 7 1 #11 Diesel Fuel Oil Storage Tank Room 1 1 #12 Diesel Fuel Oil Storage Tank Room 1 2 Battery Rooms 9 2 84' El. Switchgear Room 1 .2 #21 Diesel Fuel Oil Storage Tank Room 1 2 #22 Diesel Fuel Oil Storage Tank Room 1 APPARENT CAUSE OF OCCURRENCE: | | The fire areas in which the dampers were not surveilled include: Unit Area Number of Dampers 1 Battery Rooms 8 1 84' El. Switchgear Room 7 1 #11 Diesel Fuel Oil Storage Tank Room 1 1 #12 Diesel Fuel Oil Storage Tank Room 1 2 Battery Rooms 9 2 84' El. Switchgear Room 1 .2 #21 Diesel Fuel Oil Storage Tank Room 1 2 #22 Diesel Fuel Oil Storage Tank Room 1 APPARENT CAUSE OF OCCURRENCE: |
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Category:LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (SEE ALSO AO
MONTHYEARML18102B4681997-07-25025 July 1997 LER 97-005-00:on 970625,radioactive Liquid Effluent Samples Were Not Analyzed within Required Surveillance Interval. Caused by Incorrect Interpretation of TS Sr.Training Will Be Provided to Chemistry Supervisors.W/970725 Ltr ML18102A6511996-12-0202 December 1996 LER 96-027-00:on 961031,diesel Watt Meter Inaccuracies Were Not Accounted for in Surveillance Testing.Caused by Lack of Detailed Instructions to Load EDG in Ctr of TS Surveillance Load Band.Edg Surveillance Procedure revised.W/961202 Ltr ML18094A4541989-05-17017 May 1989 LER 89-016-00:on 890421,Tech Spec 3.11.2.5.entered Due to Waste Gas Decay Tank Indicating Oxygen Concentration Above 2% for Greater than 48 H.Caused by Sys Design.Oxygen Concentration Lowered Below 2% limit.W/890517 Ltr ML20023D4951983-05-11011 May 1983 LER 83-014/03L-0:on 830413 & 18,operating Loads on 2A 4-kV & 460-volt Vital Buses Tripped.Caused by Spurious Operation of Safeguards Equipment Control Sys.Rhr Pump 21 Restarted. Contract Written for Further Investigation ML20040B1801981-12-0909 December 1981 LER 81-115/01X-2:on 811125,during Routine Containment Insp, Svc Water Discovered Leaking from Second from Top Primary Cooling Coil on Containment Fan Coil Unit 24.Leak Repaired W/Belzona Metal Filler ML19351F3661981-01-0606 January 1981 LER 80-064/03L-0:on 801207,Tech Spec Flow Rate Not Obtained for Spray Additive Tank or Sodium Hydroxide Solution.Caused by Difference Between Startup Procedure & Surveillance Procedure.Tech Specs Changed ML18082A9091980-08-12012 August 1980 LER 80-014/03L-0:on 800714,at Completion of Hot No Flow Rod Drop Test,Employees Were Unable to Restart Reactor Coolant Pump Due to Problem W/Relief Valve on Vol Control Tank.Valve Was Repaired,Reinstalled & Tested Satisfactorily ML18082A9001980-08-12012 August 1980 LER 80-016/03L-0:on 800716,review of Test Data by NRC Resident Inspector Revealed That Pressurizer Safety Valves Were Improperly Set.Caused by Failure of Personnel to Note Limitations on Test Conditions.Procedure Changed ML18082A1621980-04-0909 April 1980 LER 79-081/04L-0:on 790823,during Normal River Trawling Survey of DE River,Atlantic Loggerhead Sea Turtle Was Captured.Turtle Is Listed as Threatened & Endangered.Turtle Was Released Unharmed ML18081A9571980-01-22022 January 1980 Supplemental LER 79-052/01X-1:on 790809,during Review of License Amend 4 Re Safety Analysis,Found Imposition of 1.2 Inches/Minute Rate of Rise Restriction Could Produce Unreviewed Safety Question.Cause Not Stated ML18081A8601977-05-18018 May 1977 LER 77-037/03L:on 790514,during Mode 1 operation,5023 500-kV Transmission Line Tripped.Caused by Forest Fire Between Towers 36/1 & 36/3 1997-07-25
[Table view] Category:RO)
MONTHYEARML18102B4681997-07-25025 July 1997 LER 97-005-00:on 970625,radioactive Liquid Effluent Samples Were Not Analyzed within Required Surveillance Interval. Caused by Incorrect Interpretation of TS Sr.Training Will Be Provided to Chemistry Supervisors.W/970725 Ltr ML18102A6511996-12-0202 December 1996 LER 96-027-00:on 961031,diesel Watt Meter Inaccuracies Were Not Accounted for in Surveillance Testing.Caused by Lack of Detailed Instructions to Load EDG in Ctr of TS Surveillance Load Band.Edg Surveillance Procedure revised.W/961202 Ltr ML18094A4541989-05-17017 May 1989 LER 89-016-00:on 890421,Tech Spec 3.11.2.5.entered Due to Waste Gas Decay Tank Indicating Oxygen Concentration Above 2% for Greater than 48 H.Caused by Sys Design.Oxygen Concentration Lowered Below 2% limit.W/890517 Ltr ML20023D4951983-05-11011 May 1983 LER 83-014/03L-0:on 830413 & 18,operating Loads on 2A 4-kV & 460-volt Vital Buses Tripped.Caused by Spurious Operation of Safeguards Equipment Control Sys.Rhr Pump 21 Restarted. Contract Written for Further Investigation ML20040B1801981-12-0909 December 1981 LER 81-115/01X-2:on 811125,during Routine Containment Insp, Svc Water Discovered Leaking from Second from Top Primary Cooling Coil on Containment Fan Coil Unit 24.Leak Repaired W/Belzona Metal Filler ML19351F3661981-01-0606 January 1981 LER 80-064/03L-0:on 801207,Tech Spec Flow Rate Not Obtained for Spray Additive Tank or Sodium Hydroxide Solution.Caused by Difference Between Startup Procedure & Surveillance Procedure.Tech Specs Changed ML18082A9091980-08-12012 August 1980 LER 80-014/03L-0:on 800714,at Completion of Hot No Flow Rod Drop Test,Employees Were Unable to Restart Reactor Coolant Pump Due to Problem W/Relief Valve on Vol Control Tank.Valve Was Repaired,Reinstalled & Tested Satisfactorily ML18082A9001980-08-12012 August 1980 LER 80-016/03L-0:on 800716,review of Test Data by NRC Resident Inspector Revealed That Pressurizer Safety Valves Were Improperly Set.Caused by Failure of Personnel to Note Limitations on Test Conditions.Procedure Changed ML18082A1621980-04-0909 April 1980 LER 79-081/04L-0:on 790823,during Normal River Trawling Survey of DE River,Atlantic Loggerhead Sea Turtle Was Captured.Turtle Is Listed as Threatened & Endangered.Turtle Was Released Unharmed ML18081A9571980-01-22022 January 1980 Supplemental LER 79-052/01X-1:on 790809,during Review of License Amend 4 Re Safety Analysis,Found Imposition of 1.2 Inches/Minute Rate of Rise Restriction Could Produce Unreviewed Safety Question.Cause Not Stated ML18081A8601977-05-18018 May 1977 LER 77-037/03L:on 790514,during Mode 1 operation,5023 500-kV Transmission Line Tripped.Caused by Forest Fire Between Towers 36/1 & 36/3 1997-07-25
[Table view] Category:TEXT-SAFETY REPORT
MONTHYEARLR-N99-0449, Monthly Operating Rept for Sept 1999 for Salem,Unit 2.With1999-09-30030 September 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for Sept 1999 for Salem,Unit 2.With LR-N99-0448, Monthly Operating Rept for Sept 1999 for Salem,Unit 1.With1999-09-30030 September 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for Sept 1999 for Salem,Unit 1.With ML20217A9931999-09-30030 September 1999 NRC Regulatory Assessment & Oversight Pilot Program, Performance Indicator Data ML20212B7221999-09-14014 September 1999 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amends 224 & 205 to Licenses DPR-70 & DPR-75,respectively LR-N99-0416, Monthly Operating Rept for Aug 1999 for Salem,Unit 2.With1999-08-31031 August 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for Aug 1999 for Salem,Unit 2.With LR-N99-0415, Monthly Operating Rept for Aug 1999 for Salem,Unit 1.With 9909131999-08-31031 August 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for Aug 1999 for Salem,Unit 1.With 990913 05000272/LER-1999-006-02, :on 990729,determined That SG Blowdown RMs Setpoint Was non-conservative.Caused by Inadequate ACs for Incorporating Original Plant Licensing Data Into Plant Procedures.Blowdown Will Be Restricted.With1999-08-26026 August 1999
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ML18107A5211999-07-0101 July 1999 Rev 0 to Sgs Unit 2 ISI RFO Exam Results (S2RFO 10) Second Interval,Second Period,Second Outage (99RF) 05000311/LER-1999-006, :on 990501,determined That There Was No Flow in One of Four Injection Legs.Caused by Sticking of Valve in Safety Injection Discharge Line to 21 Cold Leg.Valve Was Cut Out of Sys & Replaced.With1999-07-0101 July 1999
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05000311/LER-1999-002, :on 990405,determined That 2SA118 Failed as Found Leakrate Test.Caused by Foreign Matl Found in 2SA118 valve.2SA118 Valve Was Cycled Several Times & Seat Area Was Air Blown in Order to Displace Foreign Matl.With1999-07-0101 July 1999
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LR-N99-0324, Monthly Operating Rept for June 1999 for Salem,Unit 1.With1999-06-30030 June 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for June 1999 for Salem,Unit 1.With LR-N99-0325, Monthly Operating Rept for June 1999 for Salem,Unit 2.With1999-06-30030 June 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for June 1999 for Salem,Unit 2.With ML20196H8621999-06-30030 June 1999 NRC Regulatory Assessment & Oversight Pilot Program, Performance Indicator Data, June 1999 Rept ML18107A4161999-06-23023 June 1999 Safety Evaluation Accepting Licensee Response to GL 96-06, Assurance of Equipment Operability & Containment Integrity During Design Basis Accident Conditions 05000272/LER-1999-004-02, :on 990520,reactor Tripped from 100% Power,Due to Negative Flux Trip Signal from Nuclear Instrumentation. Cause Has Not Been Determined.Discoloration Was Identified on One of Penetrations.With1999-06-17017 June 1999
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ML18107A3751999-06-15015 June 1999 Safety Evaluation Accepting Licensee Request for Approval of Proposed Changes to Nuclear Business Unit EP for Hope Creek & Salem Generating Stations,Iaw 10CFR50.54(q) 05000272/LER-1999-003-02, :on 990513,unplanned Entry Into TS 3.0.3 Was Made.Caused by Human error.Re-positioned Creacs Supply Fan Selector Switches & Revised Procedures S1 & S2.OP-ST.SSP-0001(Q).With1999-06-0909 June 1999
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05000311/LER-1999-005-01, :on 990504,failure to Meet TS Action Statement Requirements for High Oxygen Concentration in Waste Gas Holdup Sys Occurred.Caused by Inability of Operators. Existing Procedures Will Be Evaluated.With1999-06-0202 June 1999
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ML18107A3441999-06-0101 June 1999 Interim Part 21 Rept Re Premature Over Voltage Protection Actuation in Circuit Specific Application in Dc Power Supply.Testing & Evaluation Activities Will Be Completed on 990716 LR-N99-0275, Monthly Operating Rept for May 1999 for Salem Generating Station,Unit 1.With1999-05-31031 May 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for May 1999 for Salem Generating Station,Unit 1.With LR-N99-0278, Monthly Operating Rept for May 1999 for Salem Generating Station,Unit 2.With1999-05-31031 May 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for May 1999 for Salem Generating Station,Unit 2.With ML18107A3111999-05-21021 May 1999 SER Accepting GL-88-20,suppl 4, IPEEEs for Severe Accident Vulnerabilities, for Plant,Units 1 & 2 05000272/LER-1999-002-02, :on 990413,determined That Number 12 Auxiliary Bldg Exhaust Fan Was Rotating Backwards.Caused by mis-wiring of Motor Due to Human Error by Maint technician.Mis-wiring Was Corrected & Fan Was Returned to Svc.With1999-05-12012 May 1999
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05000311/LER-1999-004-01, :on 990411,automatic Actuation of ESF Occurred During Reactor Vessel Head Removal in Support of Refueling Operations.Caused by High Radiation Condition.Containment Atmosphere Was Monitored.With1999-05-10010 May 1999
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LR-N99-0226, Monthly Operating Rept for Apr 1999 for Salem Unit 2.With1999-04-30030 April 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for Apr 1999 for Salem Unit 2.With LR-N99-0225, Monthly Operating Rept for Apr 1999 for Salem Unit 1.With1999-04-30030 April 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for Apr 1999 for Salem Unit 1.With ML18107A3151999-04-30030 April 1999 Submittal-Only Screening Review of Salem Generating Station Individual Plant Exam for External Events (Seismic Portion), Rev 1 ML18107A3711999-04-30030 April 1999 Corrected Monthly Operating Rept for Apr 1999 for Salem Generating Station,Unit 1 ML20206B4761999-04-26026 April 1999 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amends 220 & 202 to Licenses DPR-70 & DPR-75,respectively 05000311/LER-1999-001-03, :on 990330,MSSV Failed Lift Set Test.Caused by Setpoint Variance Which Is Result of Aging.Valves Were Adjusted & Retested to Ensure TS Tolerance.With1999-04-23023 April 1999
- on 990330,MSSV Failed Lift Set Test.Caused by Setpoint Variance Which Is Result of Aging.Valves Were Adjusted & Retested to Ensure TS Tolerance.With
ML18107A1791999-04-15015 April 1999 Safety Evaluation Supporting Changes to QA Program in That QA Program Continues to Meet Requirements of App B to 10CFR50 ML18107A2881999-04-0707 April 1999 Rev 0 to NFS-0174, COLR for Salem Unit 2 Cycle 11 ML18107A1601999-04-0707 April 1999 Safety Evaluation Accepting Request for Exemption from Update Requirements of 10CFR50.71(e)(4) LR-N99-0177, Monthly Operating Rept for Mar 1999 for Salem,Unit 2.With1999-03-31031 March 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for Mar 1999 for Salem,Unit 2.With LR-N99-0176, Monthly Operating Rept for Mar 1999 for Salem,Unit 1.With1999-03-31031 March 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for Mar 1999 for Salem,Unit 1.With 05000272/LER-1999-001-02, :on 990228,reactor Scram Was Noted as Result of Turbine Trip.Caused by Operator Error.Lesson Plans Revised to Explicitly Demonstrate Manner in Which Valve Functions. with1999-03-29029 March 1999
- on 990228,reactor Scram Was Noted as Result of Turbine Trip.Caused by Operator Error.Lesson Plans Revised to Explicitly Demonstrate Manner in Which Valve Functions. with
05000272/LER-1999-001-01, :on 990228,reactor Scram Resulted in Turbine Trip.Caused by Personnel Error.Revised Lesson Plans to Explicitly Demonstrate Manner in Which Valve Functions. with1999-03-29029 March 1999
- on 990228,reactor Scram Resulted in Turbine Trip.Caused by Personnel Error.Revised Lesson Plans to Explicitly Demonstrate Manner in Which Valve Functions. with
ML18106B0981999-03-12012 March 1999 Safety Evaluation Supporting Relief Requests to Licenses DPR-70 & DPR-82,respectively LR-N99-0115, Monthly Operating Rept for Feb 1999 for Salem Unit 2.With1999-02-28028 February 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for Feb 1999 for Salem Unit 2.With 1999-09-30
[Table view] |
Text
- NllC Form311 IM3) U.I, NUCLEAll llEGULATOllY COflWllllON APl'AOVED OMI NO. 311111-4104 LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) EXl'IRES:
11/31115 I DOCKET NUM9Ell (2) I """"' I'll 0 I 5 I 0 I 0 I 0 I 2 17 I 2 1 I OF 0 I 5 FACILITY NAME 111 Sa1em Generating Station -Unit 1 TITLE l*I T. s. Survei11ance 4.7.11 Ron-Comp1iance
-Fire Pampers Rot Survei11ed
-Inad. Admin. Con EVENT DATE (II) LEA NUMDEll Ill llEl'OAT DATE (7) OTHEll FACILITIES INVOLVED Ill MONTH QAY YEAR YEAR ]@
ft MONTH DAY YEAR FACILITY NAMES DOCKET NUMllERISI Sa1em -Unit 2 o 1 s Io I o I o 13 1 111 nlgolg a a ale -ol1IG-olo1lo ol4ala OPlRATING MODE tel THll llEl'OAT II IUIMITTED l'UlllUANT TO THE REQUlllEMENTI OF 10 CFll §: (Ch<<:lt one or man of Ill* followln11J (11) ..,.. ______ ............
__. 21U02(bl 20.-lcl I0,7311oll2llM
---I0.*1*1111 ll0.731oll21M LEVEL ----731.71lb) 73..71.lcl POWEii I N/A 20.G(1111 Ill) 1101 I I 20.ac.11111u1 11111=::::::::
1111.*Ccll21 "Y llll.73(ol(21(1J llll.73(oll211wH)
-I0.7311oll211wlllllAI
-OTHEll ($/>>c/fymAb,,,.,r l>>low ond In Toxr, NRC Fann 366A) --1111.731(11121(111 I0.731Cell211wfllllll
--1111.7:11(81121 (Ill) 1111.731(111211*1 LICENIEE CONTACT FOR THll LEI! (12) NAME AREA CODE M. J. _Po11ack -LER Coordinator COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DEICAllED IN THll llEl'OAT (1311 CAUSE SYSTEM COMPONENT I I I I I I I I TURER I I I SYSTEM I I -COMPONENT MANUFAC-TUR ER I I I I I I I I I I I I TELEPHONE NUMBER EXPECTED IUJIPLEMENTAL llEl'ORT EXl'ECTED 1141 MONTH DAY SUllMISSION DATE (151 kl NO n YES (If ya, comp-EXPECTED SU6MISSION DATE) I I On September 9, 1988, it was identified, by Site Protection personnel, that "twenty-nine ( 29) Air Balance Model #119 dampers, in several Unit 1 and Unit 2 fire areas, have never been surveilled as required by Technical Specification 4.7.11. The apparent root cause of this event has been attributed to inadequate administrative control. The dampers although shown on controlled mechanical arrangement drawings, did not have unique equipment identifier tag numbers. Consequently, the dampers were not identified on the equipment lists used as a reference to prepare surveillance procedures.
Subsequently, -the damper surveillance requirement was missed. The surveillance for the subject dampers was completed.
All dampers successfully passed. The Site Protection staff engineer(s) have been counseled on* the use of "Incident Report/Licensee Event Report Program".
Engineering is reviewing fire protection programmatic requirements to ensure timely dissemination of information to departments which may be affected.
As part of the Fire Protection Improvement -program, a design change will be made to have the appropriate P&ID-schematics identify and number (i.e., component I.D.) the dampers. NAC Form 311 (Ml) 8810120307" 881004 *>s .8 PDR ADOCK 05000272 PNU I
- LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION Salem Generating Station Unit 1 DOCKET NUMBER 5000272 LER NUMBER 88-016-00 PAGE 2 of 5 PLANT AND SYSTEM IDENTIFICATION:
Westinghouse
-
Water Reactor Energy Industry Identification System (EIIS) codes are identified in the text as {xx} IDENTIFICATION OF OCCURRENCE:
Technical Specification Surveillance 4.7.11 Non-compliance; Fire Dampers Not Surveilled Due To Inadequate Design Review Event Date: 9/09/88 Report Date: 10/04/88 This report was initiated by Incident Report Nos.88-379 and 88-380. CONDITIONS PRIOR TO OCCURRENCE:
N/A DESCRIPTION OF OCCURRENCE:
On September 9, 1988, it was identified, by Site Protection personnel, that twenty-nine (29) Air Balance Model #119 dampers, 1n several Unit 1 and Unit 2 fire areas, have never been surveilled as required by Technical Specification 4.7.11. Technical Specification 3 .. 7 .11 states: "All fire penetrations (including cable penetration barriers, fire doors and fire dampers), in fire zone boundaries, protecting safety related areas shall be functional." Technical Specification Action Statement 3.7.11.a states: "With one or more of the above required fire barrier penetrations non-functional, within one hour either establish a continuous fire watch on at least one side of the affected penetration, or
- verify* the OPERABILITY of fire detectors on at least one side of .the non-functional fire barrier and establish an hourly fire watch patrol. Restore the non-functional fire barrier penetration(s) to functional status within 7 days or, in lieu of any other report required by Specification 6.9.1, prepare and s_ubmi t a Special Report to the Commission pursuant to Specification
6.9.2 within
the next {30) days outlining the action taken, the cause of the 'non-functional penetration and . plans and schedule for restoring the fire barrier penetration (s) -; to functional status." Technical Specification Surveillance states: *"Each of the above required penetration fire barriers shall be
- LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION Salem Generating Station Unit 1 DOCKET NUMBER 5000272 LER NUMBER 88-016-00 PAGE 3 of 5 DESCRIPTION OF OCCURRENCE: (cont'd) verified to be functional:
- a. At least once per 18 months by a visual inspection, and b. Prior to returning a penetration fire barrier to functional status following repairs or maintenance by the performance of a visual inspection of the affected penetration fire barrier(s}." Note -Unit 1 Technical Specification 3.7.11 differs from Unit 2. The Unit 1 words "functional" and "non-functional" are replaced by the words "OPERABLE" and "inoperable" respectively.
The fire areas in which the dampers were not surveilled include: Unit Area Number of Dampers 1 Battery Rooms 8 1 84' El. Switchgear Room 7 1 #11 Diesel Fuel Oil Storage Tank Room 1 1 #12 Diesel Fuel Oil Storage Tank Room 1 2 Battery Rooms 9 2 84' El. Switchgear Room 1 .2 #21 Diesel Fuel Oil Storage Tank Room 1 2 #22 Diesel Fuel Oil Storage Tank Room 1 APPARENT CAUSE OF OCCURRENCE:
-The apparent root cause of this event has been attributed to inadequate administrative control. The dampers although shown on controlled mechanical arrangement drawings, did not have unique equipment identifier tag numbers. Consequently, the dampers were not identified on the equipment lists used as a reference to surveillance'procedures.
Subsequently,:the damper surveillance requirement was missed. ANALYSIS OF OCCURRENCE:
The fire barrier penetration visual surveillance ensures the functional integrity of barrier penetrations, including dampers, is not violated.
The functional integrity of fire barriers ensures fires will be confined or adequately from spreading to adjacent portions of the facility.
- This design feature minimizes the ;,'
- LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION Salem Generating Station DOCKET NUMBER LER NUMBER PAGE 88-016-00 4 of 5 ANALYSIS OF OCCURRENCE: (cont'd) possibility of a single fire involving several areas of the facility prior to detection and extinguishment.
The penetration fire barriers are a passive element in the facility fire protection program. However, because the fire barrier dampers have not been inspected within the 18 month period as per Technical Specification Surveillance 4.7.11 this event is reportable in accordance with Code of Federal Regulations lOCFR 50.73(a) (2) (i) (B). An hourly fire watch patrol, for the fire barriers containing these dampers, had been previously established due to other fire protection and lOCFR 50, Appendix R concerns.
This fire watch complies with the action required per Technical Specification Action Statement 3.7.11.a.
Investigation of this event revealed that in August 1987, field walkdowns, conducted by engineering, were performed to evaluate fire area boundaries in support of revision to lOCFR 50 Appendix R exemption requests.
One of the results of this walkdown recognized these dampers as being a component of the fire barrier(s).
The scope of the review, however, did not include surveillance compliance thus the deficiency was not identified at that time. Coincidentally, in the spring of 1988 of procedure MlO-SST-031-1, "18 Month Fire Damper Visual Inspection", was initiated to address newly installed dampers. Other dampers (without a fusible link) have historically been functionally tested. The Site Protection staff engineer aware of the subject dampers through detailed review of the mechanical arrangement drawings.
The Site Protection staff engineer, however, did not recognize the_ potential reportability.
In August 1988, ,the procedure was approved by the Station Operations Review Committee At that SORC meeting, it was questioned whether these dampers have been surveilled historically*.
Investigation of the historical records indicated that these dampers have not been surveilled historically.
CORRECTIVE ACTION: The surveillance for the subject dampers was completed.
All dampers successfully passed. The Site Protection staff engineers have been counseled on the use of AP-6, "Incident Report/Licensee Evept Report.Progra*".
Engineering is reviewing fire protection programmatic requirements to ensure timely dissemination of information to departments which may be affected.
- LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION Salem Generating Station Unit 1 CORRECTIVE ACTION: (cont'd) DOCKET NUMBER 5000272 LER NUMBER 88-016-00 PAGE 5 of 5 As part of the Fire Protection Improvement Program, a design change will be made to have the appropriate drawings revised to identify and number (i.e., component I.D.) the dampers. MJP:pc SORC Mtg.88-082 General Manager -Salem Operations
- Public Service Electric and Gas Company P.O. Box E Hancocks Bridge, New Jersey 08038 Salem Generating Station U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Document Control Desk Washington, DC 20555
Dear Sir:
SALEM GENERATING STATION LICENSE NO. DPR-70 DOCKET NO. 50-272 UNIT NO. 1 LICENSEE EVENT REPORT 88-016-00 October 4, 1988 This Licensee Event Report is being submitted pursuant to the requirements of the Code of Federal Regulations
- 1ocFR 50.73(a) (2) (i) (B). This report is required within thirty (30) days of*discovery.
MJP:pc Distribution The Energy People Sincerely yours, L. K. Miller General Salem Operations 95-2189 (11 M) 12-84