ENS 44931: Difference between revisions
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| event date = 03/23/2009 17:00 CDT | | event date = 03/23/2009 17:00 CDT | ||
| last update date = 03/23/2009 | | last update date = 03/23/2009 | ||
| title = Unanalyzed Condition | | title = Unanalyzed Condition for Postulated Missile Hazard That Could Disable Both Trains of Component Cooling | ||
| event text = At 1700 on 3/23/09 Prairie Island staff declared both trains of Unit 1 Component Cooling (CC) system inoperable due to discovery that a postulated missile hazard in the Fuel Handling Area could fail a CC line to 122 Spent Fuel Pool Heat Exchanger (SFP HX), affecting both trains of CC. This condition represented an unanalyzed condition reportable under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) since the event might represent a significant degradation of plant safety. The inoperability of Unit 1 CC caused entry into Technical Specification LCO 3.0.3. The CC line in question does not have automatic closure and the resulting loss of CC inventory would eventually affect both trains of CC. This condition represents a loss of safety function for safe shutdown capability and is reportable per 10 CFR 50.72 (b)(3)(v)(A). | | event text = At 1700 on 3/23/09 Prairie Island staff declared both trains of Unit 1 Component Cooling (CC) system inoperable due to discovery that a postulated missile hazard in the Fuel Handling Area could fail a CC line to 122 Spent Fuel Pool Heat Exchanger (SFP HX), affecting both trains of CC. This condition represented an unanalyzed condition reportable under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) since the event might represent a significant degradation of plant safety. The inoperability of Unit 1 CC caused entry into Technical Specification LCO 3.0.3. The CC line in question does not have automatic closure and the resulting loss of CC inventory would eventually affect both trains of CC. This condition represents a loss of safety function for safe shutdown capability and is reportable per 10 CFR 50.72 (b)(3)(v)(A). | ||
122 SFP HX was last modified by design change 99SF02 to allow for full redundant capacity of the 121 SFP HX. While seismic was addressed in the design change, tornado protection was not. | 122 SFP HX was last modified by design change 99SF02 to allow for full redundant capacity of the 121 SFP HX. While seismic was addressed in the design change, tornado protection was not. | ||
Latest revision as of 22:12, 1 March 2018
| Where | |
|---|---|
Prairie Island  Minnesota (NRC Region 3) | |
| Reporting | |
| 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(A), Loss of Safety Function - Shutdown the Reactor | |
| Time - Person (Reporting Time:+1.17 h0.0488 days <br />0.00696 weeks <br />0.0016 months <br />) | |
| Opened: | William Bodine 23:10 Mar 23, 2009 |
| NRC Officer: | Joe O'Hara |
| Last Updated: | Mar 23, 2009 |
| 44931 - NRC Website
| |
Prairie Island with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(A), Loss of Safety Function - Shutdown the Reactor, 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed Condition | |