05000482/FIN-2012005-07: Difference between revisions
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| identified by = Licensee | | identified by = Licensee | ||
| Inspection procedure = | | Inspection procedure = | ||
| Inspector = C Long, C Osterholtz, C Peabody, J Laughlin, N O | | Inspector = C Long, C Osterholtz, C Peabody, J Laughlin, N O'Keefe, S Hedger, T Buchanan | ||
| CCA = N/A for ROP | | CCA = N/A for ROP | ||
| INPO aspect = | | INPO aspect = | ||
| description = Wolf Creek identified a violation of Technical Specification Limiting Condition for Operation 3.8.1 because diesel generator A was unable to perform its safety function for its full mission time under certain conditions. The retaining pin for the fuel rack control shaft between cylinders 6 and 7 had not been installed during maintenance on December 3, 2010, and the pin had backed about half way out on February 23, 2011. If the pin came out, the fuel injector for number 7 cylinder would no longer respond to governor controls and could fail to full-fuel position. The violation is more than minor because if left uncorrected it had the potential to lead to a more significant safety concern. Using Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, Appendix A, Exhibit 2, the inspectors performed a significance determination screening and determined that a more detailed risk evaluation was required because the finding potentially represented an actual loss of safety function for a single train for greater than the Technical Specification allowed outage time. The senior reactor analyst utilized the Wolf Creek plant-specific standardized plant analysis risk model, Revision 8.20, to assess the risk of this performance deficiency. Based on testing and analysis performed by the licensee, the analyst agreed that emergency diesel generator A would likely start and load given the conditions identified on February 23, 2011. Therefore, the primary risk would be from the failure of the diesel upon a consequential loss of offsite power resulting from a different accident initiator. The analyst determined that the change in core damage frequency for consequential loss of offsite power events with an associated failure of emergency diesel generator A was 4.0 x 10-8 over a 1-year period. This resulted in a change in core damage frequency of 8.9 x 10-9 for an 81-day exposure, or very low safety significance (Green). Since the finding is of very low safety significance, was identified by Wolf Creek, and has been entered into the licensees corrective action program as Condition Report s 33909 and 50360, this violation is being treated as a non-cited violation consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the NRC Enforcement Policy. | | description = Wolf Creek identified a violation of Technical Specification Limiting Condition for Operation 3.8.1 because diesel generator A was unable to perform its safety function for its full mission time under certain conditions. The retaining pin for the fuel rack control shaft between cylinders 6 and 7 had not been installed during maintenance on December 3, 2010, and the pin had backed about half way out on February 23, 2011. If the pin came out, the fuel injector for number 7 cylinder would no longer respond to governor controls and could fail to full-fuel position. The violation is more than minor because if left uncorrected it had the potential to lead to a more significant safety concern. Using Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, Appendix A, Exhibit 2, the inspectors performed a significance determination screening and determined that a more detailed risk evaluation was required because the finding potentially represented an actual loss of safety function for a single train for greater than the Technical Specification allowed outage time. The senior reactor analyst utilized the Wolf Creek plant-specific standardized plant analysis risk model, Revision 8.20, to assess the risk of this performance deficiency. Based on testing and analysis performed by the licensee, the analyst agreed that emergency diesel generator A would likely start and load given the conditions identified on February 23, 2011. Therefore, the primary risk would be from the failure of the diesel upon a consequential loss of offsite power resulting from a different accident initiator. The analyst determined that the change in core damage frequency for consequential loss of offsite power events with an associated failure of emergency diesel generator A was 4.0 x 10-8 over a 1-year period. This resulted in a change in core damage frequency of 8.9 x 10-9 for an 81-day exposure, or very low safety significance (Green). Since the finding is of very low safety significance, was identified by Wolf Creek, and has been entered into the licensees corrective action program as Condition Report s 33909 and 50360, this violation is being treated as a non-cited violation consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the NRC Enforcement Policy. | ||
}} | }} | ||
Latest revision as of 11:46, 30 May 2018
| Site: | Wolf Creek  |
|---|---|
| Report | IR 05000482/2012005 Section 4OA7 |
| Date counted | Dec 31, 2012 (2012Q4) |
| Type: | NCV: Green |
| cornerstone | Mitigating Systems |
| Identified by: | Licensee-identified |
| Inspection Procedure: | |
| Inspectors (proximate) | C Long C Osterholtz C Peabody J Laughlin N O'Keefe S Hedger T Buchanan |
| INPO aspect | |
| ' | |