05000498/FIN-2013005-01: Difference between revisions

From kanterella
Jump to navigation Jump to search
(Created page by program invented by StriderTol)
 
(Created page by program invented by StriderTol)
 
(One intermediate revision by the same user not shown)
Line 12: Line 12:
| identified by = NRC
| identified by = NRC
| Inspection procedure = IP 71111.11
| Inspection procedure = IP 71111.11
| Inspector = D You, G Apger, J Kramer, J Laughlin, L Carson, N Greene, N O,'Keefe P, Jayroe T, Buchanan A, Sanchez B, Larso
| Inspector = D You, G Apger, J Kramer, J Laughlin, L Carson, N Greene, N O'Keefe, P Jayroe, T Buchanan, A Sanchez, B Larson
| CCA = H.13
| CCA = H.13
| INPO aspect = DM.1
| INPO aspect = DM.1
| description = The inspectors identified a non-cited violation of Title 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings, for failure to include appropriate quantitative or qualitative acceptance criteria for determining that important activities have been satisfactorily accomplished. Specifically, the licensee did not include sufficient criteria to identify and evaluate new critical tasks created for operator performance on the simulator scenario portion of the biennial requalification examination to enable the evaluators to correctly assess licensed operator performance. The licensee has entered this issue into their corrective action program as Condition Report 2013-13857. The failure to include appropriate qualitative acceptance criteria in Procedure LOR-GL-002, to ensure evaluators can correctly identify and evaluate critical tasks based on operator performance was a performance deficiency. The performance deficiency was more than minor, therefore, a finding, because if left uncorrected, the performance deficiency would have the potential to lead to a more significant safety concern. Specifically, the failure to include the appropriate criteria to identify and evaluate critical tasks during biennial requalification examinations could result in operators returning to licensed operator duties without being properly remediated and retested on performance deficiencies. Using Manual Chapter 0609, Attachment 0609.04, Appendix I, Operator Requalification Human Performance Significance Determination Process, starting at block 9, the finding was determined to be of very low safety significance (Green) because the finding is associated with licensee administration of an annual requalification operating test. The finding had a cross-cutting aspect in the area of human performance associated with the decision-making component because the licensee failed to make safety-significant or risk-significant decisions using a systematic process [H.1(a)] (Section 1R11.3.b.1).
| description = The inspectors identified a non-cited violation of Title 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings, for failure to include appropriate quantitative or qualitative acceptance criteria for determining that important activities have been satisfactorily accomplished. Specifically, the licensee did not include sufficient criteria to identify and evaluate new critical tasks created for operator performance on the simulator scenario portion of the biennial requalification examination to enable the evaluators to correctly assess licensed operator performance. The licensee has entered this issue into their corrective action program as Condition Report 2013-13857. The failure to include appropriate qualitative acceptance criteria in Procedure LOR-GL-002, to ensure evaluators can correctly identify and evaluate critical tasks based on operator performance was a performance deficiency. The performance deficiency was more than minor, therefore, a finding, because if left uncorrected, the performance deficiency would have the potential to lead to a more significant safety concern. Specifically, the failure to include the appropriate criteria to identify and evaluate critical tasks during biennial requalification examinations could result in operators returning to licensed operator duties without being properly remediated and retested on performance deficiencies. Using Manual Chapter 0609, Attachment 0609.04, Appendix I, Operator Requalification Human Performance Significance Determination Process, starting at block 9, the finding was determined to be of very low safety significance (Green) because the finding is associated with licensee administration of an annual requalification operating test. The finding had a cross-cutting aspect in the area of human performance associated with the decision-making component because the licensee failed to make safety-significant or risk-significant decisions using a systematic process [H.1(a)] (Section 1R11.3.b.1).
}}
}}

Latest revision as of 23:20, 21 February 2018

01
Site: South Texas STP Nuclear Operating Company icon.png
Report IR 05000498/2013005 Section 1R11
Date counted Dec 31, 2013 (2013Q4)
Type: NCV: Green
cornerstone Initiating Events
Identified by: NRC identified
Inspection Procedure: IP 71111.11
Inspectors (proximate) D You
G Apger
J Kramer
J Laughlin
L Carson
N Greene
N O'Keefe
P Jayroe
T Buchanan
A Sanchez
B Larson
Violation of: 10 CFR 50 Appendix B Criterion V
CCA H.13, Consistent Process
INPO aspect DM.1
'