The inspectors identified a noncited violation (
NCV) of
10 CFR 50.54(q) and
10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E.IV.F.2.g, for the licensees failure to correct an identified risk significant planning standard weakness between May 2, 2007 and October 28, 2007. Specifically, the licensee failed to implement adequate corrective actions for identified weaknesses in the ability to correctly make a Site Area Emergency declaration for a
steam generator tube rupture event. This issue was entered into the licensees correction action program as Palo Verde Action Request 3083911. The NRC determined that the inability to consistently implement an Emergency Action Level was a performance deficiency within the licensees control. This finding is more than minor because it was associated with the
Emergency Preparedness attribute of emergency response organization performance and affected the cornerstone objective to implement adequate measures to protect the health and safety of the public because the inability to properly recognize and classify an emergency condition affects the licensees ability to implement adequate protective measures. This finding was preliminarily determined to be of low to moderate safety significance. After consideration of information provided during and after a Regulatory Conference held on March 25, 2008, the NRC has concluded that the knowledge deficiency identified among senior operators would not likely result in an incorrect emergency classification during a
steam generator tube rupture event, and the NRC has concluded the significance of the inspection finding is appropriately characterized as Green (i.e., a finding of very low safety significance). This violation is being treated as an
NCV, consistent with Section VI of the
NRC Enforcement Policy. The cause of this finding has crosscutting aspects associated with the corrective action aspect of the problem identification and resolution area in that the licensee failed to thoroughly evaluate problems such that resolutions ensured correcting problems [P.1.(c)]. The cause of this finding was also related to the safety culture component of accountability in that the licensee failed to demonstrate a proper safety focus and reinforce safety principles [O.1.(c)] (Section 4OA5)
