ML15016A042

1/14/2015, Meeting Slide for Watts Bar Nuclear Plant Regarding Wrag

ML15016A042
Person / Time
Site:	Watts Bar
Issue date:	01/14/2015
From:	Tennessee Valley Authority
To:	Watts Bar Special Projects Branch
Dion J
References
Download: ML15016A042 (34)

Text

Watts Bar Nuclear Plant WRAG January 14, 2015

2 Agenda

• Introductions

• Watts Bar Unit 2 Completion Status

• Project Risks

• Licensing

• Special Topics

- Fire Protection

- General Design Criterion - 5

- Cyber Security

- Degraded Voltage

- Buried Piping Integrity Program

- Substantially Complete Process

• Closing Remarks Simmons

3 Watts Bar 2 Guiding Principles

• Safe and High Quality

• Design Basis Fidelity with Watts Bar 1

• Systems, Structures, and Components -

Made Like New Watts Bar Unit 2 Completion Status Simmons

4 Overview

• Progress and milestone accomplishments continue

• Safety better than target, quality targets being met

• Discovery and closeout key risks to completion

• Completion challenges exist around hot functional testing (HFT) milestone

• Actions being taken to address challenges and reduce project risk

• Licensing issues remain stable and within plan - critical near-term activities

• Accelerating involvement and integration with operating unit Simmons Watts Bar Unit 2 Completion Status

5 Simmons Project Update

• Progress since October 2014 Completed primary cold hydrostatic test Completed secondary steam generator (SG) hydrostatic test Completed secondary hydrostatic test Successfully completed 5 pre-operational or acceptance test instructions and 600 component tests Completed major secondary side evolutions Watts Bar Unit 2 Completion Status

6 Simmons Project Update

• Progress since October 2014 (continued)

Completed Unit 2 portion of ice condenser glycol system flushes Completed pressurizer relief tank coating American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME) stamped/certified reactor vessel, pressurizer, and reactor coolant pumps ASME stamped multiple major systems Reactor Coolant System Chemical Volume & Control (CVCS) System Residual Heat Removal Containment Spray Control Rod Drive Influx Detectors Station Drainage Unit 2 license review status briefing with Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC)

Watts Bar Unit 2 Completion Status

7 Simmons

• Major Milestone Status Start Open Vessel Component & Logic Testing - Complete Start Reactor Vessel Flush - Complete Start Open Vessel Testing - Complete Cold Hydrostatic test - Complete Steam Generator Hydrostatic test - Complete Secondary Hydrostatic test - Complete Start Ice Condenser Cool Down - January 2015 Energize Plant Systems through Unit 2 Switchyard - February 2015 Establish Main Condenser Vacuum - February 2015 Start Ice Load - February 2015 Start Hot Functional Testing - March 2015 System Turnover Status

87 systems involved in turnover process 17 systems turned over to Operations 38 systems turned over to startup testing 32 systems to be turned over to startup testing Surveillance Status

895 total surveillances associated with WBN Unit 2

659 required to be performed prior to fuel load

895 currently scheduled Milestone, System, and Surveillance Status Watts Bar Unit 2 Completion Status

8 Simmons Critical Path with Forecast dates Watts Bar Unit 2 Completion Status

9 Project Risks

• Fire Protection

• Degraded Voltage

• Schedule challenges in Construction and Startup

• Equipment Failures During Testing Simmons

10

• Final Environmental Statement - Complete

• Safety Evaluation - Nearing Completion

• Closure of Regulatory Commitments Accelerating

• No Watts Bar 2 Specific Contentions Remain Open Supplemental Safety Evaluation Report Open Item Status Inspection Planning and Scheduling Item Status Licensing Status Simmons 83%

16%

1%

NRCClosed TVAOpen NRCReview 79%

14%

7%

NRCClosed TVAAction NRCAction

11

• Transition and Operational Readiness Overview

- Operating organization driving transition

- Unit 1 sharing ownership of critical Unit 2 milestones

- Staffing at appropriate level

- Training complete for dual-unit operation

- Corporate organization providing oversight and support

- Preparing for Operational Readiness Assessment Team Inspection Walsh Overview of Watts Bar Unit 2 Project

Special Topics

13 Crouch Fire Protection WBN Dual Unit Fire Protection Report (FPR) Status As-Designed FPR Submitted (March 2013)

• Initial As-Constructed FPR Submitted (September 2014)

Final equipment configurations Additional equipment incorporated (Fukushima related)

Optimized and Refined Supporting Analyses

• Triennial Fire Protection Inspection (October through December 2014)

Summary of Issues Identified Technical Consistency of Information from Design Inputs to Final Procedures Procedural Enhancements Resolution In Process

• Re-Submittal of As-Constructed FPR (March 2015)

14 General Design Criterion (GDC) 5 Item 91 - GDC-5 TVA should update the FSAR with information describing how WBN Unit 2 meets GDC 5, assuming the worst case single failure and a Loss of Offsite Power GDC 5 - Sharing of structures, systems, and components.

Structures, systems, and components important to safety shall not be shared among nuclear power units unless it can be shown that such sharing will not significantly impair their ability to perform their safety functions, including, in the event of an accident in one unit, an orderly shutdown and cooldown of the remaining units.

Koontz

15 General Design Criterion 5 Koontz

• Design Basis Watts Bar designed as a hot standby plant One unit in accident Second unit can remain safely in hot standby (350ºF)

Watts Bar has capability to safely handle one unit in an accident and bring second unit to cold shutdown (200ºF) within approximately 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />

16 General Design Criterion 5 Koontz

17

• Final Safety Analysis Report has been revised

• Staff request for additional information (RAIs) have been answered

• Open item closed by NRC in SSER 27

• Remaining action Technical Specification revision General Design Criterion 5 Koontz

18

• Met with Nuclear Security and Incident Response (NSIR), Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR) and Regional Staff - December 18, 2014 Proposed modifications to Milestones 6, 7 and 8 implementation schedules for Watts Bar Unit 2 to align with NEI Cyber Security Implementation Plan Template and TVA Fleet Approach Proposed modifications to License Conditions Unit 1 Unit 2 Provided Status of Cyber Security Implementation for Watts Bar Unit 2 Actions taken Inspection Insights Milestone Implementation Anticipated Status at Fuel Load Arent Cyber Security

19 Bright Line Alignment with Nuclear Security and Incident Response (NSIR) on scope of issue Limited to communications equipment from the hydro yard which impacts in-plant electrical equipment Cyber Security Assessment Team (CSAT) meeting to be held on 1/15/15 to evaluate equipment Response to Staff on resolution - February 2015 Hilmes

20 Degraded Voltage Issue:

• WBN does not use the Degraded Voltage Relay (DVR) Analytical Limit (AL) as an Operability Limit for Off Site Power

• WBN has not demonstrated that Safety Related loads will start assuming a Grid Voltage pre-accident which results in a Safety Related Bus Voltage at the DVR AL Hilmes

21 Degraded Voltage WBN dual unit grid operability is based upon the ability of the grid to accept accident loads while maintaining grid voltage >153kV and <9kV drop.

• Operability determined by the use of a Grid State Estimator (Real Time Program which continuously determines Grid Capability)

• Use of the Grid State Estimator is consistent with RG 1.93.

Hilmes

22 The WBN Scheme:

• Ensures that safety related equipment will have adequate voltage to start and run at the time required to perform their safety functions while connected to offsite power or

• Ensures that the Safety Related loads are transferred to the on-site power system once the Diesel Generator becomes available and subsequently start and run.

WBN has performed sensitivity studies to demonstrate that the scheme works for any grid capability condition.

Degraded Voltage Hilmes

23 Degraded Voltage WBN methodology maximizes the margin between the grid operability criteria and the Degrade Voltage Relay set point which provides the best scheme to:

• Maintain offsite power as the preferred power supply when it is capable

• Maximizes nuclear safety Maximizing this margin is consistent with Generic Safety Issue (GSI) -171 and Branch Technical Position PSB-1 Resolution of Issue

• Independent Third Party Review of TVA Approach

• Insights from NRC/Industry Meeting - January 13th and 14th

• TVA resolution to RAI questions will be provided to NRR in January 2015 Hilmes

24 Buried Piping Integrity Program

• WBN buried safety related piping included in the WBN Buried Piping Integrity Program (BPIP)

• The objective of the BPIP is to provide a comprehensive program to reduce the probability and consequences of buried piping failure.

• Program based upon EPRI Guidelines.

• The program applies to safety-related and non-safety-related piping systems.

• No additional safety-related buried piping is placed in service by Unit 2 completion.

• Program addresses external (OD) corrosion and/or degradation of buried

piping,

• Program ensures piping is repaired or replaced prior to loss of function Crouch

25 Installation

• Buried pipe is bedded to provide a continuous and uniform earth bearing from trench bottom to bottom quadrant of pipe.

• Trenches are backfilled with rock-free earth or sand compacted to a minimum depth of 12 over top of pipe.

• Steel pipe is either coal tar epoxy coated or spiral wrapped using coal-tar protective coating in tape form. Spiral wrap is overlapped more than half-width of the tape to provide a minimum of double thickness of tape.

• Pipe is heated to remove moisture prior to wrapping.

• Prior to backfilling, externally-coated pipe is inspected for holidays.

Crouch Buried Piping Integrity Program

26 The Buried Pipe Integrity Program (BPIP) is implemented in six steps:

• Steps 1 and 2 establish the program.

1. Establishing site documents/databases.

2. Risk ranking of in-scope pipe segments.

• Steps 3 thru 6 ensure adequacy of the piping.

3. Inspections of in-scope piping systems.

4. Fitness-for-service evaluations of inspection results.

5. Identification of repair options for degraded piping.

6. Prevention and mitigation measures for reducing risk of failure.

• Steps 3 thru 6 are ongoing throughout the life of the plant.

Crouch Buried Piping Integrity Program

27 Buried Pipe Conclusions

• The piping systems will maintain reliable operation.

• No new safety related buried piping being added to program to support Unit 2 operation.

• WBN is currently following the industry initiatives for buried piping, which is assessing the conditions, performing risk ranking models and replacing pipe as required.

• The type failures that could occur will not challenge the operability of the systems and/or their functions.

• To date there has not been any occurrence of major failure (loss of safety related system function).

• WBN has processes and procedures to monitor all safety related piping.

Crouch Buried Piping Integrity Program

28 Substantially Complete Letter

• Definition of Substantially Complete

- When the Owner takes responsibility

- Based on plant completion, not time to startup

• Substantially Complete Letter timed to support notation paper

- Allows Commission 60 days for review of notation paper

- Approximately 90 days prior to fuel load

• Letter will include a Readiness Assessment Report

- Readiness Assessment Report will provide inventory of TVA Quality Activities to construct, test, and transition to dual unit operations

- Readiness Assessment Report will include high level list of remaining construction and testing activities to complete before fuel load Letter will be available for discussion Calle

29 Substantially Complete Letter Substantially complete letter alignment to the sub-parts of 10 CFR 50.57 10CFR 50.57 Sub-part Substantially Complete Letter Section (1) Construction of the facility has been substantially completed, in conformity with the construction permit and the application as amended, the provisions of the Act, and the rules and regulations of the Commission; and Attachment A1-Current Schedule for Completion of Remaining Work Attachment A2 - Design Basis Verification Attachment A3 - Refurbishment Program Description Attachment A4 - CAPs and SPs Attachment A5 - Status of Generic Communications Attachment A6 - Quality Assurance Activities (2) The facility will operate in conformity with the application as amended, the provisions of the Act, and the rules and regulations of the Commission; and Attachment B1 - Current Schedule for Completion of the Test Program (3) There is reasonable assurance (i) that the activities authorized by the operating license can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the public, and (ii) that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the regulations in this chapter Attachment C1 - Department Transition and Change Management Plans Attachment C2 - Unit Differences - Design Attachment C3 - Unit Differences - Training Attachment C4 - Safety Culture Calle

30 Ready For Fuel Load Letter

• Letter to be submitted just prior to fuel load

- Will include:

Schedule for testing - Startup and Power ascension List of activities that need completion prior to fuel load Unanticipated exemptions or reliefs

- Will request timely turnaround

- Will request full power license Calle

31 2015 Unit 2 - Key Milestone Linkages NRRIssues License TVA Letter Ready for Fuel Load WRAG confirms all licensing issues are resolved Region 2 finding -

(94300) Inspection Program Complete Integrated Safeguards Testing Complete (final Mandatory MC 2513 inspection)

Federal Register Notice - Issue license NRR submits Notation Vote Paper Commission Decision to Issue License TVA Letter -

Construction is Substantially Complete Construction is Substantially Complete All Systems and Areas turned over from Bechtel to TVA ACRS Final Letter TVA NRC Fukushima Orders Closed Calle Internal WRAG NRC Sr.

Mgmt.

Mtg.

Closing Remarks

33

• Work to complete Watts Bar 2 is being done safely, in a quality manner, and in accordance with stringent standards.

• The combination of construction, refurbishment, improvements, and ongoing pre-startup testing will demonstrate systems, structures, and components have achieved like new condition.

• Startup testing and system turnovers support a June 2015 fuel load date.

• Project challenges are being identified and addressed.

Fire Protection - Open issues being addressed Degraded Voltage - interaction with the Staff continues

• Substantially Complete letter under development Simmons Conclusion

Questions