05000482/FIN-2018001-01: Difference between revisions
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| finding integer = 01 | | finding integer = 01 | ||
| quarter = 2018Q1 | | quarter = 2018Q1 | ||
| IR section = | | IR section = 1R15 | ||
| finding type = NCV | | finding type = NCV | ||
| significance = | | significance = Green | ||
| cornerstone = Mitigating Systems | | cornerstone = Mitigating Systems | ||
| violation of = 10 CFR 50 Appendix B, 10 CFR 50 Appendix B Criterion V | | violation of = 10 CFR 50 Appendix B, 10 CFR 50 Appendix B Criterion V | ||
| identified by = NRC | | identified by = NRC | ||
| Inspection procedure = IP | | Inspection procedure = IP 71111.15 | ||
| Inspector = | | Inspector = D Dodson, F Thomas, D Bradley, N Taylor | ||
| CCA = | | CCA = | ||
| INPO aspect = | | INPO aspect = DM.2 | ||
| description = The inspectors identified a Green finding and associated non-cited violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings, when the licensee failed to adequately implement the operability determination and functionality assessment procedure. Specifically, the licensee failed to document a functionality assessment of sufficient scope to address the capability of a safety-related excess letdown heat exchanger to pressurizer relief tank isolation valve and the excess letdown system to perform their specified safety functions, which resulted in the licensee failing to recognize that two independent Technical Requirements Manual required boration injection subsystems were not functional. | | description = The inspectors identified a Green finding and associated non-cited violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings, when the licensee failed to adequately implement the operability determination and functionality assessment procedure. Specifically, the licensee failed to document a functionality assessment of sufficient scope to address the capability of a safety-related excess letdown heat exchanger to pressurizer relief tank isolation valve and the excess letdown system to perform their specified safety functions, which resulted in the licensee failing to recognize that two independent Technical Requirements Manual required boration injection subsystems were not functional. | ||
}} | }} | ||
Latest revision as of 17:34, 10 September 2018
| Site: | Wolf Creek  |
|---|---|
| Report | IR 05000482/2018001 Section 1R15 |
| Date counted | Mar 31, 2018 (2018Q1) |
| Type: | NCV: Green |
| cornerstone | Mitigating Systems |
| Identified by: | NRC identified |
| Inspection Procedure: | IP 71111.15 |
| Inspectors (proximate) | D Dodson F Thomas D Bradley N Taylor |
| Violation of: | 10 CFR 50 Appendix B 10 CFR 50 Appendix B Criterion V |
| INPO aspect | DM.2 |
| ' | |