The inspectors reviewed two examples of a self-revealing, noncited violation of
Technical Specification 6.8.1 because workers failed to follow procedural requirements when preparing to enter the radiological controlled area. The first example, on April 28, 2008, involved a contract employee who informed the radiation protection shift control technician he would be working on the
reactor coolant pump 1B platform where dose rates were below 350 millirems per hour. Subsequently, the contract employee entered another area, one which had not been surveyed and on which the worker had not been briefed, and received a dose rate alarm measuring 553 millirems per hour. The second example, on April 30, 2008, involved a rigger who was assigned to help rig and lift a
reactor coolant pump seal from the pump to the top of the D-ring. However, the rigger did not report to radiation protection personnel to receive a briefing on the dose rates in the area of
Reactor Coolant Pump 1A. Before being reassigned, the rigger was briefed for an area with dose rates less than 180 millirems per hour, but during his work on the
reactor coolant pump, the worker entered an area with dose rates as high as 628 millirems per hour and received a dose rate alarm. Radiation protection personnel counseled the workers and documented the occurrences in the corrective action program. The occurrence involved the program attributes of exposure control and affected the cornerstone objective, in that the failure of the workers to follow procedural guidance and inform radiation protection personnel of the workers intended activities work area resulted in the workers being unknowledgeable of the dose rates in all areas entered. The inspectors used the
Occupational Radiation Safety Significance Determination Process and determined the finding had very low safety significance because it was not: (1) an as low as reasonably achievable finding, (2) an
overexposure, (3) a
substantial potential for overexposure, or (4) an inability to assess dose. The finding had a crosscutting aspect in the area of human performance, work practices component, because the workers failed to use human error prevention techniques such as self and peer checking
H.4.a] (Section 2OS1.1)
