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See also: [[followed by::IR 05000369/1985006]]
See also: [[see also::IR 05000369/1985006]]


=Text=
=Text=
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                                        FEB 19 USS
FEB 19 USS
    Docket Nos. 50-369, 50-370
Docket Nos. 50-369, 50-370
    License Nos. NPF-9, NPF-17
License Nos. NPF-9, NPF-17
    Duke Power Company
Duke Power Company
    ATTN: Mr. H. B. Tucker, Vice President
ATTN: Mr. H. B. Tucker, Vice President
            Nuclear Production Department
Nuclear Production Department
    422 South Church Street
422 South Church Street
    Charlotte, NC 28242
Charlotte, NC 28242
    Gentlemen:
Gentlemen:
    SUBJECT:   NRC INSPECTION REPORT NOS. 50-369/85-06 AND 50-370/85-06
SUBJECT:
    Thank you for your response of July 26, 1985, to our Notice of Violation issued
NRC INSPECTION REPORT NOS. 50-369/85-06 AND 50-370/85-06
    on June 28, 1985, for violation 369/85-06-04 and 370/85-06-03.       Due to an
Thank you for your response of July 26, 1985, to our Notice of Violation issued
    administrative oversight, we did not respond earlier to your rec;uest regarding
on June 28, 1985, for
    the noted violations. We are hereby documenting our actions relative to your
violation 369/85-06-04 and 370/85-06-03.
    request.
Due to an
    In your response you deny the violation. You feel the violation raised two
administrative oversight, we did not respond earlier to your rec;uest regarding
    concerns, lack of notification to plant operations personnel of a potential
the noted violations.
    backleakage problem past auxiliary feedwater check valves and the failure to
We are hereby documenting our actions relative to your
    take prompt corrective action for the improper installation of the turbine
request.
    driven auxiliary feedwater pump discharge stop check valve, which you
In your response you deny the violation.
    adequately addressed.
You feel the violation raised two
    After careful consideration of the bases for your denial of the violation, we
concerns, lack of notification to plant operations personnel of a potential
    have concluded, for the reasons presented in the enclosure to the letter, that
backleakage problem past auxiliary feedwater check valves and the failure to
    the violation occurred as stated in the Notice of Violation. As discussed in
take prompt corrective action for the improper installation of the turbine
    your response, we understand the stop check valves have been replaced on both
driven auxiliary feedwater pump discharge stop check valve, which you
    Units 1 ai 2 and you have stated that you are in full compliance. We will
adequately addressed.
    examine the implementation of your corrective action during future inspections.
After careful consideration of the bases for your denial of the violation, we
                                                                                            1
have concluded, for the reasons presented in the enclosure to the letter, that
    We appreciate your cooperation in this matter.
the violation occurred as stated in the Notice of Violation.
                                              Sincerely,
As discussed in
                                              M
your response, we understand the stop check valves have been replaced on both
                                              J. Nelson Grace                               i
Units 1 ai 2 and you have stated that you are in full compliance.
                                              Regional Administratce                       !
We will
    Enclosure:
examine the implementation of your corrective action during future inspections.
    Evaluations and Conclusions                                                           l
1
    cc w/ encl:
We appreciate your cooperation in this matter.
    T. L. McConnell, Station Manager
Sincerely,
      Senior Resident inspector - Catawba
M
    bec w/ encl: (See page 2)
J. Nelson Grace
8802250384 880219 9                                                                  i
i
                                                                                          \
Regional Administratce
PDR      ADOCK 050
Enclosure:
G                                                                                   11 01
Evaluations and Conclusions
cc w/ encl:
T. L. McConnell, Station Manager
Senior Resident inspector - Catawba
bec w/ encl:
(See page 2)
8802250384 880219
i
PDR
ADOCK 050
9
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G
11 01


.     .
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                                                          #
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    Duke Power Company                 2
4
    bec w/ encl:
#
    NRC Resident Inspector
Duke Power Company
    DRS Technical Assistant
2
    D. Hood, NRR
bec w/ encl:
    Document Control Desk
NRC Resident Inspector
    State of South Carolina
DRS Technical Assistant
    RII                 RII                     / RII       n1I
D. Hood, NRR
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State of South Carolina
                                                                      1
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    _ -   .             . _ .     -       .   -.       -     - -
_
        .   ~
-
                                                                                              k
.
!                                                                                             ,
. _ .
                                                                                              9
-
                                                                                              I
.
                                                ENCLOSURE
-.
                                      EVALUATION AND CONCLUSIONS
-
                                                                                              i
- -
          On June 28, 1985, a Notice of Violation was issued for violation 369/85-06-04,       !
~
          370/85-06-03 identified during a routine NRC inspection. Duke Power Company         l
.
          responded to the Notice on July 26, 1985. Duke denied the violation on the           :
k
          basis that they promptly identified and corrected the problem associated with       ,
!
          the auxiliary feedwater pump suction piping overpressurization.                     l
,
                                                                                              l
9
                                                                                              $
I
          Restatement of Violation
ENCLOSURE
EVALUATION AND CONCLUSIONS
i
On June 28, 1985, a Notice of Violation was issued for violation 369/85-06-04,
!
370/85-06-03 identified during a routine NRC inspection.
Duke Power Company
l
responded to the Notice on July 26, 1985.
Duke denied the violation on the
:
basis that they promptly identified and corrected the problem associated with
,
the auxiliary feedwater pump suction piping overpressurization.
l
l
$
'
'
          10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI as implemented by Duke Power Compcny (DPC)
Restatement of Violation
          Topical Report, Quality Assurance Program Duke-1-A, Amendment 7. Section             :
10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI as implemented by Duke Power Compcny (DPC)
i         17.2.16 requires that conditions advorse to quality be promptly identified and       ,
Topical Report, Quality Assurance Program Duke-1-A, Amendment 7. Section
          corrected and that the identification of the significant condition, the cause        l
:
          of the condition and the corrective action shall be documented and reported to      i
i
          appropriate levels of management.
17.2.16 requires that conditions advorse to quality be promptly identified and
                                                                                              {
          Contrary to the above, conditions adverse to quality were not promptly              l
            identified and corrected, as detailed below:
          An occurrence of August ?5,1981, on Unit 1 as reported in Licensee Event            l
            Report 369/81-136, caused overpret.surization of the suction side of the turbine
                                                                                                ~
          driven auxiliary feedwater pump. Identified as contributing to this problem
;          was the stop check valve on the outlet of the pump being mounted in a
,
,
corrected and that the identification of the significant condition, the cause
l
of the condition and the corrective action shall be documented and reported to
i
appropriate levels of management.
{
Contrary to the above, conditions adverse to quality were not promptly
l
identified and corrected, as detailed below:
An occurrence of August ?5,1981, on Unit 1 as reported in Licensee Event
l
Report 369/81-136, caused overpret.surization of the suction side of the turbine
~
driven auxiliary feedwater pump.
Identified as contributing to this problem
;
was the stop check valve on the outlet of the pump being mounted in a
horizontal position which prevents the closure of this valve to be aided by
;
,'
gravity as designed.
Furthermore, on November 11, 1981, Westinghouse notified
:
DPC of a potential problem concerning the design of the audliary feedwater
[
,
pump discharge piping valve arrangement such that damage could occur which
f
would compromise the safety-related function of the auxiliary feedwater system.
!
i
Westinghouse in this letter, recomrrended system modifications and an operating
l
!
procedures amendment to detect and correct this problem,
j
No actions were taken on these items identified above until September 5,1984, when
!
'
NSM 1-1705 for Unit 1 and NSM 2-0550 for Unit 2 were generated to replace the
l
existing stop check valves with a different design valve, and NSM's 1-1706 and
!
;
2-0551 were generated to install a temperature monitoring system as reconnended
i
by Westinghouse.
As of March 12, 1985, NSM 1-1706 and NSM-20551 were in the
;
'
'
            horizontal position which prevents the closure of this valve to be aided by        ;
process of being installed and NSM 1-1705 and NSM 2-0550 were scheduled for
            gravity as designed. Furthermore, on November 11, 1981, Westinghouse notified      :
i
,           DPC of a potential problem concerning the design of the audliary feedwater        [
outages in 1986 due to material delivery,
            pump discharge piping valve arrangement such that damage could occur which        f
t
            would compromise the safety-related function of the auxiliary feedwater system.    !
!
i          Westinghouse in this letter, recomrrended system modifications and an operating    l
)
!
Sunwary of Licensee's Response
            procedures amendment to detect and correct this problem,                           j
!
The licensee contends that following the August 25, 1981 overpressurization
'
'
            No actions were taken on these items identified above until September 5,1984, when !
appropriate corrective action was taken.
            NSM 1-1705 for Unit 1 and NSM 2-0550 for Unit 2 were generated to replace the      l
The licensee feels two concerns were
            existing stop check valves with a different design valve, and NSM's 1-1706 and    !
.
  ;        2-0551 were generated to install a temperature monitoring system as reconnended
raised by the violation,
i          by Westinghouse. As of March 12, 1985, NSM 1-1706 and NSM-20551 were in the          ;
j
'
,
            process of being installed and NSM 1-1705 and NSM 2-0550 were scheduled for        i
1
            outages in 1986 due to material delivery,                                          t
1
                                                                                              !
:
            Sunwary of Licensee's Response                                                    !
,
)
1
'
!
            The licensee contends that following the August 25, 1981 overpressurization        I
.
            appropriate corrective action was taken. The licensee feels two concerns were
_
  .
            raised by the violation,                                                           j
                                                                                                ,
                                                                                                1
                                                                                                  1
:                                                                                               ,
1
                                                                                              !


  -       .   . - .   - _ _ _ _   -     -   . -   .     -   - - -   .   .-   -     .
-
!     .   "                                                                                .
.
i                                                                                           a
. - .
i       Enclosure                                 2
- _ _ _ _
-
-
. -
.
-
- - -
.
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-
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!
"
.
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i
a
i
Enclosure
2
:
:
                                                                                              !
!
The first concern was a lack of notification to plant operations personnel of a
,
*
potential problem with backleakage past auxiliary feedwater check valves.
The
,
4
backleakage pertains to a waterhammer resulting from check valve leakage.
The
;
licensee states that plant operations personnel were not notified in 1981 of
'
,
potential waterhanner problems because a Duke Power evaluation found this
'
particular situation did not exist at McGuire Nuclear Station.
j
*
i
The second concern involved a failure to take prompt corrective action for the
improper installation of the tur"ine driven auxiliary feedwater pump (TDAFWP)
'
discharge stop check valve.
On August 25, 1981, the suction piping of the
t
TDAFWP was overpressurized.
The licensee felt their solution to install a
relief valve in the suction piping and ensure that the mini-flow line to the
'
upper surge tank would always be open when the pump was not operating was
appropriate considering the knowledge of the potential problems at the time.
Since the 1981 solution, the licensee states recurrence of the TOAFWP suction
i
overpressurization and industry studies have made it more apparent that the
i
addition of relief valves may not provide a total solution and that more
insurance against loss of auxiliary feedwater was required.
1
As discussed in the licensee's response, as of July 26, 1985, further
corrective steps have been taken.
Temperature indication on discharge piping
was installed and the stop check valves were replaced on both McGuire units.
NRC Evaluation
;
The NRC has reviewed the licensee's response and does not agree that the
,
,
        The first concern was a lack of notification to plant operations personnel of a      ,
licensee's corrective action was prompt or adequate.
                                                                                              *
The licensee's investi-
4        potential problem with backleakage past auxiliary feedwater check valves. The
!
        backleakage pertains to a waterhammer resulting from check valve leakage.    The    ;
gation following the August 25, 1981 overpressurization event discovered the
        licensee states that plant operations personnel were not notified in 1981 of
i
                                                                                              '
stop check valve (ICA-22) in the discharge line of the Unit 1 TDAFWP was
                                                                                              ,
improperly installed.
                                                                                              '
The identification of the improperly installed valve
        potential waterhanner problems because a Duke Power evaluation found this
-
j      particular situation did not exist at McGuire Nuclear Station.
should have been sufficient to initiate replacement of the valves on both
                                                                                              *
units.
i        The second concern involved a failure to take prompt corrective action for the
Also following a January 1984 industry report and a review by the
        improper installation of the tur"ine driven auxiliary feedwater pump (TDAFWP)        '
licensee a DPC memorandum dated June 24, 1984, identified the discharge stop
        discharge stop check valve. On August 25, 1981, the suction piping of the            t
check valves as being improperly installed on both units and should be
        TDAFWP was overpressurized.    The licensee felt their solution to install a        '
corrected.
        relief valve in the suction piping and ensure that the mini-flow line to the
On August 26 and again on August 30, 1984, the TDAFWP suction
        upper surge tank would always be open when the pump was not operating was
piping was overpressurized due to backleakage.
        appropriate considering the knowledge of the potential problems at the time.
Contributing to this problem
        Since the 1981 solution, the licensee states recurrence of the TOAFWP suction        i
was the stop check valve on the outlet of the pump being improperly installed.
        overpressurization and industry studies have made it more apparent that the          i
It was not until September 5,1984, that Nuclear Station Modifications (NSM)
        addition of relief valves may not provide a total solution and that more
were initiated by the licensee to replace the valves.
        insurance against loss of auxiliary feedwater was required.
NRC Conclusion
                                                                                              1
From the evaluation given above the NRC concludes that conditions adverse to
        As discussed in the licensee's response, as of July 26, 1985, further                l
quality were not promptly identified and corrected and the violation occurred
        corrective steps have been taken. Temperature indication on discharge piping
as stated.
        was installed and the stop check valves were replaced on both McGuire units.
        NRC Evaluation                                                                      ;
        The NRC has reviewed the licensee's response and does not agree that the            ,
          licensee's corrective action was prompt or adequate. The licensee's investi-       !
        gation following the August 25, 1981 overpressurization event discovered the         i
          stop check valve (ICA-22) in the discharge line of the Unit 1 TDAFWP was             1
          improperly installed. The identification of the improperly installed valve           !
    -
          should have been sufficient to initiate replacement of the valves on both           !
        units. Also following a January 1984 industry report and a review by the
          licensee a DPC memorandum dated June 24, 1984, identified the discharge stop
        check valves as being improperly installed on both units and should be               ;
          corrected. On August 26 and again on August 30, 1984, the TDAFWP suction
          piping was overpressurized due to backleakage. Contributing to this problem
          was the stop check valve on the outlet of the pump being improperly installed.
          It was not until September 5,1984, that Nuclear Station Modifications (NSM)
          were initiated by the licensee to replace the valves.
          NRC Conclusion
          From the evaluation given above the NRC concludes that conditions adverse to
          quality were not promptly identified and corrected and the violation occurred
          as stated.
}}
}}

Latest revision as of 16:13, 24 May 2025

Ack Receipt of 850726 Response to 850628 Notice of Violation Re Insp Repts 50-369/85-06 & 50-370/85-06.Evaluations & Conclusions Re Notice of Violation Encl.Nrc Concludes That Violation Occurred as Originally Stated
ML20149M171
Person / Time
Site: McGuire, Mcguire  
Issue date: 02/19/1988
From: Grace J
NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II)
To: Tucker H
DUKE POWER CO.
References
NUDOCS 8802250384
Download: ML20149M171 (4)


See also: IR 05000369/1985006

Text

-

- )

-

.

m

.

FEB 19 USS

Docket Nos. 50-369, 50-370

License Nos. NPF-9, NPF-17

Duke Power Company

ATTN: Mr. H. B. Tucker, Vice President

Nuclear Production Department

422 South Church Street

Charlotte, NC 28242

Gentlemen:

SUBJECT:

NRC INSPECTION REPORT NOS. 50-369/85-06 AND 50-370/85-06

Thank you for your response of July 26, 1985, to our Notice of Violation issued

on June 28, 1985, for

violation 369/85-06-04 and 370/85-06-03.

Due to an

administrative oversight, we did not respond earlier to your rec;uest regarding

the noted violations.

We are hereby documenting our actions relative to your

request.

In your response you deny the violation.

You feel the violation raised two

concerns, lack of notification to plant operations personnel of a potential

backleakage problem past auxiliary feedwater check valves and the failure to

take prompt corrective action for the improper installation of the turbine

driven auxiliary feedwater pump discharge stop check valve, which you

adequately addressed.

After careful consideration of the bases for your denial of the violation, we

have concluded, for the reasons presented in the enclosure to the letter, that

the violation occurred as stated in the Notice of Violation.

As discussed in

your response, we understand the stop check valves have been replaced on both

Units 1 ai 2 and you have stated that you are in full compliance.

We will

examine the implementation of your corrective action during future inspections.

1

We appreciate your cooperation in this matter.

Sincerely,

M

J. Nelson Grace

i

Regional Administratce

Enclosure:

Evaluations and Conclusions

cc w/ encl:

T. L. McConnell, Station Manager

Senior Resident inspector - Catawba

bec w/ encl:

(See page 2)

8802250384 880219

i

PDR

ADOCK 050

9

\\

G

11 01

.

.

.

4

Duke Power Company

2

bec w/ encl:

NRC Resident Inspector

DRS Technical Assistant

D. Hood, NRR

Document Control Desk

State of South Carolina

RII

RII

/

RII

n1I

i

ebis

v(A&ptJVZEg

)_$

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MErnst

)

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02/t//88

2//7/88

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1

_

-

.

. _ .

-

.

-.

-

- -

~

.

k

!

,

9

I

ENCLOSURE

EVALUATION AND CONCLUSIONS

i

On June 28, 1985, a Notice of Violation was issued for violation 369/85-06-04,

!

370/85-06-03 identified during a routine NRC inspection.

Duke Power Company

l

responded to the Notice on July 26, 1985.

Duke denied the violation on the

basis that they promptly identified and corrected the problem associated with

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the auxiliary feedwater pump suction piping overpressurization.

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Restatement of Violation

10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI as implemented by Duke Power Compcny (DPC)

Topical Report, Quality Assurance Program Duke-1-A, Amendment 7. Section

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17.2.16 requires that conditions advorse to quality be promptly identified and

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corrected and that the identification of the significant condition, the cause

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of the condition and the corrective action shall be documented and reported to

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appropriate levels of management.

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Contrary to the above, conditions adverse to quality were not promptly

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identified and corrected, as detailed below:

An occurrence of August ?5,1981, on Unit 1 as reported in Licensee Event

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Report 369/81-136, caused overpret.surization of the suction side of the turbine

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driven auxiliary feedwater pump.

Identified as contributing to this problem

was the stop check valve on the outlet of the pump being mounted in a

horizontal position which prevents the closure of this valve to be aided by

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gravity as designed.

Furthermore, on November 11, 1981, Westinghouse notified

DPC of a potential problem concerning the design of the audliary feedwater

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pump discharge piping valve arrangement such that damage could occur which

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would compromise the safety-related function of the auxiliary feedwater system.

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Westinghouse in this letter, recomrrended system modifications and an operating

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procedures amendment to detect and correct this problem,

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No actions were taken on these items identified above until September 5,1984, when

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NSM 1-1705 for Unit 1 and NSM 2-0550 for Unit 2 were generated to replace the

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existing stop check valves with a different design valve, and NSM's 1-1706 and

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2-0551 were generated to install a temperature monitoring system as reconnended

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by Westinghouse.

As of March 12, 1985, NSM 1-1706 and NSM-20551 were in the

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process of being installed and NSM 1-1705 and NSM 2-0550 were scheduled for

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outages in 1986 due to material delivery,

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Sunwary of Licensee's Response

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The licensee contends that following the August 25, 1981 overpressurization

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appropriate corrective action was taken.

The licensee feels two concerns were

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raised by the violation,

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Enclosure

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The first concern was a lack of notification to plant operations personnel of a

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potential problem with backleakage past auxiliary feedwater check valves.

The

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backleakage pertains to a waterhammer resulting from check valve leakage.

The

licensee states that plant operations personnel were not notified in 1981 of

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potential waterhanner problems because a Duke Power evaluation found this

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particular situation did not exist at McGuire Nuclear Station.

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The second concern involved a failure to take prompt corrective action for the

improper installation of the tur"ine driven auxiliary feedwater pump (TDAFWP)

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discharge stop check valve.

On August 25, 1981, the suction piping of the

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TDAFWP was overpressurized.

The licensee felt their solution to install a

relief valve in the suction piping and ensure that the mini-flow line to the

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upper surge tank would always be open when the pump was not operating was

appropriate considering the knowledge of the potential problems at the time.

Since the 1981 solution, the licensee states recurrence of the TOAFWP suction

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overpressurization and industry studies have made it more apparent that the

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addition of relief valves may not provide a total solution and that more

insurance against loss of auxiliary feedwater was required.

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As discussed in the licensee's response, as of July 26, 1985, further

corrective steps have been taken.

Temperature indication on discharge piping

was installed and the stop check valves were replaced on both McGuire units.

NRC Evaluation

The NRC has reviewed the licensee's response and does not agree that the

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licensee's corrective action was prompt or adequate.

The licensee's investi-

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gation following the August 25, 1981 overpressurization event discovered the

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stop check valve (ICA-22) in the discharge line of the Unit 1 TDAFWP was

improperly installed.

The identification of the improperly installed valve

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should have been sufficient to initiate replacement of the valves on both

units.

Also following a January 1984 industry report and a review by the

licensee a DPC memorandum dated June 24, 1984, identified the discharge stop

check valves as being improperly installed on both units and should be

corrected.

On August 26 and again on August 30, 1984, the TDAFWP suction

piping was overpressurized due to backleakage.

Contributing to this problem

was the stop check valve on the outlet of the pump being improperly installed.

It was not until September 5,1984, that Nuclear Station Modifications (NSM)

were initiated by the licensee to replace the valves.

NRC Conclusion

From the evaluation given above the NRC concludes that conditions adverse to

quality were not promptly identified and corrected and the violation occurred

as stated.