05000305/FIN-2011002-01: Difference between revisions
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| identified by = NRC | | identified by = NRC | ||
| Inspection procedure = IP 71111.08 | | Inspection procedure = IP 71111.08 | ||
| Inspector = A Shaikh, E Sanchez | | Inspector = A Shaikh, E Sanchez-Santiago, M Holmberg, R Langstaff, R Winter, J Jandovitz, J Cassidy, M Kunowski, R Krsek, K Barclay, R Jones | ||
| CCA = H.12 | | CCA = H.12 | ||
| INPO aspect = QA.4 | | INPO aspect = QA.4 | ||
| description = A finding of very low safety significance and associated non-cited violation (NCV) of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion IX, Control of Special Processes, was identified by the inspectors on March 3, 2011, for the licensees failure to establish a procedure that incorporated the American Society of Mechanical Engineers Code acceptance criteria for evaluation of flaws detected during ultrasonic examinations. Consequently, the licensee applied incorrect acceptance criteria to the flaws identified during ultrasonic examination of a weld on the chemical and volume control system seal water injection filter 1A housing. Licensee corrective actions included: evaluation of weld flaws to ensure they met applicable Code criteria and revision of a site procedure to incorporate appropriate Code acceptance criteria. The finding was determined to be more than minor because the finding, if left uncorrected, would become a more significant safety concern. Absent NRC identification, the failure to provide Code acceptance criteria could have allowed components with unacceptable cracks to be returned to service. Cracks in components returned to service would place safety-related piping systems at increased risk for through-wall leakage and/or failure. The licensee promptly corrected this issue before components with unacceptable flaws were returned to service. The inspectors answered No to the Significance Determination Process Phase I screening question, Assuming worst case degradation, would the finding result in exceeding the Technical Specification (TS) limit for any reactor coolant system leakage or could the finding have likely affected other mitigation systems resulting in a total loss of their safety function assuming the worst case degradation. Therefore, this finding screened as having very low safety significance (Green). This finding has a cross-cutting aspect in the area of human performance, work practices, because the licensee did not effectively implement human error prevention techniques. Specifically, the lack of procedure acceptance criteria was caused by inadequate peer checking during the licensees review and approval of the procedure for evaluation of non-destructive examination data (H.4(a)). | | description = A finding of very low safety significance and associated non-cited violation (NCV) of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion IX, Control of Special Processes, was identified by the inspectors on March 3, 2011, for the licensees failure to establish a procedure that incorporated the American Society of Mechanical Engineers Code acceptance criteria for evaluation of flaws detected during ultrasonic examinations. Consequently, the licensee applied incorrect acceptance criteria to the flaws identified during ultrasonic examination of a weld on the chemical and volume control system seal water injection filter 1A housing. Licensee corrective actions included: evaluation of weld flaws to ensure they met applicable Code criteria and revision of a site procedure to incorporate appropriate Code acceptance criteria. The finding was determined to be more than minor because the finding, if left uncorrected, would become a more significant safety concern. Absent NRC identification, the failure to provide Code acceptance criteria could have allowed components with unacceptable cracks to be returned to service. Cracks in components returned to service would place safety-related piping systems at increased risk for through-wall leakage and/or failure. The licensee promptly corrected this issue before components with unacceptable flaws were returned to service. The inspectors answered No to the Significance Determination Process Phase I screening question, Assuming worst case degradation, would the finding result in exceeding the Technical Specification (TS) limit for any reactor coolant system leakage or could the finding have likely affected other mitigation systems resulting in a total loss of their safety function assuming the worst case degradation. Therefore, this finding screened as having very low safety significance (Green). This finding has a cross-cutting aspect in the area of human performance, work practices, because the licensee did not effectively implement human error prevention techniques. Specifically, the lack of procedure acceptance criteria was caused by inadequate peer checking during the licensees review and approval of the procedure for evaluation of non-destructive examination data (H.4(a)). | ||
}} | }} | ||
Latest revision as of 19:42, 20 February 2018
| Site: | Kewaunee  |
|---|---|
| Report | IR 05000305/2011002 Section 1R08 |
| Date counted | Mar 31, 2011 (2011Q1) |
| Type: | NCV: Green |
| cornerstone | Initiating Events |
| Identified by: | NRC identified |
| Inspection Procedure: | IP 71111.08 |
| Inspectors (proximate) | A Shaikh E Sanchez-Santiago M Holmberg R Langstaff R Winter J Jandovitz J Cassidy M Kunowski R Krsek K Barclay R Jones |
| CCA | H.12, Avoid Complacency |
| INPO aspect | QA.4 |
| ' | |