05000336/FIN-2010003-05: Difference between revisions
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| CCA = P.3 | | CCA = P.3 | ||
| INPO aspect = PI.3 | | INPO aspect = PI.3 | ||
| description = A self-revealing finding of very low safety significance (Green) was identified for Dominion's failure to correct a long-standing stability problem with control of the Unit 3 feedwater regulating bypass valves (FRBVs). Operation at low power conditions has resulted in excessive steam generator (SG) level oscillations while in automatic control and unintended equipment response when attempting to control SG level in manual control. The inadequate design of the SG level control system for low power operations was identified by numerous condition reports dating back to 2002, but had not been corrected. Dominion entered this issue into their corrective action program (CR381435, CR384014). The finding is more than minor because it was similar to NRC Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC) 0612, Appendix E, Examples of Minor Issues, Example 4b, in that the failure to correct a condition adverse to quality resulted in a reactor trip. The inspectors determined that the finding was associated with the Equipment Performance attribute of the Initiating Events cornerstone, and affected the cornerstone objective of limiting the likelihood of those events that upset plant stability and challenge critical safety functions. Specifically, the long standing condition of the FRBVs' inability to control SG level at low power operations led to an automatic reactor trip. The inspectors performed an initial screening of the finding in accordance with IMC 0609.04, Phase 1 - Initial Screening and Characterization of Findings. The inspectors determined the finding was of very low safety significance (Green) because it did not affect both the likelihood of a reactor trip and the likelihood that mitigation equipment or functions would not be available. The inspectors determined that the finding had a cross-cutting aspect in the Problem Identification and Resolution cross-cutting area, Corrective Action Program component, because Dominion did not take appropriate corrective action to address the longstanding adverse conditions associated with control of the FRBVs [P.1 (d)]. | | description = A self-revealing finding of very low safety significance (Green) was identified for Dominion\'s failure to correct a long-standing stability problem with control of the Unit 3 feedwater regulating bypass valves (FRBVs). Operation at low power conditions has resulted in excessive steam generator (SG) level oscillations while in automatic control and unintended equipment response when attempting to control SG level in manual control. The inadequate design of the SG level control system for low power operations was identified by numerous condition reports dating back to 2002, but had not been corrected. Dominion entered this issue into their corrective action program (CR381435, CR384014). The finding is more than minor because it was similar to NRC Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC) 0612, Appendix E, Examples of Minor Issues, Example 4b, in that the failure to correct a condition adverse to quality resulted in a reactor trip. The inspectors determined that the finding was associated with the Equipment Performance attribute of the Initiating Events cornerstone, and affected the cornerstone objective of limiting the likelihood of those events that upset plant stability and challenge critical safety functions. Specifically, the long standing condition of the FRBVs\' inability to control SG level at low power operations led to an automatic reactor trip. The inspectors performed an initial screening of the finding in accordance with IMC 0609.04, Phase 1 - Initial Screening and Characterization of Findings. The inspectors determined the finding was of very low safety significance (Green) because it did not affect both the likelihood of a reactor trip and the likelihood that mitigation equipment or functions would not be available. The inspectors determined that the finding had a cross-cutting aspect in the Problem Identification and Resolution cross-cutting area, Corrective Action Program component, because Dominion did not take appropriate corrective action to address the longstanding adverse conditions associated with control of the FRBVs [P.1 (d)]. | ||
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Latest revision as of 20:40, 20 February 2018
| Site: | Millstone  |
|---|---|
| Report | IR 05000336/2010003 Section 1R20 |
| Date counted | Jun 30, 2010 (2010Q2) |
| Type: | Finding: Green |
| cornerstone | Initiating Events |
| Identified by: | Self-revealing |
| Inspection Procedure: | IP 71111.2 |
| Inspectors (proximate) | P Kaufman D Jackson B Haagensen C Bickett J Krafty S Shaffer D Dodson J Rady T Moslak J Richmond |
| CCA | P.3, Resolution |
| INPO aspect | PI.3 |
| ' | |