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| number = ML23251A059
| number = ML23251A059
| issue date = 09/13/2023
| issue date = 09/13/2023
| title = Session 3 - Development of Risk-Informed and Performance-Based (Ripb) Standards
| title = Session 3 - Development of Risk-Informed and Performance-Based (RIPB) Standards
| author name = Roche-Rivera R
| author name = Roche-Rivera R
| author affiliation = NRC/RES/DE
| author affiliation = NRC/RES/DE
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Eric Thornsbury (EPRI)
Eric Thornsbury (EPRI)


Overview of ANS Activities to Support RIPB Standards N. Prasad Kadambi Chair, Risk-informed, Performance-Based Principles and Policy Committee (RP3C)
Presented to:
Presented to:
2023 NRC Standards Forum September 13, 2023 Overview of ANS Activities to Support RIPB Standards N. Prasad Kadambi Chair, Risk-informed, Performance-Based Principles and Policy Committee (RP3C) 2
2023 NRC Standards Forum September 13, 2023 2


The ANS Standards Board Supports RIPB Standards To Modernize Nuclear VCS*
The ANS Standards Board Supports RIPB Standards To Modernize Nuclear VCS*
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* ANS Standards Board (SB) has directed ANS consensus committees (CCs) to incorporate RIPB principles where appropriate.
* ANS Standards Board (SB) has directed ANS consensus committees (CCs) to incorporate RIPB principles where appropriate.
* All eight CCs provide reports at every SB meeting.
* All eight CCs provide reports at every SB meeting.
  - The SB recognizes the varied application and applicability of such principles to each portfolio of standards.
- The SB recognizes the varied application and applicability of such principles to each portfolio of standards.
  - Relative to advanced reactors, the Joint Committee on Risk Management (JCNRM) plays a central role in supporting modernization relative to RIPB standards development
- Relative to advanced reactors, the Joint Committee on Risk Management (JCNRM) plays a central role in supporting modernization relative to RIPB standards development
  *Voluntary consensus standard as defined in OMB Circular A-119 [1]. NOTE: Numbers in brackets refer to corresponding reference numbers on slide 11.
*Voluntary consensus standard as defined in OMB Circular A-119 [1]. NOTE: Numbers in brackets refer to corresponding reference numbers on slide 11.
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ANS Has Been a Leader in Promoting RIPB VCS
ANS Has Been a Leader in Promoting RIPB VCS
* Recent experience with conventional VCS shows that products that have detailed shall statements give rise to system requirements that are unnecessary or too conservative.
* Recent experience with conventional VCS shows that products that have detailed shall statements give rise to system requirements that are unnecessary or too conservative.
  - Frequently the motivation is driven by convenience for verification of compliance to requirements established by regulatory authorities.
Frequently the motivation is driven by convenience for verification of compliance to requirements established by regulatory authorities.
* Conventional VCS often do not support economic deployment of advanced reactors mandated by the Nuclear Energy Innovation and Modernization Act (NEIMA) and supported by industry investments.
* Conventional VCS often do not support economic deployment of advanced reactors mandated by the Nuclear Energy Innovation and Modernization Act (NEIMA) and supported by industry investments.
  - RIPB VCS provide a more logical fit with NEIMA than conventional ones.
RIPB VCS provide a more logical fit with NEIMA than conventional ones.
  - ANS is in a good position to advocate for RIPB VCS by articulating specific aspects of the value proposition to move away from prescription.
ANS is in a good position to advocate for RIPB VCS by articulating specific aspects of the value proposition to move away from prescription.
  - ANS is actively tackling the challenges of creating guidance for RIPB VCS.
ANS is actively tackling the challenges of creating guidance for RIPB VCS.
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Current Activities Toward RIPB VCS
Current Activities Toward RIPB VCS
* ANS has recognized the need to create an infrastructure to support RIPB VCS.
* ANS has recognized the need to create an infrastructure to support RIPB VCS.
        - Part of this is to focus on structured performance objectives such that varied levels of detail can be accommodated rigorously.
- Part of this is to focus on structured performance objectives such that varied levels of detail can be accommodated rigorously.
* The most visible of these activities are related to creating one or more internally consistent and coherent suites of standards that could foster further development of RIPB VCS within and outside of ANS.
* The most visible of these activities are related to creating one or more internally consistent and coherent suites of standards that could foster further development of RIPB VCS within and outside of ANS.
* An existing example is the suite of seismic standards ANS-2.26 [2]*, 2.27 [3],
* An existing example is the suite of seismic standards ANS-2.26 [2]*, 2.27 [3],
2.29 [4], and ASCE 43-05 [5].
2.29 [4], and ASCE 43-05 [5].
* Currently, ANS efforts are focused on the series ANS-30.1 [6], 30.2 [7], and 30.3 [8].
* Currently, ANS efforts are focused on the series ANS-30.1 [6], 30.2 [7], and 30.3 [8].
* ANS views these standards within a structure where success in issuing ANS-30.1 as a Guidance Standard, developing ANS-30.2, and obtaining regulatory endorsement of ANS-30.3 would be major accomplishments toward RIPB VCS.
ANS views these standards within a structure where success in issuing ANS-30.1 as a Guidance Standard, developing ANS-30.2, and obtaining regulatory endorsement of ANS-30.3 would be major accomplishments toward RIPB VCS.
*Titles of standards are provided on slide 11.
*Titles of standards are provided on slide 11.
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What ANS-2.26 Does Figure from Appendix A:
What ANS-2.26 Does ANS-2.26:
ANS-2.26:
Assign a Seismic Design Category (SDC):
Assign a Seismic Design Category (SDC):
Given the potential consequences of failure, assign a performance criterion:
Given the potential consequences of failure, assign a performance criterion:
specifically, a failure probability criterion.
specifically, a failure probability criterion.
The other standards then tell you how to go about engineering satisfaction of this criterion.
The other standards then tell you how to go about engineering satisfaction of this criterion.
Figure from Appendix A:
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ANS Standards Committee Hierarchy For Advanced Reactors ANS-30.1*
ANS-30.1*
Risk and Performance Objectives (Linn)
Risk and Performance Objectives (Linn)
ANS-20.2 Liquid Molten Salt Reactor (Holcomb)
ANS-53.1 Modular Helium Cooled Reactor (August)
ANS-54.1 Liquid Sodium Cooled Reactor (Flanagan)
ANS-30.3 Advanced Light-Water Reactor (Welter)
ANS-30.2 Categorization of Structures, Systems and Components (Diaconeasa)
ANS-30.2 Categorization of Structures, Systems and Components (Diaconeasa)
ANS-20.2              ANS-53.1                    ANS-54.1                        ANS-30.3 Liquid Molten Salt  Modular Helium Cooled      Liquid Sodium Cooled            Advanced Light-Water Reactor                Reactor                      Reactor                        Reactor (Holcomb)              (August)                    (Flanagan)                        (Welter)
ANS and other SDO standards as needed:
Advanced Reactor                                          Large Light Water Rx ANS and other SDO standards as needed:
- Cross cutting topics
                                                                  - Cross cutting topics
- Reactor technology specific issues Advanced Reactor Large Light Water Rx ANS Standards Committee Hierarchy For Advanced Reactors
*ANS-30.1 is now being prepared as an ANS guidance standard,       - Reactor technology specific issues not as an ANSI consensus standard 7
*ANS-30.1 is now being prepared as an ANS guidance standard, not as an ANSI consensus standard 7


NRC activities support RIPB, but more can be done.
NRC activities support RIPB, but more can be done.
* Commission approval of SECY-18-0096 [9] on Functional Containment has major significance for RIPB standards as an example of performance-based principles.
* Commission approval of SECY-18-0096 [9] on Functional Containment has major significance for RIPB standards as an example of performance-based principles.
    - This clears the way for standards development organizations (SDOs) to consider all general design criteria from a performance-based perspective.
- This clears the way for standards development organizations (SDOs) to consider all general design criteria from a performance-based perspective.
* Similarly, issuance of RG 1.233 [10] has significance because it is meant to be technology-inclusive for addressing certain major safety issues.
* Similarly, issuance of RG 1.233 [10] has significance because it is meant to be technology-inclusive for addressing certain major safety issues.
    - Logically, it means that light water reactors should also be able to use its provisions as one acceptable way to implement relevant regulations.
- Logically, it means that light water reactors should also be able to use its provisions as one acceptable way to implement relevant regulations.
* NRC should recognize that industry and SDOs alike look for regulatory cues that may encourage or discourage RIPB VCS.
* NRC should recognize that industry and SDOs alike look for regulatory cues that may encourage or discourage RIPB VCS.
* NRC can do more to clarify how the provisions of NEIMA relative to a technology-inclusive regulatory framework will use appropriate VCS for conforming with OMB Circular A-119 [1].
* NRC can do more to clarify how the provisions of NEIMA relative to a technology-inclusive regulatory framework will use appropriate VCS for conforming with OMB Circular A-119 [1].
    - Federal policy clearly favors performance-based requirements instead of prescriptive ones.
- Federal policy clearly favors performance-based requirements instead of prescriptive ones.
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The ANS Standards Committee Standards Board (Top-level committee)
The ANS Standards Committee Standards Board (Top-level committee)
Risk-informed, Performance-based Principles and Policy                                                                              Task Groups Committee (RP3C)
Large Light Water Reactors Consensus Committee (LLWRCC)
Large      Research                                                          Joint Nonreactor              Safety &                           Nuclear     Environmental          Fuel, Light          and                                                        Committee Nuclear            Radiological                        Criticality                    Waste, and Water      Advanced                                                      on Nuclear                   and Siting Facilities            Analyses                            Safety                      Decommissioning Reactors      Reactors                                                Risk Management                 Consensus Consensus              Consensus                          Consensus                      Consensus Consensus    Consensus                                                      (JCNRM*)                   Committee Committee               Committee                          Committee                        Committee Committee    Committee                                                    Consensus                      (ESCC)
Research and Advanced Reactors Consensus Committee (RARCC)
(NRNFCC)                (SRACC)                            (NCSCC)                          (FWDCC)
Safety &
(LLWRCC)      (RARCC)                                                      Committee Subcommittees Working Groups
Radiological Analyses Consensus Committee (SRACC)
                  *The JCNRM is a joint ANS and ASME committee.
Nonreactor Nuclear Facilities Consensus Committee (NRNFCC)
Joint Committee on Nuclear Risk Management (JCNRM*)
Consensus Committee Nuclear Criticality Safety Consensus Committee (NCSCC)
Environmental and Siting Consensus Committee (ESCC)
: Fuel, Waste, and Decommissioning Consensus Committee (FWDCC)
Subcommittees Working Groups Task Groups Risk-informed, Performance-based Principles and Policy Committee (RP3C)
*The JCNRM is a joint ANS and ASME committee.
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11
11


Titles of Cited Documents and Standards
[1]
[1] OMB Circular A-119, Federal Participation in the Development and Use of Voluntary Consensus Standards and in Conformity Assessment Activities
OMB Circular A-119, Federal Participation in the Development and Use of Voluntary Consensus Standards and in Conformity Assessment Activities
[2] ANSI/ANS-2.26-2004 (R2021), Components for Seismic Design Categorization of Nuclear Facility Structures, Systems, and Components for Seismic Design
[2]
[3] ANSI/ANS-2.27-2020, Criteria for Investigations of Nuclear Facility Sites for Seismic Hazard Assessments
ANSI/ANS-2.26-2004 (R2021), Components for Seismic Design Categorization of Nuclear Facility Structures, Systems, and Components for Seismic Design
[4] ANSI/ANS-2.29-2020, Probabilistic Seismic Hazard Analysis
[3]
[5] ASCE/SEI 43-05, Seismic Design Criteria for Structures, Systems, and Components in Nuclear Facilities
ANSI/ANS-2.27-2020, Criteria for Investigations of Nuclear Facility Sites for Seismic Hazard Assessments
[6] ANS-GS-30.1-202X, Integrating Risk and Performance Objectives into New Reactor Nuclear Safety Designs
[4]
[7] ANS-30.2-202X, Classification and Categorization of Structures, Systems, and Components for New Nuclear Power Plants
ANSI/ANS-2.29-2020, Probabilistic Seismic Hazard Analysis
[8] ANSI/ANS-30.3-2022, Light Water Reactor Risk- Informed, Performance- Based Design
[5]
[9] SECY-18-0096, Functional Containment Performance Criteria For Non-Light-Water-Reactors
ASCE/SEI 43-05, Seismic Design Criteria for Structures, Systems, and Components in Nuclear Facilities
[10] RG 1.233, Guidance for a Technology-Inclusive, Risk-Informed, and Performance-Based Methodology to Inform the Licensing Basis and Content of Applications for Licenses, Certifications, and Approvals for Non-Light Water Reactors 12
[6]
ANS-GS-30.1-202X, Integrating Risk and Performance Objectives into New Reactor Nuclear Safety Designs
[7]
ANS-30.2-202X, Classification and Categorization of Structures, Systems, and Components for New Nuclear Power Plants
[8]
ANSI/ANS-30.3-2022, Light Water Reactor Risk-Informed, Performance-Based Design
[9]
SECY-18-0096, Functional Containment Performance Criteria For Non-Light-Water-Reactors
[10]
RG 1.233, Guidance for a Technology-Inclusive, Risk-Informed, and Performance-Based Methodology to Inform the Licensing Basis and Content of Applications for Licenses, Certifications, and Approvals for Non-Light Water Reactors Titles of Cited Documents and Standards 12


ASME/ANS NON-LWR PRA STANDARD IMPLEMENTATION EXPERIENCE Dave Grabaskas Manager, Licensing and Risk Assessments Group, Argonne National Laboratory Chair, ASME/ANS Non-LWR PRA standard working group Former Chair (current Vice Chair), NLWR PRA standard working group 13
ASME/ANS NON-LWR PRA STANDARD IMPLEMENTATION EXPERIENCE Dave Grabaskas Manager, Licensing and Risk Assessments Group, Argonne National Laboratory Chair, ASME/ANS Non-LWR PRA standard working group Former Chair (current Vice Chair), NLWR PRA standard working group 13


JCNRM Background
JCNRM Background
* Joint Committee on Nuclear Risk Management (JCNRM) o The JCNRM is the PRA Standards development and maintenance consensus committee - formed by combining:
* Joint Committee on Nuclear Risk Management (JCNRM) oThe JCNRM is the PRA Standards development and maintenance consensus committee - formed by combining:
        § ANS RISC committee - originally developing the hazard PRA standards (e.g., Seismic, Fire, Flooding, etc.)
§ ANS RISC committee - originally developing the hazard PRA standards (e.g., Seismic, Fire, Flooding, etc.)
        § ASME CRNM committee - developed the internal events requirements.
§ ASME CRNM committee - developed the internal events requirements.
o Committees both started in the late 1990s, and officially merged around 2009, and issued the combined standard for LWRs covering L1 PRA, endorsed in RG 1.200.
oCommittees both started in the late 1990s, and officially merged around 2009, and issued the combined standard for LWRs covering L1 PRA, endorsed in RG 1.200.
o Oversees two issued PRA standards (LWR - L1 and Non-LWR) and five under development.
oOversees two issued PRA standards (LWR - L1 and Non-LWR) and five under development.
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Standard Background
Standard Background
* Non-LWR PRA Standard Development o Working grouped formed in 2006 o Trial use standard issued in 2013 o New version formally approved by ASME, ANS, and ANSI in 2021
* Non-LWR PRA Standard Development oWorking grouped formed in 2006 oTrial use standard issued in 2013 oNew version formally approved by ASME, ANS, and ANSI in 2021
        § ASME/ANS/ANSI RA-S-1.4-2021 o Endorsed by the NRC in trial use RG 1.247 in 2022 o An integrated standard:
§ ASME/ANS/ANSI RA-S-1.4-2021 oEndorsed by the NRC in trial use RG 1.247 in 2022 oAn integrated standard:
      § Covers from initiating events to offsite consequence
§ Covers from initiating events to offsite consequence
      § Can include any radionuclide source at the plant
§ Can include any radionuclide source at the plant
      § From conceptual design to operation 15
§ From conceptual design to operation 15


Implementation Experience
Implementation Experience
* NRC Endorsement Process o NRC staff involved throughout the standard development process, which greatly expedited NRC endorsement o Some disagreement regarding certain NRC positions; many resolved through collaboration, others further explored as part of RG trial use period
* NRC Endorsement Process oNRC staff involved throughout the standard development process, which greatly expedited NRC endorsement oSome disagreement regarding certain NRC positions; many resolved through collaboration, others further explored as part of RG trial use period
* User Feedback o Multiple non-LWR vendors are currently utilizing the standard as part of risk-informed performance-based design and licensing approaches, such as the Licensing Modernization Project (LMP) o Continual feedback from vendors regarding implementation experience                       16
* User Feedback oMultiple non-LWR vendors are currently utilizing the standard as part of risk-informed performance-based design and licensing approaches, such as the Licensing Modernization Project (LMP) oContinual feedback from vendors regarding implementation experience 16


Implementation Experience
Implementation Experience
* Standard and Applications o As further experience is gained using the standard for risk-informed applications, potential discrepancies between standard requirements and application requirements are being identified
* Standard and Applications oAs further experience is gained using the standard for risk-informed applications, potential discrepancies between standard requirements and application requirements are being identified
* Seismic Requirements o Gaining further insight regarding the practicality and implementation details of risk-informed seismic design
* Seismic Requirements oGaining further insight regarding the practicality and implementation details of risk-informed seismic design
* Innovative Uses o Vendors utilizing deterministic or partially risk-informed approaches have been able to leverage certain elements of the standard (initiating events, mechanistic source term, radiological consequence, etc.)   17
* Innovative Uses oVendors utilizing deterministic or partially risk-informed approaches have been able to leverage certain elements of the standard (initiating events, mechanistic source term, radiological consequence, etc.)
17


Treatment of extremes in RIPB design Andrew Whittaker, Ph.D., S.E.
Treatment of extremes in RIPB design Andrew Whittaker, Ph.D., S.E.
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19


Right sizing the treatment of extremes for next generation nuclear TerraPower and GEH                          Lucid Catalyst BWXT 20
3 Lucid Catalyst TerraPower and GEH Right sizing the treatment of extremes for next generation nuclear BWXT 20


Extremes we must rethink in support of RIPB design
Extremes we must rethink in support of RIPB design
* Load effects
* Load effects Wind-borne missile impact Normal impact of high-velocity missiles Schedule 40 steel pipe Simple but why normal impact?
* Wind-borne missile impact
Any evidence in non-nuclear sectors of such damage?
* Normal impact of high-velocity missiles
Aircraft impact Extreme ground shaking
* Schedule 40 steel pipe
* Simple but why normal impact?
* Any evidence in non-nuclear sectors of such damage?
* Aircraft impact
* Extreme ground shaking
* Acceptable risk Stephenson, Terranova et al.
* Acceptable risk Stephenson, Terranova et al.
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21


Extremes we must rethink in support of RIPB design
Extremes we must rethink in support of RIPB design
* Load effects: aircraft impact
* Load effects: aircraft impact Aircraft cockpits secured for 20 years Hijacking of aircraft in US since 2001 = 0 Strike a RC box and not a political target? No.
* Aircraft cockpits secured for 20 years
Could you hit the RC box if you wanted to? No. See below.
* Hijacking of aircraft in US since 2001 = 0
MAF of aircraft impact on a RC box in the US = 0 Guaranteed fatalities from an aircraft strike? Yes Missing target = 250+ dead on B787, all on the plane Boeing 22
* Strike a RC box and not a political target? No.
* Could you hit the RC box if you wanted to? No. See below.
* MAF of aircraft impact on a RC box in the US = 0 Boeing
* Guaranteed fatalities from an aircraft strike? Yes
* Missing target = 250+ dead on B787, all on the plane 22


Extremes we must rethink in support of RIPB design
Extremes we must rethink in support of RIPB design
* Load effects: incredible ground shaking
* Load effects: incredible ground shaking Consider Seismic Design Category 4, Clinch River 100% DRS (PHA=0.53g, RP=5,300 years), 200% DRS (1.06g, 25,000), 400% DRS (2.12g, 150,000), 600% DRS (3.18g, 490,000), 800% DRS (4.24g, 1,250,000) 0 1
* Consider Seismic Design Category 4, Clinch River
2 3
* 100% DRS (PHA=0.53g, RP=5,300 years), 200% DRS (1.06g, 25,000), 400% DRS (2.12g, 150,000), 600% DRS (3.18g, 490,000), 800% DRS (4.24g, 1,250,000) 0.4                                                                          4.5 1982 Miramichi,                                  8 DRS 1.5 2011 Greenbrier, AR,                                   4.0 0.4 g 0.4 g Horizontal Vertical 3.5 0.3                                                                                              6 DRS 3.0 2008 Mt. Carmel, 2.5 1
4 Period (sec) 0 0.5 1
IL, 0.2 g PGA, H (g)                                                                   PGA, H (g) 0.2                                                                                              4 DRS 2.0 Sa (g)                                                                                                          2011 Mineral, VA, 0.2 g 0.5 1.5 0.1                                                                          1.0               2 DRS 0.5                 DRS 0
1.5 Sa (g)
0    1              2      3               4 0.0                                                                           0.0 Period (sec) 0      2000   4000 6000 8000 10000 12000 14000                               0  2000    4000 6000 8000 10000 12000 14000 Record sequence number (RSN)                                               Record sequence number (RSN) 23
Horizontal Vertical 2008 Mt. Carmel, IL, 0.2 g 2011 Greenbrier, AR, 0.4 g 2011 Mineral, VA, 0.2 g 1982 Miramichi, 0.4 g 0.0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0
2000 4000 6000 8000 10000 12000 14000 PGA, H (g)
Record sequence number (RSN) 0.0 0.5 1.0 1.5 2.0 2.5 3.0 3.5 4.0 4.5 0
2000 4000 6000 8000 10000 12000 14000 PGA, H (g)
Record sequence number (RSN)
DRS 2 DRS 4 DRS 6 DRS 8 DRS 23


Outcomes of extreme: nuclear-related fatalities = 0 TMI, 1979 Fukushima Daiichi, 2011 24
7 Outcomes of extreme: nuclear-related fatalities = 0 Fukushima Daiichi, 2011 TMI, 1979 24


Extremes we must rethink in support of RIPB design
Extremes we must rethink in support of RIPB design
* Societal tolerable risk
* Societal tolerable risk MAF of death in a car accident 1/10000 (1E-4)
* MAF of death in a car accident
MAF of building collapse 1/5000 (2E-4)
* 1/10000 (1E-4)
MAF of death due to dam failure 1/10000 (1E-4), existing dam 1/100000 (1E-5), new, major dam
* MAF of building collapse
* 1/5000 (2E-4)
* MAF of death due to dam failure
* 1/10000 (1E-4), existing dam
* 1/100000 (1E-5), new, major dam
* Need to right size the F-C chart 25
* Need to right size the F-C chart 25


awhittak@buffalo.edu 26
awhittak@buffalo.edu 26


Treatment of risk in other sectors: dams Munger et al. (2009), USACE Existing dams                  New dams 27
Treatment of risk in other sectors: dams Existing dams New dams Munger et al. (2009), USACE 27


Approach for Risk-Informing IEEE Standards Rebecca Steinman, PhD, PE Chair: SC-3, WG 3.4 and WG 2.10 09-13-2023 28
Approach for Risk-Informing IEEE Standards Rebecca Steinman, PhD, PE Chair: SC-3, WG 3.4 and WG 2.10 09-13-2023 28


5 Technical Subcommittees Qualification (SC-2)
Operations, Maintenance, Aging, Testing & Reliability (SC-3)
Auxiliary Power (SC-4)
Human Factors, Control Facilities and Human Reliability (SC-5)
Safety Related Systems (SC-6)
Nuclear Power Engineering Committee (NPEC)
Nuclear Power Engineering Committee (NPEC)
SC-2, 18, 35%
SC-3, 8, 16%
SC-4, 11, 21%
SC-5, 7, 14%
SC-6, 7, 14%
SC-6, 7, 14%
5 Technical Subcommittees
51 IEEE 336 IEEE 692 IEEE 338 IEEE 933 IEEE 352 IEEE 1205 IEEE 577 IEEE 1819 29
* Qualification (SC-2)                                                                    SC-2, 18, 35%
SC-5, 7, 14%
* Operations, Maintenance, Aging, Testing & Reliability (SC-3)
* Auxiliary Power (SC-4) 51
* Human Factors, Control Facilities and Human Reliability (SC-5)
SC-4, 11, 21%
* Safety Related Systems (SC-6)                                              SC-3, 8, 16%
IEEE 336         IEEE 692 IEEE 338         IEEE 933 IEEE 352         IEEE 1205 IEEE 577         IEEE 1819 29


NPEC Standards Approach
NPEC Standards Approach
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30


IEEE 1819 Risk-Informed Categorization & Treatment of Electrical Equipment
Risk-Informed Categorization & Treatment of Electrical Equipment
* alternate treatments: Those licensee-defined requirements applied to electrical and electronic systems and components (EESCs) that provide reasonable confidence that 1)
* alternate treatments: Those licensee-defined requirements applied to electrical and electronic systems and components (EESCs) that provide reasonable confidence that 1)
RISC-3 EESCs are capable of performing their Class 1E functions under design basis conditions; and 2) RISC-2 EESCs perform their functions consistent with the key assumptions in the categorization process that relate to their assumed performance, as applicable.
RISC-3 EESCs are capable of performing their Class 1E functions under design basis conditions; and 2) RISC-2 EESCs perform their functions consistent with the key assumptions in the categorization process that relate to their assumed performance, as applicable.
* reasonable assurance: A justifiable level of confidence used to satisfy regulatory requirements, based upon objective and/or measurable evidence.
* reasonable assurance: A justifiable level of confidence used to satisfy regulatory requirements, based upon objective and/or measurable evidence.
* reasonable confidence: A level of confidence based on facts, actions, knowledge, experience, and/or observations, which is deemed to be adequate. Reasonable confidence is a lower level of confidence than reasonable assurance.
* reasonable confidence: A level of confidence based on facts, actions, knowledge, experience, and/or observations, which is deemed to be adequate. Reasonable confidence is a lower level of confidence than reasonable assurance.
31
IEEE 1819 31


Usage and Status of IEEE Standards
Usage and Status of IEEE Standards
Line 227: Line 239:
32
32


NEI Codes and Standards Task Force NRC Standards Forum 2023 Thomas Basso Sr. Director Eng & Risk September 13, 2023
©2023 Nuclear Energy Institute NRC Standards Forum 2023 Thomas Basso Sr. Director Eng & Risk September 13, 2023 NEI Codes and Standards Task Force 33
©2023 Nuclear Energy Institute 33
 
©2023 Nuclear Energy Institute Risk informed approaches have provided a better safety focus, improved safety and enabled efficiencies As we look to the future fleet, there are opportunities for risk-informing the regulatory fabric that come with both promise and attention Navigating this change will require embracing uncertainties and discipline in responding A Risk-Informed Journey 34
 
©2023 Nuclear Energy Institute The use of PRA technology should be increased in all regulatory matters to the extent supported by the state-of-the-art in PRA methods and data and in a manner that complements the NRCs deterministic approach and supports the NRCs traditional defense-in-depth philosophy.
1995 PRA Policy Statement 35
 
©2023 Nuclear Energy Institute Risk-informed Regulatory Decision-making PRA Realism Conservative Safety Decisions Uncertainties Improving the State of the Knowledge 36
 
©2023 Nuclear Energy Institute ASME Section XI Code Activities
 
Code Case N-752 Risk-informed Repair/Replacement NRC Endorsement and Approval of 50.55a(z) Submittals
 
IWA-4000 Repair/Replacement Optimization
 
Alternative VT-2 Qualification Establish appropriate training hours requirements
 
IWE General Visual Examinations (Category E-A, Item E1.11) Insulation Removal - Industry Survey
 
Application of EPRI Tech Bases using PFM for Relief to Extend SG/PRZ Nozzle Weld Inspections 37
 
©2023 Nuclear Energy Institute ASME OM Code Activities
 
Valve Exercising and Testing Requirements Valve Manual Exercising Frequency Extension Revise Testing of Passive Valve Quarterly Valve Stroking Extension


A Risk-Informed Journey Risk informed approaches have provided a better safety focus, improved safety and enabled efficiencies As we look to the future fleet, there are opportunities for risk-informing the regulatory fabric that come with both promise and attention Navigating this change will require embracing uncertainties and discipline in responding 34            ©2023 Nuclear Energy Institute
Risk-informed Applications


1995 PRA Policy Statement The use of PRA technology should be increased in all regulatory matters to the extent supported by the state-of-the-art in PRA methods and data and in a manner that complements the NRCs deterministic approach and supports the NRCs traditional defense-in-depth philosophy.
Replacement of Operability Term in OM
                                          ©2023 Nuclear Energy Institute 35


Risk-informed Regulatory Decision-making Uncertainties Conservative PRA                          Safety Realism                    Decisions Improving the State of the Knowledge
(OM-2) Code on Component Testing Requirements 38
                                                ©2023 Nuclear Energy Institute 36


ASME Section XI Code Activities Code Case N-752 Risk-informed Repair/Replacement
©2023 Nuclear Energy Institute TG Alternative Treatment Requirements
* NRC Endorsement and Approval of 50.55a(z) Submittals IWA-4000 Repair/Replacement Optimization Alternative VT-2 Qualification
* Code Case on Alternate Requirements for NDE and Testing of Items Commensurate with their Contribution to Safety and Risk ASME III CC N-907 and Code Change on Preservice Inspection Requirements Regulatory Engagement on ASME Section III Priorities ASME Section III CSTF Activities 39
* Establish appropriate training hours requirements IWE General Visual Examinations (Category E-A, Item E1.11) Insulation Removal - Industry Survey Application of EPRI Tech Bases using PFM for Relief to Extend SG/PRZ Nozzle Weld Inspections 37
                                                          ©2023 Nuclear Energy Institute


ASME OM Code Activities Valve Exercising and Testing Requirements
©2023 Nuclear Energy Institute NEI CSTF Regulatory Activities
* Valve Manual Exercising Frequency Extension
* Revise Testing of Passive Valve
* Quarterly Valve Stroking Extension Risk-informed Applications Replacement of Operability Term in OM (OM-2) Code on Component Testing Requirements 38
                                                  ©2023 Nuclear Energy Institute


ASME Section III CSTF Activities TG Alternative Treatment Requirements
10 CFR 50.55a Rulemaking Review (NRC-2018-0289)
* Code Case on Alternate Requirements for NDE and Testing of Items Commensurate with their Contribution to Safety and Risk ASME III CC N-907 and Code Change on Preservice Inspection Requirements Regulatory Engagement on ASME Section III Priorities 39
                                                    ©2023 Nuclear Energy Institute


NEI CSTF Regulatory Activities 10 CFR 50.55a Rulemaking Review (NRC-2018-0289)
Reg Guides 1.147, 1.84, 1.192, and 1.193 Comments (NRC-2018-0291)
Reg Guides 1.147, 1.84, 1.192, and 1.193 Comments (NRC-2018-0291)
Extension of 10-year ISI/IST Program Updates Extension of ISI Intervals from 10 to 12 Years Response to NRC RIS 2022-02 on Operational Leakage NEI 18-03 Operability Guidance 40
                                                    ©2023 Nuclear Energy Institute


EPRI Activities Supporting RIPB Standards 2023 NRC Standards Forum Eric Thornsbury Principal Technical Leader September 13, 2023 41 www.epri.com  © 2023 Electric Power Research Institute, Inc. All rights reserved.
Extension of 10-year ISI/IST Program Updates
 
Extension of ISI Intervals from 10 to 12 Years


Response to NRC RIS 2022-02 on Operational Leakage
NEI 18-03 Operability Guidance 40
© 2023 Electric Power Research Institute, Inc. All rights reserved.
w w w. e p r i. c o m Eric Thornsbury Principal Technical Leader September 13, 2023 EPRI Activities Supporting RIPB Standards 2023 NRC Standards Forum 41
© 2023 Electric Power Research Institute, Inc. All rights reserved.
Introduction EPRI participates in many activities related to the development of standards across the nuclear industry Interest in Risk-Informed, Performance-Based applications (including standards) has been increasing, and is getting additional attention due to activities related to our Advanced Nuclear Technology program Key Question for Advanced Reactors:
Introduction EPRI participates in many activities related to the development of standards across the nuclear industry Interest in Risk-Informed, Performance-Based applications (including standards) has been increasing, and is getting additional attention due to activities related to our Advanced Nuclear Technology program Key Question for Advanced Reactors:
  - How to meet current regulations, standards, and other expectations that were developed from a light water reactor perspective?
- How to meet current regulations, standards, and other expectations that were developed from a light water reactor perspective?
42
42
                              © 2023 Electric Power Research Institute, Inc. All rights reserved.


© 2023 Electric Power Research Institute, Inc. All rights reserved.
Examples of EPRI Activities for the Current Fleet RPV Threads in Flange (EPRI Report #3002010345)
Examples of EPRI Activities for the Current Fleet RPV Threads in Flange (EPRI Report #3002010345)
N715 for Streamlined RI-ISIN (EPRI Report
N715 for Streamlined RI-ISIN (EPRI Report
  #3002003026 on BWR and PWR Lessons Learned)
#3002003026 on BWR and PWR Lessons Learned)
ASME Section XI - Appendix R, Supplement 2 was included in the last rulemaking on 50.55a N711 for Inservice Inspection (EPRI Report
ASME Section XI - Appendix R, Supplement 2 was included in the last rulemaking on 50.55a N711 for Inservice Inspection (EPRI Report
  #3002010353 )
#3002010353 )
Risk-informed Repair / Replacement (EPRI Report
Risk-informed Repair / Replacement (EPRI Report
  #3002013126) 10CFR50.69 (EPRI Reports #3002012984, 3002012988, 3002012990, 3002022453, 3002015999, )
#3002013126) 10CFR50.69 (EPRI Reports #3002012984, 3002012988, 3002012990, 3002022453, 3002015999, )
43
43
                            © 2023 Electric Power Research Institute, Inc. All rights reserved.


Strategic Elements of the EPRI/NEI AR Roadmap Regulatory Efficiency     Technology Readiness                                                   Project Execution Licensing                                Fuel Cycle                                       Project Management 7 Actions                                3 Actions                                             4 Actions Environmental                        Plant/SSC Design                                     Engineering & Procurement 7 Actions                                 3 Actions                                             2 Actions Oversight                              Supply Chain                                  Construction & Commissioning 2 Actions                                7 Actions                                              3 Actions Nuclear Beyond Electricity                                  Initial Operations & Maintenance 3 Actions                                              1 Actions Codes & Standards                                      Workforce Development 2 Actions                                              4 Actions 44                               © 2023 Electric Power Research Institute, Inc. All rights reserved.
© 2023 Electric Power Research Institute, Inc. All rights reserved.
Strategic Elements of the EPRI/NEI AR Roadmap Regulatory Efficiency Licensing 7 Actions Environmental 7 Actions Oversight 2 Actions Technology Readiness Fuel Cycle 3 Actions Plant/SSC Design 3 Actions Supply Chain 7 Actions Nuclear Beyond Electricity 3 Actions Codes & Standards 2 Actions Project Execution Project Management 4 Actions Engineering & Procurement 2 Actions Construction & Commissioning 3 Actions Initial Operations & Maintenance 1 Actions Workforce Development 4 Actions 44


EPRIs Strengths Plant Operation & Maintenance Component Manufacturing
© 2023 Electric Power Research Institute, Inc. All rights reserved.
EPRIs Strengths
* Technical Process Guidance
* Technical Process Guidance
* Technical Methods Development
* Technical Methods Development
* Efficient Tools and Software
* Efficient Tools and Software
* Technology Transfer and Member Support Standards Development Regulatory Guidance & Interface 45
* Technology Transfer and Member Support Standards Development Regulatory Guidance & Interface Plant Operation & Maintenance Component Manufacturing 45
                            © 2023 Electric Power Research Institute, Inc. All rights reserved.


Example: Fuel Qualification from NUREG-2246 46                      © 2023 Electric Power Research Institute, Inc. All rights reserved.
© 2023 Electric Power Research Institute, Inc. All rights reserved.
Example: Fuel Qualification from NUREG-2246 46


Example: Fuel Qualification for an Advanced Reactor Geometry for a Liquid Fueled Reactor isdifficult                                                 to define!
© 2023 Electric Power Research Institute, Inc. All rights reserved.
Geometry for a Liquid Fueled Reactor isdifficult to define!
The fuel does not have a defined geometry of its own What are we really ensuring?
The fuel does not have a defined geometry of its own What are we really ensuring?
If the intent is to show that we can cool the fuel, perhaps the underlying purpose is that we show that the fuel is in a coolable form (but not necessarily a fixed geometry)
If the intent is to show that we can cool the fuel, perhaps the underlying purpose is that we show that the fuel is in a coolable form (but not necessarily a fixed geometry)
Prescriptive interpretation of this requirement could break down, but RIPB can satisfy the intent!
Prescriptive interpretation of this requirement could break down, but RIPB can satisfy the intent!
47                                 © 2023 Electric Power Research Institute, Inc. All rights reserved.
Example: Fuel Qualification for an Advanced Reactor 47


Options for Fuel Qualification for a Liquid Fueled Reactor We could meet it prescriptively with sufficient data, or flexibly with a RIPB approach Prescriptive: global                                                                               RIPB: locally large margins based on                                                                                margins tied to specific highest uncertainty                                                                                  uncertainty
© 2023 Electric Power Research Institute, Inc. All rights reserved.
    *Prescriptive provides certainty; RIPB provides flexibility to meet the same intent 48                                 © 2023 Electric Power Research Institute, Inc. All rights reserved.
Options for Fuel Qualification for a Liquid Fueled Reactor We could meet it prescriptively with sufficient data, or flexibly with a RIPB approach Prescriptive: global margins based on highest uncertainty RIPB: locally large margins tied to specific uncertainty
*Prescriptive provides certainty; RIPB provides flexibility to meet the same intent 48


© 2023 Electric Power Research Institute, Inc. All rights reserved.
EPRI Evaluation of Risk Analysis Methods & Tools for ARs
EPRI Evaluation of Risk Analysis Methods & Tools for ARs
: 1. Determine the readiness of current PRA* methods and tools for use in Advanced Reactors and identify technical gaps that can be resolved through EPRI research
: 1. Determine the readiness of current PRA* methods and tools for use in Advanced Reactors and identify technical gaps that can be resolved through EPRI research
: 2. Develop an EPRI research roadmap to guide EPRI research in this area over the next several years to ensure readiness of PRA methods and tools for Advanced Reactor community implementation
: 2. Develop an EPRI research roadmap to guide EPRI research in this area over the next several years to ensure readiness of PRA methods and tools for Advanced Reactor community implementation
: 3. Perform research and development based on the first two objectives to resolve key technical gaps in PRA methods and tools for the Advanced Reactor community.
: 3. Perform research and development based on the first two objectives to resolve key technical gaps in PRA methods and tools for the Advanced Reactor community.
PRA terminology represents a broad range of Risk approaches 49                           © 2023 Electric Power Research Institute, Inc. All rights reserved.
PRA terminology represents a broad range of Risk approaches 49


EPRI Evaluation of Risk Analysis Methods & Tools for ARs Challenges                                                                                                   Solutions
© 2023 Electric Power Research Institute, Inc. All rights reserved.
* Risk analysis is an important input to final designs and initial
EPRI Evaluation of Risk Analysis Methods & Tools for ARs
* Common methods, tools, licensing                                                                                                     and data that support realistic risk analysis in
* Common methods, tools, and data that support realistic risk analysis in support of design and licensing activities
* New technologies used in advanced reactor designs present new                                                 support of design and challenges to the existing risk analysis toolset                                                             licensing activities
* Streamlined risk analysis approaches, results, and insights that are appropriate for advanced reactors Challenges
* Risk analysis for advanced reactors is expected to produce
* Risk analysis is an important input to final designs and initial licensing
* Streamlined risk analysis different results and insights than the current fleet and                                                    approaches, results, and regulators are familiar with                                                                                 insights that are appropriate for advanced
* New technologies used in advanced reactor designs present new challenges to the existing risk analysis toolset
* The current risk-informed decision-making approaches may not                                                 reactors be a realistic approach for advanced reactors 50                                           © 2023 Electric Power Research Institute, Inc. All rights reserved.
* Risk analysis for advanced reactors is expected to produce different results and insights than the current fleet and regulators are familiar with
* The current risk-informed decision-making approaches may not be a realistic approach for advanced reactors Solutions 50


© 2023 Electric Power Research Institute, Inc. All rights reserved.
EPRI Support for the AR Roadmap Action:
EPRI Support for the AR Roadmap Action:
Demonstrate Risk-Informed & Performance-Based Approach Risk Assessments with Digital I&C Systems                                                               Data Needs for Common Approaches                                 Advanced Reactor Evaluate Risk for Passive System                               Risk Analysis Methods & Tools Reliability 2023 Guidance for            Guidance for                                          Human Reliability      Methods for Selecting Risk         Very Low Freq.                                        Analysis Methods        Economic Risk Metrics                External Events                                        for ARs                Analysis EPRI Report - 3002026495 - Evaluation of Risk Analysis Methods & Tools for Advanced Reactors 51
Demonstrate Risk-Informed & Performance-Based Approach 2023 Human Reliability Analysis Methods for ARs Guidance for Very Low Freq.
                                          © 2023 Electric Power Research Institute, Inc. All rights reserved.
External Events Evaluate Risk Methods & Tools Risk Assessments with Digital I&C Systems Guidance for Selecting Risk Metrics Common Approaches for Passive System Reliability Methods for Economic Risk Analysis Data Needs for Advanced Reactor Risk Analysis EPRI Report - 3002026495 - Evaluation of Risk Analysis Methods & Tools for Advanced Reactors 51


© 2023 Electric Power Research Institute, Inc. All rights reserved.
Summary EPRI supports the development of RIPB standards and related activities RIPB approaches offer the needed focus and flexibility for Advanced Reactors to safely and efficiently design, license, and operation Uncertainties, both technical and regulatory, need to be acknowledged and addressed as part of any RIPB application 52
Summary EPRI supports the development of RIPB standards and related activities RIPB approaches offer the needed focus and flexibility for Advanced Reactors to safely and efficiently design, license, and operation Uncertainties, both technical and regulatory, need to be acknowledged and addressed as part of any RIPB application 52
                            © 2023 Electric Power Research Institute, Inc. All rights reserved.


TogetherShaping the Future of Energy 53
© 2023 Electric Power Research Institute, Inc. All rights reserved.
          © 2023 Electric Power Research Institute, Inc. All rights reserved.}}
TogetherShaping the Future of Energy 53}}

Latest revision as of 08:56, 25 November 2024

Session 3 - Development of Risk-Informed and Performance-Based (RIPB) Standards
ML23251A059
Person / Time
Issue date: 09/13/2023
From: Robert Roche-Rivera
NRC/RES/DE
To:
References
Download: ML23251A059 (1)


Text

Development of Risk-Informed and Performance-Based (RIPB) Standards Opening Remarks by Mike Franovich, Division Director, NRR/DRA Session Chair: Matthew Humberstone, Senior Reliability and Risk Analyst, RES/DRA/PRB Panelists/Speakers:

Prasad Kadambi (ANS)

David Grabaskas (ASME/ANS JCNRM)

Andrew Whittaker (ASCE)

Rebecca Steinman (IEEE)

Tom Basso (NEI)

Eric Thornsbury (EPRI)

Overview of ANS Activities to Support RIPB Standards N. Prasad Kadambi Chair, Risk-informed, Performance-Based Principles and Policy Committee (RP3C)

Presented to:

2023 NRC Standards Forum September 13, 2023 2

The ANS Standards Board Supports RIPB Standards To Modernize Nuclear VCS*

  • Creation and operation of RP3C
  • Current activities of RP3C
  • ANS Standards Board (SB) has directed ANS consensus committees (CCs) to incorporate RIPB principles where appropriate.
  • All eight CCs provide reports at every SB meeting.

- The SB recognizes the varied application and applicability of such principles to each portfolio of standards.

- Relative to advanced reactors, the Joint Committee on Risk Management (JCNRM) plays a central role in supporting modernization relative to RIPB standards development

  • Voluntary consensus standard as defined in OMB Circular A-119 [1]. NOTE: Numbers in brackets refer to corresponding reference numbers on slide 11.

3

ANS Has Been a Leader in Promoting RIPB VCS

  • Recent experience with conventional VCS shows that products that have detailed shall statements give rise to system requirements that are unnecessary or too conservative.

Frequently the motivation is driven by convenience for verification of compliance to requirements established by regulatory authorities.

RIPB VCS provide a more logical fit with NEIMA than conventional ones.

ANS is in a good position to advocate for RIPB VCS by articulating specific aspects of the value proposition to move away from prescription.

ANS is actively tackling the challenges of creating guidance for RIPB VCS.

4

Current Activities Toward RIPB VCS

  • ANS has recognized the need to create an infrastructure to support RIPB VCS.

- Part of this is to focus on structured performance objectives such that varied levels of detail can be accommodated rigorously.

  • The most visible of these activities are related to creating one or more internally consistent and coherent suites of standards that could foster further development of RIPB VCS within and outside of ANS.
  • An existing example is the suite of seismic standards ANS-2.26 [2]*, 2.27 [3],

2.29 [4], and ASCE 43-05 [5].

  • Currently, ANS efforts are focused on the series ANS-30.1 [6], 30.2 [7], and 30.3 [8].

ANS views these standards within a structure where success in issuing ANS-30.1 as a Guidance Standard, developing ANS-30.2, and obtaining regulatory endorsement of ANS-30.3 would be major accomplishments toward RIPB VCS.

  • Titles of standards are provided on slide 11.

5

What ANS-2.26 Does ANS-2.26:

Assign a Seismic Design Category (SDC):

Given the potential consequences of failure, assign a performance criterion:

specifically, a failure probability criterion.

The other standards then tell you how to go about engineering satisfaction of this criterion.

Figure from Appendix A:

6

ANS-30.1*

Risk and Performance Objectives (Linn)

ANS-20.2 Liquid Molten Salt Reactor (Holcomb)

ANS-53.1 Modular Helium Cooled Reactor (August)

ANS-54.1 Liquid Sodium Cooled Reactor (Flanagan)

ANS-30.3 Advanced Light-Water Reactor (Welter)

ANS-30.2 Categorization of Structures, Systems and Components (Diaconeasa)

ANS and other SDO standards as needed:

- Cross cutting topics

- Reactor technology specific issues Advanced Reactor Large Light Water Rx ANS Standards Committee Hierarchy For Advanced Reactors

  • ANS-30.1 is now being prepared as an ANS guidance standard, not as an ANSI consensus standard 7

NRC activities support RIPB, but more can be done.

  • Commission approval of SECY-18-0096 [9] on Functional Containment has major significance for RIPB standards as an example of performance-based principles.

- This clears the way for standards development organizations (SDOs) to consider all general design criteria from a performance-based perspective.

  • Similarly, issuance of RG 1.233 [10] has significance because it is meant to be technology-inclusive for addressing certain major safety issues.

- Logically, it means that light water reactors should also be able to use its provisions as one acceptable way to implement relevant regulations.

  • NRC should recognize that industry and SDOs alike look for regulatory cues that may encourage or discourage RIPB VCS.
  • NRC can do more to clarify how the provisions of NEIMA relative to a technology-inclusive regulatory framework will use appropriate VCS for conforming with OMB Circular A-119 [1].

- Federal policy clearly favors performance-based requirements instead of prescriptive ones.

8

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION 9

The ANS Standards Committee Standards Board (Top-level committee)

Large Light Water Reactors Consensus Committee (LLWRCC)

Research and Advanced Reactors Consensus Committee (RARCC)

Safety &

Radiological Analyses Consensus Committee (SRACC)

Nonreactor Nuclear Facilities Consensus Committee (NRNFCC)

Joint Committee on Nuclear Risk Management (JCNRM*)

Consensus Committee Nuclear Criticality Safety Consensus Committee (NCSCC)

Environmental and Siting Consensus Committee (ESCC)

Fuel, Waste, and Decommissioning Consensus Committee (FWDCC)

Subcommittees Working Groups Task Groups Risk-informed, Performance-based Principles and Policy Committee (RP3C)

  • The JCNRM is a joint ANS and ASME committee.

10

Risk-informed, Performance-based Principles and Policy Committee (RP3C)

The ANS Standards Board established the RP3C to support modernizing of ANS standards. Activities for training and knowledge sharing of RIPB principles and practices are part of the scope. The RP3C is responsible for the identification and oversight of the development and implementation of RIPB approaches in ANS standards. The RP3C Community of Practice (CoP) is one of the more successful ongoing training activities. The CoP is held on the last Friday of a month and is open to all professionals interested in RIPB principles and practices. Nearly 40 CoP recordings since February 2020 are available at https://www.ans.org/standards/rp3c/cop/. Contact standards@ans.org for questions or to get on the list to receive announcements of upcoming presentations.

11

[1]

OMB Circular A-119, Federal Participation in the Development and Use of Voluntary Consensus Standards and in Conformity Assessment Activities

[2]

ANSI/ANS-2.26-2004 (R2021), Components for Seismic Design Categorization of Nuclear Facility Structures, Systems, and Components for Seismic Design

[3]

ANSI/ANS-2.27-2020, Criteria for Investigations of Nuclear Facility Sites for Seismic Hazard Assessments

[4]

ANSI/ANS-2.29-2020, Probabilistic Seismic Hazard Analysis

[5]

ASCE/SEI 43-05, Seismic Design Criteria for Structures, Systems, and Components in Nuclear Facilities

[6]

ANS-GS-30.1-202X, Integrating Risk and Performance Objectives into New Reactor Nuclear Safety Designs

[7]

ANS-30.2-202X, Classification and Categorization of Structures, Systems, and Components for New Nuclear Power Plants

[8]

ANSI/ANS-30.3-2022, Light Water Reactor Risk-Informed, Performance-Based Design

[9]

SECY-18-0096, Functional Containment Performance Criteria For Non-Light-Water-Reactors

[10]

RG 1.233, Guidance for a Technology-Inclusive, Risk-Informed, and Performance-Based Methodology to Inform the Licensing Basis and Content of Applications for Licenses, Certifications, and Approvals for Non-Light Water Reactors Titles of Cited Documents and Standards 12

ASME/ANS NON-LWR PRA STANDARD IMPLEMENTATION EXPERIENCE Dave Grabaskas Manager, Licensing and Risk Assessments Group, Argonne National Laboratory Chair, ASME/ANS Non-LWR PRA standard working group Former Chair (current Vice Chair), NLWR PRA standard working group 13

JCNRM Background

  • Joint Committee on Nuclear Risk Management (JCNRM) oThe JCNRM is the PRA Standards development and maintenance consensus committee - formed by combining:

§ ANS RISC committee - originally developing the hazard PRA standards (e.g., Seismic, Fire, Flooding, etc.)

§ ASME CRNM committee - developed the internal events requirements.

oCommittees both started in the late 1990s, and officially merged around 2009, and issued the combined standard for LWRs covering L1 PRA, endorsed in RG 1.200.

oOversees two issued PRA standards (LWR - L1 and Non-LWR) and five under development.

14

Standard Background

  • Non-LWR PRA Standard Development oWorking grouped formed in 2006 oTrial use standard issued in 2013 oNew version formally approved by ASME, ANS, and ANSI in 2021

§ ASME/ANS/ANSI RA-S-1.4-2021 oEndorsed by the NRC in trial use RG 1.247 in 2022 oAn integrated standard:

§ Covers from initiating events to offsite consequence

§ Can include any radionuclide source at the plant

§ From conceptual design to operation 15

Implementation Experience

  • NRC Endorsement Process oNRC staff involved throughout the standard development process, which greatly expedited NRC endorsement oSome disagreement regarding certain NRC positions; many resolved through collaboration, others further explored as part of RG trial use period
  • User Feedback oMultiple non-LWR vendors are currently utilizing the standard as part of risk-informed performance-based design and licensing approaches, such as the Licensing Modernization Project (LMP) oContinual feedback from vendors regarding implementation experience 16

Implementation Experience

  • Standard and Applications oAs further experience is gained using the standard for risk-informed applications, potential discrepancies between standard requirements and application requirements are being identified
  • Seismic Requirements oGaining further insight regarding the practicality and implementation details of risk-informed seismic design
  • Innovative Uses oVendors utilizing deterministic or partially risk-informed approaches have been able to leverage certain elements of the standard (initiating events, mechanistic source term, radiological consequence, etc.)

17

Treatment of extremes in RIPB design Andrew Whittaker, Ph.D., S.E.

SUNY Distinguished Professor, University at Buffalo Chair, ASCE Nuclear Standards Committee Board of Directors, TerraPraxis 18

Standardization of design and licensing Licensed design spaces Pre-binned seismic hazard (6 zones, 2 soils)

Licensed isolation systems

1) Site selected. 2) Pick a licensed heat source (MWe). 3) Pick a licensed isolation solution.
4) Price time and construction. 5) Evaluate alternatives and iterate on 2, 3, and 4.

19

3 Lucid Catalyst TerraPower and GEH Right sizing the treatment of extremes for next generation nuclear BWXT 20

Extremes we must rethink in support of RIPB design

  • Load effects Wind-borne missile impact Normal impact of high-velocity missiles Schedule 40 steel pipe Simple but why normal impact?

Any evidence in non-nuclear sectors of such damage?

Aircraft impact Extreme ground shaking

  • Acceptable risk Stephenson, Terranova et al.

21

Extremes we must rethink in support of RIPB design

  • Load effects: aircraft impact Aircraft cockpits secured for 20 years Hijacking of aircraft in US since 2001 = 0 Strike a RC box and not a political target? No.

Could you hit the RC box if you wanted to? No. See below.

MAF of aircraft impact on a RC box in the US = 0 Guaranteed fatalities from an aircraft strike? Yes Missing target = 250+ dead on B787, all on the plane Boeing 22

Extremes we must rethink in support of RIPB design

  • Load effects: incredible ground shaking Consider Seismic Design Category 4, Clinch River 100% DRS (PHA=0.53g, RP=5,300 years), 200% DRS (1.06g, 25,000), 400% DRS (2.12g, 150,000), 600% DRS (3.18g, 490,000), 800% DRS (4.24g, 1,250,000) 0 1

2 3

4 Period (sec) 0 0.5 1

1.5 Sa (g)

Horizontal Vertical 2008 Mt. Carmel, IL, 0.2 g 2011 Greenbrier, AR, 0.4 g 2011 Mineral, VA, 0.2 g 1982 Miramichi, 0.4 g 0.0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0

2000 4000 6000 8000 10000 12000 14000 PGA, H (g)

Record sequence number (RSN) 0.0 0.5 1.0 1.5 2.0 2.5 3.0 3.5 4.0 4.5 0

2000 4000 6000 8000 10000 12000 14000 PGA, H (g)

Record sequence number (RSN)

DRS 2 DRS 4 DRS 6 DRS 8 DRS 23

7 Outcomes of extreme: nuclear-related fatalities = 0 Fukushima Daiichi, 2011 TMI, 1979 24

Extremes we must rethink in support of RIPB design

  • Societal tolerable risk MAF of death in a car accident 1/10000 (1E-4)

MAF of building collapse 1/5000 (2E-4)

MAF of death due to dam failure 1/10000 (1E-4), existing dam 1/100000 (1E-5), new, major dam

  • Need to right size the F-C chart 25

awhittak@buffalo.edu 26

Treatment of risk in other sectors: dams Existing dams New dams Munger et al. (2009), USACE 27

Approach for Risk-Informing IEEE Standards Rebecca Steinman, PhD, PE Chair: SC-3, WG 3.4 and WG 2.10 09-13-2023 28

5 Technical Subcommittees Qualification (SC-2)

Operations, Maintenance, Aging, Testing & Reliability (SC-3)

Auxiliary Power (SC-4)

Human Factors, Control Facilities and Human Reliability (SC-5)

Safety Related Systems (SC-6)

Nuclear Power Engineering Committee (NPEC)

SC-2, 18, 35%

SC-3, 8, 16%

SC-4, 11, 21%

SC-5, 7, 14%

SC-6, 7, 14%

51 IEEE 336 IEEE 692 IEEE 338 IEEE 933 IEEE 352 IEEE 1205 IEEE 577 IEEE 1819 29

NPEC Standards Approach

  • Majority of standards focused on design &

qualification of electrical and electronic equipment

  • Class 1E or not, as determined by IEEE 308, 603, and 497
  • Class 1E: Safety classification of the electrical equipment and systems that are essential to emergency reactor shutdown, containment isolation, reactor core cooling, and containment and reactor heat removal, or are otherwise essential in preventing significant release of radioactive material to the environment.

30

Risk-Informed Categorization & Treatment of Electrical Equipment

  • alternate treatments: Those licensee-defined requirements applied to electrical and electronic systems and components (EESCs) that provide reasonable confidence that 1)

RISC-3 EESCs are capable of performing their Class 1E functions under design basis conditions; and 2) RISC-2 EESCs perform their functions consistent with the key assumptions in the categorization process that relate to their assumed performance, as applicable.

  • reasonable assurance: A justifiable level of confidence used to satisfy regulatory requirements, based upon objective and/or measurable evidence.
  • reasonable confidence: A level of confidence based on facts, actions, knowledge, experience, and/or observations, which is deemed to be adequate. Reasonable confidence is a lower level of confidence than reasonable assurance.

IEEE 1819 31

Usage and Status of IEEE Standards

  • 10 year revision policy of IEEE
  • Desire for global harmonization of standards
  • Operating plants stick to their original licensing basis (mostly the 70s and 80s versions)
  • Near-term attempts to apply the updated standards often ended up reverting to prior versions because licensing the old standards was "easier"
  • So even when we try to modernize a standard to the current state of knowledge we struggle with getting new reactor vendors or other users to commit to their use The decision to develop a single standard to "bridge the gap" as opposed to significant revision of 50 standards remains the right approach for IEEE. 32

©2023 Nuclear Energy Institute NRC Standards Forum 2023 Thomas Basso Sr. Director Eng & Risk September 13, 2023 NEI Codes and Standards Task Force 33

©2023 Nuclear Energy Institute Risk informed approaches have provided a better safety focus, improved safety and enabled efficiencies As we look to the future fleet, there are opportunities for risk-informing the regulatory fabric that come with both promise and attention Navigating this change will require embracing uncertainties and discipline in responding A Risk-Informed Journey 34

©2023 Nuclear Energy Institute The use of PRA technology should be increased in all regulatory matters to the extent supported by the state-of-the-art in PRA methods and data and in a manner that complements the NRCs deterministic approach and supports the NRCs traditional defense-in-depth philosophy.

1995 PRA Policy Statement 35

©2023 Nuclear Energy Institute Risk-informed Regulatory Decision-making PRA Realism Conservative Safety Decisions Uncertainties Improving the State of the Knowledge 36

©2023 Nuclear Energy Institute ASME Section XI Code Activities

Code Case N-752 Risk-informed Repair/Replacement NRC Endorsement and Approval of 50.55a(z) Submittals

IWA-4000 Repair/Replacement Optimization

Alternative VT-2 Qualification Establish appropriate training hours requirements

IWE General Visual Examinations (Category E-A, Item E1.11) Insulation Removal - Industry Survey

Application of EPRI Tech Bases using PFM for Relief to Extend SG/PRZ Nozzle Weld Inspections 37

©2023 Nuclear Energy Institute ASME OM Code Activities

Valve Exercising and Testing Requirements Valve Manual Exercising Frequency Extension Revise Testing of Passive Valve Quarterly Valve Stroking Extension

Risk-informed Applications

Replacement of Operability Term in OM

(OM-2) Code on Component Testing Requirements 38

©2023 Nuclear Energy Institute TG Alternative Treatment Requirements

  • Code Case on Alternate Requirements for NDE and Testing of Items Commensurate with their Contribution to Safety and Risk ASME III CC N-907 and Code Change on Preservice Inspection Requirements Regulatory Engagement on ASME Section III Priorities ASME Section III CSTF Activities 39

©2023 Nuclear Energy Institute NEI CSTF Regulatory Activities

10 CFR 50.55a Rulemaking Review (NRC-2018-0289)

Reg Guides 1.147, 1.84, 1.192, and 1.193 Comments (NRC-2018-0291)

Extension of 10-year ISI/IST Program Updates

Extension of ISI Intervals from 10 to 12 Years

Response to NRC RIS 2022-02 on Operational Leakage

NEI 18-03 Operability Guidance 40

© 2023 Electric Power Research Institute, Inc. All rights reserved.

w w w. e p r i. c o m Eric Thornsbury Principal Technical Leader September 13, 2023 EPRI Activities Supporting RIPB Standards 2023 NRC Standards Forum 41

© 2023 Electric Power Research Institute, Inc. All rights reserved.

Introduction EPRI participates in many activities related to the development of standards across the nuclear industry Interest in Risk-Informed, Performance-Based applications (including standards) has been increasing, and is getting additional attention due to activities related to our Advanced Nuclear Technology program Key Question for Advanced Reactors:

- How to meet current regulations, standards, and other expectations that were developed from a light water reactor perspective?

42

© 2023 Electric Power Research Institute, Inc. All rights reserved.

Examples of EPRI Activities for the Current Fleet RPV Threads in Flange (EPRI Report #3002010345)

N715 for Streamlined RI-ISIN (EPRI Report

  1. 3002003026 on BWR and PWR Lessons Learned)

ASME Section XI - Appendix R, Supplement 2 was included in the last rulemaking on 50.55a N711 for Inservice Inspection (EPRI Report

  1. 3002010353 )

Risk-informed Repair / Replacement (EPRI Report

  1. 3002013126) 10CFR50.69 (EPRI Reports #3002012984, 3002012988, 3002012990, 3002022453, 3002015999, )

43

© 2023 Electric Power Research Institute, Inc. All rights reserved.

Strategic Elements of the EPRI/NEI AR Roadmap Regulatory Efficiency Licensing 7 Actions Environmental 7 Actions Oversight 2 Actions Technology Readiness Fuel Cycle 3 Actions Plant/SSC Design 3 Actions Supply Chain 7 Actions Nuclear Beyond Electricity 3 Actions Codes & Standards 2 Actions Project Execution Project Management 4 Actions Engineering & Procurement 2 Actions Construction & Commissioning 3 Actions Initial Operations & Maintenance 1 Actions Workforce Development 4 Actions 44

© 2023 Electric Power Research Institute, Inc. All rights reserved.

EPRIs Strengths

  • Technical Process Guidance
  • Technical Methods Development
  • Efficient Tools and Software
  • Technology Transfer and Member Support Standards Development Regulatory Guidance & Interface Plant Operation & Maintenance Component Manufacturing 45

© 2023 Electric Power Research Institute, Inc. All rights reserved.

Example: Fuel Qualification from NUREG-2246 46

© 2023 Electric Power Research Institute, Inc. All rights reserved.

Geometry for a Liquid Fueled Reactor isdifficult to define!

The fuel does not have a defined geometry of its own What are we really ensuring?

If the intent is to show that we can cool the fuel, perhaps the underlying purpose is that we show that the fuel is in a coolable form (but not necessarily a fixed geometry)

Prescriptive interpretation of this requirement could break down, but RIPB can satisfy the intent!

Example: Fuel Qualification for an Advanced Reactor 47

© 2023 Electric Power Research Institute, Inc. All rights reserved.

Options for Fuel Qualification for a Liquid Fueled Reactor We could meet it prescriptively with sufficient data, or flexibly with a RIPB approach Prescriptive: global margins based on highest uncertainty RIPB: locally large margins tied to specific uncertainty

  • Prescriptive provides certainty; RIPB provides flexibility to meet the same intent 48

© 2023 Electric Power Research Institute, Inc. All rights reserved.

EPRI Evaluation of Risk Analysis Methods & Tools for ARs

1. Determine the readiness of current PRA* methods and tools for use in Advanced Reactors and identify technical gaps that can be resolved through EPRI research
2. Develop an EPRI research roadmap to guide EPRI research in this area over the next several years to ensure readiness of PRA methods and tools for Advanced Reactor community implementation
3. Perform research and development based on the first two objectives to resolve key technical gaps in PRA methods and tools for the Advanced Reactor community.

PRA terminology represents a broad range of Risk approaches 49

© 2023 Electric Power Research Institute, Inc. All rights reserved.

EPRI Evaluation of Risk Analysis Methods & Tools for ARs

  • Common methods, tools, and data that support realistic risk analysis in support of design and licensing activities
  • Streamlined risk analysis approaches, results, and insights that are appropriate for advanced reactors Challenges
  • Risk analysis is an important input to final designs and initial licensing
  • New technologies used in advanced reactor designs present new challenges to the existing risk analysis toolset
  • Risk analysis for advanced reactors is expected to produce different results and insights than the current fleet and regulators are familiar with
  • The current risk-informed decision-making approaches may not be a realistic approach for advanced reactors Solutions 50

© 2023 Electric Power Research Institute, Inc. All rights reserved.

EPRI Support for the AR Roadmap Action:

Demonstrate Risk-Informed & Performance-Based Approach 2023 Human Reliability Analysis Methods for ARs Guidance for Very Low Freq.

External Events Evaluate Risk Methods & Tools Risk Assessments with Digital I&C Systems Guidance for Selecting Risk Metrics Common Approaches for Passive System Reliability Methods for Economic Risk Analysis Data Needs for Advanced Reactor Risk Analysis EPRI Report - 3002026495 - Evaluation of Risk Analysis Methods & Tools for Advanced Reactors 51

© 2023 Electric Power Research Institute, Inc. All rights reserved.

Summary EPRI supports the development of RIPB standards and related activities RIPB approaches offer the needed focus and flexibility for Advanced Reactors to safely and efficiently design, license, and operation Uncertainties, both technical and regulatory, need to be acknowledged and addressed as part of any RIPB application 52

© 2023 Electric Power Research Institute, Inc. All rights reserved.

TogetherShaping the Future of Energy 53