05000293/FIN-2011003-04: Difference between revisions
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| CCA = H.5 | | CCA = H.5 | ||
| INPO aspect = WP.1 | | INPO aspect = WP.1 | ||
| description = The inspectors identified a Green NCV of Technical Specification (TS) 3'7.8.2'f | | description = The inspectors identified a Green NCV of Technical Specification (TS) 3\'7.8.2\'f | ||
StanOOV Gas Treatment System and Control Room High Efficiency Air Filtration Syste | StanOOV Gas Treatment System and Control Room High Efficiency Air Filtration Syste | ||
(CRHEAFS)," for Entergy's failure to enter and perform the actions prescribed in TS afte | (CRHEAFS),\" for Entergy\'s failure to enter and perform the actions prescribed in TS afte | ||
the Control Room Envelope (CRE) was breached during work on a vital area door into th | the Control Room Envelope (CRE) was breached during work on a vital area door into th | ||
CRE. Entergy has since repaired the vital area door and restored the CRE. This finding was more than minor because it was associated with the Human Performanc | CRE. Entergy has since repaired the vital area door and restored the CRE. This finding was more than minor because it was associated with the Human Performanc | ||
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control room) and adversely affected the cornerstone objective to provide reasonabl | control room) and adversely affected the cornerstone objective to provide reasonabl | ||
assurance that physical design barriers protect the public from radionuclide release | assurance that physical design barriers protect the public from radionuclide release | ||
caused by accidents or events. Specifically, the inoperable CRE could affect the operator' | caused by accidents or events. Specifically, the inoperable CRE could affect the operator\' | ||
ability to occupy the control room under adverse radiological, chemical, or smoke condition | ability to occupy the control room under adverse radiological, chemical, or smoke condition | ||
while responding to an event. IMC 0609, "Significance Determination Process," Attachmen | while responding to an event. IMC 0609, \"Significance Determination Process,\" Attachmen | ||
0609.04, "Phase 1- Initial Screening and Characterization of Findings," was used t | 0609.04, \"Phase 1- Initial Screening and Characterization of Findings,\" was used t | ||
evaluate the impact of the finding on loss of operability or functionality of the CRE an | evaluate the impact of the finding on loss of operability or functionality of the CRE an | ||
CHREAFS, and it was determined that further evaluation was required since the finding ha | CHREAFS, and it was determined that further evaluation was required since the finding ha | ||
Latest revision as of 20:42, 20 February 2018
| Site: | Pilgrim |
|---|---|
| Report | IR 05000293/2011003 Section 1R15 |
| Date counted | Sep 30, 2011 (2011Q3) |
| Type: | NCV: Green |
| cornerstone | Barrier Integrity |
| Identified by: | NRC identified |
| Inspection Procedure: | IP 71111.15 |
| Inspectors (proximate) | T Burns R Rolph B Smith M Schneider K Dunham |
| CCA | H.5, Work Management |
| INPO aspect | WP.1 |
| ' | |