Information Notice 1984-42, Equipment Availability for Conditions During Outages Not Covered by Technical Specifications: Difference between revisions
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| issue date = 06/05/1984 | | issue date = 06/05/1984 | ||
| title = Equipment Availability for Conditions During Outages Not Covered by Technical Specifications | | title = Equipment Availability for Conditions During Outages Not Covered by Technical Specifications | ||
| author name = Jordan E | | author name = Jordan E | ||
| author affiliation = NRC/IE | | author affiliation = NRC/IE | ||
| addressee name = | | addressee name = | ||
Line 14: | Line 14: | ||
| page count = 4 | | page count = 4 | ||
}} | }} | ||
{{#Wiki_filter:SSINS No. 6835 IN 84-42 UNITED STATES | {{#Wiki_filter:SSINS No. 6835 IN 84-42 UNITED STATES | ||
COMMISSION | NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION | ||
OFFICE OF INSPECTION | OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT | ||
WASHINGTON, DC 20555 June 5, 1984 IE INFORMATION NOTICE NO. 84-42: EQUIPMENT AVAILABILITY FOR CONDITIONS | |||
WASHINGTON, DC 20555 June 5, 1984 IE INFORMATION | |||
DURING OUTAGES NOT COVERED BY TECHNICAL | |||
SPECIFICATIONS | |||
==Addressees== | ==Addressees== | ||
: | : | ||
All holders of a nuclear power plant operating | All holders of a nuclear power plant operating license (OL) or construction | ||
license (OL) or construction | |||
permit (CP). | permit (CP). | ||
==Purpose== | ==Purpose== | ||
: This information | : | ||
This information notice is provided to alert licensees to the importance of | |||
controlling equipment availability for conditions. during outages not covered | |||
by Technical Specifications. It is expected that recipients will review the | |||
information for applicability to their facilities and consider actions, if | |||
appropriate, to preclude similar problems occurring at their facilities. | |||
However, suggestions contained in this information notice do not constitute | |||
NRC requirements and, therefore, no specific action or written response is | |||
required. | |||
==Description of Circumstances== | |||
: | |||
On January 8, 1984, the Palisades Nuclear Plant experienced a complete loss of | |||
of Circumstances: | |||
On January 8, 1984, the Palisades | |||
Nuclear Plant experienced | |||
a complete loss of | |||
offsite and onsite ac power. The event was precipitated by the need to isolate | |||
a faulty swit:hyard breaker. To isolate the breaker, it was necessary to | |||
interrupt the offsite power supply to the plant. At the time of the event, Palisades was in a refueling outage with all fuel removed from the.reactor and | |||
the | the *o. 2 diesel generator (DG) inoperable. The service water pump powered | ||
from the no. 1 (operable) DG also was inoperable as a result of maintenance. | |||
When the shift supervisor interrupted the offsite power supply to the plant, the operators did not realize cooling water to the operable DG was not | |||
available. The control room alarm indication, which should have warned the | |||
of | operators, was apparently masked by the large number of simultaneous alarms | ||
received when the offsite power was interrupted. Approximately 50 minutes | |||
later the DG overheated and was manually tripped. Once the DG was tripped, all station power was lost, with the exception of the station batteries and | |||
their associated dc and preferred ac buses. The loss of ac power caused a | |||
loss of plant communications, fire protection, security, and habitability | |||
were | systems as well as the fuel pool cooling system. (Compensatory measures were | ||
promptly taken-upon loss of the normal security systems.) The loss of. | |||
of | communications is considered the most serious consequence of this event. This | ||
loss of communications will be further addressed in a separate Information | |||
840805CO | |||
4C)012 ~hI~1 | |||
a | |||
IN 84-42 June 5, 1984 notice (IN). The restoration of ac power was delayed as a result of an | |||
Inoperable main transformer (out for maintenance) and a malfunction of one of | |||
the startup supply breakers. | |||
While operating procedures required two operable diesel generators before | |||
removing offsite power, operating procedures did not specifically delineate | |||
equipment availability requirements for this defueled condition. The shift | |||
supervisor violated the procedure and proceeded with the evolution after | |||
evaluating fuel cooling. The fuel pool was known to heat up very slowly and | |||
to require days without active cooling before the high temperature alarm would | |||
be reached. The shift supervisor, however, failed to fully recognize the | |||
importance of the other support systems (e.g., communication, fire protection) | |||
to the overall safety of the plant. The procedural requirements were reviewed | |||
as part of the evaluation of fuel cooling and it was determined their intent | |||
to | was to minimize risk to fuel integrity when the fuel was in the reactor vessel. | ||
and | Following the loss of onsite and offsite ac power, the Emergency Procedures | ||
of the | were not implemented in a timely manner because the importance of the various | ||
support systems had not been recognized. | |||
The licensee initiated many corrective actions as a result of this event (see | |||
Palisades Licensee Event Report (LER) 84-001). Some of the more important cor- rective actions by the licensee include: | |||
1. A review of the management control of equipment for plant conditions not | |||
covered by the requirements of the Technical Specifications. The review | |||
will specifically address electrical system requirements during cold | |||
shutdown to ensure sufficient equipment remains available to maintain the | |||
plant in a safe condition and to meet the commitments of the Site Emer- gency, Security, and Fire Protection Plans. | |||
2. *Establishing minimum equipment availability for specific conditions not | |||
covered by the Technical Specifications. | |||
3. Provide classroom training for all operators on the use and intent of the | |||
Site Emergency Plan. | |||
Plan into simulator | 4. Integrate the use of the Site Emergency Plan into simulator training. | ||
5. Discuss the need for strict adherence to operating procedures with all | |||
operations personnel. | |||
NRC has previously identified concerns with operability of required equipment | |||
in IE.IN 83-56, "Operability of Required Auxiliary Equipment," and IN 80-20, | |||
"Loss of Decay Heat Removal Capability at Davis-Besse Unit I While in a | |||
Refueling Mode." If you have any questions regarding this matter, please | |||
NRC | IN 84-42 June 5 , 1984 contact the Regional Administrator of the appropriate NRC Regional Office or | ||
this office. | |||
Edward 'Jordan, Director | |||
of | Divisi of Emergency Preparedness | ||
and gineering Response | |||
Office of Inspection and Enforcement | |||
===Technical Contact:=== | |||
===H. Bailey, IE=== | |||
(301) 492-7078 Attachment: | |||
===List of Recently Issued IE Information Notices=== | |||
I | |||
Attachment | |||
IN 84-42 June 5 , 1984 | IN 84-42 June 5, 1984 LIST OF RECENTLY ISSUED | ||
IE INFORMATION NOTICES | |||
Information Date of | |||
Notice No. Subject Issue Issued to | |||
84-41 IGSCC in BWR Plants 06/01/84 All BWR reactor | |||
facilities holding | |||
an OL or CP | |||
84-40 Emergency Worker Doses 05/30/84 All power reactor | |||
facilities holding | |||
an OL or CP; research. | |||
and test reactor and | |||
fuel cycle licensees | |||
83-66 Fatality at Argentine 05/25/84 All power reactor | |||
Critical Facility facilities holding | |||
an OL or CP; non- power reactor, critical facility, | |||
& fuel cycle | |||
licensees | |||
84-39 Inadvertent Isolation of 05/25/84 All power reactor | |||
Spray Systems facilities holding | |||
an OL or CP | |||
84-38 Problems With Design, 05/17/84 All power reactor | |||
Maintenance, and Operation facilities holding | |||
of Offsite Power Systems an OL or CP | |||
84-37 Use of Lifted Leads and 05/10/84 All power reactor | |||
Jumpers During Maintenance facilities holding | |||
or Surveillance Testing an OL or CP | |||
84-36 Loosening of Locking Nut on 05/01/84 All power reactor | |||
holding | Limitorque Operator facilities holding | ||
an OL or CP | |||
84-35 BWR Post Scram Drywell 04/23/84 All power reactor | |||
holding | Pressurization facilities holding | ||
an OL or CP | |||
84-34 Respirator Users Warning: 04/23/84 All power reactor | |||
holding | Defective Self-Contained facilities holding | ||
Breathing Apparatus Air .an OL'or CP; research | |||
License | -Cylinders and test; fuel cycle; | ||
and Priority 1 OL =Operating License | |||
Permit}} | CP = Construction Permit}} | ||
{{Information notice-Nav}} | {{Information notice-Nav}} |
Latest revision as of 11:26, 23 November 2019
ML070180078 | |
Person / Time | |
---|---|
Issue date: | 06/05/1984 |
From: | Jordan E NRC/IE |
To: | |
References | |
IN-84-042, NUDOCS 8406050012 | |
Download: ML070180078 (4) | |
SSINS No. 6835 IN 84-42 UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT
WASHINGTON, DC 20555 June 5, 1984 IE INFORMATION NOTICE NO. 84-42: EQUIPMENT AVAILABILITY FOR CONDITIONS
DURING OUTAGES NOT COVERED BY TECHNICAL
SPECIFICATIONS
Addressees
All holders of a nuclear power plant operating license (OL) or construction
permit (CP).
Purpose
This information notice is provided to alert licensees to the importance of
controlling equipment availability for conditions. during outages not covered
by Technical Specifications. It is expected that recipients will review the
information for applicability to their facilities and consider actions, if
appropriate, to preclude similar problems occurring at their facilities.
However, suggestions contained in this information notice do not constitute
NRC requirements and, therefore, no specific action or written response is
required.
Description of Circumstances
On January 8, 1984, the Palisades Nuclear Plant experienced a complete loss of
offsite and onsite ac power. The event was precipitated by the need to isolate
a faulty swit:hyard breaker. To isolate the breaker, it was necessary to
interrupt the offsite power supply to the plant. At the time of the event, Palisades was in a refueling outage with all fuel removed from the.reactor and
the *o. 2 diesel generator (DG) inoperable. The service water pump powered
from the no. 1 (operable) DG also was inoperable as a result of maintenance.
When the shift supervisor interrupted the offsite power supply to the plant, the operators did not realize cooling water to the operable DG was not
available. The control room alarm indication, which should have warned the
operators, was apparently masked by the large number of simultaneous alarms
received when the offsite power was interrupted. Approximately 50 minutes
later the DG overheated and was manually tripped. Once the DG was tripped, all station power was lost, with the exception of the station batteries and
their associated dc and preferred ac buses. The loss of ac power caused a
loss of plant communications, fire protection, security, and habitability
systems as well as the fuel pool cooling system. (Compensatory measures were
promptly taken-upon loss of the normal security systems.) The loss of.
communications is considered the most serious consequence of this event. This
loss of communications will be further addressed in a separate Information
840805CO
4C)012 ~hI~1
a
IN 84-42 June 5, 1984 notice (IN). The restoration of ac power was delayed as a result of an
Inoperable main transformer (out for maintenance) and a malfunction of one of
the startup supply breakers.
While operating procedures required two operable diesel generators before
removing offsite power, operating procedures did not specifically delineate
equipment availability requirements for this defueled condition. The shift
supervisor violated the procedure and proceeded with the evolution after
evaluating fuel cooling. The fuel pool was known to heat up very slowly and
to require days without active cooling before the high temperature alarm would
be reached. The shift supervisor, however, failed to fully recognize the
importance of the other support systems (e.g., communication, fire protection)
to the overall safety of the plant. The procedural requirements were reviewed
as part of the evaluation of fuel cooling and it was determined their intent
was to minimize risk to fuel integrity when the fuel was in the reactor vessel.
Following the loss of onsite and offsite ac power, the Emergency Procedures
were not implemented in a timely manner because the importance of the various
support systems had not been recognized.
The licensee initiated many corrective actions as a result of this event (see
Palisades Licensee Event Report (LER)84-001). Some of the more important cor- rective actions by the licensee include:
1. A review of the management control of equipment for plant conditions not
covered by the requirements of the Technical Specifications. The review
will specifically address electrical system requirements during cold
shutdown to ensure sufficient equipment remains available to maintain the
plant in a safe condition and to meet the commitments of the Site Emer- gency, Security, and Fire Protection Plans.
2. *Establishing minimum equipment availability for specific conditions not
covered by the Technical Specifications.
3. Provide classroom training for all operators on the use and intent of the
Site Emergency Plan.
4. Integrate the use of the Site Emergency Plan into simulator training.
5. Discuss the need for strict adherence to operating procedures with all
operations personnel.
NRC has previously identified concerns with operability of required equipment
in IE.IN 83-56, "Operability of Required Auxiliary Equipment," and IN 80-20,
"Loss of Decay Heat Removal Capability at Davis-Besse Unit I While in a
Refueling Mode." If you have any questions regarding this matter, please
IN 84-42 June 5 , 1984 contact the Regional Administrator of the appropriate NRC Regional Office or
this office.
Edward 'Jordan, Director
Divisi of Emergency Preparedness
and gineering Response
Office of Inspection and Enforcement
Technical Contact:
H. Bailey, IE
(301) 492-7078 Attachment:
List of Recently Issued IE Information Notices
I
Attachment
IN 84-42 June 5, 1984 LIST OF RECENTLY ISSUED
IE INFORMATION NOTICES
Information Date of
Notice No. Subject Issue Issued to
84-41 IGSCC in BWR Plants 06/01/84 All BWR reactor
facilities holding
84-40 Emergency Worker Doses 05/30/84 All power reactor
facilities holding
and test reactor and
fuel cycle licensees
83-66 Fatality at Argentine 05/25/84 All power reactor
Critical Facility facilities holding
an OL or CP; non- power reactor, critical facility,
& fuel cycle
licensees
84-39 Inadvertent Isolation of 05/25/84 All power reactor
Spray Systems facilities holding
84-38 Problems With Design, 05/17/84 All power reactor
Maintenance, and Operation facilities holding
of Offsite Power Systems an OL or CP
84-37 Use of Lifted Leads and 05/10/84 All power reactor
Jumpers During Maintenance facilities holding
or Surveillance Testing an OL or CP
84-36 Loosening of Locking Nut on 05/01/84 All power reactor
Limitorque Operator facilities holding
84-35 BWR Post Scram Drywell 04/23/84 All power reactor
Pressurization facilities holding
84-34 Respirator Users Warning: 04/23/84 All power reactor
Defective Self-Contained facilities holding
Breathing Apparatus Air .an OL'or CP; research
-Cylinders and test; fuel cycle;
and Priority 1 OL =Operating License
CP = Construction Permit