A licensee-identified violation was discovered on March 11, 2010 for Unit 2 of
TS 3.6.1.3 which states each
primary containment isolation valve (
PCIV), except reactor building-to-suppression chamber vacuum breakers, shall be
operable during Modes 1, 2 and 3, when associated instrumentation is required to be
operable per
LCO 3.3.6.1,
Primary Containment Isolation Instrumentation. Contrary to this requirement, on March 11, 2010, it was discovered that on March 10, 2010 a violation of
Tech Spec 3.6.1.3 occurred following a surveillance run of the
RCIC system when the
2E51-F028, a
PCIV, stuck closed. This should have been recognized by the Unit 2 operators at the time that the valve should have been declared
inoperable, and
TS 3.6.1.3 required action A.1 should have been entered to isolate that line within
4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br />. While an
operability determination was performed on March 10 that supported the operability of the
RCIC system, the
inoperable PCIV was not recognized until March 11. The significance of this finding was screened using the Phase 1 of the
SDP in accordance with NRC
IMC 0609 Attachment 4, Table 4a. The analysis determined the significance of the finding to be Green, because the finding did not represent an actual open pathway in the physical integrity of reactor containment. Upon discovery, the licensee entered the appropriate TS action statement to isolate the line containing the
2E51-F028 valve within
4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br />. Additionally, the licensee replaced valve
2E51-F028 on April 8, 2010. This issue was captured in the licensees corrective action program as CR 2009111523 and
LER 05000366/2010-001