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| number = ML110610758
| number = ML110610758
| issue date = 01/26/2011
| issue date = 01/26/2011
| title = Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station Units 1, 2 & 3, Technical Requirements Manual, Revision 54
| title = Technical Requirements Manual, Revision 54
| author name = Stephenson C J
| author name = Stephenson C
| author affiliation = Arizona Public Service Co
| author affiliation = Arizona Public Service Co
| addressee name =  
| addressee name =  
Line 15: Line 15:


=Text=
=Text=
{{#Wiki_filter:PALO VERDE UNITS 1, 2, 3 Technical Requirements Manual Revision 54 January 26, 2011 (continued)
{{#Wiki_filter:}}
PALO VERDE UNITS 1, 2, 3 i Rev 33  4/20/05 TABLE OF CONTENTS T1.0 USE AND APPLICATION Definitions.................................................. T1.1.100-1 Logical Connectors........................................... T1.2.100-1 Completion Times............................................. T1.3.100-1 Frequency.................................................... T1.4.100-1 T2.0 SAFETY LIMITS................................................ T2.0.100-1 T3.0 TRM Limiting Condition for Operation (TLCO) APPLICABILITY.... T3.0.100-1 TRM Surveillance Requirement (TSR) Applicability............. T3.0.100-3 T3.1 REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS T3.1.100 Flow Paths - Shutdown ............................. T3.1.100-1 T3.1.101 Flow Paths - Operating ............................ T3.1.101-1 T3.1.102 Charging Pumps - Shutdown ......................... T3.1.102-1 T3.1.103 Charging Pumps - Operating ........................ T3.1.103-1 T3.1.104 Borated Sources - Shutdown ........................ T3.1.104-1 T3.1.105 Borated Sources - Operating ....................... T3.1.105-1 T3.1.200 Shutdown Margin - Reactor Trip Breakers Closed .... T3.1.200-1 T3.1.201 Shutdown Margin - Reactor Trip Breakers Open ...... T3.1.201-1 T3.1.202 Control Element Assembly - Alignment .............. T3.1.202-1 T3.1.203 Control Element Assembly - Drop Time .............. T3.1.203-1 T3.1.204 Shutdown Control Element Assembly Insertion Limits ............................................ T3.1.204-1 T3.1.205 Regulating Control Element Assembly Group Insertion Limits .................................. T3.1.205-1 T3.2 POWER DISTRIBUTION LIMITS T3.2.200 Azimuthal Power Tilt - T q ......................... T3.2.200-1 T3.3 INSTRUMENTATION T3.3.100 Supplementary Prot. System (SPS) Instrumentation .. T3.3.100-1 T3.3.101 Radiation Monitoring Instrumentation .............. T3.3.101-1 T3.3.102 Incore Detectors .................................. T3.3.102-1 T3.3.103 Seismic Monitoring ................................ T3.3.103-1 T3.3.104 Meteorological Instrumentation .................... T3.3.104-1 T3.3.105 Post Accident Monitoring Instrumentation .......... T3.3.105-1 T3.3.106 Loose-Part Detection Instrumentation .............. T3.3.106-1 T3.3.107 Explosive Gas Monitoring System ................... T3.3.107-1 T3.3.108 Fuel Bldg Ess. Vent. Actuation Signal (FBEVAS) .... T3.3.108-1 T3.3.200 RPS Instrumentation - Operating ................... T3.3.200-1 T3.3.201 ESFAS Logic and Manual Trip ....................... T3.3.201-1
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS  (continued) (continued) PALO VERDE UNITS 1, 2, 3 ii Rev 48  7/22/09 T3.4 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM (RCS) T3.4.100 Auxiliary Spray System ............................ T3.4.100-1 T3.4.101 RCS Chemistry ..................................... T3.4.101-1 T3.4.102 Pressurizer Heatup and Cooldown Limits ............ T3.4.102-1 T3.4.103 Structural Integrity .............................. T3.4.103-1 T3.4.104 RCS Vents (Reactor Head Vents) .................... T3.4.104-1 T3.4.200 RCS Pressure and Temperature (P/T) Limits ......... T3.4.200-1 T3.4.201 Pressurizer ....................................... T3.4.201-1 T3.4.202 Pressurizer Vents ................................. T3.4.202-1 T3.4.203 RCS Operational LEAKAGE ........................... T3.4.203-1 T3.4.204 RCS PIV Leakage ................................... T3.4.204-1 T3.5 EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS (ECCS) T3.5.200 Safety Injection Tanks ............................ T3.5.200-1 T3.5.201 Shutdown Cooling System ........................... T3.5.201-1 T3.5.202 ECCS - Operating .................................. T3.5.202-1 T3.5.203 ECCS - Shutdown ................................... T3.5.203-1 T3.6 CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS T3.6.100 Hydrogen Purge Cleanup System ..................... T3.6.100-1 T3.6.200 Pre-stressed Concrete Containment Tendon .......... T3.6.200-1 T3.6.201 Containment Spray Systems ......................... T3.6.201-1 T3.6.300 Hydrogen Recombiners .............................. T3.6.300-1 T3.7 PLANT SYSTEMS T3.7.100 Steam Generator Pressure and Temp. Limitations .... T3.7.100-1 T3.7.101 Snubbers .......................................... T3.7.101-1 T3.7.102 Sealed Source Contamination ....................... T3.7.102-1 T3.7.200 Atmospheric Dump Valves (ADVs) .................... T3.7.200-1 T3.7.201 AFW System ........................................ T3.7.201-1 T3.7.202 Essential Cooling Water (EW) System ............... T3.7.202-1 T3.7.203 Essential Spray Pond System (ESPS) ................ T3.7.203-1 T3.7.204 Essential Chilled Water (EC) System ............... T3.7.204-1 T3.7.205 Cont. Room Emergency Air Temp. Cont. Sys. (CREATCS)T3.7.205-1 T3.7.206 Fuel Storage Pool Water Level ..................... T3.7.206-1 T3.7.207 Secondary Specific Activity ....................... T3.7.207-1 T3.8 ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS T3.8.100 Cathodic Protection ............................... T3.8.100-1 T3.8.101 Cont. Penetration Cond. Overcurrent Prot. Devices . T3.8.101-1 T3.8.102 MOV Thermal Overload Prot. and Bypass Devices ..... T3.8.102-1 T3.8.200 AC Sources - Shutdown ............................. T3.8.200-1 TABLE OF CONTENTS  (continued) (continued) PALO VERDE UNITS 1, 2, 3 iii Rev 33  4/20/05 T3.9 REFUELING OPERATIONS T3.9.100 Decay Time ........................................ T3.9.100-1 T3.9.101 Communications .................................... T3.9.101-1 T3.9.102 Refueling Machine ................................. T3.9.102-1 T3.9.103 Crane Travel - Spent Fuel Pool Storage Building ... T3.9.103-1 T3.9.104 Fuel Building Essential Ventilation System (FBEVS) T3.9.104-1 T3.9.200 Boron Concentration ............................... T3.9.200-1 T3.9.201 Containment Penetrations .......................... T3.9.201-1 T3.10 RADIOACTIVE EFFLUENTS T3.10.200 Liquid Holdup Tanks ............................... T3.10.200-1 T3.10.201 Explosive Gas Mixture ............................. T3.10.201-1 T3.10.202 Gas Storage Tanks ................................. T3.10.202-1 T3.11 FIRE PROTECTION T3.11.100 Fire Detection Instrumentation (formerly TS 3.3.3.7) ............................. T3.11.100-1 T3.11.101 Fire Suppression Water System (formerly TS 3.7.11.1) ............................ T3.11.101-1 T3.11.102 Spray and/or Sprinkler Systems (formerly TS 3.7.11.2) ............................ T3.11.102-1 T3.11.103 CO2 Systems (formerly TS 3.7.11.3) ................ T3.11.103-1 T3.11.104 Fire Hose Stations (formerly TS 3.7.11.4) ......... T3.11.104-1 T3.11.105 Yard Fire Hydrants and associated emergency response vehicle (formerly TS 3.7.11.5) ........... T3.11.105-1 T3.11.106 Halon Systems (formerly TS 3.7.11.6) .............. T3.11.106-1 T3.11.107 Fire-Rated Assemblies (formerly TS 3.7.12) ........ T3.11.107-1 T4.0 DESIGN FEATURES.............................................. T4.0.100-1 T5.0 ADMINISTRATIVE CONTROLS T5.0.100 Responsibility .................................... T5.0.100-1 T5.0.200 Organization ...................................... T5.0.200-1 T5.0.300 Unit Staff Qualification .......................... T5.0.300-1 T5.0.400 Procedures ........................................ T5.0.400-1 T5.0.500 Programs and Manuals .............................. T5.0.500-1 T5.0.600 Reporting Requirements ............................ T5.0.600-1 T5.0.700 High Radiation Areas .............................. T5.0.700-1 T6.0 TRM SPECIFICATION BASES...................................... T6.0.100-1 TABLE OF CONTENTS  (continued)
PALO VERDE UNITS 1, 2, 3 iv Rev 52  7/16/10 T7.0 COMPONENT LISTS T7.0.100 Remote Shutdown Disconnect Switches ............... T7.0.100-1 T7.0.200 Remote Shutdown Control Circuits .................. T7.0.200-1 T7.0.300 Containment Isolation Valves ...................... T7.0.300-1 T7.0.400 MOV Thermal Overload Protection and Bypass Devices T7.0.400-1 T7.0.500 Containment Penetration Overcurrent Prot. Devices . T7.0.500-1 Appendix TA Reactor Coolant System Pressure and Temperature
 
Limits Report (PTLR)
TA-i PALO VERDE UNITS 1, 2, 3 1 Rev 54  1/26/11 Technical Requirements Manual LIST OF EFFECTIVE PAGES Page No. Revision No. Page No. Revision No.
TOC page i 33 TOC page ii 4 8 TOC page iii 33 TOC page iv 52 T1.1.100-1 0 T1.2.100-1 0 T1.3.100-1 0 T1.4.100-1 0 T2.0.100-1 0 T3.0.100-1 4 7 T3.0.100-2 40 T3.0.100-3 23 T3.0.100-4 47 T3.1.100-1 0 T3.1.100-2 0 T3.1.101-1 0 T3.1.101-2 54 T3.1.101-3 0 T3.1.102-1 0 T3.1.103-1 1 T3.1.104-1 0 T3.1.104-2 0 T3.1.105-1 46 T3.1.105-2 0 T3.1.105-3 50 T3.1.200-1 46 T3.1.200-2 24 T3.1.201-1 0 T3.1.202-1 53 T3.1.202-2 46 T3.1.203-1 29 T3.1.204-1 33 T3.1.205-1 33 T3.2.200-1 53 T3.3.100-1 46 T3.3.100-2 10 T3.3.101-1 40 T3.3.101-2 46 T3.3.101-3 18 T3.3.101-4 18 T3.3.101-5 52 T3.3.102-1 21 T3.3.102-2 40 T3.3.103-1 51 T3.3.103-2 5 4 T3.3.103-3 13 T3.3.103-4 13 T3.3.104-1 46 T3.3.104-2 0 T3.3.105-1 46 T3.3.105-2 4 8 T3.3.105-3 48 T3.3.106-1 46 T3.3.106-2 14 T3.3.107-1 0 T3.3.107-2 46 T3.3.108-1 0 T3.3.108-2 0 T3.3.200-1 4 6 T3.3.200-2 31 T3.3.201-1 0 T3.4.100-1 28 T3.4.101-1 0 T3.4.101-2 0 T3.4.101-3 0 T3.4.101-4 0 T3.4.102-1 0 T3.4.102-2 0 T3.4.103-1 53 T3.4.104-1 28 T3.4.104-2 0 T3.4.200-1 52 T3.4.201-1 46 T3.4.202-1 46 T3.4.203-1 46 T3.4.204-1 46 T3.5.200-1 46 T3.5.200-2 0 T3.5.200-3 0 T3.5.201-1 16 T3.5.201-2 47 T3.5.202-1 46 T3.5.202-2 39 T3.5.202-3 47 T3.5.202-4 0 T3.5.203-1 46 Technical Requirements Manual LIST OF EFFECTIVE PAGES Page No. Revision No. Page No. Revision No.
PALO VERDE UNITS 1, 2, 3 2 Rev 54  1/26/11 T3.5.203-2 35 T3.6.100-1 48 T3.6.100-2 0 T3.6.200-1 22 T3.6.200-2 22 T3.6.201-1 47 T3.6.300-1 48 T3.6.300-2 48 T3.7.100-1 27 T3.7.100-2 27 T3.7.101-1 4 6 T3.7.101-2 46 T3.7.102-1 0 T3.7.102-2 0 T3.7.102-3 0 T3.7.200-1 T3.7.200-2 42 53 T3.7.201-1 46 T3.7.202-1 46 T3.7.203-1 46 T3.7.204-1 46 T3.7.205-1 46 T3.7.205-2 46 T3.7.206-1 0 T3.7.207-1 46 T3.8.100-1 46 T3.8.100-2 0 T3.8.101-1 46 T3.8.101-2 40 T3.8.101-3 12 T3.8.101-4 0 T3.8.102-1 0 T3.8.102-2 0 T3.8.200-1 0 T3.9.100-1 0 T3.9.101-1 0 T3.9.102-1 0 T3.9.102-2 0 T3.9.103-1 0 T3.9.104-1 0 T3.9.104-2 0 T3.9.104-3 0 T3.9.200-1 46 T3.9.200-2 29 T3.9.201-1 46 T3.10.200-1 40 T3.10.201-1 0 T3.10.201-2 0 T3.10.202-1 40 T3.10.202-2 0 T3.11.100-1 40 T3.11.100-2 38 T3.11.100-3 3 8 T3.11.100-4 3 8 T3.11.100-5 38 T3.11.100-6 38 T3.11.100-7 38 T3.11.100-8 38 T3.11.100-9 38 T3.11.101-1 40 T3.11.101-2 46 T3.11.101-3 46 T3.11.101-4 39 T3.11.101-5 46 T3.11.102-1 46 T3.11.102-2 4 T3.11.102-3 4 T3.11.102-4 4 T3.11.102-5 18 T3.11.103-1 46 T3.11.103-2 4 9 T3.11.104-1 44 T3.11.104-2 4 T3.11.104-3 4 T3.11.104-4 18 T3.11.105-1 46 T3.11.105-2 4 T3.11.105-3 18 T3.11.106-1 40 CORRECTED T3.11.106-2 4 9 T3.11.107-1 40 CORRECTED T3.11.107-2 4 T3.11.107-3 4 T4.0.100-1 0 T5.0.100-1 0 T5.0.200-1 0 Technical Requirements Manual LIST OF EFFECTIVE PAGES Page No. Revision No. Page No. Revision No.
PALO VERDE UNITS 1, 2, 3 3 Rev 54  1/26/11 T5.0.300-1 0 T5.0.400-1 0 T5.0.500-1 53 T5.0.500-2 24 T5.0.500-3 0 T5.0.500-4 53 T5.0.500-5 0 T5.0.500-6 0 T5.0.500-7 0 T5.0.500-8 22 T5.0.500-9 0 T5.0.500-10 0 T5.0.500-11 5 4 T5.0.500-12 5 4 T5.0.500-13 11 T5.0.500-14 20 T5.0.500-15 53 T5.0.500-16 53 T5.0.500-17 8 T5.0.500-18 8 T5.0.600-1 37 T5.0.600-2 37 T5.0.700-1 34 T6.0.100-1 40 T6.0.100-2 40 T6.0.100-3 40 T6.0.100-4 40 T6.0.100-5 46 T6.0.100-6 40 T6.0.100-7 54 T6.0.100-8 4 6 T6.0.100-9 40 T6.0.100-10 40 T6.0.100-11 40 T6.0.100-12 40 T6.0.100-13 46 T6.0.100-14 4 6 T6.0.100-15 53 T6.0.100-16 53 T6.0.100-17 5 3 T6.0.100-18 5 3 T6.0.100-19 53 T6.0.100-20 5 3 T6.0.100-21 5 3 T6.0.100-22 5 3 T6.0.100-23 5 3 T6.0.100-24 5 3 T6.0.100-25 5 3 T6.0.100-26 53 T6.0.100-27 5 3 T6.0.100-28 5 3 T6.0.100-29 5 3 T6.0.100-30 5 3 T6.0.100-31 5 3 T6.0.100-32 53 T6.0.100-33 5 3 T6.0.100-34 5 3 T6.0.100-35 5 3 T6.0.100-36 53 T6.0.100-37 5 3 T7.0.100-1 52 T7.0.100-2 52 T7.0.100-3 0 T7.0.200-1 52 T7.0.200-2 52 T7.0.200-3 0 T7.0.300-1 50 T7.0.300-2 41 T7.0.300-3 32 T7.0.300-4 43 T7.0.300-5 32 T7.0.300-6 32 T7.0.300-7 32 T7.0.300-8 32 T7.0.400-1 0 T7.0.400-2 0 T7.0.400-3 0 T7.0.400-4 51 17.0.400-5 0 T7.0.500-1 0 TA-i 52 TA-ii 52 TA-iii 52 TA-1 52 TA-2 52 TA-3 52 Technical Requirements Manual LIST OF EFFECTIVE PAGES Page No. Revision No. Page No. Revision No.
PALO VERDE UNITS 1, 2, 3 4 Rev 54  1/26/11 TA-4 52 TA-5 52 TA-6 52 TA-7 52 TA-8 52 TA-9 52 TA-10 52 TA-11 52 TA-12 52 TA-13 52 TA-14 52 TA-15 52 TA-16 52 Logical Connectors TRM 1.2.100 Palo Verde - Units 1, 2, 3 T1.2.100-1 Rev 0  8/10/98 T1.0  USE AND APPLICATION
 
===1.2 Logical===
Connectors Refer to PVNGS Improved Technical Specification 1.2.
 
Completion Times TRM 1.3.100 Palo Verde - Units 1, 2, 3 T1.3.100-1 Rev 0  8/13/98 T1.0  USE AND APPLICATION
 
===1.3 Completion===
Times Refer to PVNGS Improved Technical Specification 1.3.
 
Frequency TRM 1.4.100 Palo Verde - Units 1, 2, 3 T1.4.100-1 Rev 0  8/13/98 T1.0  USE AND APPLICATION
 
===1.4 Frequency===
 
Refer to PVNGS Improved Technical Specification 1.4.
 
Safety Limits TRM  2.0.100 Palo Verde - Units 1, 2, 3 T2.0.100-1 Rev 0  8/13/98 T2.0  Safety Limits Refer to PVNGS Improved Technical Specification 2.0.
 
TLCO Applicability TRM 3.0.100  (continued) Palo Verde - Units 1, 2, 3 T3.0.100-1 Rev 47  2/26/09 T3.0 TRM LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION (TLCO) APPLICABILITY TLCO  3.0.100.1 TLCOs shall be met during the MODES or other specified conditions in the Applicability, except as provided in TLCO 3.0.100.2.
______________________________________________________________________________ TLCO  3.0.100.2 Upon discovery of a failure to meet a TLCO, the Required Actions within the TRM of the associated Conditions shall be met, except as provided in TLCO 3.0.100.5.
Failure to meet a TLCO may require initiation of an operability determination to determine the impact of the failure on equipment contained within the Technical Specifications.
If the TLCO is met or is no longer applicable prior to expiration of the specified Completion Time(s), completion of the Required Action(s) is not required, unless otherwise
 
stated. ______________________________________________________________________________ TLCO  3.0.100.3 When a TLCO is not met and the associated ACTIONS are not met, an associated ACTION is not provided, or if directed by the associated ACTIONS, action shall be initiated immediately to communicate the situation to the Shift
 
Manager and document the condition in accordance with the PVNGS corrective action program. An initial decision on whether the unit can continue to operate with the condition
 
shall be completed within 7 hours. Further actions shall be as required by the corrective action disposition and as deemed necessary by plant management.
Exceptions to this Specification are stated in the individual Specifications.
Where corrective measures are completed that permit operation in accordance with the TLCO or ACTIONS, completion of the actions required by TLCO 3.0.100.3 is not required.
TLCO 3.0.100.3 is only applicable in MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4.
 
TLCO Applicability TRM 3.0.100 Palo Verde - Units 1, 2, 3 T3.0.100-2 Rev 40  2/21/07 T3.0 TLCO APPLICABILITY (continued) TLCO  3.0.100.4 When a TLCO is not met, entry into a MODE or other specified condition in the Applicability shall only be made:
: a. When the associated ACTIONS to be entered permit continued operation in the MODE or other specified condition in the Applicability for an unlimited period of time; or
: b. After performance of a risk assessment addressing inoperable systems and components, consideration of the results, determination of the acceptability of entering the MODE or other specified condition in the Applicability, and establishment of risk management actions, if appropriate; exceptions to this Specification are stated in the individual Specifications, or
: c. When an allowance is stated in the individual value, parameter, or other Specification.
This Specification shall not prevent changes in MODES or other specified conditions in the Applicability that are required to comply with ACTIONS or that are part of a
 
shutdown of the unit.
______________________________________________________________________________ TLCO  3.0.100.5 Equipment removed from service or declared inoperable to comply with ACTIONS may be returned to service under administrative control solely to perform testing required to demonstrate its OPERABILITY or the OPERABILITY of other
 
equipment. This is an exception to TLCO 3.0.100.2 for the system returned to service under administrative control to perform the testing required to demonstrate OPERABILITY.
 
TSR Applicability TRM 3.0.100 (continued
) Palo Verde - Units 1, 2, 3 T3.0.100-3 Rev 23  5/30/03 TRM SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENT (TSR) APPLICABILITY TSR  3.0.100.1 TSRs shall be met during the MODES or other specified conditions in the Applicability for individual TLCOs, unless otherwise stated in the TSR. Failure to meet a TSR, whether such failure is experienced during the performance of the TSR or between performances of the TSR, may require
 
initiation of an operability determination to determine the impact of the failure on equipment contained within the Technical Specifications. Failure to perform a TSR within
 
the specified Frequency shall be failure to meet the TLCO except as provided in TSR 3.0.100.3. TSR's do not have to be performed on inoperable equipment or variables outside specified limits.
______________________________________________________________________________ TSR  3.0.100.2 The specified Frequency for each TSR is met if the TSR is performed within 1.25 times the interval specified in the Frequency, as measured from the previous performance or as measured from the time a specified condition of the
 
Frequency is met.
For Frequencies specified as "once," the above interval extension does not apply.
If a Completion Time requires periodic performance on a "once per ..." basis, the above Frequency extension applies to each performance after the initial performance.
Exceptions to this Specification are stated in the individual Specifications.
______________________________________________________________________________ TSR  3.0.100.3 If it is discovered that a TSR was not performed within its specified Frequency, then compliance with the requirement to declare the TLCO not met may be delayed, from the time of
 
discovery, up to 24 hours or up to the limit of the specified Frequency, whichever is greater. This delay period is permitted to allow performance of the TSR. A risk
 
evaluation shall be performed for any Surveillance delayed greater than 24 hours and the risk impact shall be managed.
 
TSR Applicability TRM 3.0.100 Palo Verde - Units 1, 2, 3 T3.0.100-4 Rev 47  2/26/09 TRM SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENT (TSR) APPLICABILITY (continued) TSR 3.0.100.3 If the TSR is not performed within the delay period, the  (continued) TLCO must immediately be declared not met, and the applicable Condition(s) must be entered When the TSR is performed within the delay period and the Surveillance is not met, the TLCO must immediately be declared not met, and the applicable Condition(s) must be entered. ______________________________________________________________________________ TSR  3.0.100.4 Entry into a MODE or other specified condition in the Applicability of an TLCO shall only be made when TSR's have been met within their specified Frequency, except as provided by TSR 3.0.100.3. When a TLCO is not met due to Surveillances not having been met, entry into a MODE or other Specified Condition in the Applicability shall only be made in accordance with TLCO 3.0.100.4. This provision shall not prevent entry into MODES or other specified
 
conditions in the Applicability that are required to comply with ACTIONS or that are part of a shutdown of the unit.
 
Flow Paths -  Shutdown TRM 3.1.100 PALO VERDE UNITS 1, 2, 3 T3.1.100-1 Rev 0  8/13/98 T3.1 REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS T3.1.100  Flow Paths - Shutdown TLCO  3.1.100 As a minimum, one of the following boron injection flow paths shall be OPERABLE: a. If only the spent fuel pool in TLCO 3.1.104.a. is OPERABLE, a flow path from the spent fuel pool via a gravity feed connection and a charging pump to the Reactor Coolant System. b. If only the refueling water tank in Specification 3.1.104.b. is OPERABLE, a flow path from the refueling
 
water tank via either a charging pump, a high pressure
 
safety injection pump, or a low pressure safety injection pump to the Reactor Coolant System. APPLICABILITY: MODES 5 and 6.
ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. None of the above flow paths OPERABLE. A.1 Suspend CORE ALTERATIONS A.2 Suspend positive reactivity changes.
AND Immediately Immediately Flow Paths -  Shutdown TRM 3.1.100 PALO VERDE UNITS 1, 2, 3 T3.1.100-2 Rev 0  8/13/98 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY TSR  3.1.100.1 At least one of the above required flow paths shall be demonstrated OPERABLE by verifying that each valve (manual, power-
 
operated, or automatic) in the flow path that is not locked, sealed, or otherwise secured in position, is in its correct
 
position.
31 days Flow Paths -  Operating TRM 3.1.101 PALO VERDE UNITS 1, 2, 3 T3.1.101-1 Rev 0  8/13/98 T3.1  REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS T3.1.101  Flow Paths - Operating TLCO  3.1.101 At least two of the following three boron injection flow paths shall be OPERABLE: a. A gravity feed flow path from either the refueling water tank or the spent fuel pool through CH-536 (RWT Gravity Feed Isolation Valve) and a charging pump to the Reactor Coolant System, b. A gravity feed flow path from the refueling water tank through CH-327 (RWT Gravity Feed/Safety Injection
 
System Isolation Valve) and a charging pump to the
 
Reactor Coolant System, c. A flow path from either the refueling water tank or the spent fuel pool through CH-164 (Boric Acid Filter
 
Bypass Valve), utilizing gravity feed and a charging pump to the Reactor Coolant System. APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3 and 4.
ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. One required boron injection flow path inoperable. A.1 Restore the required boron injection flow
 
paths to OPERABLE.
72 hours (continued)
Flow Paths -  Operating TRM 3.1.101 PALO VERDE UNITS 1, 2, 3 T3.1.101-2 Rev 54  01/26/11 ACTIONS  (continued)
B. Required Action and associated completion time of Condition A not met. B.1 Enter TLCO 3.0.100.3.
Immediately SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY TSR  3.1.101.1 Verify that each valve (manual, power-operated, or automatic) in the flow path
 
that is not locked, sealed, or otherwise secured in position, is in its correct position.
31 days (continued)
Flow Paths -  Operating TRM 3.1.101 PALO VERDE UNITS 1, 2, 3 T3.1.101-3 Rev 0  8/13/98 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS  (continued) TSR  3.1.101.2 -----------------NOTE-----------------
The provisions of TLCO 3.0.100.4 are not applicable for entry into MODE 3 or MODE
 
4 to perform the surveillance testing of TSR 3.1.101.2 provided the testing is performed within 24 hours after
 
achieving normal operating pressure in the reactor coolant system.
--------------------------------------
Verify that the flow paths required by Specification 3.1.101 deliver at least 26 gpm for 1 charging pump and 68 gpm
 
for two charging pumps to the Reactor Coolant System when the Reactor Coolant System is at normal operating pressure.
18 months Charging Pumps - Shutdown TRM 3.1.102 PALO VERDE UNITS 1, 2, 3 T3.1.102-1 Rev 0  8/13/98 T3.1  REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS T3.1.102  Charging Pumps - Shutdown TLCO  3.1.102 At least one charging pump or one high pressure safety injection pump or one low pressure safety injection pump in the boron injection flow path required OPERABLE pursuant to
 
TRM Specification 3.1.100 shall be OPERABLE and capable of being powered from an OPERABLE emergency power source. APPLICABILITY: MODES 5 and 6.
ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. With no charging pump or high pressure safety injection pump or low pressure safety injection
 
pump OPERABLE or capable of being powered from an OPERABLE emergency power
 
source. A.1 Suspend CORE ALTERATIONS AND A.2 Suspend positive reactivity changes.
Immediately Immediately SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY Refer to PVNGS Improved Technical Specifications LCO 5.5.8.
Charging Pumps - Operating TRM 3.1.103 PALO VERDE UNITS 1, 2, 3 T3.1.103-1 Rev 1    9/18/98 T3.1  REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS T3.1.103  Charging Pumps - Operating TLCO  3.1.103 At least two charging pumps shall be OPERABLE. APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3 and 4.
ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. One required charging pump inoperable. A.1 Restore at least two charging pumps to OPERABLE status.
72 hours B. Required Action and associated completion time of Condition A not met. B.1 Be in MODE 3.
AND B.2 Restore at least two charging pumps to
 
OPERABLE status 6 hours 7 days C. Required Action and associated Completion Time of Condition B not
 
met. C.1 Be in MODE 5.
30 hours SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY Refer to PVNGS Improved Technical Specifications LCO 5.5.8.
Borated Sources - Shutdown TRM 3.1.104 PALO VERDE UNITS 1, 2, 3 T3.1.104-1 Rev 0  8/13/98 T3.1  REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS T3.1.104  Borated Sources - Shutdown TLCO  3.1.104 As a minimum, one of the following borated water sources shall be OPERABLE: a. The spent fuel pool  b. The refueling water tank APPLICABILITY: MODES 5 and 6.
ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. With no borated water sources OPERABLE A.1 Suspend CORE ALTERATIONS AND A.2 Suspend positive reactivity changes.
Immediately Immediately SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY TSR  3.1.104.1 --------------------NOTE-------------------
Only required to be performed when the refueling water tank is the borated water source and the outside air temperature is
 
outside the 60 F to 120 F range. -------------------------------------------
Verify that the refueling water tank
 
solution temperature is  60 F and  120 F. 24 hours (continued)
Borated Sources - Shutdown TRM 3.1.104 PALO VERDE UNITS 1, 2, 3 T3.1.104-2 Rev 0  8/13/98 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS  (continued)
TSR  3.1.104.2 --------------------NOTE-------------------
Only required to be performed when the spent fuel pool is the borated water source
 
and irradiated fuel is present in the pool.
-------------------------------------------
Verify that the spent fuel pool solution
 
temperature is  60 F and  180 F. 24 hours TSR  3.1.104.3 Verify that the boron concentration of the borated water source is  4000 ppm and  4400 ppm.
7 days TSR  3.1.104.4 Verify that the contained volume of the borated water source is  33,500 gallons.
7 days Borated Sources - Operating TRM  3.1.105 Palo Verde - Units 1, 2, 3 T3.1.105-1 Rev 46  1/8/09 T3.1  REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS T3.1.105  Borated Sources - Operating TLCO  3.1.105 The spent fuel pool shall be OPERABLE APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4.
ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. Spent fuel pool inoperable. A.1 Restore to OPERABLE status. 72 hours B. Required Action and associated completion time of Condition A not met. B.1 Enter TLCO 3.0.100.3 Immediately
 
Borated Sources - Operating TRM  3.1.105 Palo Verde - Units 1, 2, 3 T3.1.105-2 Rev 0  8/13/98 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY TSR  3.1.105.1 --------------------NOTE-------------------
Only required to be performed when irradiated fuel is present in the pool.
 
-------------------------------------------
Verify spent fuel pool solution temperature is  60 F and  180 F. 24 hours TSR  3.1.105.2 Verify spent fuel pool borated water volume is greater than or equal to the minimum
 
required volume in Figure 3.1.105-1.
7 days TSR  3.1.105.3 Verify that the spent fuel pool boron concentration is  4000 ppm and  4400 ppm.
7 days Borated Sources - Operating TRM  3.1.105 Palo Verde - Units 1, 2, 3 T3.1.105-3 Rev 50  12/10/09 FIGURE 3.1.105-1.
Minimum Borated Water Volume
 
Shutdown Margin - Reactor Trip Breakers Closed TRM  3.1.200 Palo Verde - Units 1, 2, 3 T3.1.200-1 Rev 46  1/8/09 T3.1  REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS T3.1.200  Shutdown Margin - Reactor Trip Breakers Closed TLCO  3.1.200 Refer to PVNGS Improved Technical Specification 3.1.2. APPLICABILITY: Refer to PVNGS Improved Technical Specification 3.1.2.
ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. Requirements of TSR 3.1.200.1 not met. A.1 Document the condition in accordance with the PVNGS corrective action
 
program and initiate an operability determination, as
 
necessary, to determine the impact on equipment in the technical
 
specifications.
Immediately Shutdown Margin - Reactor Trip Breakers Closed TRM  3.1.200 Palo Verde - Units 1, 2, 3 T3.1.200-2 Rev 24  7/25/03 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY TSR  3.1.200.1 With the reactor trip breakers closed and the CEA drive system capable of CEA withdrawal, the SHUTDOWN MARGIN shall be
 
determined to be greater than or equal to that specified in the CORE OPERATING LIMITS REPORT by:
: a. Verifying that the predicted critical CEA position is within the limits of PVNGS ITS LCO 3.1.7.
Prior to achieving reactor criticality 
: b. Comparison of the SHUTDOWN MARGIN consideration factors with the CEA
 
groups at the Transient Insertion Limits of PVNGS ITS LCO 3.1.7.
Prior to initial
 
operation above 5% RATED THERMAL POWER after each
 
fuel loading TRM  3.1.201 Palo Verde - Units 1, 2, 3 T3.1.201-1 Rev 0  8/13/98 TRM specification number 3.1.201 is not utilized and this page is intentionally left blank.
 
Control Element Assembly - Alignment TRM  3.1.202 Palo Verde - Units 1, 2, 3 T3.1.202-1 Rev 53  11/10/10 T3.1  REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS T3.1.202  Control Element Assembly - Alignment TLCO  3.1.202 At least one CEA Reed Switch Position Transmitter indicator channel shall be OPERABLE for each shutdown, regulating or part strength CEA not fully inserted. APPLICABILITY: MODES 3, 4, and 5 (with the reactor trip breakers closed).
ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. Less than the above required position indicator channels(s)
 
OPERABLE in MODES 3 or
: 4. A.1 Enter TLCO 3.0.100.3 Immediately B. Less than the above required position indicator channel(s)
 
OPERABLE in MODE 5 B.1 Action shall be initiated immediately
 
to communicate the
 
situation to the Shift Manager and document the condition in
 
accordance with the PVNGS corrective action program. An
 
initial decision on whether the unit can continue Immediately (continued)
Control Element Assembly - Alignment TRM  3.1.202 Palo Verde - Units 1, 2, 3 T3.1.202-2 Rev 46  1/8/09 ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME to operate with the condition shall be completed within 7
 
hours. Further actions shall be as required by the
 
corrective action disposition and as deemed necessary by plant management.
SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY TSR  3.1.202.1 --------------------NOTE-------------------
TSR 3.1.202.1 has a different applicability than ITS SR 3.1.5.4
-------------------------------------------
 
Perform a CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST of each reed switch position transmitter channel.
18 months
 
Control Element Assembly - Drop Time TRM  3.1.203 Palo Verde - Units 1, 2, 3 T3.1.203-1 Rev 29  4/15/04 T3.1  REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS T3.1.203  Control Element Assembly - Drop Time TLCO  3.1.203 The individual full strength (shutdown and regulating) CEA drop time, from a fully withdraw position, shall be  4 seconds. Time is measured from when the electrical power is interrupted to the CEA drive mechanism until the CEA reaches its 90% insertion position with:  Tcold greater than or equal to 550 degrees F  All reactor coolant pumps operating APPLICABILITY: MODES 1 and 2.
ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. Drop time exceeds limit. A.1. Restore to within limit. Prior to proceeding to
 
MODE 1 or 2.
SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY TSR  3.1.203.1 Verify that the full strength CEA drop time is  4.0 seconds for specifically affected individual CEAs.
------NOTE------
Refer to PVNGS
 
ITS SR 3.1.5.5
----------------
 
Following any
 
maintenance on or modification to the CEA drive
 
system which could affect the drop time of
 
those specific CEAs.
Shutdown CEA Insertion Limits TRM  3.1.204 Palo Verde - Units 1, 2, 3 T3.1.204-1 Rev 33  4/20/05 T3.1 REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS T3.1.204 Shutdown Control Element Assembly (CEA) Insertion Limits TLCO 3.1.204 All Shutdown CEAs shall be fully withdrawn to inches by Pulse Counter Indication and Reed Switch Position Transmitter Indication (RSPT). APPLICABILITY: MODES 1 and 2 
-------------------------NOTE----------------------------
This TLCO is not applicable while performing SR 3.1.5.3 --------------------------------------------------------------
ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. One shutdown CEA not within limit. A.1 Restore shutdown CEA to within limit.
2 hours B. Required Action and associated Completion
 
Time not met. B.1 Be in MODE 3.
6 hours SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY TSR 3.1.204.1 Verify each shutdown CEA is fully withdrawn to
 
Counter Indication and by Reed Switch Position Transmitter Indication (RSPT).
12 hours Regulating CEA Insertion Limits TRM  3.1.205 Palo Verde - Units 1, 2, 3 T3.1.205-1 Rev 33  4/20/05 T3.1 REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS T3.1.205 Regulating Control Element Assembly (CEA) Groups Insertion Limits TLCO 3.1.205 Regulating Groups 1 and 2 CEAs shall be limited to the insertion limits specified in the COLR. APPLICABILITY: MODES 1 and 2
--------------------------NOTE-----------------------------
This TLCO is not applicable while performing SR 3.1.5.3
-----------------------------------------------------------
ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. One Regulating Group 1 or 2 CEA not within limit. A.1 Restore Regulating Group 1 or 2 CEA to within
 
limit. 2 hours B. Required Action and associated completion
 
time not met. B.1 Enter TLCO 3.0.100.3 Immediately SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY TSR  3.1.205.1 Verify each Regulating Group 1 & 2 CEA is fully withdrawn as specified in the
 
COLR. 12 hours Azimuthal Power Tilt - T q TRM  3.2.200 Palo Verde - Units 1, 2, 3 T3.2.200-1 Rev 53  11/10/10 T3.2  POWER DISTRIBUTION LIMITS T3.2.200  Azimuthal Power Tilt - T q TLCO  3.2.200 Refer to PVNGS Improved Technical Specifications LCO 3.2.3 APPLICABILITY: Refer to PVNGS Improved Technical Specifications LCO 3.2.3 ACTIONS -------------------------------------NOTE-------------------------------------
 
Refer to PVNGS Improved Technical Specifications LCO 3.2.3 for additional
 
requirements.
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME
-------------NOTE-------------
Condition A is due to a
 
misalignment of either a part
 
strength or full strength CEA.
------------------------------
A. Measured T q not within the limit in the COLR with COLSS in service.
OR Measured T q  > 0.03 with COLSS out of service A.1 Verify that the Core Operating Limit Supervisory
 
system (COLSS) (When COLSS is being used to
 
monitor the core
 
power distribution
 
per PVNGS Improved
 
Technical Specifications 3.2.1 and 3.2.4) is
 
detecting the
 
misalignment.
30 minutes SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY Refer to PVNGS Improved Technical Specifications LCO 3.2.3.
 
Supplementary Protection System Instrumentation TRM 3.3.100 PALO VERDE UNITS 1, 2, 3 T3.3.100-1 Rev 46  1/8/09 T3.3  INSTRUMENTATION T3.3.100  Supplementary Protection System (SPS) Instrumentation TLCO  3.3.100 Three RPS Supplementary Protection System (Pressurizer Pressure - High) channels shall be OPERABLE. APPLICABILITY: MODES 1 and 2.
 
ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. One of the required SPS trip channels inoperable. A.1 Restore an inoperable channel to OPERABLE
 
status 48 hours B. Required Action and associated Completion Time not met. B.1 Enter TLCO 3.0.100.3 Immediately SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY TSR  3.3.100.1 Perform a CHANNEL CHECK on each channel.
12 hours TSR  3.3.100.2 Perform a CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST with setpoint allowable value  2414 psia.
92 days (continued)
Supplementary Protection System Instrumentation TRM 3.3.100 PALO VERDE UNITS 1, 2, 3 T3.3.100-2 Rev 10  9/28/00 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS  (continued) TSR  3.3.100.3 Perform a CHANNEL CALIBRATION on each channel. 18 months TSR  3.3.100.4 Verify RPS RESPONSE TIME is within limits.
18 months on a STAGGERED TEST
 
BASIS.
Radiation Monitoring Instrumentation TRM 3.3.101 PALO VERDE UNITS 1, 2, 3 T3.3.101-1 Rev 40  2/21/07 T3.3  INSTRUMENTATION T3.3.101  Radiation Monitoring Instrumentation TLCO  3.3.101 The Radiation Monitoring Instrumentation shall be OPERABLE with the minimum number of channels according to Table 3.3.101-1. APPLICABILITY: According to Table 3.3.101-1 ACTIONS ------------------------------------NOTE--------------------------------------
 
The provisions of Specification 3.0.100.3 are not applicable.
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. One or more radiation monitoring channel alarm/trip setpoint(s)
 
exceed the value shown in Table 3.3.101-1 A.1 Adjust the setpoint(s) to within the limit.
4 hours B. Required Action and associated Completion Time not met. B.1 Declare the channel inoperable.
Immediately (continued)
Radiation Monitoring Instrumentation TRM 3.3.101 PALO VERDE UNITS 1, 2, 3 T3.3.101-2 Rev 46  1/8/09 ACTIONS  (continued) C. Main Steam Line Area channels inoperable. C.1 Restore the inoperable channel(s) to OPERABLE status. OR C.2.1 Initiate the preplanned alternative
 
program to monitor the appropriate parameter(s).
AND C.2.2 Initiate a corrective action to evaluate the
 
action taken, the cause of the inoperability, and
 
plans and schedule for restoring the channel to OPERABLE status.
72 hours 72 hours In accordance with the PVNGS
 
corrective action program. (continued)
 
Radiation Monitoring Instrumentation TRM 3.3.101 PALO VERDE UNITS 1, 2, 3 T3.3.101-3 Rev 18  3/13/02 ACTIONS  (continued) D. New Fuel Area Monitor RU-19 channel inoperable. D.1 Perform area surveys of the monitored area
 
with portable
 
monitoring instrumentation.
Once per 24 hours Radiation Monitoring Instrumentation TRM 3.3.101 PALO VERDE UNITS 1, 2, 3 T3.3.101-4 Rev 18  3/13/02 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY TSR  3.3.101.1 Perform a CHANNEL CHECK on the New Fuel Area monitor, and Main Steam Line monitors.
12 hours TSR  3.3.101-2 Deleted TSR  3.3.101.3 Perform a CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST on the New Fuel Area monitor and Main Steam Line monitors and verify that their setpoints
 
meet the requirements of Table 3.3.101-1.
92 days TSR  3.3.101.4 Perform a CHANNEL CALIBRATION.
18 months Radiation Monitoring Instrumentation TRM 3.3.101 PALO VERDE UNITS 1, 2, 3 T3.3.101-5 Rev 52  7/16/10 Table 3.3.101-1 (Page 1 of 1)
Radiation Monitoring Instrumentation Radiation Monitoring Instrument Applicable MODES Minimum Channels OPERABLE Alarm/Trip Setpoint Measurement Range Area Monitor RU-19 (New Fuel Area)
With fuel
 
in the storage pool or building 1  15 mR/hr 10 E-1 to
 
10 E4 mR/hr Main Steam Line Area Monitors RU-139 A & B 1,2,3,4 1 Three (3)
 
times background in Rem/hr 1.5 E0 to 
 
1.0 E7 mR/hr Main Steam Line Area
 
Monitors RU-140 A & B 1,2,3,4 1 Three (3)
 
times background
 
in Rem/hr 1.5 E0 to 1.0 E7 mR/hr Incore Detectors TRM 3.3.102 PALO VERDE UNITS 1, 2, 3 T3.3.102-1 Rev 21  1/31/03 T3.3 INSTRUMENTATION T3.3.102  Incore Detectors TLCO  3.3.102 The Incore Detection System shall be OPERABLE with:
: a. 75% of incore locations, and
: b. 75% of all incore detectors with at least one incore detector in each quadrant at each level, and
: c. Sufficient OPERABLE incore detectors to perform at least six tilt estimates with at least one tilt estimate at each of three levels.
-----------------------------NOTE------------------------------
: 1. The Incore Detection System contains 50 incore locations with
 
5 detectors in each fixed detector string.
: 2. An OPERABLE incore location consists of a fixed detector
 
string with a minimum of three OPERABLE rhodium detectors.
--------------------------------------------------------------- APPLICABILITY: When the Incore Detection System is used for monitoring:
: a. AZIMUTHAL POWER TILT, b. Radial Peaking Factors, c. Local Power Density, d. DNB Margin Incore Detectors TRM 3.3.102 PALO VERDE UNITS 1, 2, 3 T3.3.102-2 Rev 40  2/21/07 ACTIONS ------------------------------------NOTE--------------------------------------
 
The provisions of Specification 3.0.100.3 are not applicable.
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. Incore Detection System inoperable. A.1 Do not use the Incore Detection System for
 
monitoring or calibration functions.
Immediately SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY TSR  3.3.102.1 Perform a CHANNEL CHECK.
Within 7 days
 
prior to use TSR  3.3.102.2 ------------------NOTE-------------------
Neutron Detectors may be excluded from the
 
CHANNEL CALIBRATION but all electronic components shall be included. Fixed incore neutron detectors shall be calibrated prior
 
to installation in the reactor core.
-----------------------------------------
Perform a CHANNEL CALIBRATION.
18 months Seismic Monitoring TRM 3.3.103 PALO VERDE UNITS 1, 2, 3 T3.3.103-1 Rev 46  1/8/09 T3.3  INSTRUMENTATION T3.3.103  Seismic Monitoring TLCO  3.3.103 The Seismic Monitoring Instrumentation shown in Table 3.3.103-1 shall be OPERABLE. APPLICABILITY: At all times.
ACTIONS --------------------------------------NOTE------------------------------------
The provisions of Specification 3.0.100.3 are not applicable
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. One or more required Seismic Monitoring Instruments of Table 3.3.103-1 inoperable. A.1 Restore the required instrumentation to OPERABLE status.
30 days B. Required Action and associated completion time of Condition A not met. B.1 Initiate a corrective action to evaluate the action taken, cause of the inoperability, and plans for restoring
 
the instrument to OPERABLE status.
In accordance with the PVNGS
 
corrective action program. (continued)
Seismic Monitoring TRM 3.3.103 PALO VERDE UNITS 1, 2, 3 T3.3.103-2 Rev 54  1/26/11 ACTIONS  (continued) C. Seismic event ( 0.02g) C.1 Perform TSR 3.3.103.2 on each seismic monitoring instrument
 
actuated C.2 Retrieve data from actuated instruments and perform analysis to determine the
 
magnitude of the vibratory ground motion. AND C.3 Initiate a corrective action to evaluate the
 
magnitude, frequency spectrum, and resultant effect upon
 
facility features important to safety.
AND 5 days Immediately In accordance with the PVNGS corrective
 
action program.
SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY TSR  3.3.103.1 -------------------NOTE------------------
Applicable to Digital Recorders of Table
 
3.3.103-1 only.
-----------------------------------------
Perform a CHANNEL CHECK.
31 days (continued)
Seismic Monitoring TRM 3.3.103 PALO VERDE UNITS 1, 2, 3 T3.3.103-3 Rev 13  4/6/01 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS  (continued)
TSR  3.3.103.2 Perform a CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST.
6 months TSR  3.3.103.3 Perform a CHANNEL CALIBRATION.
18 months Seismic Monitoring TRM 3.3.103 PALO VERDE UNITS 1, 2, 3 T3.3.103-4 Rev 13  4/6/01 Table 3.3.103-1 (Page 1 of 1)
Seismic Monitoring Instrumentation
______________________________________________________________________________
INSTRUMENTS AND SENSOR LOCATIONS MINIMUM INSTRUMENTS OPERABLE  1. Force Balance Accelerometer Unit   
: a. Tendon Gallery Floor, 55' level    1 Trigger Threshold Setpoint:  0.010 g b. Containment Building floor, 140' level    1 Trigger Threshold Setpoint:  0.020 g c. Containment Building floor, 80' level    1 Trigger Threshold Setpoint:  0.020 g  d. Control Building floor, 74' level    1 Trigger Threshold Setpoint:  0.010 g 
: e. Control Building floor, 160' level    1 Trigger Threshold Setpoint:  0.020 g 
: f. 25' E. of Turbine Bldg. W. side x 189'    1 9" S. of Turbine Bldg. S. Side on ground  (Ref. Plant N.)
Trigger Threshold Setpoint:  0.010 g 2. Digital Recorders: a. Control Room Area, 140' level    1 
: b. Control Room Area, 140' level    1 
: c. Control Room Area, 140' level    1  d. Control Room Area, 140' level      1  e. Control Room Area, 140' level    1 
: f. Control Room Area, 140' level    1 
 
Meteorological Instrumentation TRM 3.3.104 PALO VERDE UNITS 1, 2, 3 T3.3.104-1 Rev 46  1/8/09 T3.3  INSTRUMENTATION T3.3.104  Meteorological Instrumentation TLCO  3.3.104 The meteorological monitoring instrumentation channels shown in Table 3.3.104-1 shall be OPERABLE. APPLICABILITY: At all times.
ACTIONS ------------------------------------NOTE--------------------------------------
The provisions of Specification 3.0.100.3 are not applicable.
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. One or more required meteorological monitoring channels inoperable. A.1 Restore the channels to OPERABLE status.
7 days B. Required Action and associated completion time not met. B.1 Initiate a corrective action to evaluate the
 
cause of the malfunction and the
 
plans for restoring the channel(s) to OPERABLE status.
In accordance
 
with the PVNGS corrective action program.
SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY TSR  3.3.104.1 Perform a CHANNEL CHECK 24 hours ------------------NOTE------------------
Windspeed Sensors are excluded from CHANNEL CALIBRATION.
 
----------------------------------------
TSR  3.3.104.2 Perform a CHANNEL CALIBRATION 6 months Meteorological Instrumentation TRM 3.3.104 PALO VERDE UNITS 1, 2, 3 T3.3.104-2 Rev 0  8/13/98 Table 3.3.104-1 (Page 1 of 1)
Meteorological Monitoring Instrumentation INSTRUMENT LOCATION MINIMUM OPERABLE 1. WIND SPEED
: a. 0 1 to 50 mph Nominal Elev. 3 5 feet 1  b. 0 1 to 50 mph Nominal Elev. 200 feet 1    2. WIND DIRECTION
: a. 0 - 360 - 180 Nominal Elev. 35 feet 1  b. 0 - 360 - 180 Nominal Elev. 200 feet 1    3. AIR TEMPERATURE
- DELTA T    a. -6 F to 6 F Nominal Elev. 35 feet - 200 feet 1 -------------------------------------NOTE------------------------------------- 1. Wind speeds less than 0.6 MPH will be reported as 0.
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
 
Post Accident Monitoring Instrumentation TRM 3.3.105 PALO VERDE UNITS 1, 2, 3 T3.3.105-1 Rev 46  1/8/09 T3.3  INSTRUMENTATION T3.3.105  Post Accident Monitoring Instrumentation TLCO  3.3.105 The post-accident monitoring instrumentation channels shown in Table 3.3.105-1 shall be OPERABLE. APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2 and 3.
 
ACTIONS -------------------------------------NOTE-----------------------------------
Separate Condition entry is allowed for each Function.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------
CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. With the number of OPERABLE channels one less than the Required
 
number of Channels in Table 3.3.105-1. A.1 Restore the inoperable channel(s) to OPERABLE status. 30 days B. Required Action and associated completion
 
time not met. B.1 Document the condition in accordance with the
 
PVNGS corrective action
 
program and initiate an operability determination, as
 
necessary, to determine the impact on equipment in the technical specifications.
Immediately C. With the number of OPERABLE channels two
 
less than the Required
 
number of Channels in Table 3.3.105-1. C.1 Restore the inoperable channel(s) to OPERABLE status. 7 days (continued)
Post Accident Monitoring Instrumentation TRM 3.3.105 PALO VERDE UNITS 1, 2, 3 T3.3.105-2 Rev 48  7/22/09 ACTIONS  (continued) D. Required Action and associated completion time not met. D.1 Document the condition in accordance with the
 
PVNGS corrective action
 
program and initiate an operability determination, as
 
necessary, to determine the impact on equipment in the technical specifications.
Immediately SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY TSR  3.3.105.1 Perform a CHANNEL CHECK for each required instrumentation channel that is normally
 
energized.
31 days TSR  3.3.105.2 Perform a CHANNEL CALIBRATION 18 months Post Accident Monitoring Instrumentation TRM 3.3.105 PALO VERDE UNITS 1, 2, 3 T3.3.105-3 Rev 48  7/22/09 Table 3.3.105-1 (Page 1 of 1)
Post-Accident Monitoring Instrumentation FUNCTION REQUIRED NUMBER OF CHANNELS
: 1. Refueling Water Storage Tank Water Level 2 2. Auxiliary Feedwater Flow Rate 2 3. Pressurizer Safety Valve Position Indicator 1 per valve 4. Containment Water Level (Narrow Range) 2 5. Containment Hydrogen Monitor 2
Loose-Part Detection Instrumentation TRM 3.3.106 PALO VERDE UNITS 1, 2, 3 T3.3.106-1 Rev 46  1/8/09 T3.3  INSTRUMENTATION T3.3.106  Loose-Part Detection Instrumentation TLCO  3.3.106 The loose-part detection system shall be OPERABLE with all sensors specified in Table 3.3.106-1. APPLICABILITY: MODES 1 and 2.
 
ACTIONS ------------------------------------NOTE--------------------------------------
The provisions of Specification 3.0.100.3 are not applicable.
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. With one or more loose-part detection system channels inoperable.
A.1 Restore the inoperable channel(s) to OPERABLE status. 30 days B. Required Action and associated completion
 
time not met. B.1 Initiate a corrective action to evaluate the
 
cause of the
 
malfunction and the plans for restoring the channel(s) to OPERABLE status. In accordance with the PVNGS corrective
 
action program.
SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY TSR  3.3.106.1 Perform a CHANNEL CHECK.
24 hours TSR  3.3.106.2 Perform a CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST 31 days TSR  3.3.106.3 Perform a CHANNEL CALIBRATION 18 months Loose-Part Detection Instrumentation TRM 3.3.106 PALO VERDE UNITS 1, 2, 3 T3.3.106-2 Rev 14  5/4/01 Table 3.3.106-1 (Page 1 of 1)
Loose Parts Sensor Locations INSTRUMENT NUMBER LOOSE PARTS SENSOR LOCATIONS JSVNYE-1 Upper Vessel A JSVNYE-2 Upper Vessel B JSVNYE-3 Lower Vessel A (Incore Nozzle)
JSVNYE-4 Lower Vessel B (Incore Nozzle)
JSVNYE-5 SG-1A  JSVNYE-6 SG-1B  JSVNYE-7 SG-2A  JSVNYE-8 SG-2B Explosive Gas Monitoring System TRM 3.3.107 PALO VERDE UNITS 1, 2, 3 T3.3.107-1 Rev 0 8/13/98 T3.3  INSTRUMENTATION T3.3.107  Explosive Gas Monitoring System TLCO  3.3.107 Two explosive gas monitoring instrumentation Oxygen Monitoring channels shall be OPERABLE with their alarm/trip setpoints set to ensure that the limits of T3.10.201 are not
 
exceeded. This includes the following instruments: a. Oxygen monitor (surge tank) b. Oxygen monitor (waste gas header) APPLICABILITY: During Gaseous Radwaste System Operation.
ACTIONS ------------------------------------NOTE--------------------------------------
 
The provisions of Specification 3.0.100.3 are not applicable.
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. Explosive gas monitoring instrumentation channel alarm/trip setpoint less
 
conservative than required. A.1 Declare the channel inoperable.
Immediately B. One required channel inoperable B.1. Obtain and analyze grab samples. AND B.2 Restore the inoperable channel to OPERABLE status Daily 30 days (continued)
Explosive Gas Monitoring System TRM 3.3.107 PALO VERDE UNITS 1, 2, 3 T3.3.107-2 Rev 46  1/8/09 ACTIONS  (continued) C. Required Action and associated Completion Time of Condition B not
 
met. C.1 Initiate a corrective action to evaluate why
 
this inoperability was
 
not corrected in a timely manner.
In accordance
 
with the PVNGS corrective
 
action program. D. Two channels inoperable D.1 Obtain and analyze grab samples. Every 4 hours
 
during degassing operations AND Daily during
 
other operations SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY TSR  3.3.107.1 Perform a CHANNEL CHECK.
24 hours TSR  3.3.107.2 Perform a CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST.
31 days TSR  3.3.107.3 Perform a CHANNEL CALIBRATION 1 on each channel 92 days -------------------------------------NOTE-------------------------------------
The CHANNEL CALIBRATION shall include the use of standard gas samples containing a nominal:
: 1. One volume percent oxygen, balance nitrogen, and 
: 2. Four volume percent oxygen, balance nitrogen.
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Fuel Building Essential Ventilation Actuation Signal (FBEVAS)
TRM 3.3.108 PALO VERDE UNITS 1, 2, 3 T3.3.108-1 Rev 0  8/13/98 T3.3  INSTRUMENTATION T3.3.108  Fuel Building Essential Ventilation Actuation Signal (FBEVAS) TLCO  3.3.108 One FBEVAS channel shall be OPERABLE. APPLICABILITY: During movement of irradiated fuel in the fuel building.
ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. Actuation Logic, Manual Trip or radiation monitor inoperable. A.1 Place one OPERABLE Fuel Building Essential
 
Ventilation train in operation.
OR A.2 Suspend movement of irradiated fuel assemblies in the fuel
 
building.
Immediately Immediately Fuel Building Essential Ventilation Actuation Signal (FBEVAS)
TRM 3.3.108 PALO VERDE UNITS 1, 2, 3 T3.3.108-2 Rev 0  8/13/98 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS
-----------------------------------NOTE---------------------------------------
Surveillance Requirements for RU-145 are specified in the ODCM.
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY TSR  3.3.108.1 Perform a CHANNEL CHECK on RU-31.
12 hours TSR  3.3.108.2 Perform a CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST on RU-31 to include that the setpoint is  15 mR/hr and the measurement range is 10E-1 to 10E+4
 
mR/hr. 92 days TSR  3.3.108.3 --------------------NOTE-------------------
Testing of Actuation Logic shall include verification of the proper operation of each actuation relay.
 
-------------------------------------------
Perform a CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST on required FBEVAS Actuation Logic channel.
18 months TSR  3.3.108.4 Perform a CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST on required FBEVAS Manual Trip logic.
18 months TSR  3.3.108.5 Perform a CHANNEL CALIBRATION on RU-31.
18 months
 
RPS Instrumentation - Operating TRM 3.3.200 PALO VERDE UNITS 1, 2, 3 T3.3.200-1 Rev 46  1/8/09 T3.3  INSTRUMENTATION T3.3.200  RPS Instrumentation - Operating TLCO  3.3.200 Refer to PVNGS Improved Technical Specifications 3.3.1. APPLICABILITY: Refer to PVNGS Improved Technical Specifications 3.3.1.
ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. One or more core protection calculator (CPC) channels with a valid cabinet high temperature alarm. A.1 Perform CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST on
 
affected CPC(s).
AND A.2 Perform CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST on affected CEACs.
12 hours 12 hours B. Requirements of Condition A or the following NOTE not met. B.1 Document the condition in accordance with the
 
PVNGS corrective action
 
program and initiate an operability determination, as
 
necessary, to determine the impact on equipment in the technical
 
specifications.
Immediately RPS Instrumentation - Operating TRM 3.3.200 PALO VERDE UNITS 1, 2, 3 T3.3.200-2 Rev 31  6/15/04 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY ----------------------------------NOTE-------------------------------------
When performing ITS SR 3.3.1.4, between 20% and 80% of RATED THERMAL POWER, compare the linear power level, the CPC delta T power and the CPC nuclear
 
power signals to the calorimetric calculation, and:
: a. If any signal is within -0.5% to 10% of the calorimetric then do not calibrate except as required during initial power ascension after
 
refueling and except as otherwise noted in item d.
: b. If any signal is less than the calorimetric calculation by more than 0.5%, then adjust the affected signals(s) to agree with the
 
calorimetric calculation.
: c. If any signal is greater than the calorimetric calculation by more than 10%, then adjust the affected signal(s) to agree with the
 
calorimetric calculation within 8% to 10%.
: d. During any power ascension from below 80% to above 80% RTP, the calibration requirements of ITS SR 3.3.1.4 must be met (except during
 
PHYSICS TESTS, as allowed by the Note in SR 3.3.1.4). This is accomplished by performing SR 3.3.1.4 between 75% and 80% RTP during power ascension with an acceptance criteria of -0.5% to <2% to bound
 
the requirements for both below and above 80% RTP.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------
 
ESFAS Logic and Manual Trip TRM 3.3.201 PALO VERDE UNITS 1, 2, 3 T3.3.201-1 Rev 0  8/13/98 T3.3  INSTRUMENTATION T3.3.201  ESFAS Logic and Manual Trip TLCO  3.3.201 Refer to PVNGS Improved Technical Specifications 3.3.6. APPLICABILITY: Refer to PVNGS Improved Technical Specifications 3.3.6.
ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. Two or more ESFAS subgroup relay failures per unit in a 12 month period. A.1 Perform an evaluation to determine the adequacy of the interval for SR 3.3.6.2.
The evaluation should consider the design, maintenance, and testing of all ESFAS subgroup relays.
If it is determined that the
 
SR interval is inadequate for detecting a single relay failure, the SR interval
 
should be decreased. The revised interval should be such that an ESFAS subgroup
 
relay failure can be detected prior to occurrence of a second failure.
In accordance
 
with the PVNGS
 
corrective action program.
SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY Refer to PVNGS Improved Technical Specification 3.3.6
 
Auxiliary Spray System TRM 3.4.100 PALO VERDE UNITS 1, 2, 3 T3.4.100-1 Rev 28  3/26/04 T3.4  REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM (RCS)
T3.4.100  Auxiliary Spray System TLCO  3.4.100 Both auxiliary spray valves shall be OPERABLE. APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3 and 4.
ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. One auxiliary spray valve inoperable. A.1 Restore valve to OPERABLE status.
72 hours B. Both auxiliary spray valves inoperable. B.1 Restore at least one valve to OPERABLE status. 6 hours C. Required Action and associated completion
 
time of condition A or B
 
not met. C.1 Enter TLCO 3.0.100.3 Immediately SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY TSR  3.4.100.1 Verify that power is available to each auxiliary spray valve.
24 hours TSR  3.4.100.2 Verify CH-HV-524 and CH-HV-532 are locked open. 31 days TSR  3.4.100.3 Cycle the auxiliary spray valves.
18 months RCS Chemistry TRM 3.4.101 PALO VERDE UNITS 1, 2, 3 T3.4.101-1 Rev 0  8/13/98 T3.4  Reactor Coolant System (RCS)
T3.4.101  RCS Chemistry TLCO  3.4.101 The Reactor Coolant System chemistry shall be maintained within the limits specified in Table 3.4.101-1. APPLICABILITY: At all times.
ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. ----------NOTE-----------
Condition A is applicable during MODES 1, 2, 3, and
 
4 only.
-------------------------
One or more chemistry parameter in excess of its Steady State Limit but within its Transient
 
Limit while in MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4. A.1 Restore the parameter to within its Steady
 
State Limit.
24 hours B. Required Action and associated Completion
 
Time of Condition A not met. OR One or more chemistry parameters in excess of
 
its Transient Limit while
 
in MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4. B.1 Be in MODE 3.
AND B.2 Be in MODE 5.
6 hours 36 hours (continued)
RCS Chemistry TRM 3.4.101 PALO VERDE UNITS 1, 2, 3 T3.4.101-2 Rev 0  8/13/98 ACTIONS  (continued) C. ----------NOTE-----------
Condition C is applicable at all times other than during MODES 1, 2, 3 and
: 4. -------------------------
Concentration of either chloride or fluoride in the Reactor Coolant System in excess of its
 
Steady State Limit  C.1 Restore the parameter to within its Steady State Limit.
24 hours D. Required Action and associated Completion Time of Condition C not
 
met. OR Concentration of either chloride or fluoride in
 
the Reactor Coolant
 
System in excess of its
 
Transient Limit while
 
other than during MODES 1, 2, 3 and 4. D.1 Reduce the pressurizer pressure to  500 psia, if applicable.
AND D.2 Perform an engineering evaluation to determine the effects
 
of the out-of-limit
 
condition on the
 
structural integrity
 
of the Reactor Coolant System. AND D.3 Determine that the Reactor Coolant System remains acceptable for
 
continued operation.
Immediately In accordance with the PVNGS corrective action program Prior to increasing the pressurizer pressure above
 
500 psia or
 
prior to proceeding to
 
MODE 4.
RCS Chemistry TRM 3.4.101 PALO VERDE UNITS 1, 2, 3 T3.4.101-3 Rev 0  8/13/98 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY TSR  3.4.101.1 The Reactor Coolant System chemistry shall be determined to be within the limits by sample and analysis of those parameters
 
specified in Table 3.4.101-1.
72 hours RCS Chemistry TRM 3.4.101 PALO VERDE UNITS 1, 2, 3 T3.4.101-4 Rev 0  8/13/98 Table 3.4.101-1 (Page 1 of 1)
RCS Chemistry Limits Surveillance Limits.
PARAMETER STEADY STATE LIMIT TRANSIENT LIMIT Dissolved Oxygen 1  0.10 ppm  1.00 ppm Chloride  0.15 ppm  1.50 ppm Fluoride  0.10 ppm  1.00 ppm
-------------------------------------NOTE-------------------------------------
: 1. Limits for Dissolved Oxygen are not applicable with T cold  250 F. ------------------------------------------------------------------------------
 
Pressurizer Heatup and Cooldown Limits TRM 3.4.102 PALO VERDE UNITS 1, 2, 3 T3.4.102-1 Rev 0  8/13/98 T3.4  REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM (RCS)
T3.4.102  Pressurizer Heatup and Cooldown Limits TLCO  3.4.102 The pressurizer temperature shall be limited to:
: a. A maximum heatup rate of 200 F per hour, and
: b. A maximum cooldown rate of 200 F per hour. APPLICABILITY: At all times.
ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. Pressurizer temperature limits in excess of specified values. A.1 Restore temperature to within limits.
AND A.2 Perform an engineering evaluation to determine
 
the effects of the out-of-limit condition on the structural
 
integrity of the
 
pressurizer AND A.3 Determine pressurizer remains acceptable for
 
continued operation.
30 minutes In accordance with the PVNGS
 
corrective action program.
In accordance with the PVNGS
 
corrective action program. (continued)
Pressurizer Heatup and Cooldown Limits TRM 3.4.102 PALO VERDE UNITS 1, 2, 3 T3.4.102-2 Rev 0  8/13/98 ACTIONS  (continued) B. Required Action and associated Completion Time of Condition A not met. B.1 Be in MODE 3.
AND B.2 Reduce pressurizer pressure to < 500 psig.
6 hours 36 hours SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY TSR  3.4.102.1 --------------------NOTE--------------------
Only required to be performed during pressurizer heatup and cooldown operations.
 
--------------------------------------------
Verify that pressurizer heatup and cooldown rates are within the specified limits:
30 minutes TSR  3.4.102.2 The spray water temperature differential shall be determined for use.
Each cycle of
 
main spray when less than 4 reactor coolant
 
pumps are
 
operating and
 
for each cycle
 
of auxiliary spray operation.
 
Structural Integrity TRM 3.4.103 PALO VERDE UNITS 1, 2, 3 T3.4.103-1 Rev 53  11/10/10 This Page Intentionally Left Blank
 
RCS Vents (Reactor Head Vents)
TRM 3.4.104 PALO VERDE UNITS 1, 2, 3 T3.4.104-1 Rev 28  3/26/04 T3.4  REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM (RCS)
T3.4.104  RCS Vents (Reactor Head Vents) TLCO  3.4.104 Four reactor vessel head vent paths shall be OPERABLE. APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, and 3 MODE 4 with RCS pressure  385 psia.
ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. Two or three required reactor vessel head vent paths inoperable. A.1 Restore required vent path(s) to OPERABLE
 
status. 72 hours B. All reactor vessel head vent paths inoperable. B.1 Restore at least one path to OPERABLE
 
status. 6 hours C. Required Action and associated Completion
 
Time of Condition A or B
 
not met. C.1 Enter TLCO 3.0.100.3 Immediately
 
RCS Vents (Reactor Head Vents)
TRM 3.4.104 PALO VERDE UNITS 1, 2, 3 T3.4.104-2 Rev 0  8/13/98 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS
-------------------------------------NOTE-------------------------------------
Perform TSR 3.4.104.1, TSR 3.4.104.2 and TSR 3.4.104.3 when in MODE 5 or 6.
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
SURVEILLA NCE FREQUENCY TSR  3.4.104.1 Verify all manual isolation valves in each vent path are locked in the open position.
18 months TSR  3.4.104.2 Cycle each vent valve through at least one complete cycle from the control room.
18 months TSR  3.4.104.3 Verify flow through the reactor coolant system vent paths during venting.
18 months
 
RCS Pressure and Temperature (P/T) Limits TRM 3.4.200 PALO VERDE UNITS 1, 2, 3 T3.4.200-1 Rev 52  7/16/10 T3.4  REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM (RCS)
T3.4.200  RCS Pressure and Temperature (P/T) Limits TLCO  3.4.200 Refer to PVNGS Improved Technical Specifications 3.4.3. APPLICABILITY: Refer to PVNGS Improved Technical Specifications 3.4.3.
ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. Requirements of TSR 3.4.200.1 not met. A.1 Document the condition in accordance with the PVNGS corrective action program and initiate an
 
operability
 
determination, as
 
necessary, to determine
 
the impact on equipment in the technical specifications.
Immediately
----------------------------------NOTE------------------------------------
 
Changes to the reactor vessel surveillance specimen withdrawal schedule that meet the applicable ASTM standard must be submitted to the NRC with technical justification for approval prior to implementation (the NRC must verify
 
compliance with the ASTM standard) in accordance with 10 CFR 50, Appendix H, paragraph III.B.3. Changes to the withdrawal schedule that do not meet the
 
applicable ASTM standard must be submitted to the NRC for approval as a
 
license amendment with information required by 10 CFR 50.91 and 50.92 (see NRC Administrative Letter 97-04 dated September 30, 1997).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 
SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY TSR  3.4.200.1 The reactor vessel material irradiation surveillance specimens shall be removed and examined to determine changes in material properties at the intervals required by 10 CFR
 
50, Appendix H in accordance with PVNGS UFSAR
 
section 5.3.1.6.6 "Withdrawal Schedule". The
 
results of these examinations shall be used to
 
update the PTLR.
Refer to PVNGS
 
UFSAR Section 5.3.1.6.6 "Withdrawal
 
Schedule" Pressurizer TRM 3.4.201 PALO VERDE UNITS 1, 2, 3 T3.4.201-1 Rev 46  1/8/09 T3.4  REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM (RCS)
T3.4.201  Pressurizer TLCO  3.4.201 Refer to PVNGS Improved Technical Specifications 3.4.9. APPLICABILITY: Refer to PVNGS Improved Technical Specifications 3.4.9.
ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTIO N COMPLETION TIME A. Requirements of TSR 3.4.201.1 not met. A.1 Document the condition in accordance with the PVNGS corrective action program and initiate an
 
operability
 
determination, as
 
necessary, to determine
 
the impact on equipment in the technical specifications.
Immediately SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY TSR  3.4.201.1 The emergency power supply for the pressurizer heaters shall be demonstrated OPERABLE by verifying that on an Engineered
 
Safety Features Actuation test signal
 
concurrent with a loss-of-offsite power:
The pressurizer heaters are automatically shed from the emergency power sources and; The pressurizer heaters can be reconnected to their respective buses manually from the
 
control room.
18 months
 
Pressurizer Vents TRM 3.4.202 PALO VERDE UNITS 1, 2, 3 T3.4.202-1 Rev 46  1/8/09 T3.4  REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM T3.4.202 Pressurizer Vents TLCO  3.4.202 Refer to PVNGS Improved Technical Specifications 3.4.12. APPLICABILITY: Refer to PVNGS Improved Technical Specifications 3.4.12.
ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. Requirements of TSR 3.4.202.1 not met. A.1 Document the condition in accordance with the PVNGS corrective action program and initiate an
 
operability
 
determination, as
 
necessary, to determine
 
the impact on equipment in the technical specifications.
Immediately SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANC E FREQUENCY TSR  3.4.202.1 Verify all manual isolation valves in each vent path are locked in the open position (when in MODE 5 or 6).
18 months
 
RCS Operational LEAKAGE TRM 3.4.203 PALO VERDE UNITS 1, 2, 3 T3.4.203-1 Rev 46  1/8/09 T3.4  REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM T3.4.203  RCS Operational LEAKAGE TLCO  3.4.203 Refer to PVNGS Improved Technical Specification 3.4.14. APPLICABILITY: Refer to PVNGS Improved Technical Specification 3.4.14.
ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. Requirements of TSR 3.4.203.1 or 3.4.203.2 not met. A.1 Document the condition in accordance with the
 
PVNGS corrective action program and initiate an
 
operability
 
determination, as
 
necessary, to determine
 
the impact on equipment in the technical specifications.
Immediately SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY TSR  3.4.203.1 Monitor the containment sump inventory and discharge.
12 hours TSR  3.4.203.2 Monitor the reactor head flange leakoff system. 24 hours RCS PIV Leakage TRM 3.4.204 PALO VERDE UNITS 1, 2, 3 T3.4.204-1 Rev 46  1/8/09 T3.4  REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM T3.4.204  RCS PIV Leakage TLCO  3.4.204 Refer to PVNGS Improved Technical Specifications LCO 3.4.15. APPLICABILITY: Refer to PVNGS Improved Technical Specifications LCO 3.4.15.
ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. Requirements of TSR 3.4.204.1 not met. A.1 Document the condition in accordance with the PVNGS corrective action program and initiate an
 
operability
 
determination, as
 
necessary, to determine
 
the impact on equipment in the technical specifications.
Immediately SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY TSR  3.4.204.1 -------------------NOTE---------------------
The provisions of this TSR are not applicable for valves UV-651, UV-652, UV-653
 
and UV-654 due to position indication of
 
valves in the control room.
--------------------------------------------
Each reactor Coolant System pressure
 
isolation valve shall be demonstrated
 
OPERABLE by verifying leakage to be within
 
its limit.
Within 72 hours
 
following a
 
system response
 
to an Engineered
 
Safety Feature
 
actuation signal.
Safety Injection Tanks TRM 3.5.200 PALO VERDE UNITS 1, 2, 3 T3.5.200-1 Rev 46  1/8/09 T3.5  EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS (ECCS)
T3.5.200  Safety Injection Tanks TLCO  3.5.200 Refer to PVNGS Improved Technical Specifications LCOs 3.5.1 and 3.5.2 APPLICABILITY: Refer to PVNGS Improved Technical Specifications LCOs 3.5.1 and 3.5.2 ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. Requirements of TSR 3.5.200.1, 3.5.200.2, 3.5.200.3, 3.5.200.4 or 3.5.200.5 not met. A.1 Document the condition in accordance with the PVNGS corrective action program and initiate an
 
operability determination, as necessary, to
 
determine the impact on equipment in the technical specifications.
Immediately Safety Injection Tanks TRM 3.5.200 PALO VERDE UNITS 1, 2, 3 T3.5.200-2 Rev 0  8/13/98 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY TSR  3.5.200.1 -------------------NOTE------------------
Nitrogen vent valves may be cycled as necessary to maintain the required nitrogen cover pressure in accordance with PVNGS Improved Technical
 
Specifications 3.5.1 and 3.5.2.
-----------------------------------------
Verify the required safety injection tank
 
nitrogen vent valves are closed when pressurizer pressure is  430 psia.
12 hours TSR  3.5.200.2 -------------------NOTE------------------
Nitrogen vent valves may be cycled as necessary to maintain the required nitrogen cover pressure in accordance with PVNGS Improved Technical
 
Specifications 3.5.1 and 3.5.2.
-----------------------------------------
Verify that power is removed from the
 
required nitrogen vent valves when pressurizer pressure is  1500 psia.
31 days TSR  3.5.200.3 Verify that the SIT nitrogen vent valves can be opened when the SITS are isolated.
18 months TSR  3.5.200.4 Verify that each safety injection tank isolation valve opens automatically under each of the following conditions:
: 1. Prior to exceeding an actual or simulated RCS pressure signal of 515 psia, and
: 2. Upon receipt of a safety injection actuation (SIAS) test signal 18 months 18 months (continued)
Safety Injection Tanks TRM 3.5.200 PALO VERDE UNITS 1, 2, 3 T3.5.200-3 Rev 0  8/13/98 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS  (continued)
TSR  3.5.200.5 Verify OPERABILITY of RCS-SIT differential pressure alarm by simulating RCS pressure greater than 715 psia with SIT pressure less than 600 psig.
18 months Shutdown Cooling System TRM 3.5.201 PALO VERDE UNITS 1, 2, 3 T3.5.201-1 Rev 16 8/30/01 T3.5  EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS (ECCS)
T3.5.201  Shutdown Cooling System TLCO  3.5.201 Two independent shutdown cooling subsystems shall be OPERABLE, with each subsystem comprised of: a. One OPERABLE low pressure safety injection pump, and
: b. An independent OPERABLE flow path capable of taking suction from the RCS hot leg and discharging coolant through the shutdown cooling heat exchanger and back to the RCS through the cold leg injection lines. APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, and 3.
ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. One shutdown cooling subsystem inoperable. A.1 Restore the inoperable subsystem to OPERABLE STATUS 7 days B. Required Action and associated Completion Time of Condition A not met. B.1 Continue action to restore the required subsystems to OPERABLE status. AND B.2 Verify the functionality of the inoperable subsystem Immediately 1 hour C. Required Action and associated Completion Time of Condition B not met. C.1 Be in MODE 3 AND C.2 Be in MODE 4 7 hours 13 hours (continued)
Shutdown Cooling System TRM 3.5.201 PALO VERDE UNITS 1, 2, 3 T3.5.201-2 Rev 47 2/26/09 ACTIONS  (continued) D. Both shutdown cooling subsystems inoperable. D.1 Restore one subsystem to OPERABLE status.
6 hours E. Required Actions and associated Completion time of Condition D not met. E.1 Continue action to restore the required subsystems to OPERABLE status. AND E.2 Verify the functionality of one
 
inoperable subsystem.
Immediately 1 hour F. Required Actions and associated Completion time of Condition E not met. F.1 Be in MODE 3 AND F.2 Be in MODE 4 7 hours 13 hours G. Both shutdown cooling subsystems inoperable and both reactor coolant loops
 
inoperable. G.1 Initiate action to restore the required subsystems to OPERABLE status. Immediately SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY TSR  3.5.201.1 Establish shutdown cooling flow (during shutdown) from the RCS hot legs, through the shutdown cooling heat exchangers, and returning to the RCS cold leg.
18 months TSR  3.5.201.2 Verify shutdown cooling system suction piping is full of water.
31 days ECCS - Operating TRM 3.5.202 PALO VERDE UNITS 1, 2, 3 T3.5.202-1 Rev 46 1/8/09 T3.5.202  ECCS - Operating TLCO  3.5.202 Refer to PVNGS Improved Technical Specifications 3.5.3. APPLICABILITY: Refer to PVNGS Improved Technical Specifications 3.5.3.
ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. ECCS actuates and injects water into the Reactor Coolant System. A.1 Initiate a corrective action to evaluate the
 
circumstances of the actuation and the total accumulated actuation
 
cycles to date. The current value of the usage factor for each
 
affected injection nozzle shall be provided in this corrective action whenever its value exceeds 0.70.
In accordance with the PVNGS
 
corrective action program. B. Requirements of TSR 3.5.202.1, 3.5.202.2
 
3.5.202.3 or 3.5.202.4 not met. B.1 Document the condition in accordance with the PVNGS corrective action program and initiate an
 
operability determination, as necessary, to determine the impact on equipment in the technical specifications.
Immediately ECCS - Operating TRM 3.5.202 PALO VERDE UNITS 1, 2, 3 T3.5.202-2 Rev 39 1/26/07 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY TSR  3.5.202.1 Conduct a visual inspection to verify that no loose debris (rags, trash, clothing, etc.) is present in the containment which could be transported to the containment sump and cause restriction of the pump suctions
 
during LOCA conditions.
Prior to establishing
 
containment OPERABILITY, for all accessible
 
areas of the containment.
AND Daily and during the final entry, for areas in
 
containment affected by a containment entry, when the containment is OPERABLE. TSR  3.5.202.2 Conduct a flow balance test and verify that the flow rates meet the requirements listed in Table 3.5.202-1.
------NOTE------
Perform during shutdown.
----------------
 
Following completion of modifications (that alter the subsystem flow characteristics) to the ECCS subsystems. (continued)
ECCS - Operating TRM 3.5.202 PALO VERDE UNITS 1, 2, 3 T3.5.202-3 Rev 47  2/26/09 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS  (continued)
TSR  3.5.202.3 Verify the correct position of each electrical and/or mechanical position stop for the following ECCS throttle valves:
LPSI System Valve Number Hot Leg Injection Valve Number
: 1. SIB-UV 615, SIA-HV 306 1. SIC-HV-321 2. SIB-UV-625, SIB-HV 307 2. SID-HV 331
: 3. SIA-UV 635
: 4. SIA-UV 645 Within 4 hours following completion of each valve
 
stroking operation or maintenance on the valve when the ECCS subsystems are
 
required to be OPERABLE TSR  3.5.202.4 Verify ECCS pump suction piping is full of water 31 days ECCS - Operating TRM 3.5.202 PALO VERDE UNITS 1, 2, 3 T3.5.202-4 Rev 0 8/13/98 Table 3.5.202-1 (Page 1 of 1)
ECCS Flow Rates SOURCE PARAMETER REQUIRED FLOWRATE HPSI System Single Pump Injection Lines - Sum of the flow rates, excluding the highest flow rate  816 gpm LPSI System Single Pump Injection Loop 1 - Total flow 4800
+/- 200 gpm  Injection Legs 1A and 1B - When tested individually, with the
 
other leg isolated Within 200 gpm
 
of each other Injection Loop 2 - Total flow 4800
+/- 200 gpm  Injection Legs 2A and 2B - When
 
tested individually, with the other leg isolated Within 200 gpm of each other.
Simultaneous Hot Leg
 
and Cold Leg Injection
- Single Pump Hot Leg  525 gpm.
Cold Leg - Sum of flowrates  525 gpm.
Total Pump Flowrate  1200 gpm.
ECCS - Shutdown TRM 3.5.203 PALO VERDE UNITS 1, 2, 3 T3.5.203-1 Rev 46 1/8/09 T3.5  EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS (ECCS)
T3.5.203  ECCS - Shutdown TLCO  3.5.203 Refer to PVNGS Improved Technical Specifications 3.5.4. APPLICABILITY: Refer to PVNGS Improved Technical Specifications 3.5.4.
ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. ECCS actuates and injects water into the Reactor Coolant System. A.1 Initiate a corrective action to evaluate the circumstances of the actuation and the total
 
accumulated actuation cycles to date. The current value of the usage factor for each affected injection nozzle shall be provided in this corrective action whenever its value exceeds 0.70.
In accordance with the PVNGS corrective action program. B. Requirements of TSR 3.5.203.1 not met. B.1 Document the condition in accordance with the PVNGS corrective action program and initiate an operability determination, as
 
necessary, to determine the impact on equipment in the technical specifications.
Immediately ECCS - Shutdown TRM 3.5.203 PALO VERDE UNITS 1, 2, 3 T3.5.203-2 Rev 35  8/31/05 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY TSR  3.5.203.1 The following TSRs are applicable:  TSR 3.5.202.1 TSR 3.5.202.2 TSR 3.5.202.3 TSR 3.5.202.4 In accordance with applicable
 
TSRs Hydrogen Purge Cleanup System TRM 3.6.100 PALO VERDE UNITS 1, 2, 3 T3.6.100-1 Rev 28  3/26/04 T3.6  CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS T3.6.100  Hydrogen Purge Cleanup System TLCO  3.6.100 A containment hydrogen purge cleanup system, shared among the three units, shall be OPERABLE and capable of being powered from a minimum of one OPERABLE emergency bus. APPLICABILITY: MODES 1 and 2 with less than two hydrogen recombiners OPERABLE.
ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. Containment hydrogen purge cleanup system inoperable and only one hydrogen recombiner
 
OPERABLE. A.1 Restore the hydrogen purge cleanup system to OPERABLE status.
30 days B. Required Action and associated Completion Time of Condition A not
 
met. B.1 Enter TLCO 3.0.100.3 Immediately Hydrogen Purge Cleanup System TRM 3.6.100 PALO VERDE UNITS 1, 2, 3 T3.6.100-2 Rev 0  8/13/98 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY TSR  3.6.100.1 Initiate flow through the HEPA filters and charcoal adsorbers and verify that the system operates for at least 15 minutes.
31 days TSR  3.6.100.2 Perform required hydrogen purge cleanup system filter testing in accordance with the
 
TRM Ventilation Filter Testing Program (VFTP) (Reference TRM 5.0.500.11).
In accordance with the TRM VFTP Pre-Stressed Concrete Containment Tendon Surveillance TRM 3.6.200 PALO VERDE UNITS 1, 2, 3 T3.6.200-1 Rev 22  3/7/03 T3.6  CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS T3.6.200  Pre-Stressed Concrete Containment Tendon Surveillance TLCO  3.6.200 The acceptance criteria of the Pre-Stressed Concrete Containment Tendon Surveillance Program shall be met. APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3 and 4.
ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. Acceptance criteria not met (except for the average of all measured
 
pre-stressing forces requirements). A.1 Restore containment vessel to the required level of integrity.
AND A.2 Perform an Engineering Evaluation of the
 
containment vessel structural integrity.
15 days In accordance with the PVNGS corrective action program (continued)
Pre-Stressed Concrete Containment Tendon Surveillance TRM 3.6.200 PALO VERDE UNITS 1, 2, 3 T3.6.200-2 Rev 22  3/7/03 ACTIONS (continued)
CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME B. Acceptance criteria not met for the average of all measured pre-stressing forces requirements. B.1 Restore containment vessel to the required
 
level of integrity.
AND B.2 Perform an engineering evaluation of the containment vessel structural integrity 72 hours In accordance with the PVNGS
 
corrective action program C Required Action and associated Completion
 
Time not met. C.1 Be in MODE 3 AND C.2 Be in MODE 5 6 hours 36 hours SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY TSR  3.6.200.1 Testing shall be performed in accordance with the Pre-Stressed Concrete Containment Tendon Surveillance Program (Reference TRM 5.0.500.6).
In accordance with the Pre-Stressed
 
Concrete Containment Tendon Surveillance
 
Program Containment Spray Systems TRM 3.6.201 PALO VERDE UNITS 1, 2, 3 T3.6.201-1 Rev 47  2/26/09 T3.6  CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS T3.6.201  Containment Spray Systems TLCO  3.6.201 Refer to PVNGS Improved Technical Specifications 3.6.6 APPLICABILITY: Refer to PVNGS Improved Technical Specifications 3.6.6
 
ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. Requirements of TSR 3.6.201.1 not met. A.1 Document the condition in accordance with the PVNGS corrective action program and initiate an
 
operability determination, as necessary, to determine
 
the impact on equipment in the technical specifications.
Immediately SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY TSR  3.6.201.1 Verify containment spray system suction piping is full of water.
31 days Hydrogen Recombiners TRM 3.6.300 PALO VERDE UNITS 1,2,3 T3.6.300-1 REV 48  7/22/09 T3.6  CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS T3.6.300  Hydrogen Recombiners TLCO  3.6.300 Two hydrogen recombiners shared among the three units shall be OPERABLE. APPLICABILITY: MODES 1 and 2.
ACTIONS
------------------------------------NOTE-------------------------------------
 
All three PVNGS Units (Units 1, 2, and 3) shall simultaneously comply with the REQUIRED ACTION(s) when the shared portion of the hydrogen recombiner(s)
 
is the cause of a CONDITION.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------
CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. One hydrogen recombiner inoperable. A.1 Restore hydrogen recombiner to OPERABLE status.
30 days B. Two hydrogen recombiners
 
inoperable. B.1 Verify by administrative means
 
that the hydrogen
 
control function is
 
maintained.
AND 1 hour AND Every 12 hours thereafter B.2 Restore one hydrogen recombiner to
 
OPERABLE status.
7 days C. Required Action and associated Completion
 
Time not met. C.1 Enter TLCO 3.0.100.3. Immediately Hydrogen Recombiners TRM 3.6.300 PALO VERDE UNITS 1,2,3 T3.6.300-2 REV 48  7/22/09 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY TSR 3.6.300-1 Visually examine each hydrogen recombiner enclosure and verify there is no evidence of abnormal conditions.
6 months TSR 3.6.300-2 Perform a functional test for each hydrogen recombiner.
6 months TSR 3.6.300-3 Perform a CHANNEL CALIBRATION to include a System Functional Test for each hydrogen
 
recombiner.
12 months
 
Steam Generator Pressure and Temperature Limitations TRM 3.7.100 PALO VERDE UNITS 1, 2, 3 T3.7.100-1 Rev 27 2/24/04 T3.7  PLANT SYSTEMS T3.7.100  Steam Generator Pressure and Temperature Limitations TLCO  3.7.100 The temperature of the secondary coolant in the steam generators shall be greater than 120 F in Units 1 and 3, or 70 F in Unit 2, when the pressure of the secondary coolant
 
in the steam generator is greater than 230 psig in Units 1
 
and 3, or 650 psig in Unit 2. APPLICABILITY: At all times.
ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. With the requirements of the above specification not satisfied. A.1 Reduce the steam generator pressure to
 
less than or equal to
 
230 psig in Units 1 and 3, or 650 psig in Unit 2. AND A.2 Perform an engineering evaluation to determine
 
the effect of the overpressurization on the structural
 
integrity of the steam
 
generator. Determine
 
that the steam
 
generator remains acceptable for continued operation 30 minutes Prior to increasing its
 
temperature
 
above 200 F.
Steam Generator Pressure and Temperature Limitations TRM 3.7.100 PALO VERDE UNITS 1, 2, 3 T3.7.100-2 Rev 27  2/24/04 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY TSR  3.7.100.1 Verify that the pressure in the secondary side of the steam generators is less than 230 psig in Units 1 and 3, or 650 psig in
 
Unit 2. Once per 12
 
hours when the
 
temperature of
 
the secondary
 
coolant is less
 
than 120 F in Units 1 and 3, or 70 F in Unit 2.
Snubbers TRM 3.7.101 PALO VERDE UNITS 1, 2, 3 T3.7.101-1 Rev 46  1/8/09 T3.7  PLANT SYSTEMS T3.7.101  Snubbers TLCO  3.7.101 All hydraulic and mechanical snubbers shall be able to perform their associated safety function(s). The only snubbers excluded from this requirement are those installed
 
on nonsafety-related systems and then only if their failure
 
or failure of the system on which they are installed, would
 
have no adverse effect on any safety-related system. APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3 and 4.
MODES 5 and 6 for snubbers located on systems required OPERABLE in those MODES.
ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. One or more snubbers unable to perform their
 
associated safety
 
function(s). A.1.1 Enter TS LCO 3.0.8 IF the restrictions for
 
utilizing TS LCO 3.0.8
 
described in the
 
LCO 3.0.8 TS Bases are
 
met. OR A.1.2 Declare the supported system inoperable and
 
follow the appropriate
 
ACTION statement for
 
that system.
AND A.2 Upon failure to meet the functional test
 
acceptance criteria, perform an engineering
 
evaluation on the
 
attached component.
Immediately Immediately 72 hours Snubbers TRM 3.7.101 PALO VERDE UNITS 1, 2, 3 T3.7.101-2 Rev 46  1/8/09 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY TSR 3.7.101.1 Each snubber shall be demonstrated able to perform their associated safety function(s) in accordance with the requirements of the
 
ASME OM Code 2001 Edition and ASME OMb CODE-2003 Addenda, Subsection ISTD. "Preservice and Inservice Examination and Testing of
 
Dynamic Restraints (Snubbers) in Light-Water
 
Reactor Nuclear Power Plants," and approved
 
relief requests. Preservice and inservice
 
examinations must be performed using the VT-3 visual examination method described in IWA-2213.
In accordance
 
with the requirements of
 
the ASME OM Code. Subsection
 
ISTD.
Sealed Source Contamination TRM 3.7.102 PALO VERDE UNITS 1, 2, 3 T3.7.102-1 Rev 0  8/13/98 T3.7  PLANT SYSTEMS T3.7.102  Sealed Source Contamination TLCO  3.7.102 Each sealed source containing radioactive material either in excess of 100 microcuries of beta and/or gamma emitting material or 5 microcuries of alpha emitting material shall
 
be free of greater than or equal to 0.005 microcuries of
 
removable contamination. APPLICABILITY: At all times.
ACTIONS -----------------------------------NOTE---------------------------------------
 
The provisions of TLCO 3.0.100.3 are not applicable.
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. With a sealed source having removable
 
contamination in excess
 
of the above limit. A.1 Withdraw the sealed source from use.
AND A.2.1 Decontaminate and repair the sealed
 
source. OR A.2.2 Dispose of the sealed source. Immediately Prior to returning the
 
sealed source
 
to use In accordance with Commission Regulations Sealed Source Contamination TRM 3.7.102 PALO VERDE UNITS 1, 2, 3 T3.7.102-2 Rev 0  8/13/98 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS
-------------------------------------NOTE-------------------------------------
Each category of sealed sources (excluding startup sources and fission detectors previously subjected to core flux) shall be tested for leakage
 
and/or contamination, at the frequencies described below, by the licensee or
 
other persons specifically authorized by the Commission or an Agreement State. 
 
The test method shall have a detection sensitivity of at least 0.005
 
microcuries per test sample.
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY TSR  3.7.102.1 SOURCES IN USE - Leakage or contamination test sealed sources containing radioactive material:
: a. With a half-life greater than 30 days (excluding Hydrogen 3), and
: b. In any form other than gas.
6 months 6 months TSR  3.7.102.2 STORED SOURCES NOT IN USE - Each sealed source and fission detector shall be leakage or contamination tested.
Prior to use or
 
transfer to
 
another licensee
 
unless tested
 
within the previous 6 months. AND Prior to use if received without
 
a certificate indicating the last test date (continued)
Sealed Source Contamination TRM 3.7.102 PALO VERDE UNITS 1, 2, 3 T3.7.102-3 Rev 0  8/13/98 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS  (continued) TSR  3.7.102.3 Startup source and fission detectors shall be leakage or contamination tested.
Within 31 days prior to being subjected to core flux or
 
installed in the
 
core AND Following repair or maintenance to the source or
 
detector. TSR  3.7.102.4 A report shall be prepared and submitted to the Commission if sealed source or fission
 
detector leakage tests reveal the presence
 
of greater than or equal to 0.005
 
microcuries of removable contamination.
Annually Atmospheric Dump Valves (ADVs)
TRM 3.7.200 PALO VERDE UNITS 1, 2, 3 T3.7.200-1 Rev 42  07/12/07 T3.7  PLANT SYSTEMS T3.7.200  Atmospheric Dump Valves (ADVs) TLCO  3.7.200 Two ADV lines per steam generator (SG) shall be OPERABLE. APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, and 3 MODE 4 when SG is being relied upon for heat removal.
ACTIONS -----------------------------------NOTE----------------------------------
 
Separate Condition entry is allowed for each SG.
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. Requirements of TSR 3.7.200.1 not met. A.1 Document the condition in the corrective action program and initiate an operability determination, as necessary, to determine
 
the impact on equipment in
 
the technical specifications.
Immediately B. One ADV line per SG inoperable.
B.1. Restore the ADV line to OPERABLE status.
7 days C. Required Action and associated Completion Time of Condition B not met. C.1 Enter TLCO 3.0.100.3 Immediately D. Two ADV lines on one SG inoperable. D.1 See TS 3.7.4, Condition A. See TS 3.7.4, Condition A.
E. Two ADV lines on both SGs inoperable.
E.1 See TS 3.7.4, Condition B. See TS 3.7.4, Condition B.
Atmospheric Dump Valves (ADVs)
TRM 3.7.200 PALO VERDE UNITS 1, 2, 3 T3.7.200-2 Rev 53  11/10/10 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY TSR  3.7.200.1 Verify that the nitrogen accumulator tank is at a pressure  615 PSIG indicated.
24 hours AFW System TRM 3.7.201 PALO VERDE UNITS 1, 2, 3 T3.7.201-1 Rev 46  1/8/09 T3.7  PLANT SYSTEMS T3.7.201  AFW System TLCO  3.7.201 Refer to PVNGS Improved Technical Specifications 3.7.5. APPLICABILITY: Refer to PVNGS Improved Technical Specifications 3.7.5.
ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. Requirements of TSR 3.7.201.1 not met. A.1 Document the condition in accordance with the PVNGS corrective action program and initiate an
 
operability
 
determination, as
 
necessary, to determine
 
the impact on equipment in the technical specifications.
Immediately SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY TSR  3.7.201.1 Verify that all manual valves in the suction lines from the primary AFW supply tank (condensate storage tank CTE-T01) to each
 
essential AFW pump, and the manual discharge
 
line valve of each AFW pump are locked, sealed or otherwise secured in the open position.
31 days Essential Cooling Water (EW) System TRM 3.7.202 PALO VERDE UNITS 1, 2, 3 T3.7.202-1 Rev 46  1/8/09 T3.7  PLANT SYSTEMS T3.7.202  Essential Cooling Water (EW) System TLCO  3.7.202 Refer to PVNGS Improved Technical Specifications 3.7.7. APPLICABILITY: Refer to PVNGS Improved Technical Specifications 3.7.7.
ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. Requirements of TSR 3.7.202.1 not met. A.1 Document the condition in accordance with the PVNGS corrective action program and initiate an
 
operability
 
determination, as
 
necessary, to determine
 
the impact on equipment in the technical specifications.
Immediately SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY TSR  3.7.202.1 Verify that each valve (manual, power-operated, or automatic) servicing safety-related equipment that is locked, sealed, or
 
otherwise secured in position, is in its
 
correct position.
------NOTE------
 
Perform during
 
shutdown.
 
----------------
 
18 months
 
Essential Spray Pond System (ESPS)
TRM 3.7.203 PALO VERDE UNITS 1, 2, 3 T3.7.203-1 Rev 46  1/8/09 T3.7  PLANT SYSTEMS T3.7.203  Essential Spray Pond System (ESPS) TLCO  3.7.203 Refer to PVNGS Improved Technical Specifications 3.7.8. APPLICABILITY: Refer to PVNGS Improved Technical Specifications 3.7.8.
ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. Requirements of TSR 3.7.203.1 not met. A.1 Document the condition in accordance with the PVNGS corrective action program and initiate an
 
operability
 
determination, as
 
necessary, to determine
 
the impact on equipment in the technical specifications.
Immediately SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY TSR  3.7.203.1 Verify that each valve (manual, power-operated, or automatic) servicing safety-related equipment that is locked, sealed, or
 
otherwise secured in position, is in its
 
correct position.
------NOTE------
 
Perform during
 
shutdown.
 
----------------
 
18 months
 
Essential Chilled Water (EC) System TRM 3.7.204 PALO VERDE UNITS 1, 2, 3 T3.7.204-1 Rev 46  1/8/09 T3.7  PLANT SYSTEMS T3.7.204  Essential Chilled Water (EC) System TLCO  3.7.204 Refer to PVNGS Improved Technical Specifications 3.7.10. APPLICABILITY: Refer to PVNGS Improved Technical Specifications 3.7.10.
ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. Requirements of TSR 3.7.204.1 not met. A.1 Document the condition in accordance with the PVNGS corrective action program and initiate an
 
operability
 
determination, as
 
necessary, to determine
 
the impact on equipment in the technical specifications.
Immediately SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY TSR  3.7.204.1 Verify that each valve (manual, power-operated, or automatic) servicing safety-related equipment that is locked, sealed, or
 
otherwise secured in position, is in its
 
correct position.
------NOTE------
 
Perform during
 
shutdown.
 
----------------
 
18 months
 
Control Room Emergency Air Temperature Control System (CREATCS)
TRM 3.7.205 PALO VERDE UNITS 1, 2, 3 T3.7.205-1 Rev 46  1/8/09 T3.7  PLANT SYSTEMS T3.7.205  Control Room Emergency Air Temperature Control System (CREATCS) TLCO  3.7.205 The control room air temperature shall be maintained less than or equal to 80 F. APPLICABILITY: All MODES ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. Control room air temperature greater than 80 F. A.1 Reduce the air temperature to less
 
than or equal to 80 F. 30 days B. Required Action and associated Completion
 
Time of Condition A not met in MODES 1, 2, 3, or 
: 4. B.1 Enter TLCO 3.0.100.3.
Immediately C. Required Action and associated Completion Time of Condition A not
 
met in MODE 5, MODE 6,  C.1 Action shall be initiated immediately
 
to communicate the
 
situation to the Shift
 
Manager and document
 
the condition in
 
accordance with the PVNGS corrective action program. An initial
 
decision on whether the
 
unit  Immediately (continued)
Control Room Emergency Air Temperature Control System (CREATCS)
TRM 3.7.205 PALO VERDE UNITS 1, 2, 3 T3.7.205-2 Rev 46  1/8/09 ACTION CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME can continue to operate with the condition
 
shall be completed
 
within 7 hours. 
 
Further actions shall be as required by the corrective action
 
disposition and as
 
deemed necessary by
 
plant management.
SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY TSR  3.7.205.1 Verify that the control room air temperature is less than or equal to 80F. 12 hours Fuel Storage Pool Water Level TRM 3.7.206 PALO VERDE UNITS 1, 2, 3 T3.7.206-1 Rev 0  8/13/98 T3.7  PLANT SYSTEMS T3.7.206  Fuel Storage Pool Water Level TLCO  3.7.206 Refer to PVNGS Improved Technical Specifications 3.7.14. APPLICABILITY: Refer to PVNGS Improved Technical Specifications 3.7.14.
ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. Required Action and associated Completion Time of ITS 3.7.14 Condition A not met.
----------NOTE---------
 
TLCO 3.0.100.3 is not applicable.
----------------------- A.1 Suspend crane operations with loads
 
in the fuel storage
 
areas. Immediately SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY Refer to PVNGS Improved Technical Specifications LCO 3.7.14.
 
Secondary Specific Activity TRM 3.7.207 PALO VERDE UNITS 1, 2, 3 T3.7.207-1 Rev 46  1/8/09 T3.7  PLANT SYSTEMS T3.7.207  Secondary Specific Activity TLCO  3.7.207 Refer to PVNGS Improved Technical Specifications 3.7.16. APPLICABILITY: Refer to PVNGS Improved Technical Specifications 3.7.16.
ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. Requirements of TSR 3.7.207.1 not met. A.1 Document the condition in accordance with the PVNGS corrective action program and initiate an
 
operability
 
determination, as
 
necessary, to determine
 
the impact on equipment in the technical specifications.
Immediately SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY TSR  3.7.207.1 Verify that the gross activity of the secondary coolant system is within the limit by performing a Gross Activity Determination 72 hours Cathodic Protection TRM 3.8.100 PALO VERDE UNITS 1, 2, 3 T3.8.100-1 Rev 46  1/8/09 T3.8  ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS T3.8.100  Cathodic Protection TLCO  3.8.100 The Cathodic Protection System associated with the Diesel Generator Fuel Oil Storage Tanks shall be OPERABLE. APPLICABILITY: At all times.
ACTIONS -------------------------------------NOTE-------------------------------------
The provisions of TLCO 3.0.100.3 are not applicable.
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. Cathodic Protection System Inoperable. A.1 Restore to OPERABLE 30 days B. Required Action and associated Completion Time of Condition A not met. B.1 Initiate a corrective action to evaluate the cause of the malfunction and the plans for restoring the
 
system to OPERABLE status. In accordance with the PVNGS
 
corrective action program.
Cathodic Protection TRM 3.8.100 PALO VERDE UNITS 1, 2, 3 T3.8.100-2 Rev 0  8/13/98 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY TSR  3.8.100.1 Verify that the Cathodic Protection rectifiers are OPERABLE and have been inspected in accordance with Regulatory Guide 1.137.
61 days TSR  3.8.100.2 Verify that the Cathodic Protection is OPERABLE and providing adequate protection against corrosion in accordance with Regulatory Guide 1.137.
12 months Containment Penetration Conductor Overcurrent Protection Devices TRM 3.8.101 PALO VERDE UNITS 1, 2, 3 T3.8.101-1 Rev 46  1/8/09 T3.8  ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS T3.8.101  Containment Penetration Conductor Overcurrent Protection Devices TLCO  3.8.101 Primary and backup containment penetration conductor overcurrent protective devices associated with each containment electrical penetration circuit shall be
 
OPERABLE.
---------------------------NOTE-----------------------------
The scope of these protective devices excludes those circuits for which credible fault currents would not exceed the electrical penetration design rating.
------------------------------------------------------------ APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3 and 4.
Containment Penetration Conductor Overcurrent Protection Devices TRM 3.8.101 PALO VERDE UNITS 1, 2, 3 T3.8.101-2 Rev 40  2/21/07 ACTIONS ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. One or more required containment penetration conductor overcurrent protective devices
 
inoperable. A.1 Restore the protection device(s) to OPERABLE status. OR A.2.1 Deenergize the circuit(s) and declare the affected system or
 
component inoperable.
AND A.2.2 Verify the backup circuit breaker to be tripped or the inoperable circuit
 
breaker racked out.
72 hours 72 hours At least once per 7 days B. Required Action and Associated Completion Time not met. B.1 Enter TLCO 3.0.100.3.
Immediately
 
Containment Penetration Conductor Overcurrent Protection Devices TRM 3.8.101 PALO VERDE UNITS 1, 2, 3 T3.8.101-3 Rev 12  3/30/01 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY TSR  3.8.101.1 Perform a CHANNEL CALIBRATION of the protective relays associated with the medium voltage (4-15 KV) circuit breakers by selecting, on a rotating basis, at least 10%
of the circuit breakers of each voltage
 
level. 18 months TSR  3.8.101.2 Perform an integrated system functional test 1 of medium and lower voltage circuit breakers by selecting, on a rotating basis, at least 10% of the circuit breakers of each voltage level 2. 18 months
-------------------------------------NOTE-------------------------------------
: 1. An integrated system functional test includes simulated automatic actuation of the system and verifying that each relay and associated circuit breakers
 
and control circuits function as designed.
: 2. For each circuit breaker found inoperable during these functional tests, an additional representative sample of at least 10% of all the circuit
 
breakers of the inoperable type shall also be functionally tested until no more failures are found or all circuit breakers of that type have been functionally tested.
For lower voltage circuit breakers, testing of these circuit breakers shall consist of injecting a current with a value equal to 300% of the setpoint (pickup) of the long-term delay trip element, 150% of the setpoint (pickup) of the short-time delay trip element, and verifying that the circuit breaker operates within the time delay band width for that current specified by the manufacturer. The instantaneous element shall be tested (continued)
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Containment Penetration Conductor Overcurrent Protection Devices TRM 3.8.101 PALO VERDE UNITS 1, 2, 3 T3.8.101-4 Rev 0  8/13/98
---------------------------------NOTE-------------------------------------- (continued) by injecting a current for a frame size of 250 amps or less with tolerances of +40%/-25% and a frame size of 400 amps or greater of
+/-25% and verifying that the circuit breaker trips instantaneously with no apparent time delay.
Molded case circuit breaker testing shall also follow this procedure except that generally no more than two trip elements, time delay and instantaneous, will be involved. Circuit breakers found inoperable during functional testing shall be restored to OPERABLE status prior to resuming operation.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
MOV Thermal Overload Protection and Bypass Devices TRM 3.8.102 PALO VERDE UNITS 1, 2, 3 T3.8.102-1 Rev 0  8/13/98 T3.8  ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS T3.8.102  MOV Thermal Overload Protection and Bypass Devices TLCO  3.8.102 The thermal overload protection and bypass devices, integral with the motor starter, of each valve used in safety systems shall be OPERABLE. APPLICABILITY: Whenever the motor-operated valve is required to be OPERABLE.
ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. With the thermal overload protection for one or more of the required valves not bypassed
 
continuously or under accident conditions, as applicable, by an OPERABLE integral bypass device. A.1 Take administrative action to continuously
 
bypass the thermal overload.
8 hours B. Required Action and associated Completion
 
Time of Condition A not met. B.1 Declare the affected valve(s) inoperable and apply the appropriate REQUIRED ACTION(s) for the affected valves.
Immediately MOV Thermal Overload Protection and Bypass Devices TRM 3.8.102 PALO VERDE UNITS 1, 2, 3 T3.8.102-2 Rev 0  8/13/98 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY TSR  3.8.102.1 Perform a CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST of the bypass circuitry for those thermal overloads which are normally in force during plant operation and bypassed under accident conditions.
18 months AND Following maintenance on the valve motor
 
starter TSR  3.8.102.2 Verify that the thermal overload protection is bypassed for those thermal overloads which are continuously bypassed and temporarily placed in force only when the valve motors are undergoing periodic or maintenance testing.
18 months AND Following maintenance on the valve motor starter AND Following any periodic testing
 
during which the thermal overload device was
 
temporarily placed in force.
AC Sources - Shutdown TRM 3.8.200 PALO VERDE UNITS 1, 2, 3 T3.8.200-1 Rev 0  8/13/98 T3.8  ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS T3.8.200  AC Sources TLCO  3.8.200 Refer to PVNGS Improved Technical Specifications 3.8.2. APPLICABILITY: Refer to PVNGS Improved Technical Specifications 3.8.2.
ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. Requirements of PVNGS ITS LCO 3.8.2 not met. A.1 Suspend all crane operation with loads over the fuel storage pool. Immediately SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY Refer to PVNGS Improved Technical Specifications LCO 3.8.2.
 
Decay Time TRM 3.9.100 PALO VERDE UNITS 1, 2, 3 T3.9.100-1 Rev 0  8/13/98 T3.9  REFUELING OPERATIONS T3.9.100  Decay Time TLCO  3.9.100 The reactor shall be subcritical for at least 100 hours. APPLICABILITY: During movement of irradiated fuel in the reactor pressure vessel. ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. Reactor subcritical for less than 100 hours. A.1 Suspend all operations involving movement of irradiated fuel in the reactor pressure vessel. Immediately SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY TSR  3.9.100.1 Verify (by date and time of subcriticality) that the reactor has been subcritical for at least 100 hours.
Prior to movement of irradiated fuel in the reactor pressure vessel Communications TRM 3.9.101 PALO VERDE UNITS 1, 2, 3 T3.9.101-1 Rev 0  8/13/98 T3.9  REFUELING OPERATIONS T3.9.101  Communications TLCO  3.9.101 Direct communications shall be maintained between the control room and personnel at the refueling station. APPLICABILITY: During CORE ALTERATIONS.
ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. Direct communications between the control room and personnel at the refueling station cannot be maintained. A.1 Suspend all CORE ALTERATIONS.
Immediately SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY TSR  3.9.101.1 Demonstrate direct communication between the control room and personnel at the refueling machine. 12 hours AND Within 1 hour prior to the start of CORE ALTERATIONS.
Refueling Machine TRM 3.9.102 PALO VERDE UNITS 1, 2, 3 T3.9.102-1 Rev 0  8/13/98 T3.9  REFUELING OPERATIONS T3.9.102  Refueling Machine TLCO  3.9.102 The refueling machine shall be used for movement of fuel assemblies and shall be OPERABLE with:
: a. A minimum capacity of 3590 pounds, and
: b. An overload cut off limit of  1600 pounds. APPLICABILITY: During movement of fuel assemblies within the refueling cavity. ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. The requirements for the refueling machine OPERABILITY not satisfied. A.1 Suspend use of the refueling machine from operations involving the movement of fuel assemblies.
Immediately Refueling Machine TRM 3.9.102 PALO VERDE UNITS 1, 2, 3 T3.9.102-2 Rev 0  8/13/98 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY TSR  3.9.102.1 The refueling machine used for movement of fuel assemblies shall be demonstrated OPERABLE by performing a load test of at least 3590 pounds and demonstrating an automatic load cut off when the refueling
 
machine load exceeds 1600 pounds.
Within 72 hours
 
prior to the
 
start of movement of fuel assemblies.
Crane Travel - Spent Fuel Pool Storage Building TRM 3.9.103 PALO VERDE UNITS 1, 2, 3 T3.9.103-1 Rev 0  8/13/98 T3.9  REFUELING OPERATIONS T3.9.103  Crane Travel - Spent Fuel Pool Storage Building TLCO  3.9.103 Loads in excess of 2000 pounds shall be prohibited from travel over fuel assemblies in the storage pool. APPLICABILITY: With fuel assemblies in the storage pool.
ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. Requirements of the above specification not satisfied. A.1 Place the crane load in a safe condition.
Immediately SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY TSR  3.9.103.1 -------------------NOTE---------------------
Applicable only during crane operation
--------------------------------------------
Crane interlocks and physical stops which prevent crane travel with loads in excess of
 
2000 pounds over fuel assemblies shall be demonstrated OPERABLE.
7 days Fuel Building Essential Ventilation System (FBEVS)
TRM 3.9.104 PALO VERDE UNITS 1, 2, 3 T3.9.104-1 Rev 0  8/13/98 T3.9  PLANT SYSTEMS T3.9.104  Fuel Building Essential Ventilation System (FBEVS) TLCO  3.9.104 Two FBEVS trains shall be OPERABLE. APPLICABILITY: During movement of irradiated fuel assemblies in the fuel building.
ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. One FBEVS train inoperable. A.1 Verify the OPERABLE FBEVS is capable of being powered from an emergency power source.
AND A.2 Restore FBEVS train to OPERABLE status.
Immediately 7 days (continued)
Fuel Building Essential Ventilation System (FBEVS)
TRM 3.9.104 PALO VERDE UNITS 1, 2, 3 T3.9.104-2 Rev 0  8/13/98 ACTIONS  (continued) B. Required Action and associated Completion Time of Condition A not met. B.1 Place OPERABLE FBEVS train into operation.
OR B.2 Suspend all operations involving movement of irradiated fuel assemblies in the fuel
 
building. Immediately Immediately C. Two FBEVS inoperable. C.1 Suspend movement of irradiated fuel assemblies in the fuel building.
Immediately Fuel Building Essential Ventilation System (FBEVS)
TRM 3.9.104 PALO VERDE UNITS 1, 2, 3 T3.9.104-3 Rev 0  8/13/98 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY TSR 3.9.104.1 Operate each FBEVS train for at least 15 minutes. 31 days TSR 3.9.104.2 Perform required Fuel Building Essential Ventilation filter testing in accordance with the TRM Ventilation Filter Testing Program (VFTP) (Reference TRM 5.0.500.11).
In accordance
 
with the TRM VFTP TSR 3.9.104.3 Verify each FBEVS train actuates on an actual or simulated signal and directs it exhaust bank through the HEPA filters and charcoal adsorber banks.
18 months TSR 3.9.104.4 Verify one FBEVS train can maintain a measurable negative pressure with respect to atmospheric pressure, during operation.
18 months on a
 
STAGGERED TEST
 
BASIS.
Boron Concentration TRM 3.9.200 PALO VERDE UNITS 1, 2, 3 T3.9.200-1 Rev 46  1/8/09 T3.9  REFUELING OPERATIONS T3.9.200  Boron Concentration TLCO  3.9.200 Refer to PVNGS Improved Technical Specification LCO 3.9.1. APPLICABILITY: Refer to PVNGS Improved Technical Specification LCO 3.9.1 ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. Requirements of TSR 3.9.200.1 not met. A.1 Document the condition in accordance with the PVNGS corrective action program and initiate an
 
operability determination, as necessary, to determine the impact on equipment in the technical specifications.
Immediately Boron Concentration TRM 3.9.200 PALO VERDE UNITS 1, 2, 3 T3.9.200-2 Rev 29  4/15/04 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY TSR  3.9.200.1 Determine that the boron concentration is within the limits specified in the COLR.
Prior to removing or
 
unbolting the reactor vessel head AND Prior to withdrawal of
 
any full strength CEA in excess of 3
 
feet from its fully inserted position within the reactor pressure vessel Containment Penetrations TRM 3.9.201 PALO VERDE UNITS 1, 2, 3 T3.9.201-1 Rev 46  1/8/09 T3.9  REFUELING OPERATIONS T3.9.201  Containment Penetrations TLCO  3.9.201 Refer to PVNGS Improved Technical Specifications 3.9.3. APPLICABILITY: Refer to PVNGS Improved Technical Specifications 3.9.3.
ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. Requirements of TSR 3.9.201.1 not met. A.1 Document the condition in accordance with the PVNGS corrective action program and initiate an
 
operability determination, as necessary, to determine the impact on equipment in the technical specifications.
Immediately SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY TSR  3.9.201.1 Verify that each of the containment penetrations required by PVNGS ITS LCO 3.9.3 is in its required status.
Within 72 hours
 
prior to the
 
start of CORE ALTERATIONS AND Within 72 hours prior to the start of movement of irradiated fuel in the containment building.
 
Liquid Holdup Tanks TRM 3.10.200 PALO VERDE UNITS 1, 2, 3 T3.10.200-1 Rev 40  2/21/07 T3.10  RADIOACTIVE EFFLUENTS T3.10.200  Liquid Holdup Tanks TLCO  3.10.200 The quantity of radioactive material contained in each outside temporary tank and the reactor makeup water tank shall be limited to less than or equal to 60 curies, excluding tritium and dissolved or entrained noble gases. APPLICABILITY: At all times.
ACTIONS ------------------------------------NOTE--------------------------------------
The provisions of Specifications 3.0.100.3 are not applicable.
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CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. The quantity of radioactive material in any outside temporary tank or the reactor
 
makeup water tank exceeds the above limit. A.1 Suspend all additions of radioactive material
 
to the tank.
ANDA.2 Reduce the tank contents to within the limit. Immediately 48 hours SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY TSR  3.10.200.1 Verify the quantity of radioactive material contained in each outside temporary tank and the reactor makeup water tank is within the limit by analyzing a representative sample of the tanks contents when radioactive
 
materials are being added to the tank.
7 days Explosive Gas Mixture TRM 3.10.201 PALO VERDE UNITS 1, 2, 3 T3.10.201-1 Rev 0  8/13/98 T3.10  RADIOACTIVE EFFLUENTS T3.10.201  Explosive Gas Mixture TLCO  3.10.201 The concentration of oxygen in the waste gas holdup system shall be limited to  2% by volume. APPLICABILITY: Whenever waste gas holdup system is in service.
ACTIONS ------------------------------------NOTE--------------------------------------
The provisions of Specifications 3.0.100.3 and 3.0.100.4 are not applicable.
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. Concentration of oxygen in the waste gas holdup system > 2% by volume but  4% by volume. A.1 Reduce the oxygen concentration to within the limit.
48 hours B. Concentration of oxygen
> 4% by volume. B.1 Suspend all additions of waste gases to the
 
system. ANDB.2 Reduce concentration of oxygen to  4% by volume. Immediately 6 hours (continued)
Explosive Gas Mixture TRM 3.10.201 PALO VERDE UNITS 1, 2, 3 T3.10.201-2 Rev 0  8/13/98 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued)
SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY TSR  3.10.201.1 Verify the concentration of oxygen in the waste gas holdup system is within the limit by continuously monitoring the waste gases in the waste gas holdup system using the instruments required OPERABLE by TRM
 
specification T3.3.107.
Continuously 
 
Explosive Gas Mixture TRM 3.10.202 PALO VERDE UNITS 1, 2, 3 T3.10.202-1 Rev 40  2/21/07 T3.10  RADIOACTIVE EFFLUENTS T3.10.202  Gas Storage Tanks TLCO  3.10.202 The quantity of radioactivity contained in each gas storage tank shall be limited to less than or equal to 170,000 curies noble gases (considered as Xe-133). APPLICABILITY: At all times.
ACTIONS ------------------------------------NOTE--------------------------------------
The provisions of Specification 3.0.100.3 are not applicable.
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CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. Quantity of radioactive material in any gas storage tank exceeds limit. A.1 Suspend all additions of radioactive material to the tank.
ANDA.2 Reduce tank contents to within the limit.
Immediately 48 hours Explosive Gas Mixture TRM 3.10.202 PALO VERDE UNITS 1, 2, 3 T3.10.202-2 Rev 0  8/13/98 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY TSR  3.10.202.1 Verify the quantity of radioactive material contained in each gas storage tank is within the limit: 1. When radioactive materials are being added to the tank and the quantity of
 
radioactivity contained in the tank is greater than one-half of the specified limit 2. When radioactive materials are being added to the tank and the quantity of radioactivity contained in the tank is less than or equal to one-half of the specified limit 24 hours 7 days Fire Detection Instrumentation TRM 3.11.100 PALO VERDE UNITS 1, 2, 3 T3.11.100-1 Rev 40  2/21/07 T3.11  FIRE PROTECTION T3.11.100  Fire Detection Instrumentation (formerly TS 3.3.3.7) TLCO  3.11.100 As a minimum, the fire detection instrumentation for each Fire Protection Evaluation Report (FPER) detection zone shown in Table 3.11.100-1 shall be OPERABLE.
APPLICABILITY:
Whenever equipment protected by the fire detection
 
instrument is required to be OPERABLE.
ACTIONS --------------------------NOTES--------------------------
The provisions of TLCO 3.0.100.3 are not applicable.
---------------------------------------------------------
CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. Any, but not more than one-half of the Function X fire detection instruments in any fire zone shown in Table
 
3.11.100-1 inoperable. A.1 Restore the inoperable instrument(s) to OPERABLE status.
14 days B. Required Action and Completion Time of Condition A not met.
------------NOTE-----------
Required Action B.1 is not applicable if the instrument(s) are located
 
inside containment.
--------------------------- B.1 Establish a fire watch patrol to inspect the zone(s) with the inoperable instruments OR  Within 1 hour and at least
 
once per hour thereafter. (continued)
Fire Detection Instrumentation TRM 3.11.100 PALO VERDE UNITS 1, 2, 3 T3.11.100-2 Rev 38  10/18/06 ACTIONS (continued)
CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME
------------NOTE------------
Required Actions B.2.1, B.2.2 and B.2.3 are applicable for instrument(s) located inside containment.
---------------------------
B.2.1 Establish a fire watch patrol to inspect the
 
Containment zone(s) with
 
the inoperable
 
instrument(s).
OR B.2.2 Monitor the containment air temperature using the locations listed in the Bases for Technical
 
Specification SR
 
3.6.5.1. OR B.2.3 Monitor the containment air temperature using
 
the locations listed in Bases for Technical Specification SR 3.6.5.1
 
with the plant computer, multi-point recorder and audio annunciator.
Within 1 hour and at least once per 8 hours thereafter Within 1 hour and at least once per hour
 
thereafter.
Within 1 hour and continuously
 
thereafter. (continued)
Fire Detection Instrumentation TRM 3.11.100 PALO VERDE UNITS 1, 2, 3 T3.11.100-3 Rev 38  10/18/06 ACTIONS (continued)
CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME C. More than one-half of the Function X fire detection instruments in any fire zone shown in Table 3.11.100-1
 
inoperable.
OR Any Function Y fire
 
detection instruments shown in Table 3.11.100-1 inoperable.
OR Any two or more
 
adjacent fire
 
detection instruments shown in Table 3.11.100-1 inoperable.
------------NOTE------------
Required Action C.1 is not
 
applicable if the instrument(s) are located inside containment.
---------------------------- C.1 Establish a fire watch patrol to inspect the
 
zone(s) with the inoperable instrument(s).
OR ------------NOTE-----------
Required Action C.2.1, C.2.2, and C.2.3 are applicable for
 
instrument(s) located inside containment. 
----------------------------
C.2.1 Establish a fire watch patrol to inspect that
 
Containment Zone with the
 
inoperable instrument(s).
OR C.2.2 Monitor the containment air temperature using the locations listed in the Bases for Technical
 
Specification SR 3.6.5.1.
OR C.2.3 Monitor the containment air temperature using the locations listed in the Bases for Technical
 
Specification SR 3.6.5.1 with the plant computer, multi-point recorder and
 
audio annunciator.
Within 1 hour and at least once per hour thereafter.
Within 1 hour and at least once per 8 hours thereafter.
Within 1 hour and at least
 
once per hour thereafter.
Within 1 hour and continuously
 
thereafter.
Fire Detection Instrumentation TRM 3.11.100 PALO VERDE UNITS 1, 2, 3 T3.11.100-4 Rev 38  10/18/06 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY TSR  3.11.100.1 Perform a CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST of each of the required fire detection instruments which are accessible during plant operation.
12 months TSR  3.11.100.2 Perform a CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST of each of the required fire detection instruments which are not accessible during plant operation.
Each COLD SHUTDOWN, unless
 
performed in the previous 12 months. TSR  3.11.100.3 Demonstrate that the NFPA Standard 72D supervised circuits supervision
 
associated with the detector alarms of each of the required fire detection instruments is OPERABLE.
12 months Fire Detection Instrumentation TRM 3.11.100 PALO VERDE UNITS 1, 2, 3 T3.11.100-5 Rev 38  10/18/06 Table 3.11.100-1 (Formerly TS Table 3.3-11) (Page 1 of 5) FIRE DETECTION INSTRUMENTS FIRE ZONE ELEVATION INSTRUM ENT LOCATION TOTAL NUMBER OF INSTRUMENTS*
HEAT (X/Y) FLAME (X/Y) SMOKE (X/Y) BUILDING - CONTROL 1 74' Essential Chiller Rm. Train A  24/0 2 74' Essential Chiller Rm. Train B 21/0 3A 74' Cable Shaft - Train A 1/0 3B 74' Cable Shaft - Train B 1/0 86A 74-156' 4" Deadspace Com partment Train A 0/1  0/3 86B 74-156' 4" Deadspace Com partment Train B 0/1  0/3 4A 100' Cable Shaft- Train A 1/0 4B 100' Cable Shaft - Train B 1/0 5A 100' ESF Switchgear Room Train A 0/5  0/5 5B 100' ESF Switchgear Room Train B 0/5  0/5 6A 100' DC Equip. Rm. - Train A (Channel C) 2/0 6B 100' DC Equip. Rm. - Train B (Channel D) 2/0 7A 100' DC Equip. Rm. - Train A (Channel A) 2/0 7B 100' DC Equip. Rm. - Train B (Channel B) 2/0 8A 100' Battery Rm. Train A (Channel C) 0/2  0/2 8B 100' Battery Rm. Train B (Channel D) 0/2  0/2 9A 100' Battery Rm. - Train A (Channel A) 0/2  0/2 9B 100' Battery Rm. - Train B (Channel B) 0/2  0/2 10A 100' Remote Shutdown Rm. Train A 0/1  1/1 10B 100' Remote Shutdown Rm. Train B 0/1  1/1 11A 120' Cable Shaft - Train A 1/0 11B 120' Cable Shaft - Train B 1/0 14 120' Lower Cable Spreading Rm.
System 1 0/1  0/6  System 2 0/1  0/6  System 3 0/1  0/8  System 4 0/1  0/8  System 5 0/1  0/8  System 6 0/1  0/8 Fire Detection Instrumentation TRM 3.11.100 PALO VERDE UNITS 1, 2, 3 T3.11.100-6 Rev 38  10/18/06 Table 3.11.100-1 (Formerly TS Table 3.3-11)(Continued) (Page 2 of 5)
BUILDING - CONTROL (Continued) 15A 140' Cable Shaft - Train A  1/0 15B 140' Cable Shaft - Train B 1/0 17 140' Control Rm. MCB's
& Relay Cabinets 116/0 18A 160' Cable Shaft - Train A 1/0 18B 160' Cable Shaft - Train B 1/0 20 160' Upper Cable Spreading Rm.
System 1 0/1  0/12  System 2 0/1  0/8  System 3 0/1  0/8  System 4 0/1  0/8  System 5 0/1  0/8 BUILDING - DIESEL GENERATOR 21A 100' Diesel Generator - Train A 0/3 0/4  21B 100' Diesel Generator - Train B 0/3 0/4  22A 100' Diesel Generator Control Rm. - Train A  1/0 22B 100' Diesel Generator Control Rm. - Train B  1/0 24A 115' Combustion Air Intake Rm. - Train A 1/0 24B 115' Combustion Air Intake Rm. - Train B 1/0 23A 131' Fuel Oil Day Tank Train A 0/1  23B 131' Fuel Oil Day Tank Train B 0/1  25A 131' Exhaust Silencer Rm. Train A 3/0  25B 131' Exhaust Silencer Rm. Train B 3/0  BUILDING - FUEL 28 100' Spent Fuel P ool Cooling and Cleanup Pump Areas 3/0 Fire Detection Instrumentation TRM 3.11.100 PALO VERDE UNITS 1, 2, 3 T3.11.100-7 Rev 38  10/18/06 Table 3.11.100-1 (Formerly TS Table 3.3-11)(Continued) (Page 3 of 5)
BUILDING - AUXILIARY 88A 51'-6" & 87A' West Corri dors  6/0 88B 51'-6" & 87B' East Corridors 6/0 32A 51'-6" & 40' LPSI Pump Rm. - Train A 0/2 32B 51'-6" & 40' LPSI Pump Rm. - Train B 0/2 34A 70' ECW Pump Rm. - Train A 2/0 34B 70' ECW Pump Rm. - Train B 2/0 35A 70' Shutdown Cooling Hr. x Chgr.
Train A  4/0 35B 70' Shutdown Cooling Hr. x Chgr.
Train B  4/0 36 70' Reactor Makeup and Boric Acid Makeup Room 1/0 37C 70' & 88' Piping Penetrat ion Rm. - Train A 5/0 37D 70' & 88' Piping Penetrat ion Rm. - Train B 4/0 37B 70' Corridors - East 11/0 37A 70' Corridors - West 11/0 39A 88' Pipeways - Train A 8/0 39B 88' Pipeways - Train B 8/0 42A 100' Elect. Penetration Rm. - Tr. A (Chan. C) 0/1  0/25 42B 100' Elect. Penetration Rm. - Tr. B (Chan. B) 0/1  0/24 42C 100' Corridors - East & Southeast 0/2  3/35 42D 100' Corridor - West 0/1  2/29 46A 100' Charging Pump and Valve Gallery Rm. - Train A 0/3 46B 100' Charging Pump and Valve Gallery Rm. - Train B 0/3 46E 100' Charging Pump and Valve Gallery Rm. - Train E 0/3 Fire Detection Instrumentation TRM 3.11.100 PALO VERDE UNITS 1, 2, 3 T3.11.100-8 Rev 38  10/18/06 Table 3.11.100-1 (Formerly TS Table 3.3-11)(Continued) (Page 4 of 5)
BUILDING - AUXILIARY (Continued) 47A 120' Elect. Penetration Rm. - Tr. A (Chan. A) 0/1  0/28 47B 120' Elect. Penetration Rm.  - Tr. B (Chan. D) 0/1  0/24 48 120' ECW Surge Tanks Corridor - Tr. A & B 3/0 50B 120' Valve Gallery 1/0 51B 120' Spray Chemical Storage Tk. Rm.
1/0 52A 120' Central corridor - West 0/1  5/17 52D 120' Central Corridor- East 0/1  7/18 54 120' Reactor Trip Switchgear Rm.
1/0  6/0 56B 140' Storage and Elect. Equi
: p. Rm. - East 6/0 57J 140' Radiation Protection Offices, Locker Rooms. 18/0 BUILDING - CONTAINMENT
** 66A & 66B 100' &
120' Southwest and Southeast Perimeter 1/0  67A &
67B 100' Northwest and Northeast Perimeter 1/0  66A 120' Southwest Perimeter 1/0  66B 120' Southeast Perimeter 1/0  67A &
67B 120' Northwest and Northeast Perimeter 1/0  63A 120' No. 1 RCPs and SG Area 6/0 63B 120' No. 2 RCPs and SG Area 6/0 66A &
66B 67A & 67B 140' Southwest, Southeast, Northwest, and Northeast Perimeters 1/0  63A 140' No. 1 RCPs and SG Area 5/0 63B 140' No. 2 RCPs and SG Area 5/0 70 140' Refueling Pool and Canal Area 4/0 71A 140' North Preaccess Normal AFU 2/0 71B 140' South Preaccess Normal AFU 2/0 Fire Detection Instrumentation TRM 3.11.100 PALO VERDE UNITS 1, 2, 3 T3.11.100-9 Rev 38  10/18/06 Table 3.11.100-1 (Formerly TS Table 3.3-11)(Continued) (Page 5 of 5)
MAIN STEAM SUPPORT STRUCTURE 72 80' Turbine Driven Au
: x. Feedpump Rm.
0/3 73 80' Motor Driven Aux. Feedpump Rm.
1/1 74A 100', 120'
& 140' Main Steam Isol. & Dump Valve Area North 0/6  74B 100', 120'
&140' Main Steam Isol. & Dump Valve Area
 
South 0/6  OUTSIDE AREAS 83  Condensate Storage Tank Pump House  2/0 84A  Spray Pond Pump House - Train A 2/0 84B  Spray Pond Pump House - Train B 2/0 **  The fire detection instruments located wit hin the containment ar e not required to be OPERABLE during the performance of Type A containment leakage rate tests. *(x/y): x is the number of instruments associated with ear ly fire detection and notification only. y is the number of instruments associated with actuation of fire suppression systems and early fire detection and notification.
 
Fire Suppression Water Systems TRM 3.11.101 T3.11 FIRE PROTECTION T3.11.101  Fire Suppression Water System (formerly TS 3.7.11.1) TLCO  3.11.101 The fire suppression water system shall be OPERABLE with: a. Three 50% capacity fire suppression pumps, each with a capacity of at least 1350 gpm, with their discharge aligned to the fire suppression header b. Two separate water supply tanks, each with a minimum contained volume of 300,000 gallons (23 feet, 1.5 inches), and c. An OPERABLE flow path capable of taking suction from the T01-A tank and the T01-B tank and transferring the
 
water through distribution piping with OPERABLE sectionalizing control or isolation valves to the yard
 
hydrant curb valves, the last valve ahead of the water flow alarm device on each sprinkler or hose standpipe, and the last valve ahead of the deluge valve on each
 
deluge or spray system required to be OPERABLE per Specifications T3.11.102, T3.11.104, and T3.11.105. APPLICABILITY: At all times.
ACTIONS ------------------------NOTES-------------------------
The provisions of TLCO 3.0.100.3 are not applicable.
------------------------------------------------------
CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. One pump and/or one water supply inoperable. A.1 Restore the inoperable equipment to OPERABLE
 
status. OR 7 days (continued)PALO VERDE UNITS 1, 2, 3 T3.11.101-1 Rev 40  2/21/07 Fire Suppression Water Systems TRM 3.11.101 ACTIONS (continued)
CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A.2 Provide an alternate backup pump or water supply. 7 days B. The fire suppression water system inoperable
 
for reason other than
 
Condition A. B.1 Establish a backup fire suppression water
 
system. 24 hours SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY TSR  3.11.101.1 Verify the contained water supply volume of the fire suppression water system.
7 days TSR  3.11.101.2 Verify that the electrolyte level of each fire pump diesel starting 24-volt battery is above the plates.
7 days TSR  3.11.101.3 Verify that the overall voltage of each fire pump diesel starting 24-volt battery is greater than or equal to
 
24 volts.
31 days TSR  3.11.101.4 Start the electric motor-driven pump for the fire suppression water system and
 
operate it for at least 15 minutes on
 
recirculation flow.
31 days TSR  3.11.101.5 Verify that each valve (manual, power operated, or automatic) in the flow path of the fire suppression water system (except the hydrant street isolation
 
[CURB] valves) is in its correct position, when required to be OPERABLE.
31 days (continued)
PALO VERDE UNITS 1, 2, 3 T3.11.101-2 Rev 46  1/8/09 Fire Suppression Water Systems TRM 3.11.101 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued)
SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY TSR  3.11.101.6 Verify that the diesel fuel oil day storage tanks for the fire pump diesel engines each contain at least 290 gallons (3/4 level) of fuel.
31 days on a STAGGERED TEST
 
BASIS TSR  3.11.101.7 Verify that the fire pump diesel engines start from ambient conditions and operate
 
for at least 30 minutes on recirculation flow. 31 days on a STAGGERED TEST
 
BASIS TSR  3.11.101.8 Verify that the specific gravity of each fire pump diesel starting 24-volt battery
 
is appropriate for continued service of
 
the battery.
92 days TSR  3.11.101.9 Verify that a sample of diesel fuel from the fuel storage tank for the fire pump
 
diesel engines, obtained in accordance
 
with ASTM-D4057-81, is within the acceptable limits specified in Table 1 of ASTM D975-89a when checked for
 
viscosity, water, and sediment.
92 days TSR  3.11.101.10 Deleted TSR  3.11.101.11 Verify that each hydrant street isolation [CURB] valve (manual power operated, or automatic) in the flow path of the fire suppression water system is
 
in its correct position, when required to be OPERABLE.
12 months TSR  3.11.101.12 Cycle each testable valve in the flow path of the fire suppression water system through at least one complete
 
cycle of full travel.
12 months (continued) PALO VERDE UNITS 1, 2, 3 T3.11.101-3 Rev 46  1/8/09 Fire Suppression Water Systems TRM 3.11.101 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued)
SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY TSR  3.11.101.13 Deleted TSR  3.11.101.14 Deleted TSR  3.11.101.15 Perform a system functional test which includes simulated automatic actuation of the fire suppression water system
 
throughout its operating sequence.
AND Verify that each fire suppression water system pump develops at least 1350 gpm at an indicated differential pressure of 125 psid by recording readings for at
 
least 3 points on the test curve.
AND Cycle each fire suppression water system valve in the flow path that is not testable during plant operation through at least one complete cycle of full
 
travel. AND Verify that each fire suppression water system pump starts sequentially to maintain the fire suppression water system pressure greater than or equal to
 
85 psig. 18 months (continued) PALO VERDE UNITS 1, 2, 3 T3.11.101-4 Rev 39  1/26/07 Fire Suppression Water Systems TRM 3.11.101 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued)
SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY TSR  3.11.101.16 Perform a flow test of the fire suppression water system in accordance with Chapter 5, Section 11 of the Fire Protection Handbook , 14 th Edition, published by the National Fire Protection
 
Association.
3 years  PALO VERDE UNITS 1, 2, 3 T3.11.101-5 Rev 46  1/8/09 Spray and/or Sprinkler Systems TRM 3.11.102 T3.11 FIRE PROTECTION T3.11.102  Spray and/or Sprinkler Systems (formerly TS 3.7.11.2) TLCO  3.11.102 The Spray and/or Sprinkler Systems listed in Table 3.11.102-1 shall be OPERABLE.
APPLICABILITY:
Whenever equipment protected by the Spray/Sprinkler System is required to be OPERABLE.
ACTIONS --------------------------NOTES--------------------------
The provisions of TLCO 3.0.100.3 are not applicable.
---------------------------------------------------------
CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. One or more of the required spray and/or sprinkler systems inoperable in areas in
 
which redundant systems or components could be damaged. A.1 Establish a continuous fire watch with backup fire suppression equipment.
1 hour B. One or more of the required spray and/or sprinkler systems inoperable in areas in
 
which no redundant systems or components could be damaged. B.1 Establish an hourly fire watch patrol.
1 hour PALO VERDE UNITS 1, 2, 3 T3.11.102-1 Rev 46  1/8/09 Spray and/or Sprinkler Systems TRM 3.11.102 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY TSR  3.11.102.1 Verify that each valve (manual, power operated, or automatic) in the flow path of each of the required spray and/or sprinkler systems is in its correct
 
position.
31 days TSR  3.11.102.2 Cycle each testable valve in the flow path of each of the required spray
 
and/or sprinkler systems through at
 
least one complete cycle of full travel.
12 months TSR  3.11.102.3 Perform a system functional test of each of the required spray and/or sprinkler systems which includes simulated automatic actuation of the system, and:  Verify that the automatic valves in the flow path actuate to their correct
 
positions on a thermal/smoke test
 
signal, and:  Cycle each valve in the flow path that is not testable during plant operations
 
through at least one complete cycle of full travel.
18 months TSR  3.11.102.4 Visually inspect the dry pipe spray and sprinkler headers of each of the required spray and/or sprinkler systems to verify their integrity.
18 months TSR  3.11.102.5 Visually inspect each of the required spray and/or sprinkler systems nozzle's spray area to verify the spray pattern
 
is not obstructed.
18 months  (continued) PALO VERDE UNITS 1, 2, 3 T3.11.102-2 Rev 4  9/24/99 Spray and/or Sprinkler Systems TRM 3.11.102 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued)
SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY TSR  3.11.102.6 Perform an air flow test through each open head spray/sprinkler header of each of the required spray and/or sprinkler systems and verify that each open head
 
spray/sprinkler nozzle is unobstructed.
5 years PALO VERDE UNITS 1, 2, 3 T3.11.102-3 Rev 4  9/24/99 Spray and/or Sprinkler Systems TRM 3.11.102 PALO VERDE UNITS 1, 2, 3 T3.11.102-4 Rev 4  9/24/99 Table 3.11.102-1 (Formerly TS Table 3.7-3)
Page 1 of 2 SPRAY AND/OR SPRINKLER SYSTEMS
: 1. Lower Cable Spreading Room Zone 14 - Control Building 120 ft Elevation a. System 1 b. System 2 c. System 3 d. System 4
: e. System 5 f. System 6 2. Upper Cable Spreading Room Zone 20 - Control Building 160 ft Elevation a. System 1
: b. System 2 c. System 3
: d. System 4 e. System 5 3. Diesel Generator Room , Train A, Zone 21A - Diesel Generator Building 100 ft Elevation 4. Diesel Generator Room , Train B, Zone 21B - Diesel Generator Building 100 ft Elevation 5. Fuel Oil Day Tank Vault, Train A, Zone 23A - Diesel Generator Building 131 ft Elevation 6. Fuel Oil Day Tank Vault, Train B, Zone 23B - Diesel Generator Building 131 ft Elevation 7. Low Pressure Safety Injection Pu mp Room, Train A, Zone 32A Auxiliary Building 40ft and 51ft 6 inch Elevation 8. Low Pressure Safety Injection Pump Room Train B, Zone 32B - Auxiliary Building 40ft and 51ft 6 inch Elevation 9. Electrical Penetration Room, Trai n A (Channel C) Zone 42A - Auxiliary Building 100 ft Elevation 10. Electrical Penetration Room, Trai n B (Channel B) Zone 42B - Auxiliary Building 100 ft Elevation 11. Charging Pumps A, B, and E Zones 46A,46B AND 46E East Corridors, Zone 42C Auxiliary Bu ilding 100 ft Elevation 12. West Corridors, Zone 42D Au xiliary Building 100 ft Elevation 13. Electrical Penetration Room, Trai n A (Channel A) Zone 47A - Auxiliary Building 120 ft Elevation 14 Electrical Penetration Room, Train B (Channel D) Zone 47B - Auxiliary Building 120 ft Elevation 15. Central Corridors, Zone 52A -
Auxiliary Building 120 ft Elevation 16. Central Corridors, Zone 52D -
Auxiliary Building 120 ft Elevation Spray and/or Sprinkler Systems TRM 3.11.102 Table 3.11.102-1 (Formerly TS Table 3.7-3)
Page 2 of 2
: 17. Turbine Driven Auxiliary Feed Pu mp Room Zone 72 Main Steam Support Structure 81 ft Elevation. 18. Train A Compartments between Auxiliary & Control Buildings, 74 ft & 156 ft 4 inch Elevation Zone 86A 19. Train B Compartments between Auxiliary & Control Buildings, 74 ft & 156 ft 4 inch Elevation on Zone 86B 20. Train A  and Train B Main Steam Support Structure, Zone 74A and Zone 74B 100 ft through 140 ft Elevation.
PALO VERDE UNITS 1, 2, 3 T3.11.102-5 Rev 18  3/13/02 CO2 Systems TRM 3.11.103 T3.11 FIRE PROTECTION T3.11.103  CO2 Systems (formerly TS 3.7.11.3)
TLCO  3.11.103 The following low pressure CO2 systems shall be OPERABLE.
: a. ESF Switchgear Room; one Train A, one Train B Zone 5A and 5B Control Building 100 ft Elevation b. Battery Rooms; one Train A (Channel C) one Train B (Channel D) Zone 8A and 8B Control
 
Building 100 ft Elevation c. Battery Rooms; one Train A (Channel A) one Train B (Channel B) Zone 9A and 9B Control
 
Building 100 ft Elevation APPLICABILITY: Whenever equipment protected by the CO2 is required to be OPERABLE.
ACTIONS --------------------------NOTES--------------------------
The provisions of TLCO 3.0.100.3 are not applicable.
 
---------------------------------------------------------
CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. One or more of the required CO2 systems
 
inoperable in areas in
 
which redundant systems or components could be damaged. A.1 Establish a continuous fire watch with backup
 
fire suppression
 
equipment.
1 hour B. One or more of the required CO2 systems inoperable in areas in which no redundant
 
systems or components could be damaged. B.1 Establish an hourly fire watch patrol.
1 hour PALO VERDE UNITS 1, 2, 3 T3.11.103-1 Rev 46  1/8/09 CO2 Systems TRM 3.11.103 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY TSR  3.11.103.1 For each of the required CO2 systems, verify the CO2 storage tank weight to be greater than 10,000 lb and pressure to be greater than 275 psig.
7 days TSR  3.11.103.2 For each of the required CO2 systems, verify that each valve (manual, power operated, or automatic) in the flow is in its correct position.
31 days TSR  3.11.103.3 For each of the required CO2 systems, verify that the system, actuates manually and automatically, upon receipt of a
 
simulated actuation signal.
18 months TSR 3.11.103.4 For each of the required CO2 systems, visually inspect that there are no
 
obstructions in the discharge path of the
 
nozzles or during a "Puff Test."
18 months TSR 3.11.103.5 For each of the required CO2 systems, verify each circuit from the control panel to the fire damper actuation devices is capable of performing its
 
intended function.
54 months TSR 3.11.103.6 For each of the required CO2 systems, perform a functional test of associated
 
fire dampers.
54 months PALO VERDE UNITS 1, 2, 3 T3.11.103-2 Rev 49  11/06/09 Fire Hose Stations TRM 3.11.104 T3.11 FIRE PROTECTION T3.11.104  Fire Hose Stations (formerly TS 3.7.11.4) TLCO  3.11.104 The fire hose stations shown in Table 3.11.104-1 shall be OPERABLE.
APPLICABILITY:
Whenever equipment in the areas protected by the fire hose stations is required to be OPERABLE, except that
 
fire hose stations located in containment shall have their containment isolation valves closed in MODES 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5*.
* If hot work or other work relating to the use of combustible material or flammable liquids is to be
 
performed in containment during MODE 5, the fire hose
 
stations located in containment shall have their containment isolation valves open and their containment flooding valve closed during the period
 
that the work is being performed.
ACTIONS --------------------------NOTES--------------------------
The provisions of TLCO 3.0.100.3 are not applicable.
 
---------------------------------------------------------
CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. One or more of the fire hose stations shown in
 
Table 3.11.104-1
 
inoperable where the fire hose is the primary means of fire suppression. A.1 Provide a gated wye on the nearest OPERABLE hose
 
station. One outlet of
 
the wye shall be connected to the standard length of hose provided
 
for the OPERABLE hose station. The second outlet of the wye shall
 
be connected to a length of hose sufficient to provide coverage for the
 
area left unprotected by the inoperable hose station. 1 hour (continued) PALO VERDE UNITS 1, 2, 3 T3.11.104-1 Rev 44  1/3/08 Fire Hose Stations TRM 3.11.104 ACTIONS (continued)
CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. (continued)
The hose for the unprotected area shall be stored at the OPERABLE hose station. Signs
 
identifying the purpose and location of the fire hose and related valves
 
shall be mounted above the hose and at the inoperable hose station.
B. One or more of the fire hose stations shown in Table 3.11.104-1 inoperable where the fire
 
hose is not the primary means of fire suppression. B.1 Provide a gated wye on the nearest OPERABLE hose station. One outlet of the wye shall be
 
connected to the standard length of hose provided for the OPERABLE hose
 
station. The second outlet of the wye shall be connected to a length
 
of hose sufficient to provide coverage for the area left unprotected by
 
the inoperable hose station. The hose for the unprotected area shall be stored at the OPERABLE hose station. Signs
 
identifying the purpose and location of the fire hose and related valves
 
shall be mounted above the hose and at the inoperable hose station.
24 hours PALO VERDE UNITS 1, 2, 3 T3.11.104-2 Rev 4  9/24/29 Fire Hose Stations TRM 3.11.104 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY TSR  3.11.104.1 Visually inspect each of the fire hose stations shown in Table 3.11.104-1 accessible during plant operation to assure all required equipment is at the
 
station. 31 days TSR  3.11.104.2 Visually inspect each of the fire hose stations shown in Table 3.11.104-1 not
 
accessible during plant operation to
 
assure all required equipment is at the station. 18 months TSR  3.11.104.3 Remove the hose at each of the fire hose stations shown in Table 3.11.104-1 for inspection and reracking.
18 months TSR  3.11.104.4 Inspect all gaskets and replace any degraded gaskets in the couplings at each of the fire hose stations shown in Table 3.11.104-1.
18 months TSR  3.11.104.5 For each of the fire hose stations shown in Table 3.11.104-1, partially open each
 
hose station valve to verify valve operability and no flow blockage.
3 years TSR  3.11.104.6 For each of the fire hose stations shown in Table 3.11.104-1, conduct a hose hydrostatic test at a pressure of 150 psig or at least 50 psig above maximum fire main operating pressure, whichever is greater.
3 years PALO VERDE UNITS 1, 2, 3 T3.11.104-3 Rev 4  9/24/29 Fire Hose Stations TRM 3.11.104 Table 3.11.104-1 (Formerly TS Table 3.7-4)
FIRE HOSE STATIONS LOCATION ELEVATION HOSE RACK IDENTIFICATION Containment NE 80' HS # 01 Containment SE 80' HS # 02 Containment SW 80' HS # 03 Containment NW 80' HS # 04 Containment NE 100' HS # 05 Containment SE 100' HS # 06 Containment SW 100' HS # 07 Containment NW 100' HS # 08 Containment NE 120' HS # 09 Containment SE 120' HS # 10 Containment SW 120' HS # 11 Containment NW 120' HS # 12 Containment NE 140' HS # 13 Containment SW 140' HS # 14 Auxiliary Bldg. North Corridor-W 40' HS # 17 Auxiliary Bldg. North Corridor-E 40' HS # 18 Auxiliary Bldg. North Corridor-W 51' 6" HS # 21 Auxiliary Bldg. North Corridor-E 51' 6" HS # 22 Auxiliary Bldg SE 70' HS # 23 Auxiliary Bldg SW 70' HS # 24 Auxiliary Bldg NW 70' HS # 25 Auxiliary Bldg North Cent er Corridor 70' HS # 26 Auxiliary Bldg NE 70' HS # 27 Auxiliary Bldg NW 88' HS # 30 -Hose Removed-Auxiliary Bldg NE 88' HS # 31 Auxiliary Bldg SW 100' HS # 33 Auxiliary Bldg East Corridor 120' HS # 37 Auxiliary Bldg SW 120' HS # 38 Control Bldg SW 74' HS # 86 Control Bldg E 74' HS # 87 Control Bldg SW 100' HS # 88 Control Bldg East by Elevator 100' HS # 89 Control Bldg SW 120' HS # 90 Control Bldg SW 140' HS # 92 Control Bldg SW 160' HS # 94 Control Bldg SE 100' HS # 108 Fuel Bldg South 100' HS # 97  PALO VERDE UNITS 1, 2, 3 T3.11.104-4 Rev 18  3/13/02 Yard Fire Hydrants and Associated Emergency Response Vehicles TRM 3.11.105 T3.11 FIRE PROTECTION T3.11.105  Yard Fire Hydrants and associated emergency response vehicle (formerly TS 3.7.11.5) TLCO  3.11.105 The yard fire hydrants shown in Table 3.11.105-1 and an associated equipped emergency response vehicle shall be OPERABLE.
APPLICABILITY:
Whenever equipment in the areas protected by yard fire
 
hydrants is required to be OPERABLE.
ACTIONS --------------------------NOTES--------------------------
The provisions of TLCO 3.0.100.3 a are not applicable.
 
---------------------------------------------------------
CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. One or more of the yard fire hydrants shown in
 
Table 3.11.105-1
 
inoperable. A.1 Have sufficient additional lengths of
 
2-1/2 inch diameter hose
 
located in an OPERABLE, equipped emergency response vehicle to
 
provide service from an OPERABLE yard fire hydrant adjacent to the
 
unprotected area(s).
1 hour B. Equipped emergency response vehicle
 
inoperable. B.1 Have another equipped emergency response
 
vehicle OPERABLE.
1 hour PALO VERDE UNITS 1, 2, 3 T3.11.105-1 Rev 46  1/8/09 Yard Fire Hydrants and Associated Emergency Response Vehicles TRM 3.11.105 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY TSR  3.11.105.1 Visually inspect the emergency response vehicle to assure all required equipment is in the emergency response vehicles.
31 days TSR  3.11.105.2 Visually inspect each of the yard fire hydrants shown in Table 3.11.105-1 for
 
damage. 6 months TSR  3.11.105.3 Conduct a hose hydrostatic test on each hose in the equipped emergency response
 
vehicle at a pressure of 150 psig or at least 50 psig above maximum fire main operating pressure, whichever is greater.
12 months TSR 3.11.105.4 Inspect all gaskets and replace any degraded gaskets in the couplings in the yard fire hydrants shown in Table 3.11.105-1.
12 months TSR 3.11.105.5 Perform a flow check of each of the yard fire hydrants shown in Table 3.11.105-1
 
hydrant to verify its OPERABILITY.
12 months PALO VERDE UNITS 1, 2, 3 T3.11.105-2 Rev 4  9/24/99 Yard Fire Hydrants and Associated Emergency Response Vehicles TRM 3.11.105 TABLE 3.11.105-1 YARD FIRE HYDRANTS LOCATION HYDRANT NUMBER Unit 1: 150' Plant North of Fuel Bldg.
F. H. #7 100' Plant West of Rad Waste Bldg. F. H. #9 150' Plant Northwest of Fuel Bldg. F. H. #8 100' South of Control Bldg.
F. H. #10 Unit 2: 150' Plant North of Fuel Bldg.
F. H. #15 100' Plant West of Rad Waste Bldg. F. H. #16 150' Plant Northwest of Fuel Bldg. F. H. #17 100' South of Control Bldg. F. H. #18 Unit 3: 150' Plant North of Fuel Bldg.
F. H. #23 100' Plant West of Rad Waste Bldg.
F. H. #24 150' Plant Northwest of Fuel Bldg. F. H. #25 100' South of Control Bldg. F. H. #26 PALO VERDE UNITS 1, 2, 3 T3.11.105-3 Rev 18  3/13/02 Halon Systems TRM 3.11.106 T3.11 FIRE PROTECTION T3.11.106  Halon Systems (formerly TS 3.7.11.6)
TLCO  3.11.106 The following Halon systems shall be OPERABLE.
: a. Train A Remote Shutdown Panel Room, Zone 10A -
Control Building 100 ft Elevation. b. Train B Remote Shutdown Panel Room, Zone 10B -
Control Building 100 ft. Elevation. APPLICABILITY: Whenever equipment protected by the Halon system is required to be OPERABLE.
ACTIONS --------------------------NOTES--------------------------
The provisions of TLCO 3.0.100.3 are not applicable.
---------------------------------------------------------
CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. One or more of the required Halon systems
 
inoperable in areas in which redundant systems or components could be
 
damaged. A.1 Establish a continuous fire watch with backup
 
fire suppression equipment.
1 hour (continued) PALO VERDE UNITS 1, 2, 3 T3.11.106-1 Rev 40  2/21/07 CORRECTED April 20, 2007 Halon Systems TRM 3.11.106 ACTIONS (continued)
CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME B. One or more of the required Halon systems inoperable in areas other than those in which redundant systems or
 
components could be damaged. B.1 Establish an hourly fire watch patrol.
1 hour SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY TSR  3.11.106.1 For each of the required Halon systems, verify that each valve (manual, power operated, or automatic) in the flow path is
 
in its correct position.
31 days TSR  3.11.106.2 For each of the required Halon systems, verify Halon storage tank weight or level to be at least 95% of full charge weight or level and pressure to be at least 90% of
 
full charge pressure.
6 months TSR  3.11.106.3 For each of the required Halon systems, verify the system actuates manually and
 
automatically, upon receipt of a simulated
 
test signal.
18 months TSR 3.11.106.4 For each of the required Halon systems, perform a flow test through headers and nozzles to assure no blockage.
18 months TSR 3.11.106.5 For each of the required Halon systems, verify each circuit from the control panel to the fire damper actuation devices is capable of performing its intended function.
54 months TSR 3.11.106.6 For each of the required Halon systems, perform a functional test of associated fire dampers. 54 months PALO VERDE UNITS 1, 2, 3 T3.11.106-2 Rev 49  11/06/09 Fire-Rated Assemblies TRM 3.11.107 T3.11 FIRE PROTECTION T3.11.107  Fire-Rated Assemblies (formerly TS 3.7.12)
TLCO  3.11.107 All fire-rated assemblies (walls, floor/ceilings, cable tray enclosures, and other fire barriers) separating safety-related fire areas or separating
 
portions of redundant systems important to safe shutdown within a fire area and all sealing devices in fire-rated assembly penetrations (fire doors, fire
 
dampers, cable, piping and ventilation duct penetration seals) shall be OPERABLE.
APPLICABILITY:
When the equipment in an affected area is required to be OPERABLE.
ACTIONS --------------------------NOTES--------------------------
The provisions of TLCO 3.0.100.3 are not applicable.
---------------------------------------------------------
CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. One or more of the required fire-rated assemblies (including sealing devices) inoperable. A.1 Establish a continuous fire watch* on at least
 
one side of the affected assembly.
OR A.2.1 Verify the OPERABILITY of the fire detectors on at least one side of
 
the inoperable assembly.
AND 1 hour 1 hour (continued)PALO VERDE UNITS 1, 2, 3 T3.11.107-1 Rev 40  2/21/07 CORRECTED April 20, 2007 Fire-Rated Assemblies TRM 3.11.107 ACTIONS (continued)
CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A.2.2 Establish an hourly fire watch* patrol.
* Closed circuit TV may be used in lieu of fire watches in radiation areas
 
that would pose an unnecessary risk to personnel.
1 hour SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY TSR  3.11.107.1 For each of the required fire doors, verify that doors with automatic hold-open
 
and release mechanisms are free of obstructions.
24 hours TSR  3.11.107.2 For each of the required fire doors, verify that each unlocked fire door without electrical supervision is closed.
24 hours TSR  3.11.107.3 For each of the required fire doors, verify that each locked-closed fire door is closed.
7 days TSR  3.11.107.4 For each of the required fire doors, inspect the automatic hold-open, release and closing mechanism and latches.
6 months TSR  3.11.107.5 For each of the required fire-rated assemblies and penetration devices, perform a visual inspection of the exposed surfaces of each fire rated assembly.
18 months (continued) PALO VERDE UNITS 1, 2, 3 T3.11.107-2 Rev 4  9/24/99 Fire-Rated Assemblies TRM 3.11.107 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued)
SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY TSR  3.11.107.6 For each of the required fire-rated assemblies and penetration devices, perform a visual inspection of at least 10% of each type of sealed penetration.
If apparent changes in appearance or
 
abnormal degradation's are found, a visual inspection of an additional 10% of each type of sealed penetration shall be made.
 
This inspection process shall continue until a 10% sample with no apparent changes in appearance or abnormal
 
degradation is found. Samples shall be selected such that each penetration seal will be inspected every 15 years.
18 months TSR  3.11.107.7 For each of the required fire-rated assemblies and penetration devices, perform a visual inspection of 10% of the fire dampers and associated hardware, coincident with functional testing of the dampers. 18 months TSR 3.11.107.8 For each of the required fire-rated assemblies and penetration devices, perform a functional test of at least 10%
 
of the fire dampers that are installed in fire barriers separating redundant trains important to safe shutdown. If any
 
dampers fail to operate correctly, an additional 10% of the dampers shall be sampled. This process shall continue until
 
a 10% sample is verified OPERABLE.
Samples shall be selected such that each damper will be inspected every 15 years.
18 months TSR 3.11.107.9 For each of the required fire doors, perform a functional test.
18 months PALO VERDE UNITS 1, 2, 3 T3.11.107-3 Rev 4  9/24/99 Design Features TRM 4.0.100 PALO VERDE UNITS 1, 2, 3 T4.0.100-1 Rev 0  8/13/98 T4.0  DESIGN FEATURES Refer to PVNGS Improved Technical Specification 4.0.
 
Responsibility TRM 5.0.100 (continued) PALO VERDE UNITS 1, 2, 3 T5.0.100-1 Rev 0  8/13/98 T5.0  ADMINISTRATIVE CONTROLS T5.0.100  Responsibility Refer to PVNGS Improved Technical Specifications Section 5.1
 
Organization TRM 5.0.200 (continued) PALO VERDE UNITS 1, 2, 3 T5.0.200-1 Rev 0  8/13/98 T5.0  ADMINISTRATIVE CONTROLS T5.0.200  Organization Refer to PVNGS Improved Technical Specifications Section 5.2
 
Unit Staff Qualifications TRM 5.0.300 (continued) PALO VERDE UNITS 1, 2, 3 T5.0.300-1 Rev 0  8/13/98 T5.0  ADMINISTRATIVE CONTROLS T5.0.300  Unit Staff Qualifications Refer to PVNGS Improved Technical Specifications Section 5.3
 
Procedures TRM 5.0.400
______________________________________________________________________________ (continued) PALO VERDE UNITS 1, 2, 3 T5.0.400-1 Rev 0  8/13/98 T5.0  ADMINISTRATIVE CONTROLS T5.0.400  Procedures Refer to PVNGS Improved Technical Specifications Section 5.4
 
Programs and Manuals TRM 5.0.500 (continued)
PALO VERDE UNITS 1, 2, 3 T5.0.500-1 Rev 53  11/10/10 T5.0  ADMINISTRATIVE CONTROLS T5.0.500 Programs and Manuals The following programs shall be established, implemented and maintained. 5.0.500.1 Offsite Dose Calculation Manual (ODCM)
The purpose of the ODCM program is to contain the information, methodology and parameters used in calculating offsite dose as well as the related controls, monitoring activities and descriptions of the information to be included in the Annual
 
Radiological Environmental Operating and Radioactive Effluent
 
Release Reports. The Radiation Protection group is the program
 
owner. In addition to the program requirements specified in ITS 5.5.1, the following also applies: a. The Radiological Environmental Monitoring Program shall be contained in the ODCM. 5.0.500.2 Primary Coolant Sources Outside Containment The purpose of the Primary Coolant Sources Outside Containment Program is to minimize leakage from those portions of systems outside containment that could contain highly radioactive fluids during a serious transient or accident to levels as low as
 
practicable. The PVNGS System Engineering (NSSS) group is the
 
program owner.
In addition to the program requirements specified in ITS 5.5.2, the following also applies:
: a. At least once per 18 months, during shutdown, conduct an inspection of all ECCS piping outside of containment, which is in contact with recirculation sump inventory during LOCA
 
conditions and verify that the total measured leakage from
 
piping and components is less than 1500 ml/hr when pressurized
 
to at least 40 psig.
: b. The provisions of TLCO 3.0.100.3 and TSR 3.0.100.3 are applicable to the inspection performed in T5.0.500.2a.
Programs and Manuals TRM 5.0.500 5.0.500 Programs and Manuals (continued) (continued)
PALO VERDE UNITS 1, 2, 3 T5.0.500-2 Rev 24  7/25/03 5.0.500.3 Post Accident Sampling Deleted 5.0.500.4 Radioactive Effluent Controls Program The purpose of the Radioactive Effluent Controls Program is to specify the PVNGS measures used to control radioactive effluents and for maintaining the doses to members of the public from
 
radioactive effluents as low as reasonably achievable. The
 
Radiation Protection group is the program owner.
In addition to the program requirements specified in ITS 5.5.4, the following also applies:
: a. Licensee-initiated major changes to the radioactive waste systems (liquid, gaseous, and solid) shall be submitted as part of the FSAR update or reported to the Commission in the Annual
 
Radioactive Effluent Release Report for the period in which the
 
evaluation was reviewed by PRB. The discussion of each change
 
shall contain:
: 1. A summary of the evaluation that led to the determination that the change could be made in accordance with 10 CFR 50.59. 2. Sufficient detailed information to totally support the reason for the change without benefit of additional or
 
supplemental information;
: 3. A detailed description of the equipment, components, and processes involved and the interfaces with other plant
 
systems; Programs and Manuals TRM 5.0.500 5.0.500 Programs and Manuals (continued) (continued)
PALO VERDE UNITS 1, 2, 3 T5.0.500-3 Rev 0  8/13/98
: 4. An evaluation of the change, which shows the predicted releases of radioactive materials in liquid and gaseous effluents and/or quantity of solid waste that differ from
 
those previously predicted in the license application and amendments thereto; 
: 5. An evaluation of the change, which shows the expected maximum exposures to a MEMBER OF THE PUBLIC in the UNRESTRICTED AREA and to the general population that differ
 
from those previously estimated in the license application
 
and amendments thereto;
: 6. A comparison of the predicted releases of radioactive materials, in liquid and gaseous effluents and in solid
 
waste, to the actual releases for the period prior to when
 
the changes are to be made; and
: 7. An estimate of the exposure to plant operating personnel as a result of the change.
The program elements of the Radioactive Effluent Controls Program
 
are described in the Offsite Dose Calculation Manual (ODCM). 5.0.500.5 Component Cyclic or Transient Limit The purpose of the Component cyclic or Transient Limit Program is
 
to track the UFSAR Section 3.9.1.1 cyclic and transient
 
occurrences to ensure that components are maintained within the design limits. The PVNGS System Engineering (NSSS) group is the program owner.
The program requirements are specified in ITS 5.5.5.
 
Programs and Manuals TRM 5.0.500 5.0.500 Programs and Manuals (continued) (continued)
PALO VERDE UNITS 1, 2, 3 T5.0.500-4 Rev 53  11/10/10 5.0.500.6 Pre-Stressed Concrete Containment Tendon Surveillance Program The purpose of the Pre-Stressed Concrete Containment Tendon Surveillance Program is to ensure containment structural integrity
 
by providing controls for monitoring any tendon degradation and the effectiveness of the corrosion protection medium. The PVNGS Program Engineering group is the program owner.
The structural integrity of the containment vessel shall be demonstrated at the end of 1, 3, and 5 years following the initial
 
containment vessel structural integrity test and at 5-year
 
intervals thereafter except where relief has been authorized by the NRC. All of the acceptance testing of tendon and visual examinations of end anchorages, adjacent concrete surfaces and
 
containment vessel surfaces shall be performed sequentially and
 
within the same time frame.
In addition to the program requirements specified in ITS 5.5.6, the following also applies:
: a. The structural integrity of the containment vessel shall be maintained at a level consistent with the acceptance criteria in the Pre-Stressed Concrete Containment Tendon Surveillance
 
Program while in MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4.
Refer to TRM specification T3.6.200 for specification requirements. The provisions of TLCO 3.0.100.3 and TSR 3.0.100.3 are applicable to the Pre-Stressed Concrete Containment Tendon Surveillance Program.
 
Programs and Manuals TRM 5.0.500 5.0.500 Programs and Manuals (continued) (continued)
PALO VERDE UNITS 1, 2, 3 T5.0.500-5 Rev 0  8/13/98
: b. The structural integrity of the tendons shall be demonstrated by:  1. Determining from a random but representative sample of at least 10 tendons (6 hoop and 4 inverted U) that each group ( hoop, and inverted U) has an observed lift-off force within the predicted limits for that group. For each subsequent
 
inspection one tendon from each group shall be kept
 
unchanged to develop a history and to correlate the observed
 
data. The procedure of inspection and the tendon acceptance
 
criteria shall be as follows: (a) If the measured prestressing force of the selected tendon in a group lies above the prescribed lower limit, the lift-off test is considered to be a
 
positive indication of the sample tendon's
 
acceptability; (b) If the measured prestressing force of the selected tendon in a group lies between the prescribed lower
 
limit and 90% of the prescribed lower limit, two
 
tendons, one on each side of this tendon, shall be
 
checked for their prestressing forces. If the
 
prestressing forces of these two tendons are above 95%
 
of the prescribed lower limits for tendons, all three tendons shall be restored to the required level of integrity, and the tendon group shall be considered
 
acceptable. If the measured prestressing force of any
 
two tendons falls below 95% of the prescribed lower
 
limits of the tendons, additional lift-off testing
 
shall be done to detect the cause and extent of such occurrence; (c) If the measured prestressing force of any tendon lies below 90% of the prescribed lower limit, the defective tendon shall be completely detensioned and additional
 
lift-off testing shall be performed to determine the
 
cause and extent of such occurrence;
 
Programs and Manuals TRM 5.0.500 5.0.500  Programs and Manuals (continued) (continued)
PALO VERDE UNITS 1, 2, 3 T5.0.500-6 Rev 0  8/13/98  (d) If the average of all measured prestressing forces for each group (corrected for average condition) is found to be less than the minimum required prestress level
 
at anchorage location for that group, the condition shall be considered as below the acceptance criteria for containment vessel structural integrity; and (e) Unless there is degradation of the containment vessel below the acceptance criteria during the first three
 
inspections, the sample population for subsequent
 
inspections shall include at least 6 tendons (3 hoop and 3 inverted U). 
: 2. Performing tendon detensioning, inspections, and material tests on a previously stressed tendon from each group. A randomly selected tendon from each group shall be completely
 
detensioned in order to identify broken or damaged wires. A
 
previously stressed tendon wire or strands from one tendon of each group shall be removed for testing and examination over the entire length to determine (which should include
 
the broken wire if so identified) that:  (a) The tendon wires are free of corrosion, cracks, and damage;  (b) There are no changes in the presence or physical appearance of the sheathing filler-grease; and (c) A minimum tensile strength of 240,000 psi (guaranteed ultimate strength of the tendon material) exists for at least three wire samples (one from each end and one
 
at mid-length) cut from each removed wire. Failure of
 
any one of the wire samples to meet the minimum tensile strength test is evidenced that structural integrity is below the acceptance criteria. 
: 3. Performing tendon retensioning of those tendons detensioned for inspection to at least force level recorded prior to
 
detensioning or the predicted value, whichever is greater, with the tolerance within minus zero to plus 6%, except that Programs and Manuals TRM 5.0.500 5.0.500 Programs and Manuals (continued) (continued)
PALO VERDE UNITS 1, 2, 3 T5.0.500-7 Rev 0  8/13/98 the final seating force shall be such that the stress in the wire or strand shall not exceed 70% of the guaranteed
 
ultimate tensile strength of the tendons. During
 
retensioning of these tendons, the stress in the tendon shall not exceed 80% of its ultimate strength, and the changes in load and elongation shall be measured
 
simultaneously at a minimum of three approximately equally
 
spaced levels of force between zero and the seating force. 
 
If the elongation corresponding to a specific load differs
 
by more than 10% from that recorded during installation, an investigation shall be made to ensure that the difference is not related to wire failures or slips of wires in
 
anchorages; and
: 4. Verifying the OPERABILITY of the sheathing filler-grease by assuring:  (a) No voids in excess of 5% of the net duct volume,  (b) Minimum grease coverage exists for the different parts of the anchorage system, and (c) The chemical properties of the filler material are within the tolerance limits specified as follows:  Water content 0 -  5% by wt.
Chlorides 0 - 10 ppm Nitrates 0 - 10 ppm Sulfides 0 -  5 ppm Reserved Alkalinity 0 - 50% of the installed value (Base Numbers) (installed value 0 - 5 for older
 
grease) c. As an assurance of the structural integrity of the containment vessel, tendon anchorage assembly hardware (such
 
as bearing plates, stressing washers, wedges, and
 
buttonheads) of all tendons selected for inspection shall be
 
visually examined. For those containments in multiple unit
 
plants for which only visual inspection need be performed, tendon anchorages selected for inspection shall be visually Programs and Manuals TRM 5.0.500 5.0.500 Programs and Manuals (continued) (continued)
PALO VERDE UNITS 1, 2, 3 T5.0.500-8 Rev 22  3/7/03 examined to the extent practical without dismantling the load-bearing components of the anchorages. The surrounding
 
concrete shall also be checked visually for indication of
 
any abnormal condition. 
: d. The exterior surface of the containment vessel shall be
 
visually examined to detect areas of large spall, severe
 
scaling, D-cracking in an area of 25 sq. ft. or more, other
 
surface deterioration or disintegration, or grease leakage, each of which can be considered as evidence that the
 
structural integrity is below the acceptance criteria.
 
Programs and Manuals TRM 5.0.500 5.0.500  Programs and Manuals (continued) (continued)
PALO VERDE UNITS 1, 2, 3 T5.0.500-9 Rev 0  8/13/98 Table 5.0.500-1 (page 1 of 2)
Tendon Test Criteria Tendon Surveillance - First Year Tendon Number Visual Inspection and Monitor Forces Detension Tendon, Remove and Test Wire V32 X No V43 X No V62 X X V75* X A H13-007* X X H13-021 X No H21-037 X No H21-044 X No H32-016 X No H32-030 X X -------------------------------------NOTES------------------------------------
: 1. "X" means the tendon shown shall be inspected for the stated requirements during this surveillance.
: 2. "A" means the tendon shown shall be inspected for the stated requirements during the next or second surveillance.
: 3. "No" means that inspection is not required for that tendon.
: 4. "*" means control tendon.
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Programs and Manuals TRM 5.0.500 5.0.500 Programs and Manuals (continued) (continued)
PALO VERDE UNITS 1, 2, 3 T5.0.500-10 Rev 0  8/13/98 Table 5.0.500-1 (page 2 of 2)
Tendon Test Criteria Lift-Off Force First Year U-Tendons TENDON NUMBER TENDON END MAXIMUM (kips) MINIMUM (kips) V32 Shop 1463 1343 Field 1510 1386 V43 Shop 1436 1364  Field 1486 1364 V62 Shop 1475 1354  Field 1486 1364 V75 Shop 1527 1402  Field 1504 1380 Hoop Tendons TENDON NUMBER TENDON END MAXIMUM (kips) MINIMUM (kips) H13-007 Shop 1428 1300 Field 1451 1321 H13-021 Shop 1515 1380  Field 1491 1358 H21-037 Shop 1505 1371  Field 1446 1317 H21-044 Shop 1484 1360 Field 1530 1403 H32-016 Shop 1411 1282 Field 1457 1324 H32-030 Shop 1473 1330  Field 1473 1330 Programs and Manuals TRM 5.0.500 5.0.500 Programs and Manuals (continued) (continued)
PALO VERDE UNITS 1, 2, 3 T5.0.500-11 Rev 54  1/26/11 5.0.500.7 Reactor Coolant Pump Flywheel Inspection Program The purpose of the Reactor Coolant Pump Flywheel Inspection Program is to provide for the inspection of each reactor coolant
 
pump flywheel. The PVNGS Program Engineering group is the program owner. The program requirements are specified in ITS 5.5.7. 5.0.500.8 Inservice Inspection and Testing Programs The purpose of the Inservice Inspection (ISI) and Inservice Testing (IST) Programs is to provide controls for ASME inspection
 
and testing of ASME Code Class 1, 2 and 3 components. The PVNGS Program Engineering group is the program owner for IST and the PVNGS Component Programs group is the program owner for ISI.
In addition to the program requirements specified in ITS 5.5.8, the following also applies:
: a. Inservice inspection shall be performed in accordance with Section XI of the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code and applicable Addenda as required by 10 CFR 50, Section 50.55a(g).
: b. Inservice Testing shall be performed in accordance with the ASME Code for Operation and Maintenance of Nuclear Power Plants (ASME OM Code) and applicable Addenda as required by
 
10 CFR 50.55a(f).
: c. The testing frequency specified in Section XI of the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code and applicable Addenda for the
 
inservice inspection and testing activities required by the
 
ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code and applicable Addenda
 
shall be applicable as specified in PVNGS ITS 5.5.8.a for ITS
 
and TRM requirements.
: d. The provisions of ITS SR 3.0.2 are applicable to ITS 5.5.8.a for performing inservice inspection and testing activities. The
 
testing frequency specified in the ASME OM Code and applicable
 
Addenda for the inservice testing activities required by the
 
ASME OM Code and applicable Addenda shall be as specified in
 
PVNGS ITS 5.5.8a for ITS and TRM requirements.
Programs and Manuals TRM 5.0.500 5.0.500  Programs and Manuals (continued) (continued)
PALO VERDE UNITS 1, 2, 3 T5.0.500-12 Rev 54  1/26/11
: e. When testing ECCS trains pursuant to PVNGS ITS SR 3.5.3.3, verify that each of the following pumps develops the indicated differential pressure at or greater than their respective
 
minimum allowable recirculation flow:
: 1. High pressure safety injection pump greater than or equal to 1761 psid.
: 2. Low pressure safety injection pump greater than or equal to 165 psid.
: f. When testing the Containment Spray System pursuant to PVNGS ITS SR 3.6.6.3, verify that each pump develops an indicated head differential pressure of greater than or equal to 260 psid at greater than or equal the minimum allowable recirculation
 
flowrate.
: g. The provisions of TLCO 3.0.100.3 and TSR 3.0.100.3 are applicable to the program requirements T5.0.500.8e and
 
T5.0.500.8.f. 5.0.500.9 Steam Generator (SG) Tube Surveillance Program The purpose of the Steam Generator Tube Surveillance Program is to
 
provide controls for the Inservice Inspection of steam generator
 
tubes to ensure that structural integrity of this portion of the
 
RCS is maintained. The PVNGS System Engineering Group is the
 
program owner.
The program requirements are specified in ITS 5.5.9. 
 
Programs and Manuals TRM 5.0.500 5.0.500  Programs and Manuals (continued) (continued)
PALO VERDE UNITS 1, 2, 3 T5.0.500-13 Rev 11  12/14/00 5.0.500.10 Secondary Water Chemistry Program The purpose of the Secondary Water Chemistry Program is to provide controls for monitoring secondary water chemistry to inhibit SG
 
tube degradation and low pressure turbine disc stress corrosion cracking. The PVNGS Chemistry group is the program owner.
Program requirements are specified in PVNGS TS 5.5.10. 5.0.500.11 Ventilation Filter Testing Program (VFTP)
The purpose of the Ventilation Filter Testing Program is to implement the required testing of the TS and TRM filter
 
ventilation systems. The PVNGS Electrical Maintenance (HVAC) group is the program owner.
Program requirements for the Control Room Essential Filtration System (CREFS) and ESF Pump Room Exhaust Air Cleanup System (ESF
 
PREACS) are specified in PVNGS TS 5.5.11 and as supplemented
 
herein.
Program requirements for the Hydrogen Purge Cleanup system (HPCS) and the Fuel Building Essential Ventilation System (FBEVS) are contained herein.
The following requirements apply:
: 1. When testing pursuant to PVNGS TS SR 3.7.11.2, TS SR 3.7.13.2, TSR 3.6.100.2 and TSR 3.9.104.2, the CREFS, PREACS, HPCS and FBEVS shall be demonstrated OPERABLE at least once per 18 months or:  (a) after any maintenance affecting the airflow distribution or integrity of the HEPA or charcoal adsorber filter banks, or  (b) following painting, fire, or a chemical release in any ventilation zone communicating with the system that has been evaluated to have the potential to adversely affect the integrity of the filters.
: 2. When testing the CREFS, PREACS, HPCS and FBEVS pursuant to
 
PVNGS TS SR 3.7.11.2, TS SR 3.7.13.2, TSR 3.6.100.2 and TSR Programs and Manuals TRM 5.0.500 5.0.500  Programs and Manuals (continued) (continued)
PALO VERDE UNITS 1, 2, 3 T5.0.500-14 Rev 20  7/5/02 3.9.104.2, perform the in-place testing activities in accordance with Regulatory Positions C.5.a, C.5.c, and C.5.d of
 
Regulatory Guide 1.52, Revision 2, March 1978 and the PVNGS
 
VFTP. (In response to NRC Generic Letter 83-13).
: 3. After every 720 hours of charcoal adsorber operation and when testing the CREFS and PREACS pursuant to PVNGS TS 5.5.11.c, the HPCS pursuant to PVNGS TRM TSR 3.6.100.2, and the FBEVS pursuant to TRM TSR 3.9.104.2, verify within 31 days after a representative charcoal sample is removed, being obtained in accordance with the application of Regulatory Position C.6.b of Regulatory Guide 1.52, Revision 2, March 1978, as described in Section 1.8 of the UFSAR, that the methyl iodide penetration is less than or equal to the value specified below, when tested in accordance with ASTM D3803-1989, at a temperature of 30&deg;C and relative humidity specified as follows:    Penetration RH  CREFS <2.5%  70%  ESF PREACS/FBEVS <2.5%  70%  HPCS <2.5%  70%
: 4. After each complete or partial replacement of a HEPA filter bank for the HPCS and FBEVS by verifying that the HEPA filter banks remove greater than or equal to 99.0% of the DOP when
 
they are tested in-place in accordance with ANSI N510-1980.
The system flowrates for the HPCS and FBEVS are as specified below +/- 10%:
HPCS 50 CFM FBEVS 6000 CFM 5. After each complete or partial replacement of a charcoal adsorber bank for the HPCS and FBEVS by verifying that the charcoal adsorbers remove greater than or equal to 99.0% of a halogenated hydrocarbon refrigerant test gas when they are tested in-place in accordance with ANSI N510-1980. The system flowrates for the HPCS and FBEVS are as specified below +/-
10%: HPCS 50 CFM FBEVS 6000 CFM 6. For the HPCS and FBEVS, demonstrate at least once per 18 months that the pressure drop across the combined HEPA filters, the prefilters, and the charcoal adsorbers is as specified below when tested in accordance with Regulatory Guide 1.52, Programs and Manuals TRM 5.0.500 5.0.500 Programs and Manuals (continued) (continued)
PALO VERDE UNITS 1, 2, 3 T5.0.500-15 Rev 53  11/10/10 Revision 2 and ANSI N510-1980 at the system flowrate specified as follows +/- 10%:
Ventilation System Delta P Flowrate HPCS < 2.26 inches water gauge  50 CFM FBEVS  5.2  inches water gauge 6000 CFM
: 7. For the system specified below, demonstrate at least once per 18 months that the heaters dissipate at least the following specified value when tested in accordance with ANSI N510-1980:
Ventilation System Wattage HPCS 0.5 kW 8. The provisions of TLCO 3.0.100.3 and TSR 3.0.100.3 are applicable to the requirements of T5.0.500.11.1 (a) and (b),
T5.0.500.11.3, T5.0.500.11.4, T5.0.500.11.5, T5.0.500.11.6 and
 
T5.0.500.11.7. 5.0.500.12 Explosive Gas and Storage Tank Radioactivity Monitoring Program The purpose of the Explosive Gas and Storage Tank Radioactivity Monitoring Program is to provide control for potentially explosive gas mixtures contained in the Waste Gas Holdup System, and for the
 
quantity of radioactivity contained in gas storage tanks and
 
unprotected outdoor liquid storage tanks. The PVNGS Chemistry
 
group is the program owner.
The program requirements are specified in ITS 5.5.12.
Refer to TRM specifications T3.10.200, T3.10.201 and T3.10.202 for specification requirements. 5.0.500.13 Diesel Fuel Oil Testing Program The purpose of the Diesel Fuel Oil Testing Program is to ensure
 
the acceptability of fuel oil prior to addition to storage tanks. 
 
The PVNGS Chemistry group is the program owner.
The program requirements are specified in ITS 5.5.13.
Programs and Manuals TRM 5.0.500 5.0.500 Programs and Manuals (continued) (continued)
PALO VERDE UNITS 1, 2, 3 T5.0.500-16 Rev 53  11/10/10 5.0.500.14 Technical Specifications (TS) Bases Control Program The purpose of the Technical Specifications Bases Control Program is to provide a means for processing changes to the Bases of the
 
PVNGS ITS. Nuclear Regulatory Affairs is the program owner.
Program requirements are specified in ITS 5.5.14. 5.0.500.15 Safety Function Determination Program (SFDP)
The purpose of the Safety function Determination Program is to ensure that a loss of safety function is detected and appropriate
 
actions taken. The PVNGS Operations group is the program owner.
Program requirements are specified in ITS 5.5.15. 5.0.500.16 Containment Leakage Rate Testing Program The purpose of the Containment Leakage Rate Testing Program is to implement the required containment leakage rate testing. The
 
PVNGS Program Engineering group is the program owner.
In addition to the program requirements specified in ITS 5.5.16, the following also applies:
: a. Demonstrate CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY after each closing of each penetration subject to Type B testing, except containment air locks, if opened following a Type A or B test, by leak rate
 
testing in accordance with ITS 5.5.16.
: b. Leakage rate acceptance criteria:
: 1. For the required 42 inch containment purge supply and exhaust isolation valves with resilient material seals
 
measured leakage rate is less than or equal to 0.05 L a when pressurized to P
: a. 2. For 8 inch containment purge supply and exhaust isolation valves with resilient material seals measured leakage rate
 
is less than or equal to 0.01 L a when pressurized to P
: a. c. The provisions of TLCO 3.0.100.3 and TSR 3.0.100.3 are applicable to the requirements of T5.0.500.16 a and b.
Programs and Manuals TRM 5.0.500 5.0.500 Programs and Manuals (continued) (continued)
PALO VERDE UNITS 1, 2, 3 T5.0.500-17 Rev 8  3/17/00 5.0.500.17 Process Control Program (PCP)
The purpose of the Process Control Program is to contain the current formulas, sampling, analyses, test, and determinations to
 
be made to ensure that processing and packaging of solid radioactive wastes based on demonstrated processing of actual or simulated wet solid wastes will be accomplished in such a way as
 
to assure compliance with 10 CFR Parts 20, 61, and 71, State
 
regulations, burial ground requirements, and other requirements
 
governing the disposal of solid radioactive waste. The PVNGS
 
Radiation Protection Group is the program owner.
Requirements for changes to the PCP are contained in the PVNGS QA Plan. 5.0.500.18 Technical Requirements Manual (TRM) Control Program The purpose of the Technical Requirements Manual Control Program
 
is to provide a means for establishing controls and processing
 
changes to the TRM. Nuclear Regulatory Affairs is the program owner. 5.0.500.19 Configuration Risk Management Program (CRMP)
The Configuration Risk Management Program (CRMP) provides a proceduralized risk-informed assessment to manage the risk
 
associated with equipment inoperability. The program applies to
 
technical specification structures, systems, and components for which a risk-informed Completion Time has been granted. The program shall include the following elements: a. Provisions for the control and implementation of a Level 1 at-power internal events PRA-informed methodology. The assessment is to be capable of evaluating the applicable
 
plant configuration. b. Provisions for performing an assessment prior to entering the plant configuration described by the Limiting Conditions
 
for Operation (LCO) Action Statement for preplanned
 
activities.
Programs and Manuals TRM 5.0.500 5.0.500  Programs and Manuals (continued) (continued)
PALO VERDE UNITS 1, 2, 3 T5.0.500-18 Rev 8  3/17/00 c. Provisions for performing an assessment after entering the plant configuration described by the LCO Action Statement for unplanned entry into the LCO Action Statement. d. Provisions for assessing the need for additional actions after the discovery of additional equipment-out-of service
 
conditions while in the plant configuration described by the
 
LCO Action Statement. e. Provisions for considering other applicable risk-significant contributors such as Level 2 issues and external events, qualitatively or quantitatively.
Reporting Requirements TRM 5.0.600 (continued) ______________________________________________________________________________
PALO VERDE UNITS 1, 2, 3 T5.0.600-1 Rev 37  8/17/06 T5.0  ADMINISTRATIVE CONTROLS T5.0.600  Reporting Requirements T5.0.600.1 Annual Reports In addition to the requirements of PVNGS ITS 5.6, annual reports shall also include the results of specific activity analysis in which the primary coolant exceeded the limits of PVNGS ITS 3.4.17. 
 
The following information shall be included: (1) Reactor power history starting 48 hours prior to the first sample in which the limit was exceeded; (2) Results of the last isotopic analysis for radioiodine performed prior to exceeding the limit, results of analysis while limit was exceeded and results of one analysis after
 
the radioiodine activity was reduced to less than limit.
Each result should include date and time of sampling and the radioiodine concentrations: (3) Clean-up system flow history starting 48 hours prior to the first sample in which the limit was exceeded; (4) Graph of the I-131 concentration and one other radioiodine isotope concentration in microcuries per gram as a function of time for the duration of the specific activity above the steady-state level; and (5) The time duration when the specific activity of the primary coolant exceeded the radioiodine limit. T5.0.600.2 Startup Reports The requirement to submit startup reports to the NRC has been deleted. However, appropriate testing and retention of startup test records will continue to be performed in accordance with the
 
requirements of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, and the PVNGS Quality Assurance Program. Records will be maintained in accordance with the requirements of PVNGS UFSAR Section 1.8.
 
Reporting Requirements TRM 5.0.600 Reporting Requirements (continued) PALO VERDE UNITS 1, 2, 3 T5.0.600-2 Rev 37  8/17/06 T5.0.600.3 Operating Data Reporting Provide to the NRC, using an industry database such as the Consolidated Data Entry program, the operating data (for each calendar month) that is described in Generic Letter 97-02, "Revised Contents of the Monthly Operating Report," by the last day of the month following the end of each calendar quarter.
 
High Radiation Area TRM 5.0.700 PALO VERDE UNITS 1, 2, 3 T5.0.700-1 Rev. 34  6/15/05 T5.0  ADMINISTRATIVE CONTROLS T5.0.700  High Radiation Area Refer to PVNGS Improved Technical Specifications Section 5.7
 
TRM Specification Bases TRM 6.0.100 T3.0.100 (continued)
PALO VERDE UNITS 1, 2, 3 T6.0.100-1 Rev 40  2/21/07 T6.0  TRM SPECIFICATION BASES T3.0 TLCO Applicability TLCO 3.0.100.1 See ITS LCO 3.0.1 Specification Bases TLCO 3.0 100.2 See ITS LCO 3.0.2 Specification Bases TLCO 3.0 100.3 See ITS LCO 3.0.3 Specification Bases TLCO 3.0 100.4 See ITS LCO 3.0.3 Specification Bases TLCO 3.0 100.5 See ITS LCO 3.0.4 Specification Bases T3.0 TRM Surveillance Requirent (TRS) Applicability TSR 3.0.100.1 See ITS SR 3.0.1 Specification Bases TSR 3.0.100.2 See ITS SR 3.0.2 Specification Bases TSR 3.0.100.3 See ITS SR 3.0.3 Specification Bases TSR 3.0.100.4 See ITS SR 3.0.3 Specification Bases TRM Specification Bases TRM 6.0.100 T3.0.100 (continued)
PALO VERDE UNITS 1, 2, 3 T6.0.100-2 Rev 40  2/21/07 T6.0  TRM SPECIFICATION BASES T3.1.100 Flow Paths - Shutdown T3.1.101 Flow Paths - Operating T3.1.102 Charging Pumps - Shutdown T3.1.103 Charging Pumps - Operating T3.1.104 Borated Sources - Shutdown T3.1.105 Borated Sources - Operating BACKGROUND Boration equipment is needed to support reactivity control and the pressure and inventory control safety functions during normal operations and anticipated operational occurrences. A functional boration "system" consists of a borated water source, a gravity-fed suction pathway, a pump capable of being powered from an emergency power supply, and a discharge path to the RCS.
Use of redundant components within the chemical and volume
 
control, safety injection, and spent fuel pool cooling systems enhances flexibility and reliability in meeting design requirements.
Soluble boron in the reactor coolant and control rods provide two diverse methods of core reactivity control. In accordance with the provisions of GDC 26, boration systems can reliably
 
control the rate of reactivity changes resulting from planned, normal power changes, including xenon burnout, without exceeding acceptable fuel design limits. Each boration system is capable
 
of maintaining the temperature-dependent shutdown margin and KN-1 requirements of the Technical Specifications during a cooldown. In addition, each boration system can add the boron
 
equivalent of 4% k/k, not including the effects of xenon, during a plant cooldown to mode 5 considering only the borated
 
makeup water used to compensate for thermal contraction of the
 
coolant. Under normal conditions with letdown in service, the boration systems are also capable of making the core subcritical from a hot operating condition and holding it subcritical in the
 
hot standby condition. In the event that Technical Specification shutdown margin requirements are not met during normal operations, the associated action statements direct the
 
operator to initiate boration and continue until margins are restored. One boration system can add 1% k/k of TRM Specification Bases TRM 6.0.100 T3.1.100, T3.1.101, T3.1.102, T3.1.103, T3.1.104, T3.1.105 TRM SPECIFICATION BASES  (continued) (continued)
PALO VERDE UNITS 1, 2, 3 T6.0.100-3 Rev 40  2/21/07 negative reactivity in less than 4 hours assuming "typical" reactor physics parameters and nominal system performance with letdown in service.
In accordance with GDC 33, boration systems can supply reactor coolant makeup for protection against breaks in small lines connected to the reactor coolant pressure boundary. Small
 
lines, such as those for instrument and sample connections, contain flow orifices to limit leakage rates within the capacity of available charging pumps. As part of the normal
 
makeup, the boration systems assure that specified acceptable fuel design limits are not exceeded as a result of minor reactor coolant leakage with or without offsite electrical
 
power. GDC 10 and GDC 19 require in part that the reactor coolant
 
system be designed with appropriate margin and controls to
 
assure that specified acceptable fuel design limits are not exceeded during normal operation and anticipated operational occurrences. The operability of boration systems ensures that primary system pressure and inventory (pressurizer level) can be adequately controlled following a loss of offsite power and subsequent cooldown to cold shutdown conditions. In
 
combination with the shutdown cooling system, boration systems are capable of supporting a natural circulation cooldown in accordance with the requirements of Branch Technical Position (BTP) RSB 5-1 as accepted for PVNGS as a Class 2 plant. APPLICABLE None of the accidents analyzed in chapter 15 of the safety SAFETY analysis report require charging or auxiliary spray for ANALYSIS mitigation of the event. The boration systems support general design requirements, and verification that the systems can
 
perform their safety functions is contained in design
 
calculations separate from the accident analyses. Although these calculations are conservative with respect to expected system capability, they are based on nominal system
 
conditions/performance, and the effects of instrument uncertainty are not included. The results of these analyses are summarized in UFSAR 9.3.4. Additional requirements and TRM Specification Bases TRM 6.0.100 T3.1.100, T3.1.101, T3.1.102, T3.1.103, T3.1.104, T3.1.105 TRM SPECIFICATION BASES  (continued) (continued)
PALO VERDE UNITS 1, 2, 3 T6.0.100-4 Rev 40  2/21/07 commitments associated with natural circulation cooldown are presented in UFSAR Appendix 5C.
In addition to performance requirements, the general design criteria also place limits on the damage possible from malfunctions of the boration systems. GDC 28 requires that the rate of reactivity addition be limited so that postulated
 
reactivity accidents do not result in yielding of reactor coolant pressure boundary materials or deformation of fuel and vessel internals that may impair core cooling. This is
 
verified in part by the UFSAR 15.4.6 analysis for inadvertent deboration. Boration systems may also affect GDC 15, which requires that reactor coolant pressure boundary design limits
 
shall not be exceeded during normal or anticipated operational occurrences. UFSAR 15.5.2 shows that charging pump flow is low enough to ensure that the bounding pressurizer level control
 
system malfunction will not overpressurize the primary system.
LCO The OPERABILITY of the boration systems ensures the capability
 
to control reactivity during power changes, maintain shutdown
 
margin requirements, makeup for reduction in reactor coolant volume due to contraction and nominal system losses, makeup for losses due to small breaks in the RCS pressure boundary, provide reactor coolant pump seal injection, and control reactor coolant pressure through the use of auxiliary spray when required.
The charging pumps have a design flow of approximately 44 gpm, but pump inefficiencies result in a nominal charging pump discharge flow of about 42 gpm. Because of the nature of
 
positive displacement pumps, the pump discharge flow rate does not vary significantly with reactor coolant system pressure.
The net charging flow is the total charging pump discharge flow
 
minus the reactor coolant pump controlled bleed-off flow, which does not enter the reactor coolant system. With two pumps required to be OPERABLE, the minimum net charging flow of 26
 
gpm for a single pump ensures that the boron injection rate described in the basis of the Technical Specifications can be provided even in the event of a single failure. In addition, the nominal charging flow from a single pump provides adequate TRM Specification Bases TRM 6.0.100 T3.1.100, T3.1.101, T3.1.102, T3.1.103, T3.1.104, T3.1.105 TRM SPECIFICATION BASES  (continued) (continued)
PALO VERDE UNITS 1, 2, 3 T6.0.100-5 Rev 46  1/8/09 makeup and auxiliary pressurizer spray for a natural circulation cooldown conducted in accordance the requirements of BTP RSB 5-1, which also postulates the single active failure
 
of the other pump. Lastly, the OPERABILITY of two charging pumps ensures that the system can mitigate the effects of a small break in the reactor coolant system. Consideration of a
 
single failure is not required in support of GDC 33, and the nominal net charging rate of 68 gpm from two charging pumps (i.e., 26 gpm + 42 gpm) exceeds the maximum break flow and
 
provides sufficient makeup to prevent violation of fuel design limits during the subsequent controlled cooldown.
An OPERABLE charging pump must be powered from an OPERABLE ESF bus that can be energized from either an offsite circuit or an emergency diesel generator. Use of safety grade power supplies in combination with gravity-fed flow suction pathways provides
 
a high level of assurance of boration system function during normal operations and following a loss of offsite power.
Requiring two of three boration flowpaths to be OPERABLE provides a high probability that at least one pathway will be available to connect the borated water source to the charging pump suction. All of the specified pathways are gravity-fed
 
and therefore do not require use of non-class pumps to provide net positive suction head for the charging pumps. Since the VCT boron concentration is normally much less than 4000 ppm and
 
the tank may be pressurized with a noncondensible gas, the two pathways that utilize the normal charging pump suction are not OPERABLE unless VCT outlet valve CH-501 can be closed. 
 
Although not specified, the availability of an additional flow path from the charging pump discharge to the RCS is implied.
Actions outside the control room have been acknowledged in
 
aligning the flowpaths. The specified flowpaths are neither fully safety grade nor single failure proof. However, the probability of a single-point vulnerability failing when called
 
upon is low. In addition, high-pressure safety injection in combination with the reactor coolant head vents provides a diverse method of accomplishing the boration safety functions. 
 
Overall this results in an acceptable level of functional reliability for the boration systems.
TRM Specification Bases TRM 6.0.100 T3.1.100, T3.1.101, T3.1.102, T3.1.103, T3.1.104, T3.1.105 TRM SPECIFICATION BASES  (continued) (continued)
PALO VERDE UNITS 1, 2, 3 T6.0.100-6 Rev 40  2/21/07 The Refueling Water Tank (RWT) is required per Technical Specifications to be OPERABLE in MODES 1-4 in order to provide an adequate supply of borated water for emergency core cooling
 
systems in the event of a LOCA. The minimum RWT level required in the Technical Specifications ensures that sufficient volume is available above the high suction nozzle in order to conduct
 
a natural circulation cooldown in accordance with the provisions of BTP RSB 5-1. That minimum level also provides adequate borated make-up for a small line break and all
 
credited reactivity control functions. The Spent Fuel Pool (SFP) is also required to be OPERABLE in MODES 1-4 as a redundant borated water source to protect against single
 
failure for the emergency boration function. In other analyses, failure of the RWT as a passive, seismic class 1, safety grade component is not a credible malfunction.
A cold shutdown reserve volume (CSDRV) is maintained to compensate for the change in reactor coolant volume that results from thermal contraction during cooldown to cold
 
shutdown entry conditions with RCP controlled bleed-off isolated. The CSDRV also bounds the volumes of borated water required for postulated reactivity events. The minimum volumes
 
required for both the RWT and SFP provide a high degree of reliability with respect to the reactivity control and safe shutdown capabilities. To account for depletion of makeup
 
inventory during cooldown, the cold shutdown reserve volume requirements vary as a function of cold leg temperature. Once the primary has been cooled to cold shutdown conditions, borated water inventory is only required to makeup for further contraction during continued cool down to refueling conditions and to refill the pressurizer.
The requirements on temperature and boron concentration of the borated water sources are consistent with the values used in safety analysis and reactivity calculations. The upper limit
 
spent fuel pool temperature is 180&deg;F; however, the 2%
difference in density between water at 120&deg; and 180&deg; has negligible impact on the required volume of makeup water or its
 
reactivity worth.
TRM Specification Bases TRM 6.0.100 T3.1.100, T3.1.101, T3.1.102, T3.1.103, T3.1.104, T3.1.105 TRM SPECIFICATION BASES  (continued) (continued)
PALO VERDE UNITS 1, 2, 3 T6.0.100-7 Rev 54  1/26/11 APPLICABILITY The normal makeup system contains three charging pumps, all of which are normally in service. With the RCS temperature above 210&deg;F, a minimum of two charging pumps is required to mitigate
 
the effects of a small line break over all of the expected operating pressures. A minimum of two boron injection systems is also required to ensure single functional capability in
 
those events where an assumed failure renders one of the systems inoperable. With the RCS temperature below 210&deg;F, one system is acceptable without single failure consideration based
 
on the stable reactivity condition of the reactor and the additional restrictions prohibiting CORE ALTERATIONS and positive reactivity changes.
In MODES 1-4, charging pumps are required in order to accomplish boron injection over the full range of expected reactor coolant system pressure. The provision of three
 
charging pumps when only two are required provides for maintenance and flexibility of operation. In modes 5 and 6, the safety grade high pressure and low pressure safety
 
injection pumps are capable of delivering the required flow rates. Since they are also energized from an emergency power supply, they are acceptable alternatives if a charging pump is
 
not OPERABLE at low system pressures.
ACTIONS In MODES 1-4, the allowable out-of-service period of 72 hours for one required boration system inoperable is consistent with
 
those for safety related equipment. This time allows for minor component repair or corrective action without undue risk of overall facility safety during the repair period. If
 
restoration can not be accomplished in 72 hours, enter TLCO 3.0.100.3 and initiate corrective action in accordance with PVNGS corrective action program and initiate an operability
 
determination, as necessary to determine the impact on equipment in the technical specifications. This should include an assessment of the plant configuration and a determination of
 
the appropriate compensatory action and/or Mode changes to maintain safe operation and compliance with design and licensing basis.
TRM Specification Bases TRM 6.0.100 T3.1.100, T3.1.101, T3.1.102, T3.1.103, T3.1.104, T3.1.105 TRM SPECIFICATION BASES  (continued) (continued)
PALO VERDE UNITS 1, 2, 3 T6.0.100-8 Rev 46  1/8/09 In MODES 5-6, the absence of an OPERABLE boration method represents a serious degradation in reactivity management controls. Suspension of core alterations and positive
 
reactivity additions preclude the need for emergency boration until control can be re-established. SURVEILLANCE Surveillance tests for the RWT in the Technical Specifications  REQUIREMENTS as a supply of emergency core cooling water are more restrictive than those as a borated water source. Since SFP is
 
as stable as the RWT with respect to temperature, level (volume), and boron concentration, the prescribed testing frequency is the same as for the RWT.
Based on operational experience, monthly verification of manual valve position in the boration flowpaths provides reasonable assurance that the system will function as designed, and remedial operator actions outside the control room in addition
 
to those needed to normally align the system are not needed to initiate flow.
The charging pumps and valves in the boration flow paths are tested in accordance with the station in-service testing program.
TRM Specification Bases TRM 6.0.100 TRM SPECIFICATION BASES (continued)
PALO VERDE UNITS 1, 2, 3 T6.0.100-9 Rev 40  2/21/07 T3.1.200 Shutdown Margin - Reactor Trip Breakers Closed (See the ITS 3.1.2 Specification Bases.) T3.1.201 This TRM specification is not used and is intentionally left blank. T3.1.202 Control Element Assembly - Alignment (See the ITS 3.1.5 Specification Bases.) T3.1.203 Control Element Assembly - Drop Time (See the ITS 3.1.5 Specification Bases.) T3.1.204 Shutdown CEA Insertion Limits and T3.1.205 Regulating CEA Insertion Limits Safety analysis assumes that the Shutdown and Regulating Groups 1 & 2 CEAs are fully withdrawn any time the reactor is critical. This ensures that:
: a. The minimum shutdown margin (SDM) is maintained; and
: b. The potential effects of a CEA ejection accident are limited to acceptable limits.
CEAs are considered fully withdrawn at 147.75 inches (Pulse Counter
 
indication) and 145.25 inches (RSPT indication) since this position supports the assumptions made in the safety analysis. The required CEA insertion
 
position, as indicated by the RSPT, differs from the required CEA insertion position, as indicated by the Pulse Counter, to allow for the inaccuracies associated with the RSPT. The actual CEA position is required to be >
147.75 inches withdrawn and the Pulse Counter indication is considered to be the most accurate. Additionally, a CEA at its UEL (Upper Electrical Limit) satisfies the requirement for >
147.75 inches withdrawn.
Due to fuel design changes (Guardian Grid fuel assemblies), the active height of the core was raised resulting in the need for a higher fully withdrawn CEA position in order to maintain the active portion of the CEAs in a position
 
supported by the safety analysis. Shutdown and Regulating Groups 1 & 2 CEAs are required to be fully withdrawn to meet the SDM requirements of the safety analysis. The CEA all rods out (ARO) position specified by the Core Data Book
 
supports the CEA Guide Tube Wear Program, is a variable position based upon core life and does not violate the fully withdrawn CEA position required for the safety analysis SDM requirements.
Source documents: PVNGS CRDR #2634792, Operability Determination 266 and associated documentation, 10 CFR 50.59 #S-04-0201 TRM Specification Bases TRM 6.0.100 TRM SPECIFICATION BASES (continued)
PALO VERDE UNITS 1, 2, 3 T6.0.100-10 Rev 40  2/21/07 T3.2.200 Azimuthal Power Tilt - T q The limitations on the AZIMUTHAL POWER TILT are provided to ensure that design safety margins are maintained. An AZIMUTHAL POWER TILT greater than the limit
 
specified in the CORE OPERATING LIMITS REPORT with COLSS in service or 0.03 with COLSS out of service is not expected and if it should occur, operation is restricted to only those  conditions required to identify the cause of the
 
tilt. The tilt is normally calculated by COLSS. A minimum core power of 20%
of RATED THERMAL POWER is assumed by the CPCs in its input to COLSS for calculation of AZIMUTHAL POWER TILT. The 20% RATED THERMAL POWER threshold is
 
due to the neutron flux detector system being inaccurate below 20% core power.
Core noise level at low power is too large to obtain usable detector readings.
The surveillance requirements specified when COLSS is out of service provide
 
an acceptable means of detecting the presence of a steady-state tilt. It is necessary to explicitly account for power asymmetries because the radial peaking factors used in the core power distribution calculations are based on
 
an untilted power distribution.
The AZIMUTHAL POWER TILT is equal to  (Ptilt/Puntilt)-1.0 where:
AZIMUTHAL POWER TILT is measured by assuming that the ratio of the power at
 
any core location in the presence of a tilt to the untilted power at the location is of the form:
Ptilt/Puntilt = 1 + T q g cos (Theta - Theta o) where: T q is the peak fractional tilt amplitude at the core periphery g is the radial normalizing factor Theta is the azimuthal core location TRM Specification Bases TRM 6.0.100 TRM SPECIFICATION BASES (continued)
PALO VERDE UNITS 1, 2, 3 T6.0.100-11 Rev 40  2/21/07 Theta o is the azimuthal core location of maximum tilt Ptilt/Puntilt is the ratio of the power at a core location in the presence of a tilt to the power at that location with no tilt.
The AZIMUTHAL POWER TILT allowance used in the CPCs is defined as the value of CPC addressable constant TR-1.0. T3.3.100 Supplementary Protection System (SPS) Instrumentation The OPERABILITY of the reactor protective and Engineered Safety Features Actuation Systems instrumentation and bypasses ensures that (1) the associated Engineered Safety Features Actuation action and/or reactor trip will be
 
initiated when the parameter monitored by each channel or combination thereof reaches its setpoint, (2) the specified coincidence logic is maintained, (3) sufficient redundancy is maintained to permit a channel to be out of service
 
for testing or maintenance, and (4) sufficient system functional capability is available from diverse parameters.
The OPERABILITY of these systems is required to provide the overall reliability, redundancy, and diversity assumed available in the facility design for the protection and mitigation of accident and transient conditions.
The integrated operation of each of these systems is consistent with the
 
assumptions used in the safety analyses.
The quarterly frequency for the channel functional tests for these systems is based on the analyses presented in the NRC approved topical report CEN-327-A, "RPS/ESFAS Extended Test Interval Evaluation," and CEN-327-A, Supplement 1, and calculation 13-JC-SB-200-Rev. 01.
The verification of response time at the specified frequencies provides assurance that the protective and ESF action function associated with each channel is completed within the time limit assumed in the safety analyses. The instrumentation response times are made up of the time to generate the trip
 
signal at the detector (sensor response time) and the time for the signal to interrupt power to the CEA drive mechanism (signal or trip delay time).
Response time may be verified by any series of sequential, overlapping or total channel measurements, including allocated sensor response time, such that the response time is verified. Allocations for sensor response times may be obtained from records of test results, vendor test data, or vendor
 
engineering specifications. Topical Report CE NPSD-1167-A, "Elimination of TRM Specification Bases TRM 6.0.100 TRM SPECIFICATION BASES (continued)
PALO VERDE UNITS 1, 2, 3 T6.0.100-12 Rev 40  2/21/07 Pressure Sensor Response Time Testing Requirements," provides the basis and methodology for using allocated sensor response times in the overall verification of the channel response time for specific sensors identified in
 
the Topical Report. Response time verification for other sensor types must be demonstrated by test. The allocation of sensor response times must be verified prior to placing a new component in operation and reverified after
 
maintenance that may adversely affect the sensor response time. T3.3.101 Radiation Monitoring Instrumentation The OPERABILITY of the radiation monitoring channels ensures that:  (1) the radiation levels are continually measured in the areas served by the individual channels and (2) the alarm or automatic action is initiated when the radiation level trip setpoint is exceeded. T3.3.102 Incore Detectors The OPERABILITY of the incore detectors with the specified minimum complement of equipment ensures that the measurements obtained from use of this system
 
accurately represent the spatial neutron flux distribution of the reactor core. T3.3.103 Seismic Monitoring
 
The OPERABILITY of the seismic instrumentation ensures that sufficient capability is available to promptly determine the magnitude of a seismic event and evaluate the response of those features important to safety. This
 
capability is required to permit comparison of the measured response to that used in the design basis for the facility to determine if plant shutdown is required pursuant to Appendix A of 10 CFR Part 100. The instrumentation is
 
consistent with the recommendations of Regulatory Guide 1.12, "Nuclear Power Plant Instrumentation for Earthquakes," Revision 2 as identified in the PVNGS FSAR. T3.3.104 Meteorological Instrumentation The OPERABILITY of the meteorological instrumentation ensures that sufficient meteorological data are available for estimating potential radiation doses to
 
the public as a result of routine or accidental release of radioactive materials to the atmosphere. This capability is required to evaluate the need for initiating protective measures to protect the health and safety of the
 
public and is consistent with the recommendations of Regulatory Guide 1.23 TRM Specification Bases TRM 6.0.100 TRM SPECIFICATION BASES (continued)
PALO VERDE UNITS 1, 2, 3 T6.0.100-13 Rev 46  1/8/09 "Onsite Meteorological Programs," February 1972. Wind speeds less than 0.6 MPH cannot be measured by the meteorological instrumentation.
Surveillance requirement TSR 3.3.104.2 is modified by a NOTE to indicate that the windspeed sensors are excluded from the CHANNEL CALIBRATION. The device is fixed by design and no adjustments are possible. T3.3.105 Post Accident Monitoring Instrumentation
 
The OPERABILITY of the post-accident monitoring instrumentation ensures that sufficient information is available on selected plant parameters to monitor and assess these variables following an accident. This capability is
 
consistent with the recommendations of Regulatory Guide 1.97, "Instrumentation for Light-Water-Cooled Nuclear Plants to Assess Plant Conditions During and Following an Accident," December 1975 and NUREG 0578, "TMI-2 Lessons Learned
 
Task Force Status Report and Short-Term Recommendations." T3.3.106 Loose-Part Detection Instrumentation The OPERABILITY of the loose-part detection instrumentation ensures that sufficient capability is available to detect loose metallic parts in the primary system and avoid or mitigate damage to primary system components. The allowable out-of-service times and surveillance requirements are consistent
 
with the recommendations of Regulatory Guide 1.133, "Loose-Part Detection Program for the Primary System of Light-Water-Cooled Reactors," May 1981. T3.3.107 Explosive Gas Monitoring System
 
The explosive gas instrumentation is provided for monitoring (and controlling) the concentrations of potentially explosive gas mixtures in the GASEOUS RADWASTE SYSTEM. The OPERABILITY and use of this instrumentation is
 
consistent with the requirements of General Design Criteria 60, 63, and 64 of Appendix A to 10 CFR Part 50. T3.3.108 Fuel Bldg Essential Ventilation Actuation Signal (FBEVAS)
 
The FBEVAS is an instrumentation channel that actuates the Fuel Building Essential Ventilation System (FBEVS) to minimize radioactive material released from an irradiated fuel assembly during a Fuel Handling Accident.
TLCO 3.3.108 requires one channel of FBEVAS which includes the Actuation Logic, Manual Trip, and radiation monitor to be OPERABLE.
TRM Specification Bases TRM 6.0.100 TRM SPECIFICATION BASES (continued)
PALO VERDE UNITS 1, 2, 3 T6.0.100-14 Rev 46  1/8/09 The cross-train trip function is provided as a defense-in-depth capability and is not required for FBEVAS channel operability.
During movement of irradiated fuel assemblies in the fuel building with the required FBEVAS channel inoperable, an OPERABLE FBEVS train must be immediately placed in the emergency mode of operation (i.e., fan running, valves/dampers aligned to the post-FBEVAS mode, etc.) or movement of
 
irradiated fuel assemblies must be suspended immediately. The first action ensures that no undetected failures preventing FBEVS system operation will occur, and that any active failure will be readily detected. If an OPERABLE
 
FBEVS  train is not placed in the emergency mode of operation, this action requires suspension of the movement of irradiated fuel assemblies in order to minimize the risk of release of radioactivity that might require the actuation
 
FBEVS. This does not preclude the movement of fuel to a safe position.
Movement of spent fuel casks containing irradiated fuel assemblies is not within the scope of the Applicability of this technical specification. The
 
movement of dry casks containing irradiated fuel assemblies will be done with a single-failure-proof handling system and with transport equipment that would prevent any credible accident that could result in a release of radioactivity. T3.3.200 RPS Instrumentation - Operating (See the ITS 3.3.1 Specification Bases.)
If a valid CPC cabinet high temperature alarm is received, it is possible for an OPERABLE CPC and CEAC to be affected and not be completely reliable.
Therefore, a CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST must be performed on OPERABLE CPCs and CEACs within 12 hours. The Completion Time of 12 hours is adequate
 
considering the low probability of undetected failure, the consequences of a single channel failure, and the time required to perform a CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST. T3.4.100 Auxiliary Spray System The auxiliary pressurizer spray is required to depressurize the RCS by cooling the pressurizer steam space to permit the plant to enter shutdown cooling. The
 
auxiliary pressurizer spray is required during those periods when normal pressurizer spray is not available, such as during natural circulation and during the later stages of a normal RCS cooldown. The auxiliary pressurizer
 
spray also distributes boron to the pressurizer when normal pressurizer spray is not available.
TRM Specification Bases TRM 6.0.100 TRM SPECIFICATION BASES (continued)
PALO VERDE UNITS 1, 2, 3 T6.0.100-15 Rev 53  11/10/10 T3.4.101 RCS Chemistry The limitations on Reactor Coolant System chemistry ensure that corrosion of the Reactor Coolant System is minimized and reduces the potential for Reactor
 
Coolant System leakage or failure due to stress corrosion. Maintaining the chemistry within the Steady State Limits provides adequate corrosion protection to ensure the structural integrity of the Reactor Coolant System
 
over the life of the plant. The associated effects of exceeding the oxygen, chloride, and fluoride limits are time and temperature dependent. Corrosion studies show that operation may be continued with contaminant concentration
 
levels in excess of the Steady State Limits, up to the Transient Limits, for the specified limited time intervals without having a significant effect on the structural integrity of the Reactor Coolant System. The time interval
 
permitting continued operation within the restrictions of the Transient Limits provides time for taking corrective actions to restore the contaminant concentrations to within the Steady State Limits.
The surveillance requirements provide adequate assurance that concentrations in excess of the limits will be detected in sufficient time to take corrective action. T3.4.102 Pressurizer Heatup and Cooldown Limits The limitations imposed on the pressurizer heatup and cooldown rates and spray water temperature differential are provided to assure that the pressurizer is
 
operated within the design criteria assumed for the fatigue analysis performed in accordance with the ASME Code Requirements. T3.4.103 Intentionally Blank
 
TRM Specification Bases TRM 6.0.100 TRM SPECIFICATION BASES (continued)
PALO VERDE UNITS 1, 2, 3 T6.0.100-16 Rev 53  11/10/10 T3.4.104 RCS Vents (Reactor Head Vents)
Reactor Coolant System vents are provided to exhaust noncondensible gases and/or steam from the primary system that could inhibit natural circulation
 
core cooling. The OPERABILITY of at least one Reactor Coolant System vent path from the reactor vessel head ensures the capability exists to perform this function.
A vent path is the flow capability from the reactor vessel head to the reactor drain tank (RDT) or from the reactor vessel head to containment atmosphere.
The four vent paths are:
: 1. From the reactor vessel head through solenoid operated valve (SOV) HV-101, then through SOV HV-105 to the RDT.
: 2. From the reactor vessel head through SOV HV-101, then through SOV HV-106 directly to containment atmosphere. 
: 3. From the reactor vessel head through SOV HV-102, then through SOV HV-105 to the RDT. 
: 4. From the reactor vessel head through SOV HV-102, then through SOV HV-106 directly to containment atmosphere.
The valve redundancy of the Reactor Coolant System vent paths serves to
 
minimize the probability of inadvertent or irreversible actuation while ensuring that a single failure of a vent valve, power supply, or control system does not prevent isolation of the vent path.
The function, capabilities, and testing requirements of the Reactor Coolant System vent systems are consistent with the requirements of Item II.B.1 of NUREG-0737. T3.4.200 RCS Pressure and Temperature (P/T) Limits (See the ITS 3.4.3 Specification Bases.) T3.4.201 Pressurizer
 
An OPERABLE pressurizer provides pressure control for the Reactor Coolant System during operations with both forced reactor coolant flow and with natural circulation flow. The minimum water level in the pressurizer assures
 
the pressurizer heaters, which are required to achieve and maintain pressure control, remain covered with water to prevent failure, which could occur if the heaters were energized uncovered. The maximum water level in the
 
pressurizer ensures that this parameter is maintained within the envelope of operation assumed in the safety analysis. The maximum water level also ensures that the RCS is not a hydraulically solid system and that a steam TRM Specification Bases TRM 6.0.100 TRM SPECIFICATION BASES (continued)
PALO VERDE UNITS 1, 2, 3 T6.0.100-17 Rev 53  11/10/10 bubble will be provided to accommodate pressure surges during operation. The steam bubble also protects the pressurizer code safety valves against water relief. The requirement to verify that on an Engineered Safety Features
 
Actuation test signal concurrent with a loss-of-offsite power the pressurizer heaters are automatically shed from the emergency power sources is to ensure that the non-Class 1E heaters do not reduce the reliability of or overload the
 
emergency power source. The requirement that a minimum number of pressurizer heaters be OPERABLE enhances the capability to control Reactor Coolant System pressure and establish and maintain natural circulation. T3.4.202 Pressurizer Vents (See the ITS 3.4.12 specification Bases.) T3.4.203 RCS Operational LEAKAGE (See the ITS 3.4.14 Specification Bases.) T3.4.204 RCS PIV Leakage (See the ITS 3.4.15 Specification Bases.) T3.5.200 Safety Injection Tanks (See the ITS 3.5.1 and 3.5.2 Specification Bases.) T3.5.201 Shutdown Cooling System The OPERABILITY of two separate and independent shutdown cooling subsystems ensures that the capability of initiating shutdown cooling exists when required assuming the most limiting single failure occurs. The requirement to
 
verify the functionality of an inoperable shutdown cooling subsystem minimizes the time exposure of the plant to an event requiring shutdown concurrent with the failure of a component on the other shutdown cooling subsystem.
The shutdown cooling subsystem operation is described in UFSAR 5.4.7. Many of the components comprising the shutdown cooling system have specific requirements during Modes 1-3 in the Technical Specifications (e.g., emergency
 
core cooling, containment spray, and containment isolation). However, several components do not have specific operability requirements in Technical Specifications, and some components function differently in their shutdown
 
cooling role than they do when performing the other functions required by Technical Specifications. These factors must be considered when determining the OPERABILITY and/or functionality of the shutdown cooling subsystems.
The safety analysis assumes that shutdown cooling may be placed in operation once cold leg temperature is less than or equal to 350&deg;F and pressurizer pressure is less than approximately 400 psia. Additional information TRM Specification Bases TRM 6.0.100 TRM SPECIFICATION BASES (continued)
PALO VERDE UNITS 1, 2, 3 T6.0.100-18 Rev 53  11/10/10 regarding the shutdown cooling system is in UFSAR Section 9.3.4. Since the subsystem is manually initiated, temporary changes in the position of shutdown cooling system valves from their normal line up do not necessarily make them
 
inoperable with respect to their shutdown cooling safety function.
The action for one shutdown cooling subsystem inoperable requires verification that the inoperable subsystem is still functional. Functionality requires the
 
subsystem to be capable of performing its safety function given a transient (e.g. Small Break LOCA, SGTR). Functionality will be established utilizing the Operability Determination Program. The allowed outage time is consistent
 
with the durations permitted for those major shutdown cooling components whose operability is controlled by Technical Specifications. The specified outage time allows a reasonable opportunity to effect repairs while providing
 
acceptable limits for the duration of intervals where the system may not be OPERABLE. In combination with the maintenance rule requirements in 10 CFR 50.65, the allowed outage times help ensure that the shutdown cooling
 
subsystems will be functional when required.
If the subsystem cannot be restored or functionality verified within the stated time frame, the associated ACTION places the unit in Mode 4 where the
 
steam generators are still available for heat removal and the stored energy of the NSSS is much less than it is during power operation. While in Modes 3 and 4 continued actions to restore the subsystem to OPERABLE are required.
The action for both shutdown cooling subsystems inoperable require verification of functionality of at least one subsystem within 7 hours. The shorter duration is consistent with the increased safety consequences that
 
exist when the equipment required to establish cold shutdown conditions is inoperable. If at least one subsystem cannot be restored or verified functional within 7 hours, the associated ACTION again places the unit in Mode
 
4 where the steam generators are available for heat removal and the stored energy in the NSSS is minimized. While in Mode 3 and 4 continued actions to restore the required subsystems to OPERABLE are required.
The surveillance requirement to place each train of shutdown cooling in service every refueling interval demonstrates that the subsystems are functional. In combination with other testing performed to support Technical
 
Specifications, including that conducted as part of the in-service testing and inspection programs, the specified surveillances provide reasonable assurance that the system will be able to perform its intended safety functions.
TRM Specification Bases TRM 6.0.100 TRM SPECIFICATION BASES (continued)
PALO VERDE UNITS 1, 2, 3 T6.0.100-19 Rev 53  11/10/10 The SDC systems are normally in a standby, nonoperating mode. As such, flow path piping has the potential to develop voids and pockets of entrained gases.
The method of ensuring that any voids or pockets of gases are removed from the
 
shutdown cooling suction piping is to vent the accessible suction piping high points, which is controlled by PVNGS procedures. Maintaining the shutdown cooling system suction piping full of water ensures the system will perform
 
properly by minimizing the potential for degraded pump performance, preventing pump cavitation, and preventing pumping of noncondensible gas (e.g., air, nitrogen, or hydrogen) into the reactor vessel during SDC. The 31 day
 
Frequency takes into consideration the gradual nature of gas accumulation in the SDC piping and the adequacy of the procedural controls governing system operation.
 
==References:==
: 1. UFSAR Sections 5.4.7 and 9.3.4 2. Combustion Engineering Owners Group Joint Applications Report for Low Pressure Safety Injection System AOT Extension, CE NPSD-995, dated May 1995, as submitted to NRC in APS letter no. 102-03392, dated June 13, 1995, with updates described in letter no. 102-
 
04250 dated February 26, 1999. Also see TS amendment no. 124 dated February 1, 2000.
 
TRM Specification Bases TRM 6.0.100 TRM SPECIFICATION BASES (continued)
PALO VERDE UNITS 1, 2, 3 T6.0.100-20 Rev 53  11/10/10 T3.5.202 ECCS - Operating (See the ITS 3.5.3 Specification Bases.) SURVEILLANCE TSR 3.5.202.4 REQUIREMENT Maintaining the ECCS suction piping full of water from the Refueling Water Tank and the containment sump to the ECCS
 
pumps ensures that the system will perform properly by minimizing the potential for degraded pump performance. The 31 day frequency takes into consideration the gradual nature
 
of gas accumulation in the ECCS piping and the adequacy of procedural controls governing system operation. T3.5.203 ECCS - Shutdown (See the ITS 3.5.4 Specification Bases.) T3.6.100 Hydrogen Purge Cleanup System The OPERABILITY of the equipment and systems required for the control of hydrogen gas ensures that this equipment will be available to maintain the hydrogen concentration within containment below its flammable limit during post-LOCA conditions. The purge system is capable of controlling the expected
 
hydrogen generation associated with (1) zirconium-water reactions, (2) radiolytic decomposition of water and (3) corrosion of metals within containment. The hydrogen control system is consistent with the
 
recommendations of Regulatory Guide 1.7, "Control of Combustible Gas Concentrations in Containment Following a LOCA," March 1971.
The use of ANSI Standard N509 (1980) in lieu of ANSI Standard N509 (1976) to meet the guidance of Regulatory Guide 1.52, Revision 2, Positions C.6.a and C.6.b, has been found acceptable as documented in Revision 2 to Section 6.5.l of the Standard Review Plan (NUREG-0800). T3.6.200 Prestressed Concrete Containment Tendon Surveillance The prestressed concrete containment tendon surveillance program ensures the structural integrity of containment is maintained in accordance with ASME Code
 
Section XI, Subsection IWL of the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code and applicable addenda as required by 10 CFR 50.55a, except where an exemption or relief has been authorized by the NRC.
TRM Specification Bases TRM 6.0.100 TRM SPECIFICATION BASES (continued)
PALO VERDE UNITS 1, 2, 3 T6.0.100-21 Rev 53  11/10/10 T3.6.201 Containment Spray System The containment system is normally in a standby, nonoperating mode. As such, flow path piping has the potential to develop voids and pockets of entrained
 
gases. The method of ensuring that any voids or pockets of gases are removed from the containment spray suction piping is to vent the accessible suction piping high points, which is controlled by PVNGS procedures. Maintaining the
 
containment spray system suction piping full of water ensures the system will perform properly by minimizing the potential for degraded pump performance, preventing pump cavitation, and preventing delay of spray delivery to the
 
containment atmosphere. The 31 day Frequency takes into consideration the gradual nature of gas accumulation in the containment spray piping and the adequacy of the procedural controls governing system operation. T3.6.300 Hydrogen Recombiners BACKGROUND The function of the hydrogen recombiners is to eliminate the potential breach of containment due to a hydrogen oxygen reaction. Per 10 CFR 50.44, "Standards for Combustible Gas
 
Control Systems in Light-Water-Cooled Reactors" (Ref. 1),
and 10 CFR 50, GDC 41, "Containment Atmosphere Cleanup" (Ref. 2), hydrogen recombiners are required to reduce the
 
hydrogen concentration in the containment following a Loss
 
Of Coolant Accident (LOCA) or Main Steam Line Break (MSLB). 
 
The recombiners accomplish this by recombining hydrogen and
 
oxygen to form water vapor. The vapor remains in
 
containment, thus eliminating any discharge to the
 
environment. The hydrogen recombiners are manually
 
initiated since flammability limits would not be reached
 
until several days after a Design Basis Accident (DBA).
Two 100% capacity independent hydrogen recombiners are
 
shared among the three units. Each consists of controls, a
 
power supply, and a recombiner located in the Auxiliary
 
Building. Recombination is accomplished by heating a
 
hydrogen air mixture above 1150&deg;F. The resulting water
 
vapor and discharge gases are cooled prior to discharge from
 
the recombiner. Air flows through the unit at 50 cfm with a
 
5 hp centrifugal blower in the unit providing the motive
 
force. A single recombiner is capable of maintaining the
 
hydrogen concentration in containment below the 4.0 volume
 
percent (v/o) flammability limit. Two recombiners are
 
provided to meet the requirement for redundancy and
 
independence. Each recombiner is powered from a separate
 
Engineered Safety Features bus.
TRM Specification Bases TRM 6.0.100 TRM SPECIFICATION BASES (continued)
PALO VERDE UNITS 1, 2, 3 T6.0.100-22 Rev 53  11/10/10 APPLICABLE The hydrogen recombiners provide for controlling the bulk SAFETY ANALYSES hydrogen concentration in containment to less than the (continued) lower flammable concentration of 4.0 v/o following a DBA.
This control would prevent a containment wide hydrogen
 
burn, thus ensuring the pressure and temperature assumed in
 
the analysis are not exceeded and minimizing damage to
 
safety related equipment located in containment. The
 
limiting DBA relative to hydrogen generation is a LOCA.
 
Hydrogen may accumulate within containment following a LOCA
 
as a result of:
: a. A metal steam reaction between the zirconium fuel rod cladding and the reactor coolant;
: b. Radiolytic decomposition of water in the Reactor Coolant System (RCS) and the containment sump;
: c. Hydrogen in the RCS at the time of the LOCA (i.e., hydrogen dissolved in the reactor coolant and hydrogen
 
gas in the pressurizer vapor space); or
: d. Corrosion of metals exposed to Containment Spray System and Emergency Core Cooling Systems solutions.
To evaluate the potential for hydrogen accumulation in
 
containment following a LOCA, the hydrogen generation as a
 
function of time following the initiation of the accident is
 
calculated. Conservative assumptions recommended in
 
Reference 3 are used to maximize the amount of hydrogen
 
calculated. ______________________________________________________________________________
TLCO Two hydrogen recombiners shared among the three units must
 
be OPERABLE. This ensures operation of at least one
 
hydrogen recombiner in the event of a worst case single
 
active failure.
Operation with at least one hydrogen recombiner ensures that
 
the post LOCA hydrogen concentration can be prevented from
 
exceeding the flammability limit.
TRM Specification Bases TRM 6.0.100 TRM SPECIFICATION BASES (continued)
PALO VERDE UNITS 1, 2, 3 T6.0.100-23 Rev 53  11/10/10 APPLICABILITY In MODES 1 and 2, two hydrogen recombiners are required to control the post LOCA hydrogen concentration within containment below its flammability limit of 4.0 v/o, assuming a worst case single failure.
In MODES 3 and 4, both the hydrogen production rate and the total hydrogen produced after a LOCA would be less than
 
that calculated for the DBA LOCA. Also, because of the
 
limited time in these MODES, the probability of an accident
 
requiring the hydrogen recombiners is low. Therefore, the
 
hydrogen recombiners are not required in MODE 3 or 4.
In MODES 5 and 6, the probability and consequences of a LOCA are low, due to the pressure and temperature
 
limitations. Therefore, hydrogen recombiners are not
 
required in these MODES. ACTIONS The required ACTIONS have been modified by a Note stating that all three PVNGS Units (Units 1, 2, and 3) shall
 
simultaneously comply with the REQUIRED ACTION(s) when the
 
shared portion of the hydrogen recombiner(s) is the cause of
 
a CONDITION. This is necessary since the three PVNGS Units
 
share the two hydrogen recombiners that are required by this
 
LCO. It will be necessary for the Control Room of the Palo
 
Verde Unit that discovers an inoperable shared portion of the
 
hydrogen recombiner(s) to notify the other two Palo Verde
 
Unit's Control Rooms of the inoperability.
With one containment hydrogen recombiner inoperable, the inoperable recombiner must be restored to OPERABLE status
 
within 30 days. In this condition, the remaining OPERABLE
 
hydrogen recombiner is adequate to perform the hydrogen
 
control function. The 30 day Completion Time is based on the
 
availability of the other hydrogen recombiner, the small
 
probability of a LOCA or MSLB occurring (that would generate
 
an amount of hydrogen that exceeds the flammability limit),
and the amount of time available after a LOCA or MSLB (should
 
one occur) for operator action to prevent hydrogen
 
accumulation from exceeding the flammability limit.
A.1 TRM Specification Bases TRM 6.0.100 TRM SPECIFICATION BASES (continued)
PALO VERDE UNITS 1, 2, 3 T6.0.100-24 Rev 53  11/10/10 ACTIONS    (continued)
B.1 and B.2 With two hydrogen recombiners inoperable, the ability to perform the hydrogen control function via alternate
 
capabilities must be verified by administrative means
 
within 1 hour. The alternate hydrogen control capabilities
 
are provided by the Hydrogen Purge Cleanup System. The 1
 
hour Completion Time allows a reasonable period of time to
 
verify that a loss of hydrogen control function does not
 
exist. In addition, the alternate hydrogen control system
 
capability must be verified every 12 hours thereafter to
 
ensure its continued availability. Both the initial
 
verification and all subsequent verifications may be
 
performed as an administrative check, by examining logs or
 
other information to determine the availability of the
 
alternate hydrogen control system. It does not mean to
 
perform the Surveillances needed to demonstrate OPERABILITY
 
of the alternate hydrogen control system. If the ability
 
to perform the hydrogen control function is maintained, continued operation is permitted with two hydrogen
 
recombiners inoperable for up to 7 days.
Seven days is a reasonable time to allow two hydrogen recombiners to be inoperable because the hydrogen control
 
function is maintained and because of the low probability of
 
the occurrence of a LOCA that would generate hydrogen in
 
amounts capable of exceeding the flammability limit.
If the inoperable hydrogen recombiner(s) cannot be restored to OPERABLE status within the required Completion Time.
C.1 SURVEILLANCE TLCO 3.0.100.3 must be entered immediately REQUIREMENTS SR  3.6.7.1 This SR ensures that there are no physical problems that
 
could affect recombiner operation. A visual inspection is
 
sufficient to determine abnormal conditions that could cause
 
failures. The 6 month Frequency for this SR was developed
 
considering that the incidence of hydrogen recombiners
 
failing the SR in the past is low.
A functional test of each Hydrogen Recombiner System assures that the recombiners remain operational. The functional
 
test shall include operating the recombiner including the
 
air blast heat exchanger fan motor and enclosed blower motor SR  3.6.7.2
 
TRM Specification Bases TRM 6.0.100 TRM SPECIFICATION BASES (continued)
PALO VERDE UNITS 1, 2, 3 T6.0.100-25 Rev 53  11/10/10 continuously for at least 30 minutes at a temperature of approximately 800&deg;F reaction chamber temperature. The
 
frequency recommended for this surveillance in the Improved
 
Standard Technical Specifications (NUREG-1432, Rev. 1) is
 
18 months. The bases for NUREG 1432 was developed for
 
permanently installed hydrogen recombiners. The two
 
portable hydrogen recombiners at PVNGS are shared among the
 
three units; therefore, the 6 month frequency from the
 
initial licensing basis is retained for reliability
 
considerations.
Performance of a CHANNEL CALIBRATION to include a system functional test for each hydrogen recombiner ensures that
 
the recombiners are operational and can attain and sustain
 
the temperature necessary for hydrogen recombination. In
 
particular, this SR requires 1) resistance checks of motors, thermocouples, and heater systems, 2) testing/calibration of
 
all flow elements, switches, and temperature elements, and
: 3) operation of the recombiner to include a functional test
 
at 1200&deg;F (+/-50&deg;F) for at least 4 hours. Operating
 
experience has shown that these components usually pass the
 
Surveillance when performed at the 12 month Frequency. 
 
Therefore, the Frequency was concluded to be acceptable from
 
a reliability standpoint.
SR  3.6.7.3
______________________________________________________________________________  REFERENCES 1. 10 CFR 50.44.
: 2. 10 CFR 50, Appendix A, GDC 41.
: 3. Regulatory Guide 1.7, Revision 0.
: 4. UFSAR, Section 6.2.5 T3.7.100 Steam Generator Pressure and Temperature Limitations The limitation on steam generator pressure and temperature ensures that the pressure induced stresses in the steam generators do not exceed the maximum allowable fracture toughness stress
 
limits. The limitations to 120 F and 230 psig for Units 1
 
and 3 are based on a steam generator RTNDT of 40 F and are
 
sufficient to prevent brittle fracture. The limitations to
 
70 F and 650 psig for Unit 2 are based on a steam generator
 
RTNDT of -20 F and are sufficient to prevent brittle
 
fracture.
 
TRM Specification Bases TRM 6.0.100 TRM SPECIFICATION BASES (continued)
___________________________________________________________________________________________________________________
PALO VERDE UNITS 1, 2, 3 T6.0.100-26 Rev 53  11/10/10 T3.7.101 Snubbers All snubbers are required to be able to perform their associated safety function(s) to ensure that the structural integrity of the reactor coolant
 
system and all other safety-related systems is maintained during and following a seismic or other event initiating dynamic loads. Snubbers excluded from this inspection program are those installed on nonsafety-related systems and
 
then only if their failure or failure of the system on which they are installed, would have no adverse effect on any safety-related system.
When one or more snubbers are unable to perform their associated safety function(s), either the supported system must be declared inoperable immediately or TS LCO 3.0.8 must be entered. TS LCO 3.0.8 may only be entered if the restrictions described in the LCO 3.0.8 TS Bases are met. TS LCO 3.0.8
 
is an allowance, not a requirement. When any snubber is unable to perform its associated safety function, the supported system may be declared inoperable instead of utilizing LCO 3.0.8.
Required Action A.2 must be completed whenever Condition A is entered. This Required Action emphasizes the need to perform the evaluation to determine if the components to which the nonfunctional snubbers are attached were adversely
 
affected by the non-functionality of the snubbers in order to ensure that the component remains capable of meeting the designed service. Restoration alone per Required Action A.1.1 or A.1.2 is insufficient because higher than
 
analyzed stresses may have occurred and may have affected the supported system. A list of individual snubbers with detailed information of snubber location and size and of system affected shall be available at the plant in accordance with Section 50.71(c) of 10 CFR Part 50. The accessibility of each snubber shall be determined and approved by the Plant Review Board. The determination
 
shall be based upon the existing radiation levels and the expected time to perform a visual inspection in each snubber location as well as other factors associated with accessibility during plant operations (e.g., temperature, atmosphere, location, etc.), and the recommendations of Regulatory Guides 8.8 and 8.10. The addition or deletion of any hydraulic or mechanical snubber shall be made in accordance with Section 50.59 of 10 CFR Part 50.
The acceptance criteria specified in the 2001 Edition, 2003 Addenda, of the ASME OM Code, Subsection ISTD are to be used in the visual inspection to determine the functionality of the snubbers.
TRM Specification Bases TRM 6.0.100 TRM SPECIFICATION BASES (continued)
___________________________________________________________________________________________________________________
PALO VERDE UNITS 1, 2, 3 T6.0.100-27 Rev 53  11/10/10 To provide assurance of snubber functional reliability one of the two functional testing methods specified in the 2001 Edition, 2003 Addenda, of the AMSE OM Code, Subsection ISTD, shall be utilized.
The service life of a snubber is established via manufacturer input and information through consideration of the snubber service conditions and associated installation and maintenance records (newly installed snubber, seal
 
replaced, spring replaced, in high radiation area, in high temperature area, etc.). The requirement to monitor the snubber service life is included in the 2001 Edition, 2003 Addenda, of the ASME OM Code, Subsection ISTD to ensure
 
that the snubbers periodically undergo a performance evaluation in view of their age and operating conditions. These records will provide statistical bases for future consideration of snubber service life. T3.7.102 Sealed Source Contamination The limitations on removable contamination for sources requiring leak testing, including alpha emitters, is based on 10 CFR 70.39(c) limits for plutonium.
 
This limitation will ensure that leakage from byproduct, source, and special nuclear material sources will not exceed allowable intake values.
Sealed sources are classified into three groups according to their use, with surveillance requirements commensurate with the probability of damage to a source in that group. Those sources which are frequently handled are required to be tested more often than those which are not. Sealed sources which are
 
continuously enclosed within a shielded mechanism (i.e. sealed sources within radiation monitoring or boron measuring devices) are considered to be stored and need not be tested unless they are removed from the shield mechanism. T3.7.200 Atmospheric Dump Valves (ADVs) Background See TS Bases B 3.7.4 Applicable See UFSAR Chapter 15.
Safety Analyses TLCO Two ADVs are required to be OPERABLE on each SG to ensure that a single failure would not prevent the capability to remotely open at least one ADV on the affected SG
 
following a steam generator tube rupture with a loss of offsite power (SGTRLOP, UFSAR 15.6.3.3). At least one ADV on the affected SG would be needed to prevent overfill and TRM Specification Bases TRM 6.0.100 TRM SPECIFICATION BASES (continued)
________________________________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________
PALO VERDE UNITS 1, 2, 3 T6.0.100-28 Rev 53  11/10/10 provide for heat removal. Failure to meet the LCO by having only a single OPERABLE ADV on one or both SGs would result in the loss of the single failure ADV backup on one
 
or both SGs. An ADV is considered OPERABLE when it is capable of providing a controlled relief of the main steam flow, and is capable of fully opening and closing on
 
demand, by remote operation.
This TLCO supplements Technical Specification (TS)
 
LCO 3.7.4, which requires one ADV line per SG to be OPERABLE, until TS LCO 3.7.4 can be revised.
Actions The ACTIONS table is modified by a Note indicating that
 
separate Condition entry is allowed for each SG. This is acceptable since (1) the primary success path for accident
 
mitigation would continue to be available by the remaining OPERABLE ADV on each SG when a single ADV is inoperable on each SG, and (2) the risk associated with continuing to
 
operate the plant without the single failure ADV backup on both SGs for up to 7 days is much lower than the risk associated with shutting down the plant.
A.1  If the requirements of TSR 3.7.200 are not met, the condition must be documented in the corrective action program and an operability determination must be initiated
 
as necessary to determine the impact on equipment in the TSs. This action is required to assure compliance with the TSs. B.1  If one of the two required ADV lines on a SG is inoperable, Required Action B is to restore the ADV line to OPERABLE status within 7 days. The 7 day Completion
 
Time is acceptable because (1) when one ADV on either or both SGs is inoperable, the single failure backup is no longer available, but the primary success path for
 
accident mitigation continues to be available by the remaining OPERABLE ADVs; (2) the heat removal function of the ADVs can also be provided by the steam bypass control
 
valves to the condensers and atmosphere when offsite power TRM Specification Bases TRM 6.0.100 TRM SPECIFICATION BASES (continued)
________________________________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________
PALO VERDE UNITS 1, 2, 3 T6.0.100-29 Rev 53  11/10/10 is available, and by the main steam safety valves at all times; (3) the low probability of an accident that requires the ADVs occurring during this period; and (4)
 
the much lower risk of continuing operation with the inoperable ADV(s) compared with the risk of shutting down the plant. In addition, each ADV may be operated locally
 
by manual operation if the inoperability is due to failure of the remote operating controls or the pneumatic supply.
The allowed Completion Time is reasonable, based on
 
operating experience, to restore an inoperable ADV.
C.1  If the ADV lines cannot be restored to OPERABLE status within the associated Completion Time, TLCO 3.0.100.3 must be entered immediately. This will assure that the situation is communicated to the Shift Manager and the
 
condition is documented in the PVNGS corrective action program. An initial decision on whether the unit can continue to operate with the condition will be completed
 
within 7 hours. Further actions will be as required by the corrective action disposition and as deemed necessary by plant management.
D.1  See TS Bases B 3.7.4, Action A.1 E.1  See TS Bases B 3.7.4, Action B.1 Surveillance TSR 3.7.200.1 Requirements The nitrogen accumulator tank pressure must be verified to
 
have a pressure of at least 615 psig indicated to ensure that it has sufficient pressurized gas to operate the ADVs for 4 hours at hot standby plus 9.3 hours of operation to
 
reach cold shutdown under natural circulation conditions in the event of failure of the normal control air system, as described in UFSAR 10.3.2.2.4.
TRM Specification Bases TRM 6.0.100 TRM SPECIFICATION BASES (continued)
________________________________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________
PALO VERDE UNITS 1, 2, 3 T6.0.100-30 Rev 53  11/10/10 T3.7.201 AFW System (See the ITS 3.7.5 Specification Bases.) T3.7.202 Essential Cooling Water (EW) System (See the ITS 3.7.7 Specification Bases.) T3.7.203 Essential Spray Pond System (ESPS) (See the ITS 3.7.8 Specification Bases.) T3.7.204 Essential Chilled Water (EC) System (See the ITS 3.7.10 Specification Bases.) T3.7.205 Control Room Emergency Air Temperature Control System (CREATCS) (See the ITS 3.7.12 Specification Bases.) T3.7.206 Fuel Storage Pool Water Level (See the ITS 3.7.14 Specification Bases.) T3.7.207 Secondary Specific Activity (See the ITS 3.7.16 Specification Bases.) T3.8.100 Cathodic Protection If any other metallic structures (e.g., buildings, new or modified piping systems, conduit) are placed in the ground in the vicinity of the fuel oil
 
storage system or if the original system is modified, the adequacy and frequency of inspections of the cathodic protection system shall be re-evaluated and adjusted in accordance with Regulatory Guide 1.137. T3.8.101 Containment Penetration Conductor Overcurrent Protective Devices Containment electrical penetrations and penetration conductors are protected by either deenergizing circuits not required during reactor operation or by
 
demonstrating the OPERABILITY of primary and backup overcurrent protection circuit breakers during periodic surveillance. The circuit breakers will be tested in accordance with NEMA Standard Publication No. AB-2-1980. For a
 
frame size of 250 amperes or less, the field tolerances of the high and low setting of the injected current will be within +40%/-25% of the setpoint (pickup) value. For a frame size of 400 amperes or greater, the field
 
tolerances will be  25% of the setpoint (pickup) value. The circuit breakers should not be affected when tested within these tolerances.
The surveillance requirements applicable to lower voltage circuit breakers provide assurance of breaker reliability by testing at least one TRM Specification Bases TRM 6.0.100 TRM SPECIFICATION BASES (continued)
PALO VERDE UNITS 1, 2, 3 T6.0.100-31 Rev 53  11/10/10 representative sample of each manufacturer's brand of circuit breaker. Each manufacturer's molded case and metal case circuit breakers are grouped into representative samples which are then tested on a rotating basis to ensure
 
that all breakers are tested. If a wide variety exists within any manufacturer's brand of circuit breakers it is necessary to divide that manufacturer's breakers into groups and treat each group as a separate type of
 
breaker for surveillance purposes. There are no surveillance requirements on fuses. For in-line fuses, the applicable surveillance would require removing the fuses from the circuit which would destroy the fuse. The test data for
 
surveillance on the other fuses would not indicate whether the fuse was degrading which has been stated by the fuse manufacturer and Idaho National Engineering Laboratory. T3.8.102 MOV Thermal Overload Protection and Bypass Devices The OPERABILITY of the motor-operated valves thermal overload protection and/or bypass devices ensures that these devices will not prevent safety
 
related valves from performing their function. The surveillance requirements for demonstrating the OPERABILITY of these devices are in accordance with Regulatory Guide 1.106, "Thermal Overload Protection for Electric Motors on
 
Motor Operated Valves," Revision 1, March 1977.
TRM Specification Bases TRM 6.0.100 TRM SPECIFICATION BASES (continued)
PALO VERDE UNITS 1, 2, 3 T6.0.100-32 Rev 53  11/10/10 T3.8.200 AC Sources - Shutdown (See the ITS 3.8.2 Specification Bases.) T3.9.100 Decay Time
 
The minimum requirement for reactor subcriticality prior to movement of irradiated fuel assemblies in the reactor pressure vessel ensures that sufficient time has elapsed to allow the radioactive decay of the short lived
 
fission products. This decay time is consistent with the assumptions used in the safety analyses.
T3.9.101 Communications
 
The requirement for communications capability ensures that refueling station personnel can be promptly informed of significant changes in the facility status or core reactivity condition during CORE ALTERATIONS. T3.9.102 Refueling Machine The OPERABILITY requirements for the refueling machine ensure that:  (1) the machine will be used for movement of fuel assemblies, (2) the machine has
 
sufficient load capacity to lift a fuel assembly, and (3) the core internals and pressure vessel are protected from excessive lifting force in the event they are inadvertently engaged during lifting operations. T3.9.103 Crane Travel The restriction on movement of loads in excess of the nominal weight of a fuel assembly, CEA and associated handling tool over other fuel assemblies in the
 
storage pool ensures that in the event this load is dropped (1) the activity release will be limited to that contained in a single fuel assembly, and (2) any possible distortion of fuel in the storage racks will not result in a
 
critical array. This assumption is consistent with the activity release assumed in the safety analyses. However, the use of a single failure-proof crane to move spent fuel cask components over irradiated fuel stored in an
 
approved cask is allowed by this LCO.
TRM Specification Bases TRM 6.0.100 TRM SPECIFICATION BASES (continued)
______________________________________________________________________________
PALO VERDE UNITS 1, 2, 3 T6.0.100-33 Rev 53  11/10/10 T3.9.104 Fuel Building Essential Ventilation System (FBEVS)
The limitations on the fuel building essential ventilation system ensure that all radioactive material released from an irradiated fuel assembly will be
 
filtered through the HEPA filters and charcoal adsorber prior to discharge to the atmosphere. The OPERABILITY of this system and the resulting iodine removal capacity are consistent with the assumptions of the safety analyses.
If one FBEVS train is inoperable, action must be taken to immediately verify that the OPERABLE FBEVS is capable of being powered from an emergency power source and to restore the inoperable train to OPERABLE status within 7 days. 
 
During this time period, the remaining OPERABLE train is adequate to perform the FBEVS function. The 7 day Completion Time is reasonable, based on the risk from an event occurring requiring the inoperable FBEVS train, and ability
 
of the remaining FBEVS train to provide the required protection.
During movement of irradiated fuel assemblies in the fuel building, if the Required Actions of Condition A cannot be completed within the required
 
Completion Time, the operation (i.e., fan running, valves/dampers aligned to the post-FBEVAS mode, etc.) or movement of irradiated fuel assemblies must be suspended immediately. The first action ensures that the remaining train is
 
OPERABLE, that no undetected failures preventing system operation will occur, and that any active failure will be readily detected. If the system is not placed in the emergency mode of operation, this action requires suspension of
 
the movement of irradiated fuel assemblies in order to minimize the risk of release of radioactivity that might require the actuation of FBEVS. This does not preclude the movement of fuel to a safe position.
Movement of spent fuel casks containing irradiated fuel assemblies is not within the scope of the Applicability of this technical specification. The movement of dry casks containing irradiated fuel assemblies will be done with
 
a single-failure-proof handling system and with transport equipment that would prevent any credible accident that could result in a release of radioactivity.
TRM Specification Bases TRM 6.0.100 TRM SPECIFICATION BASES (continued)
PALO VERDE UNITS 1, 2, 3 T6.0.100-34 Rev 53  11/10/10 When two trains of the FBEVS are inoperable during movement of irradiated fuel assemblies in the fuel building, action must be taken to place the unit in a condition in which the LCO does not apply. This LCO involves immediately
 
suspending movement of irradiated fuel assemblies in the fuel building. This does not preclude the movement of fuel to a safe position.
The use of ANSI Standard N509 (1980) in lieu of ANSI Standard N509 (1976) to meet the guidance of Regulatory Guide 1.52, Revision 2, Positions C.6.a and C.6.b, has been found acceptable as documented in Revision 2 to Section 6.5.1 of the Standard Review Plan (NUREG-0800). T3.9.200 Boron Concentration (See the ITS 3.9.1 Specification Bases.) T3.9.201 Containment Penetrations (See the ITS 3.9.3 Specification Bases.) T3.10.200 Liquid Holdup Tanks The tanks referred to in this specification include all those outdoor radwaste tanks that are not surrounded by liners, dikes, or walls capable of holding the tank contents and that do not have tank overflows and surrounding area drains connected to the liquid radwaste treatment system.
Restricting the quantity of radioactive material contained in the specified tanks provides assurance that in the event of an uncontrolled release of the tanks' contents, the resulting concentrations would be less than 10 times the
 
limits of 10 CFR Part 20.1001-20.2402, Appendix B, Table 2, Column 2, at the nearest potable water supply and the nearest surface water supply in an UNRESTRICTED AREA.
The limit of 60 curies is based on the analyses given in Section 2.4 of the PVNGS FSAR and on the amount of soluble (not gaseous) radioactivity in the Refueling Water Tank in Table 2.4-26.
TRM Specification Bases TRM 6.0.100 TRM SPECIFICATION BASES (continued)
______________________________________________________________________________
PALO VERDE UNITS 1, 2, 3 T6.0.100-35 Rev 53  11/10/10 T3.10.201 Explosive Gas Mixture This specification is provided to ensure that the concentration of potentially explosive gas mixtures contained in the waste gas holdup system is maintained
 
below the flammability limits of hydrogen and oxygen.  (Automatic control features are included in the system to prevent the hydrogen and oxygen concentrations from reaching these flammability limits. These automatic
 
control features include isolation of the source of hydrogen and/or oxygen, or injection of dilutants to reduce the concentration below the flammability limits.)  Maintaining the concentration of hydrogen and oxygen below their
 
flammability limits provides assurance that the releases of radioactive materials will be controlled in conformance with the requirements of General Design Criterion 60 of Appendix A to 10 CFR Part 50. T3.10.202 Gas Storage Tanks This specification considers postulated radioactive releases due to a waste gas system leak or failure, and limits the quantity of radioactivity contained
 
in each pressurized gas storage tank in the GASEOUS RADWASTE SYSTEM to assure that a release would be substantially below the guidelines of 10 CFR Part 100 for a postulated event.
Restricting the quantity of radioactivity contained in each gas storage tank provides assurance that in the event of an uncontrolled release of the tank's contents, the resulting total body exposure to a MEMBER OF THE PUBLIC at the
 
nearest exclusion area boundary will not exceed 0.5 rem. This is consistent with Standard Review Plan 11.3, Branch Technical Position ETSB 11-5, "Postulated Radioactive Releases Due to a Waste Gas System Leak or Failure,"
in NUREG-0800, July 1981. T3.11.100 FIRE DETECTION INSTRUMENTATION OPERABILITY of the fire detection instrumentation ensures that adequate warning capability is available for the prompt detection of fires and that fire suppression systems, that are actuated by fire detectors, will discharge extinguishing agent in a timely manner. Prompt detection and suppression of
 
fires will reduce the potential for damage to safety-related equipment and is an integral element in the overall facility fire protection program.
 
TRM Specification Bases TRM 6.0.100 TRM SPECIFICATION BASES (continued)
______________________________________________________________________________
PALO VERDE UNITS 1, 2, 3 T6.0.100-36 Rev 53  11/10/10 Fire detectors that are used to actuate fire suppression systems represent a more critically important component of a plant's fire protection program than detectors that are installed solely for early fire warning and notification. 
 
Consequently, the minimum number of OPERABLE fire detectors must be greater.
The loss of detection capability for fire suppression systems, actuated by fire detectors, represents a significant degradation of fire protection for
 
any area. As a result, the establishment of a fire watch patrol must be initiated at an earlier stage than would be warranted for the loss of detectors that provide only early fire warning. The establishment of frequent
 
fire patrols in the affected areas is required to provide detection capability until the inoperable instrumentation is restored to OPERABILITY.
When inoperable fire detection instrument(s) are inside containment, REQUIRED ACTIONs B.2 and C.2 require either (1) a fire watch patrol inspect the containment zone(s) with the inoperable instrument(s) at least once per 8 hours, or (2) monitor the containment air temperature at least once per hour
 
at each of the 7 locations listed in the Bases for Technical Specification SR 3.6.5.1. The plant computer with the control room installed multi-point recorder and annunciator is an acceptable means of monitoring temperatures
 
inside containment when required. The continuous monitoring of containment air temperature by the plant computer and multi-point recorder exceeds the requirement of hourly monitoring. The plant computer and multi-point recorder
 
utilizes pre-set alarm points for each monitored location. If setpoints are exceeded, an audio annunciation is received that alerts the operator of an abnormal condition.
The fire zones listed in Table 3.3.11.100-1, Fire Detection Instruments, are discussed in Section 9B of the PVNGS UFSAR.
T3.11.101, 102, 103, 104, 105, and 106 FIRE SUPPRESSION SYSTEMS
 
The OPERABILITY of the fire suppression systems ensures that adequate fire suppression capability is available to confine and extinguish fires occurring in any portion of the facility where safety-related equipment is located. The
 
fire suppression system consists of the water system, spray and/or sprinklers, CO2, Halon, fire hose stations, and yard fire hydrants and associated emergency response vehicles. The collective capability of the fire
 
suppression systems is adequate to minimize potential damage to safety related equipment and is a major element in the facility fire protection program.
TRM Specification Bases TRM 6.0.100 TRM SPECIFICATION BASES PALO VERDE UNITS 1, 2, 3 T6.0.100-37 Rev 53  11/10/10 In the event that portions of the fire suppression systems are inoperable, alternate backup fire fighting equipment is required to be made available in the affected area(s) until the inoperable equipment is restored to service. 
 
When the inoperable fire fighting equipment is intended for use as a backup means of fire suppression, a longer period of time is allowed to provide an alternate means of fire fighting than if the inoperable equipment is the
 
primary means of fire suppression.
The surveillance requirements provide assurance that the minimum OPERABILITY requirements of the suppression systems are met. An allowance is made for
 
ensuring a sufficient volume of C02/Halon in the CO2/Halon storage tank by verifying either the weight or the level of the tank. The interval for some required surveillances for CO2 and Halon systems is based on the statistical
 
reliability methodology provided in Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI)
Technical Report 1006756, Fire Protection Equipment Surveillance Optimization and Maintenance Guide. Component failure will be entered into the corrective
 
action program for analysis and trending.
In the event the fire suppression water system becomes inoperable, immediate corrective measures must be taken since this system provides the major fire
 
suppression capability of the plant. 3.11.107 FIRE-RATED ASSEMBLIES The OPERABILITY of the fire barriers and barrier penetrations ensure that fire damage will be limited. These design features minimize the possibility of a single fire involving more than one fire area prior to detection and extinguishment. The fire barriers, fire barrier penetrations for conduits, cable trays and piping, fire dampers, and fire doors are periodically inspected and functionally tested to verify their OPERABILITY.
Remote Shutdown Disconnect Switches TRM 7.0.100
______________________________________________________________________________ (continued) PALO VERDE UNITS 1, 2, 3 T7.0.100-1 Rev 52  7/16/10 T7.0  COMPONENT LISTS T7.0.100 REMOTE SHUTDOWN DISCONNECT SWITCHES This list identifies the remote shutdown disconnect switches that are subject to the testing requirements of TS 3.3.11, "Remote Shutdown System."
DISCONNECT SWITCH SWITCH LOCATION  1. SG 1 line 2 Atmospheric Dump Valve Solenoid Air Isolation Valves SGB-HY-178A and SGB-HY-178R RSP 2. SG 2 line 1 Atmospheric Dump Valve Solenoid Air Isolation Valves SGB-HY-185A and SGB-HY-185R RSP 3. Auxiliary Spray Valve CHB-HV-203 RSP 4. Letdown to Regenerative Heat Exchanger Isolation, CHB-UV-515 RSP 5. Reactor Coolant Pump Controlled Bleedoff, CHB-UV-505 RSP 6. Auxiliary Feedwater Pump B to SG 1 Control Valve, AFB-HV-30 RSP 7. Auxiliary Feedwater Pump B to SG 2 Control Valve, AFB-HV-31 RSP 8. Auxiliary Feedwater Pump B to SG 1 Block Valve, AFB-UV-34 RSP 9. Auxiliary Feedwater Pump B to SG 2 Block Valve, AFB-UV-35 RSP 10. Pressurizer Backup Heaters Control  Bank MRCE B10, B18, A05 (Unit 1) Bank MRCE B10, B17, A05 (Unit 2) Bank MRCE B11, B17, B05 (Unit 3) RSP RSP RSP 11. Safety Injection Tank 2A Vent Control SIB-HV-613 RSP 12. Safety Injection Tank 2B Vent Control SIB-HV-623 RSP 13. Safety Injection Tank 1A Vent Control SIB-HV-633 RSP 14. Safety Injection Tank 1B Vent Control SIB-HV-643 RSP 15. Safety Injection Tank Vent Valves Power Supply SIB-HS-18C RSP 16. SG 1 line 2 Atmospheric Dump Valve Solenoid Air Isolation Valves SGD-HY-178B and SGD-HY-178S RSP 17. SG 2 line 1 Atmospheric Dump Valve Solenoid Air Isolation Valves SGD-HY-185B and SGD-HY-185S RSP 18. Control BLDG Battery Room D Essential Exhaust Fan 'HJB-JO1A' PHB-M3205 19. Control BLDG Battery Room B Essential Exhaust Fan 'HJB-JO1B' PHB-M3205 20. Battery Charger D Control Room Circuits PKD-H14 PHB-M3209 & PKD-H14 21. ESF Switchgear Room Essential AHU HJB-Z03 PHB-M3205 22. LPSI Pump SIB-P01 Breaker Control PBB-SO4F Remote Shutdown Disconnect Switches TRM 7.0.100 T7.0  COMPONENT LISTS DISCONNECT SWITCH SWITCH LOCATION ______________________________________________________________________________ (continued) PALO VERDE UNITS 1, 2, 3 T7.0.100-2 Rev 52  7/16/10 23. Diesel Generator B Breaker Control PBB-S04B 24. Essential Spray Pond Pump SPB-P01 Breaker Control PBB-S04C 25. Essential Chiller ECB-E01 Breaker Control PBB-SO4G 26. E-PBB-SO4J 4.16KV Feeder Breaker to 480V Load Center PGB-L32 PBB-SO4J 27. E-PBB-SO4H 4.16KV Feeder Breaker to 480V Load Center PGB-L34 PBB-SO4H 28. E-PBB-SO4N 4.16KV Feeder Breaker to 480V Load Center PGB-L36 PBB-SO4N 29. Auxiliary Feedwater Pump AFB-P01 Breaker Control PBB-SO4S 30. Essential Cooling Water Pump EWB-P01 Breaker Control PBB-SO4M 31. E-PGB-L32B2 480V Main Supply Breaker to Load Center PGB-L32 PGB-L32B2 32. E-PGB-L34B2 480V Main Supply Breaker to Load Center PGB-L34 PGB-L34B2 33. E-PGB-L36B2 480V Main Supply Breaker to Load Center PGB-L36 PGB-L36B2 34. Charging Pump No. 2 CHB-P01 Supply Breaker CHB-PO1 PGB-L32C1 35. Diesel Engine Control Switch HS-2A DGB-CO1 36. Diesel Engine Control Switch HS-2B DGB-CO1 37. Diesel Generator Control Switch HS-2 DGB-CO1 38. Diesel Generator Essential Exhaust Fan HDB-J01 DGB-CO1 39. Diesel Generator Fuel Oil Transfer Pump DFB-P01 DGB-CO1 40. Battery Charger BD Control Room Circuits PKB-H16 PHB-M3425 41. Battery Charger B Control Room Circuits PKB-H12 PHB-M3627 42. 125 VDC Battery B Breaker Control Room Circuits PKB-M4201 43. 125 VDC Battery D Breaker Control Room Circuits PKD-M4401 44. CS Pump B Discharge to SD HX B SIB-HV-689 PHB-M3804 45. Shutdown Cooling LPSI Suction SIB-UV-656 PHB-M3611 46. LPSI-CS from SD HX B X-Tie SIB-HV-695 PHB-M3810 47. Shutdown Cooling Warmup Bypass SIB-HV-690 PHB-M3806 48. LPSI-CS to SD HX B Crosstie SIB-HV-694 PHB-M3416 49. SD HX "B" to RC Loops 2A/2B SIB-HV-696 PHB-M3416 50. LPSI-SD HX "B" Bypass SIB-HV-307 PHB-M3803 51. LPSI Pump "B" Recirc SIB-UV-668 PHB-M3611 52. LPSI Pump "B" Suction from RWT SIB-HV-692 PHB-M3805 53. SD Cooling LPSI Pump "B" Suction SIB-UV-652 PHB-M3611 Remote Shutdown Disconnect Switches TRM 7.0.100 T7.0  COMPONENT LISTS DISCONNECT SWITCH SWITCH LOCATION PALO VERDE UNITS 1, 2, 3 T7.0.100-3 Rev 0  8/13/98 54. SD Cooling LPSI Pump "B" Suction SID-UV-654 PKD-B44 55. LPSI Header "B" to RC Loop 2A SIB-UV-615 PHB-M3611 56. LPSI Header "B" to RC Loop 2B SIB-UV-625 PHB-M3640 57. VCT Outlet Isolation CHN-UV-501 NHN-M7208 58. RWT Gravity Feed CHE-HV-536 NHN-M7209 59. Shutdown Cooling Temperature Control SIB-HV-658 PHB-M3416 60. Shutdown Cooling Heat Exchanger Bypass Valve SIB-HV-693 PHB-M3416 61. 4.16 KV Bus PBB-SO4 Feeder from XFMR NBN-XO4 PBB-SO4K 62. 4.16 KV Bus PBB-SO4 Feeder from XFMR NBN-XO3 PBB-SO4L 63. Electrical Penetration Room B ACU HAB-Z06 PHB-M3640 64. Control Room HVAC Isolation Dampers HJB-M01/HJB-M55 RSP 65. O.S.A. Supply Damper HJB-M02 RSP 66. O.S.A. Supply Damper HJB-M03 RSP 67. R.C.S. Sample Isolation Valve SSA-UV-203 SSA-J04 68. R.C.S. Sample Isolation Valve SSB-UV-200 RSP 69. 125 VDC Battery A Breaker Control Room Circuits PKA-M4101 70. ESF Equipment Room ESS AHU Fan HJB-Z04 PHB-M3205
 
Remote Shutdown Control Circuits TRM 7.0.200
______________________________________________________________________________ (continued) PALO VERDE UNITS 1, 2, 3 T7.0.200-1 Rev 52  7/16/10 T7.0  COMPONENT LISTS T7.0.200 REMOTE SHUTDOWN CONTROL CIRCUITS
 
This list identifies the remote shutdown control circuits that are subject to the testing requirements of TS 3.3.11, "Remote Shutdown System."
CONTROL CIRCUITS SWITCH LOCATION  1. Auxiliary Feedwater Pump B to S/G 1 Isolation Valve AFB-UV-34 RSP 2. Auxiliary Feedwater Pump B to S/G 1 Control Valve AFB-HV-30 RSP 3. Auxiliary Feedwater Pump B to S/G 2 Isolation Valve AFB-UV-35 RSP 4. Auxiliary Feedwater Pump B to S/G 2 Control Valve AFB-HV-31 RSP 5. Auxiliary Feedwater Pump AFB-PO1 PBB-SO4S 6. Charging Pump No. 2 CHB-PO1 PGB-L32C4 7. Pressurizer Auxiliary Spray Valve CHB-HV-203 RSP 8. Pressurizer Backup Heater Bank RSP 9. Letdown to Regen HX Isolation Valve CHB-UV-515 RSP 10. RCP Cont Bleedoff Valve CHB-UV-505 RSP 11. Volume Control Tank Outlet Isolation Valve CHN-UV-501 NHN-M7208 12. RWT Gravity Feed Isolation Valve CHE-HV-536 NHN-M7209 13. S/G 1 line 2 Atmospheric Dump Valve Controller SGB-HIC-178B RSP 14. S/G 1 line 2 Atmospheric Dump Valve Solenoid Air Isolation Valves SGB-HY-178A and SGB-HY-178R RSP 15. S/G 1 line 2 Atmospheric Dump Valve Solenoid Air Isolation Valves SGD-HY-178B and SGD-HY-178S RSP 16. S/G 2 line 2 Atmospheric Dump Valve Controller SGB-HIC-185B RSP 17. S/G 2 line 1 Atmospheric Dump Valve Solenoid Air Isolation Valves SGB-HY-185A and SGB-HY-185R RSP 18. S/G 2 line 1 Atmospheric Dump Valve Solenoid Air Isolation Valves SGD-HY-185B and SGD-HY-185S RSP 19. Diesel Generator B Output Breaker PBB-SO4B 20. Diesel Generator Building Essential Exhaust Fan HDB-J01 DGB-BO1 21. Diesel Generator B Fuel Oil Transfer Pump DFB-P01 DGB-BO1 22. E-PBB-S04H 4.16 KV Feeder Breaker to 480V Load Center PGB-L34 PBB-S04H 23. E-PBB-S04J 4.16KV Feeder Breaker to 480V Load Center PGB-L32 PBB-S04J 24. E-PBB-S04N 4.16KV Feeder Breaker to 480V Load Center PGB-L36 PBB-SO4N Remote Shutdown Control Circuits TRM 7.0.200 T7.0  COMPONENT LISTS CONTROL CIRCUITS SWITCH LOCATION  ______________________________________________________________________________ (continued) PALO VERDE UNITS 1, 2, 3 T7.0.200-2 Rev 52  7/16/10 25. E-PGB-L32B2 480V Main Supply Breaker To Load Center PGB-L32 PGB-L32B1 26. E-PGB-L34B2 480V Main Supply Breaker To Load Center PGB-L34 PGB-L34B1 27. E-PGB-L36 480V Supply Breaker To Load Center PGB-L36 PGB-L36B1 28. Battery Charger PKB-H12 Supply Breaker PHB-M3627 29. Battery Charger PKD-H14 Supply Breaker PHB-M3209 30. Backup Battery Charger PKB-H16 Supply Breaker PHB-M3425 31. Essential Spray Pond Pump SPB-PO1 PBB-SO4C 32. Essential Cooling Water Pump EWB-PO1 PBB-SO4M 33. Essential Chilled Water Chiller ECB-EO1 PBB-SO4G 34. Battery Room D Essential Exhaust Fan HJB-JO1A PHB-M3206 35. Battery Room B Essential Exhaust Fan HJB-JO1B PHB-M3207 36. ESF Switchgear Room B Essential AHU HJB-Z03 PHB-M3203 37. Electrical Penetration Room B ACU Fan HAB-ZO6 PHB-M3631 38. SIT Vent Valves Power Supply SIB-HS-18B RSP 39. SIT 2A Vent Valve SIB-HV-613 RSP 40. SIT 2B Vent Valve SIB-HV-623 RSP 41. SIT 1A Vent Valve SIB-HV-633 RSP 42. SIT 1B Vent Valve SIB-HV-643 RSP 43. LPSI Pump B SIB-PO1 PBB-SO4F 44. Containment Spray Pump B Discharge to SD HX "B" Valve SIB-HV-689 PHB-M3804 45. LPSI Containment Spray from SD HX "B" X-tie Valve SIB-HV-695 PHB-M3810 46. Shutdown Cooling LPSI Suction Valve SIB-UV-656 PHB-M3605 47. Shutdown Cooling Warmup Bypass Valve SIB-HV-690 PHB-M3806 48. LPSI Containment Spray to SD HX "B" X-tie Valve SIB-HV-694 PHB-M3414 49. SD HX "B" to RC Loops 2A/2B Valve SIB-HV-696 PHB-M3415 50. LPSI SD HX "B" Bypass Valve SIB-HV-307 PHB-M3803 51. LPSI Pump B Recirc. Valve SIB-UV-668 PHB-M3609 52. LPSI Pump B Suction From RWT SIB-HV-692 PHB-M3805 53. RC Loop to Shutdown Cooling Valve SIB-UV-652 PHB-M3604 54. RC Loop to Shutdown Cooling Valve SID-UV-654 PKD-B44 55. LPSI Header B to RC Loop 2A Valve SIB-UV-615 PHB-M3606 Remote Shutdown Control Circuits TRM 7.0.200 T7.0  COMPONENT LISTS CONTROL CIRCUITS SWITCH LOCATION  PALO VERDE UNITS 1, 2, 3 T7.0.200-3 Rev 0  8/13/98 56. LPSI Header B to RC Loop 2B Valve SIB-UV-625 PHB-M3621 57. SDC "B" Temperature Control Valve SIB-HV-658 PHB-M3412 58. Control Room Ventilation Isolation Dampers HJB-M01/HJB-M55  RSP 59. O.S.A. Supply Damper HJB-M02 RSP 60 O.S.A. Supply Damper HJB-M03 RSP 61. Diesel Generator "B" Emergency Start DGB-B01 62. Normal Offsite Power Supply Breaker PBB-S04K 63. Alternate Offsite Power Supply Breaker PBB-S04L 64. Battery "B" Breaker PKB-M4201 65. Battery "D" Breaker PKD-M4401 66. RCS Sample Isolation Valve SSA-UV-203 SSA-J04 67. RCS Sample Isolation Valve SSB-UV-200 SSB-J04 68. Train "B" Pumps Combined Recirc to RWT Valve SIB-UV-659 RSP 69. Shutdown Cooling Heat Exchanger Bypass Valve SIB-HV-693 PHB-M3413 70. Battery "A" Breaker PKA-M4101 71. ESF Equipment Room B Essential AHU HJB-Z04 PHB-M3222
 
Containment Isolation Valves TRM 7.0.300 PALO VERDE UNITS 1, 2, 3 T7.0.300-1 Rev 50  12/10/09 T7.0  COMPONENT LISTS T7.0.300  CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVES This list identifies the containment isolation valves that are subject to the testing requirements of TS 3.6.3, "Containment Isolation Valves."  All manual vent, drain, and test valves within a Containment Penetration (i.e., between the Containment Isolation Valves) will be maintained locked and closed per the
 
locked valve administrative program or surveilled closed per Technical Specification SR 3.6.3.3 or SR 3.6.3.4.
VALVE NO ITS 3.6.3 Condition PENETRATION VALVES RECEIVING CONTAINMENT ISOLATION  (CIAS) RDA-UV 023  A  9 Containment radwaste sump pump to LRS holdup tank RDB-UV 024  A  9 Containment radwaste sump pump to LRS holdup tank RDB-UV 407 (Unit 1 & 3 only) A  9 Containment radwaste sump post-accident sampling system  SGB-HV 200 (a)  A  11 Downcomer feedwater chemical injection  SGB-HV 201 (a)  A  12 Downcomer feedwater chemical injection  SIA-UV 708 (a)  A  23 Containment recirc sump to post-accident sampling system  HCB-UV 044 A  25A Containment air radioactivity monitor (inlet)  HCA-UV 045  A  25A Containment air radioactivity monitor (inlet)  HCA-UV 046  A  25B Containment air radioactivity monitor (outlet)  HCB-UV 047  A  25B Containment air radioactivity monitor (outlet)  GAA-UV 002  A  29 Nitrogen to steam generator and reactor drain tank  GAA-UV 001  A  30 Nitrogen to SI tanks  HPA-UV 001  A  35 Containment to hydrogen recombiner  HPA-UV 003  A  35 Containment to hydrogen recombiner  HPA-UV 024  A  35 Hydrogen control system  HPB-UV 002  A  36 Containment to hydrogen recombiner  HPA-UV 005  A  38 Containment to hydrogen recombiner  HPB-UV 004  A  36 Hydrogen recombiner return to containment (inlet) HPA-UV 023  A  38 Hydrogen control system  HPB-UV 006  A  39 Hydrogen recombiner return to containment (inlet) CHA-UV 516  A  40 Letdown line from RC loop 2B to regenerative heat exchanger and letdown heat exchanger  CHB-UV 523  A  40 Letdown line from RC loop 2B to regenerative heat exchanger and letdown heat exchanger  CHB-UV 924  A  40 Letdown line to post-accident sampling system  SSB-UV 201  A  42A Pressurizer liquid sample line  (continued)
: a. Not Type C Tested Containment Isolation Valves TRM 7.0.300 T7.0  COMPONENT LISTS PALO VERDE UNITS 1, 2, 3 T7.0.300-2 Rev 41  3/14/07 (continued)
VALVE NO ITS 3.6.3 Condition PENETRATION VALVES RECEIVING CONTAINMENT ISOLATION  (CIAS) SSA-UV 204  A  42A Pressurizer liquid sample line  SSB-UV 202  A  42B Pressurizer steam space sample line  SSA-UV 205  A  42B Pressurizer steam space sample line  SSB-UV 200  A  42C Hot leg sample line  SSA-UV 203  A  42C Hot leg sample line  CHA-UV 560  A  44 Reactor Drain tank to pre-holdup ion exchanger  CHB-UV 561  A  44 Reactor Drain tank to pre-holdup ion exchanger  CHA-UV 580  A  45 Makeup to reactor drain tank  CHA-UV 715  A  45 Makeup to reactor drain tank post accident sampling sys  GRA-UV 001  A  52 RDT vent to WG surge tank  GRB-UV 002  A  52 RDT vent to WG surge tank  WCB-UV 63  A  60 Normal chilled water to containment ACU (inlet)  WCB-UV 61  A  61 Normal chilled water to containment ACU (outlet) WCA-UV 62  A  61 Normal chilled water to containment ACU (outlet)
VALVE NO  ITS 3.6.3 Condition PENETRATION VALVES RECEIVING CONTAINMENT PURGE (CPIAS)
[Also isolated on CIAS] CPA-UV 002A A (a) 56 Containment purge (inlet)  CPB-UV 003A A (a) 56 Containment purge (inlet)  CPA-UV 002B A (a) 57 Containment purge (outlet)  CPB-UV 003B A (a) 57 Containment purge (outlet)  CPA-UV 004A  A 78 Containment purge (inlet)  CPB-UV 005A  A 78 Containment purge (inlet)  CPA-UV 004B  A 79 Containment purge (outlet)  CPB-UV 005B  A 79 Containment purge (outlet) a. Type C testing is not required when the valve is not a required containment isolation valve per Note 5 of LCO 3.6.3.
Containment Isolation Valves TRM 7.0.300 T7.0  COMPONENT LISTS PALO VERDE UNITS 1, 2, 3 T7.0.300-3 Rev 32  9/9/04 VALVE NO ITS 3.6.3 Condition PENETRATION VALVES RECEIVING CONTAINMENT SPRAY (CSAS) IAA-UV-002  A 31 Service air to reactor containment inst. air  NCB-UV-401  A 33 NC water to RCP motor bearing lube oil and air coolers  NCB-UV-403  A 34 NC water to RCP motor bearing lube oil and air coolers  NCA-UV-402  A 34 NC water to RCP motor bearing lube oil and air coolers  CHB-UV-505  A 43 RC pump seal bleedoff  CHA-UV-506  A 43 RC pump seal bleedoff VALVE NO ITS 3.6.3 Condition PENETRATION CONTAINMENT ISOLATION SAFETY/RELIEF VALVES AFB-PSV-0106 (a)(b) A 75 Overpressure protection for CIV AFB-UV-034 AFB-PSV-0107 (a)(b) A 76 Overpressure protection for CIV AFB-UV-035 AFA-PSV-0108 (a)(b) A 75 Overpressure protection for CIV AFC-UV-036 AFA-PSV-0109 (a)(b) A 76 Overpressure protection for CIV AFA-UV-037 NCE-PSV-0617 (c) A 34 Overpressure protection for penetration 34 SIA-PSV 151(a) A 23 Containment recirculation sump to containment spray, LPSI and HPSI headers 1A & 1B  SIB-PSV 140(a) A 24 Containment recirculation sump to containment spray, LPSI and HPSI headers 2A & 2B  SIB-PSV 189(a) (Also covered by ITS 3.4.13)  A 26 From shutdown cooling RC Loop 2  SIA-PSV 179(a) (Also covered by ITS 3.4.13) A 27 From shutdown cooling RC Loop 1  SIE-PSV 474  A 28 Safety injection drain relief 
: a. Not Type C Tested
: b. Valve installation per DMWO 00741855
: c. Valve installation per DMWO 00830780 Containment Isolation Valves TRM 7.0.300 T7.0  COMPONENT LISTS PALO VERDE UNITS 1, 2, 3 T7.0.300-4 Rev 43  12/13/07 VALVE NO  ITS 3.6.3 Condition PENETRATION  CONTAINMENT ISOLATION CHECK VALVES  SGE-V 642 (a)  A 11 Feedwater downcomer  SGE-V 652 (a)  A 11 Feedwater downcomer  SGE-V 653 (a)  A 12 Feedwater downcomer  SGE-V 693 (a)  A 12 Feedwater downcomer  GAE-V 015  A 29 Nitrogen to steam generator and reactor drain tank  GAE-V 011  A 30 Nitrogen to SI tanks  IAE-V 021  A 31 Service air to reactor containment instrument air header  NCE-V 118  A 33 NC water to RCP motor bearing lube oil and air coolers  HPA-V 002  A 38 Hydrogen recombiner return to containment  HPB-V 004  A 39 Hydrogen recombiner return to containment  CHE-V 494  A 45 Makeup to reactor drain tank  WCE-V 039  A 60 Normal chilled water to containment ACU  FPE-V 090  A 7 Containment fire protection  SGE-V 003 (a)  A 8 Steam generator feedwater  SGE-V 007 (a)  A 8 Steam generator feedwater  SGE-V 005 (a)  A 10 Steam generator feedwater  SGE-V 006 (a)  A 10 Steam generator feedwater  SIE-V 113 (a)  A 13 HPSI to RC loop 2A  SIE-V 123 (a)  A 14 HPSI to RC loop 2B  SIE-V 133 (a)  A 15 HPSI to RC loop 1A  SIE-V 143 (a) A 16 HPSI to RC loop 1B  SIE-V 114 (a) A 17 LPSI to RC loop 2A  SIE-V 124 (a) A 18 LPSI to RC loop 2B  SIE-V 134 (a) A 19 LPSI to RC loop 1A  SIE-V 144 (a) A 20 LPSI to RC loop 1B  (continued)
: a. Not Type C Tested Containment Isolation Valves TRM 7.0.300 T7.0  COMPONENT LISTS PALO VERDE UNITS 1, 2, 3 T7.0.300-5 Rev 32  9/9/04 (continued)
VALVE NO  ITS 3.6.3 Condition PENETRATION  CONTAINMENT ISOLATION CHECK VALVES  SIA-V 164  A 21 Shutdown cooling heat exchanger 1 to CS header 1  SIB-V 165  A 22 Shutdown cooling heat exchanger 2 to CS header 2 CHE-V M70  A 41 Regenerative heat exchanger to RC loop 2A  IAE-V 073  A 59 Containment service air utility station  SIB-V 533 (a) A 67 Long term recirculation loop 2  CHN-V 835 A 72 RC pump seal injection water to RCP 1A, 1B, 2A, 2B  AFA-V 079 (a) A 75 Steam generator 1 auxiliary feedwater  AFB-V 080 (a) A 76 Steam generator 2 auxiliary feedwater  SIA-V 523 (a) A 77 Long term recirculation loop 1 VALVE NO ITS 3.6.3 Condition PENETRATION NORMALLY OPEN ESF ACTUATED CLOSED(d)  SGE-UV 169 (a) C 2 Main steam isolation bypass  SGE-UV 183 (a) C 3 Main steam isolation bypass  SGA-UV 1133(a) C 2 Steam trap/bypass  SGA-UV 1134(a) C 3 Steam trap/bypass  SGB-UV 1135A (a) C 1 Steam trap/bypass  SGB-UV 1135B (a) C 2 Steam trap/bypass  SGB-UV 1136A (a) C 3 Steam trap/bypass  SGB-UV 1136B (a) C 4 Steam trap/bypass  SIA-UV 682 A 28 SI drain from drain tank  (continued)
: a. Not Type C Tested
: d. The economizer and downcomer main feedwater isolation valves (MFIV's) are covered by specification 3.7.3, "MFIVs."
Containment Isolation Valves TRM 7.0.300 T7.0  COMPONENT LISTS PALO VERDE UNITS 1, 2, 3 T7.0.300-6 Rev 32  9/9/04 (continued)
VALVE NO ITS 3.6.3 Condition PENETRATION NORMALLY OPEN ESF ACTUATED CLOSED SGA-UV 211 (a) A  37A Steam generator blowdown sample  SGB-UV 228 (a) A  37A Steam generator blowdown sample  SGA-UV 204 (a) A  37B Steam generator blowdown sample  SGB-UV 219 (a) A  37B Steam generator blowdown sample  SGA-UV 500P(a) A  46 Steam generator blowdown to SCCS  SGB-UV 500Q(a) A  46 Steam generator blowdown to SCCS  SGB-UV 500R(a) A  47 Steam generator blowdown to SCCS  SGA-UV 500S(a) A  47 Steam generator blowdown to SCCS  SGB-UV 226 (a) A  48 SG blowdown to downcomer blowdown sample  SGA-UV 227 (a) A  48 SG blowdown to downcomer blowdown sample  SGA-UV 220 (a) A  49 SG blowdown to downcomer blowdown sample  SGB-UV 221 (a) A  49 SG blowdown to downcomer blowdown sample  SGB-UV 224 (a) A  63A SG2 blowdown sample  SGA-UV 225 (a) A  63A SG2 blowdown sample  SGB-UV 222 (a) A  63B SG2 blowdown sample  SGA-UV 223 (a) A  63B SG2 blowdown sample VALVE NO ITS 3.6.3 Condition PENETRATION REQUIRED OPEN DURING ACCIDENT SID-UV 654 (a)  A  26 From shutdown cooling RC loop 2  SIB-UV 656 (a)  A  26 From shutdown cooling RC loop 2  SIB-HV 690 (a)  A  26 From shutdown cooling RC loop 2  SIC-UV 653 (a)  A  27 From shutdown cooling RC loop 1  SIA-UV 655 (a)  A  27 From shutdown cooling RC loop 1  SIA-HV 691 (a)  A  27 From shutdown cooling RC loop 1  HCC-HV 076(a)(f) C  32A Containment pressure monitor  HPA-HV 007A  A  35 Containment to hydrogen monitor  HPB-HV 008A  A  36 Containment to hydrogen monitor  (continued)
: a. Not Type C Tested
: f. Enter applicable Conditions and Required Actions of LCO 3.6.1, "Containment," when leakage results in exceeding the overall containment leakage rate acceptance criteria.
Containment Isolation Valves TRM 7.0.300 T7.0  COMPONENT LISTS PALO VERDE UNITS 1, 2, 3 T7.0.300-7 Rev 32  9/9/04 (continued)
VALVE NO ITS 3.6.3 Condition PENETRATION REQUIRED OPEN DURING ACCIDENT HPA-HV 007B  A  38 Hydrogen monitor to containment  HPB-HV 008B  A  39 Hydrogen monitor to containment  CHA-HV 524  A  41 Regenerative heat exchanger to RC Loop 2A  HCA-HV 074(a)(f) C  54A Containment pressure monitor  HCB-HV 075(a)(f) C  55A Containment pressure monitor  HCD-HV 077(a)(f) C  62A CB pressure monitor  SID-HV 331  A  67 Long-term recirculation loop 2  CHB-HV 255  A  72 RCP seal injection water to RCP 1A, 1B, 2A, 2B  SIC-HV 321  A  77 Long-term recirculation loop 1  SGA-UV 134 (a) C  2 Main steam to auxiliary feedwater turbine  SGA-UV 134A(a) C  2 Main steam to auxiliary feedwater turbine bypass  SGA-UV 138 (a) C  3 Main steam to auxiliary feedwater turbine  SGA-UV 138A(a) C  3 Main steam to auxiliary feedwater turbine bypass  SIB-UV 616 (a) A  13 HPSI to RC loop 2A  SIA-UV 617 (a) A  13 HPSI to RC loop 2A  SIB-UV 626 (a) A  14 HPSI to RC loop 2B  SIA-UV 627 (a) A  14 HPSI to RC loop 2B  SIB-UV 636 (a) A  15 HPSI to RC loop 1A  SIA-UV 637 (a) A  15 HPSI to RC loop 1A  SIB-UV 646 (a) A  16 HPSI to RC loop 1B  SIA-UV 647 (a) A  16 HPSI to RC loop 1B  SIB-UV 615 (a) A  17 LPSI to RC loop 2A  SIB-UV 625 (a) A  18 LPSI to RC loop 2B  SIA-UV 635 (a) A  19 LPSI to RC loop 1A  SIA-UV 645 (a) A  20 LPSI to RC loop 1B  SIA-UV 672 (a) A  21 Shutdown cooling heat exchanger 1 to CS header 1  SIB-UV 671 (a) A  22 Shutdown cooling heat exchanger 2 to CS header 2  SIA-UV 673 (a) A  23 Containment recirculation sump to CS, LPSI and HPSI headers 1A & 1B  (continued)
: a. Not Type C Tested
: f. Enter applicable Conditions and Required Actions of LCO 3.6.1, "Containment," when leakage results in exceeding the overall containment leakage rate acceptance criteria.
Containment Isolation Valves TRM 7.0.300 T7.0  COMPONENT LISTS PALO VERDE UNITS 1, 2, 3 T7.0.300-8 Rev 32  9/9/04 (continued)
VALVE NO ITS 3.6.3 Condition PENETRATION REQUIRED OPEN DURING ACCIDENT SIA-UV 674 (a) A 23 Containment recirculation sump to CS, LPSI and HPSI headers 1A & 1B  SIB-UV 675 (a) A 24 Containment recirculation sump to CS, LPSI and HPSI headers 2A & 2B  SIB-UV 676 (a) A 24 Containment recirculation sump to CS, LPSI and HPSI headers 2A & 2B  AFB-UV 034 (a) A 75 Steam generator 1 auxiliary feedwater  AFC-UV 036 (a) A 75 Steam generator 1 auxiliary feedwater  AFB-UV 035 (a) A 76 Steam generator 2 auxiliary feedwater  AFA-UV 037 (a) A 76 Steam generator 2 auxiliary feedwater VALVE NO ITS 3.6.3 Condition PENETRATION MANUAL CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVES(e) NORMALLY CLOSED/POST-ACCIDENT CLOSED SGE-V-603 (a) C 1 Nitrogen blanket supply/Nitrogen vent  SGE-V-611 (a) C 4 Nitrogen blanket supply/Nitrogen vent  DWE-V 061 A 6 Containment demineralized water stations DWE-V 062 A 6 Containment demineralized water stations  FPE-V 089 A 7 Fire protection containment  SIE-V 463 A 28 Safety injection tank drain  CHE-V 854 A 41 Chemical addition unit to regenerative hx  SGE-V-293 (a) A 46 SGB-UV-500Q Bypass line inlet  SGE-V-294 (a) A 47 SGA-UV-500S Bypass line inlet  PCE-V 070 A 50 Fuel pool cooling  PCE-V 071 A 50 Fuel pool cooling  PCE-V 075 A 51 Refueling pool cleanup  PCE-V 076 A 51 Refueling pool cleanup  IAE-V 072 A 59 Containment service air utility station 
: a. Not Type C Tested
: e. May be opened on an intermittent basis under administrative controls defined in the bases of TS 3.6.3, "Containment Isolation Valves."
MOV Thermal Overload Protection and Bypass Devices TRM 7.0.400 PALO VERDE UNITS 1, 2, 3 T7.0.400-1 Rev 0  8/13/98 T7.0  COMPONENT LISTS  T7.0.400 MOV THERMAL OVERLOAD PROTECTION AND BYPASS DEVICES
 
This list identifies the components subject to the testing requirements of TRM T3.8.102, "MOV Thermal Overload Protection and Bypass Devices."
VALVE NUMBER BYPASS DEVICE (Accident Conditions)
SYSTEM(S)
AFFECTED J-SIA-UV-647  HPSI A Flow Control to Reactor Coolant Valve  Safety Injection Shutdown Cooling System J-SIA-UV-637  HPSI A Flow Control to Reactor Coolant Valve  Safety Injection Shutdown Cooling System J-SIA-HV-604  HPSI Pump A Long Term Cooling Valve  Safety Injection Shutdown Cooling System J-SIB-HV-609  HPSI Pump B Long Term Cooling Valve  Safety Injection Shutdown Cooling System J-SIA-HV-657  Shutdown Clg. Temp. Control Train A Valve  Safety Injection Shutdown Cooling System J-SIB-HV-658  Shutdown Clg. Temp. Control Train B Valve  Safety Injection Shutdown Cooling System J-SIA-HV-685  LPSI - Ctmt Spray Pump Cross Connect A Valve  Safety Injection Shutdown Cooling System J-SIB-HV-694  LPSI- Ctmt Spray Pump Cross Connect B Valve  Safety Injection Shutdown Cooling System J-SIA-HV-686  Ctmt Spray A Cross Connect Valve  Safety Injection Shutdown Cooling System J-SIB-HV-696  Ctmt Spray B Cross Connect Valve  Safety Injection Shutdown Cooling System J-SIA-HV-688  Shutdown Clg. Heat Exchange\x11A Bypass Valve  Safety Injection Shutdown Cooling System J-SIB-HV-693  Shutdown Clg. Heat Exchange\x11B Bypass Valve  Safety Injection Shutdown Cooling System J-SIA-UV-617  HPSI A Flow Control To React Coolant 2A Valve  Safety Injection Shutdown Cooling System J-SIA-UV-627  HPSI A Flow Control To React Coolant 2B Valve  Safety Injection Shutdown Cooling System J-SIA-UV-645  LPSI Flow Control To React Coolant 1B Valve  Safety Injection Shutdown Cooling System J-SIA-UV-635  LPSI Flow Control To React Coolant 1A Valve  Safety Injection Shutdown Cooling System J-SIA-UV-644  Safety Injection Tank 1B Isolation Valve  Safety Injection Shutdown Cooling System (continued)
MOV Thermal Overload Protection and Bypass Devices TRM 7.0.400 T7.0  COMPONENT LISTS  PALO VERDE UNITS 1, 2, 3 T7.0.400-2 Rev 0  8/13/98 (continued)
VALVE NUMBER BYPASS DEVICE (Accident Conditions)
SYSTEM(S)
AFFECTED J-SIA-UV-634  Safety Injection Tank 1A Isolation Valve  Safety Injection Shutdown Cooling System J-SIB-UV-616  HPSI B Flow Control To React Coolant 2A Valve  Safety Injection Shutdown Cooling System J-SIB-UV-626  HPSI B Flow Control To React Coolant 2B Valve  Safety Injection Shutdown Cooling System J-SIB-UV-636  HPSI B Flow Control To React Coolant 1A Valve  Safety Injection Shutdown Cooling System J-SIB-UV-646  HPSI B Flow Control To React Coolant 1B Valve  Safety Injection Shutdown Cooling System J-SIA-UV-664  Ctmt Spray Pump A To Refueling Water Tank Isolation Vlv. Safety Injection Shutdown Cooling System J-SIB-UV-665  Ctmt Spray Pump B To Refueling Water Tank Isolation Vlv. Safety Injection Shutdown Cooling System J-SIB-UV-615  LPSI Flow Control To React Coolant 2A Valve  Safety Injection Shutdown Cooling System J-SIB-UV-625  LPSI B Flow Control To React Coolant 2B Valve  Safety Injection Shutdown Cooling System J-SIA-UV-666  HPSI Pump A to Refueling Water Tank Isolation  Safety Injection Shutdown Cooling System J-SIB-UV-667  HPSI Pump B to Refueling Water Tank Isolation  Safety Injection Shutdown Cooling System J-SIA-UV-669  LPSI Pump A To Refueling Water Tank Isolation  Safety Injection Shutdown Cooling System J-SIB-UV-668  LPSI Pump B to Refueling Water Tank Isolation  Safety Injection Shutdown Cooling System J-SIA-UV-672 Ctmt Spray Control Train A Valve  Safety Injection Shutdown Cooling System J-SIB-UV-671  Ctmt Spray Control Train B Valve  Safety Injection Shutdown Cooling System J-SIA-UV-674  Ctmt Sump Isolation Train A Valve  Safety Injection Shutdown Cooling System J-SIB-UV-676  Ctmt Sump Isolation Train B Valve  Safety Injection Shutdown Cooling System J-SIA-UV-673  Ctmt Sump Isolation Train A Valve  Safety Injection Shutdown Cooling System (continued)
MOV Thermal Overload Protection and Bypass Devices TRM 7.0.400 T7.0  COMPONENT LISTS  PALO VERDE UNITS 1, 2, 3 T7.0.400-3 Rev 0  8/13/98 (continued)
VALVE NUMBER BYPASS DEVICE (Accident Conditions)
SYSTEM(S)
AFFECTED J-SIB-UV-675  Ctmt Sump Isolation Train B Valve  Safety Injection Shutdown Cooling System J-SIB-UV-614  Safety Injection Tank 2A Isolation Valve  Safety Injection Shutdown Cooling System J-SIB-UV-624  Safety Injection Tank 2B Isolation Valve  Safety Injection Shutdown Cooling System J-SIA-HV-684  Shutdown Clg. Heat Exchange Isolation Train A  Safety Injection Shutdown Cooling System J-SIB-HV-689  Shutdown Clg. Heat Exchange Isolation Train B  Safety Injection Shutdown Cooling System J-SIA-HV-683  LPSI Pump A Isolation Valve  Safety Injection Shutdown Cooling System J-SIB-HV-692  LPSI Pump B Isolation Valve  Safety Injection Shutdown Cooling System J-SIA-HV-691  Shutdown Clg. Loop 2 Warm-Up Bypass Valve  Safety Injection Shutdown Cooling System J-SIB-HV-690  Shutdown Clg. Loop 1 Warm-Up Bypass Valve  Safety Injection Shutdown Cooling System J-SIA-HV-698  HPSI Pump A Discharge Valve  Safety Injection Shutdown Cooling System J-SIB-HV-699  HPSI Pump B Discharge Valve  Safety Injection Shutdown Cooling System J-SIA-HV-306  LPSI Pump A Header Discharge Valve  Safety Injection Shutdown Cooling System J-SIB-HV-307  LPSI Pump B Header Discharge Valve  Safety Injection Shutdown Cooling System J-SIA-HV-687  Ctmt Spray Isolation Train A Valve  Safety Injection Shutdown Cooling System J-SIB-HV-695  Ctmt Spray Isolation Train B Valve  Safety Injection Shutdown Cooling System J-SIA-HV-678  Shutdown Clg. Heat Exchange Isolation Train A  Safety Injection Shutdown Cooling System J-SIB-HV-679  Shutdown Clg. Heat Exchange Isolation Train B  Safety Injection Shutdown Cooling System J-EWA-UV-65  ECW Loop A To/From NCW Cross Tie Valve  Essential Cooling Water System (continued)
MOV Thermal Overload Protection and Bypass Devices TRM 7.0.400 T7.0  COMPONENT LISTS  PALO VERDE UNITS 1, 2, 3 T7.0.400-4 Rev 51  3/25/10 (continued)
VALVE NUMBER BYPASS DEVICE (Accident Conditions)
SYSTEM(S)
AFFECTED J-EWA-UV-145  ECW Loop A To/From NCW Cross Tie Valve  Essential Cooling Water System J-CTA-HV-1  Condensate Tank to Aux. Feedwater Pump Valve  Condensate Transfer and Storage System J-CTA-HV-4  Condensate Tank to Aux. Feedwater Pump Valve  Condensate Transfer and Storage System J-SGA-UV-134  SG-1 Aux. Feedwater Pump A Steam Supply Main Steam System J-SGA-UV-138  SG-2 Aux. Feedwater Pump A Steam Supply Main Steam System J-SGA-UV-134A SG-1 Aux. Feedwater Pump A Steam Supply Bypass Main Steam System J-SGA-UV-138A SG-2 Aux. Feedwater Pump A Steam Supply Bypass Main Steam System J-NCB-UV-401  NCWS Ctmt Isolation Valve  Nuclear Cooling Water System J-NCA-UV-402  NCWS Ctmt Isolation Valve  Nuclear Cooling Water System J-NCB-UV-403  NCWS Ctmt Isolation Valve  Nuclear Cooling Water System J-AFB-HV-30  Aux. Feedwater Regulating Valve  Auxiliary Feedwater System J-AFB-HV-31  Aux. Feedwater Regulating Valve  Auxiliary Feedwater System J-AFB-UV-34  Aux. Feedwater Regulating Valve  Auxiliary Feedwater System J-AFB-UV-35  Aux. Feedwater Isolation Valve  Auxiliary Feedwater System J-AFA-HV-32  Aux. Feedwater Regulating Valve Auxiliary Feedwater System J-AFA-UV-37  Aux. Feedwater Isolation Valve Auxiliary Feedwater System J-AFC-UV-36  Aux. Feedwater Isolation Valve Auxiliary Feedwater System J-AFC-HV-33  Aux. Feedwater Regulating Valve Auxiliary Feedwater System J-CPA-UV-2A  Ctmt Purge Refueling Mode Isolation Valve Containment Purge System J-CPB-UV-3B  Ctmt Purge Refueling Mode Isolation Valve Containment Purge System J-CPA-UV-2B  Ctmt Purge Refueling Mode Isolation Valve Containment Purge System J-CPB-UV-3A  Ctmt Purge Refueling Mode Isolation Valve Containment Purge System J-WCA-UV-62  Normal Chill Water Return Ctmt Isolation Chilled Water System J-WCB-UV-63  Normal Chill Water Supply Ctmt Isolation Chilled Water System J-WCB-UV-61  Normal Chill Water Return Ctmt Isolation Chilled Water System J-RDA-UV-23  Ctmt Radwaste Sumps Internal Isolation  Radioactive Waste Drain System J-HPA-UV-3  H2 Ctmt Train A Downstream Supply Isolation  Containment Hydrogen Control Sys. J-HPA-UV-5  H2 Ctmt Train A Return Isolation Valve  Containment Hydrogen Control Sys. (continued)
MOV Thermal Overload Protection and Bypass Devices TRM 7.0.400 T7.0  COMPONENT LISTS  PALO VERDE UNITS 1, 2, 3 T7.0.400-5 Rev 0  8/13/98 VALVE NUMBER BYPASS DEVICE (Accident Conditions)
SYSTEM(S)
AFFECTED J-HPB-UV-4  H2 Ctmt Train B Downstream Supply Isolation  Containment Hydrogen Control Sys. J-HPB-UV-6  H2 Ctmt Train B Return Isolation Valve  Containment Hydrogen Control Sys. J-HPB-UV-2  H2 Ctmt Train B Upstream Supply Isolation  Containment Hydrogen Control Sys. J-HPA-UV-1  H2 Ctmt Train A Upstream Supply Isolation  Containment Hydrogen Control Sys. J-GRA-UV-1  Radioactive Drain Tk Gas Surge Hdr Internal Containment Isolation Gaseous Radwaste System
 
Containment Penetration Conductor Overcurrent Protective Devices TRM 7.0.500 T7.0  COMPONENT LISTS PALO VERDE UNITS 1, 2, 3 T7.0.500-1 Rev 0  8/13/98 T7.0.500 Containment Penetration Conductor Overcurrent Protective Devices The below referenced procedure identifies the components subject to the requirements of TRM T3.8.101.
Refer to 32DP-9ZZ12
 
Palo Verde Units 1, 2, 3 TA-i Rev 52  07/16/10 Technical Requirements Manual APPENDIX TA REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM PRESSURE AND TEMPERA TURE LIMITS REPORT (PTLR) Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station Units 1, 2, and 3 Summary of PTLR:
This reactor coolant system pressure and temperature limits report (PTLR) has been prepared in accordance with the reporting requirements of Technical Specification 5.6.9. NRC letter dated March 16, 2001, accepted
 
report CE NPSD-683-A, Rev. 6, which provides the methodology for developing this PTLR. Application of CE NPSD-683 to PVNGS is documented in report WCAP-16835, Rev. 0.
 
TRM Appendix TA PTLR __________________________________________________________________________ Palo Verde Units 1, 2, 3 TA-ii Rev 52  07/16/10 TABLE OF CONTENTS TA1.0 Reactor Coolant System Pressure and Temperature Limits Report TA-1 TA2.0 Operating Limits............................................. TA-1  TA2.1 RCS Pressure and Temperature Limits (LCO 3.4.3)........ TA-2  TA2.2 RCS Loops - Mode 4 (LCO 3.4.6)......................... TA-2 TA2.3 RCS Loops - Mode 5, Loops Filled (LCO 3.4.7)........... TA-2  TA2.4 Pressurizer Safety Valves - Mode 4 (LCO 3.4.11)........ TA-2  TA2.5 Low Temperature Overpressure Protection System  (LCO 3.4.13)........................................... TA-2 TA3.0 Neutron Fluence.............................................. TA-8 TA4.0 Reactor Vessel Material Surveillance Program................. TA-8 TA5.0 Adjusted Reference Temperature............................... TA-8
 
TA6.0 Application of Reactor Vessel Surveillance Data.............. TA-9  TA6.1 Applicability to Adjusted Reference Temperature........ TA-9  TA6.2 Evaluation of Surveillance Data Credibility........... TA-10 TA6.3 Derivation of Chemistry Factors from Surveillance Data TA-15 TA7.0 References.................................................. TA-15 TRM Appendix TA PTLR __________________________________________________________________________ Palo Verde Units 1, 2, 3 TA-iii Rev 52  07/16/10 TABLE OF CONTENTS List of Figures Page TA2-1 RCS Heatup Limits through 32 EFPY...........................TA-6 TA2-2 RCS Cooldown Limits through 32 EFPY.........................TA-7 List of Tables Page TA2-1 RCS Heatup and Cooldown Rate Limits through 32 EFPY.........TA-3 TA2-2 Limiting RCS Temperatures through 32 EFPY...................TA-3 TA2-3 RCS Heatup P/T Limits through 32 EFPY.......................TA-4 TA2-4 RCS Cooldown P/T Limits through 32 EFPY.....................TA-5
 
TA3-1 Summary of Fluence and Fluence Factors......................TA-8
 
TA5-1 Summary of Limiting ART and RTPTS Values.....................TA-9 TA6-1 Base Metal Materials Selected for Surveillance Program.....TA-11
 
TA6-2 Unit 1 Credibility of Surveillance Measurements............TA-13
 
TA6-3 Unit 2 Credibility of Surveillance Measurements............TA-14 TA6-4 Unit 3 Credibility of Surveillance Measurements............TA-14
 
TRM Appendix TA PTLR __________________________________________________________________________ (continued) Palo Verde Units 1, 2, 3 TA-1 Rev 52  07/16/10 TA1.0 Reactor Coolant System Pressure and Temperature Limits Report (PTLR)
This Pressure and Temperature Limits Report (PTLR) has been prepared in accordance with the requirements of Technical Specification (TS) 5.6.9. The following TSs are addressed in this report:  TS 3.4.3, RCS Pressure and Temperature Limits;  TS 3.4.6, RCS Loops - Mode 4; TS 3.4.7, RCS Loops - Mode 5, Loops Filled; TS 3.4.11, Pressurizer Safety Valves - Mode 4; and  TS 3.4.13, Low Temperature Overpressure Protection System. TA2.0 Operating Limits Parametric limits for the above LCOs were developed using NRC-approved methods specified in Technical Specification 5.6.9 (Ref. 1). Application of
 
the methodology approved for developing P/T limits, i.e., report CE NPSD-
 
683-A (Ref. 2), to the Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station is detailed in WCAP-16835 (Ref. 3).
The initial PTLR was submitted to the NRC along with the Technical Specification (TS) amendment request to relocate P/T limits to the PTLR (Ref. 4). The NRC approved the relocation of the P/T limits from TS to the PTLR in amendment no. 178 (Ref. 5). Subsequent changes to the PTLR
 
are controlled in accordance with TS 5.6.9b and 10 CFR 50.59, and the
 
PTLR shall be provided to the NRC upon issuance for each reactor vessel fluence period and for any revision or supplement thereto as required by TS 5.6.9c.
The pressure-temperature limit curves comply with Appendix G to 10 CFR Part 50 requirements that the temperature of the closure head flange and vessel flange regions must be at least 120&deg;F higher than the limiting RTNDT for these regions. This RTNDT limit applies during normal operation, including heatup
 
and cooldown, when the core is not critical and the vessel pressure exceeds
 
625 psia, (20% of the pre-service hydrostatic test pressure of 3125 psia).
Refer to the Technical Specifications for LCOs and surveillance requirements applicable to RCS pressure and temperature limits. Specific TS LCO limits
 
relocated from the Technical Specifications into this PTLR are given below.
 
TRM Appendix TA PTLR __________________________________________________________________________ (continued) Palo Verde Units 1, 2, 3 TA-2 Rev 52  07/16/10
_______________________________________________________________________________ TA2.1 RCS Pressure and Temperature Limits (LCO 3.4.3)
RCS heatup and cooldown rates for Units 1, 2 and 3 through 32 EFPY shall be equal to or less than the values shown in Table TA2-1. Limiting RCS
 
temperature requirements through 32 EFPY are specified in Table TA2-2. The RCS
 
pressure and temperature for vessel head boltup, inservice hydrostatic and leak testing through 32 EFPY shall be limited as specified on Figure TA2-1 (or Table TA2-3) for RCS heatup, and Figure TA2-2 (or Table TA2-4) for RCS
 
cooldown. A gradual change in reactor coolant system temperature of +/-10&#xba;F in
 
any 1-hour period is the maximum permitted during inservice hydrostatic and leak testing.
TA2.2 RCS Loops - Mode 4 (LCO 3.4.6)
The LTOP enable temperature for RCS heatup and cooldown through 32 EFPY is 221&deg;F as specified in Table TA2-2. TA2.3 RCS Loops - Mode 5, Loops Filled (LCO 3.4.7)
The LTOP enable temperature for RCS heatup and cooldown through 32 EFPY is 221&deg;F as specified in Table TA2-2. TA2.4 Pressurizer Safety Valves - Mode 4 (LCO 3.4.11)
The LTOP enable temperature for RCS heatup and cooldown through 32 EFPY is 221&deg;F as specified in Table TA2-2. TA2.5 Low Temperature Overpressure Protection System (LCO 3.4.13)
The LTOP enable temperature for RCS heatup and cooldown through 32 EFPY is 221&deg;F as specified in Table TA2-2. 
 
TRM Appendix TA PTLR __________________________________________________________________________ (continued) Palo Verde Units 1, 2, 3 TA-3 Rev 52  07/16/10 Table TA2-1 PVNGS Units 1, 2 and 3 RCS Heatup and Cooldown Rate Limits through 32 EFPY (Formerly TS Table 3.4.3-1)
Indicated RCS Cold Leg Temperature (&#xba;F)(1)  Heatup Rate
(&#xba;F/hr)  Cooldown Rate
(&#xba;F/hr)  80&#xba; to  92&#xba;  75  30  > 92&#xba; to  100&#xba;  75  50  > 100&#xba; to 221&#xba;  75  100  > 221&#xba;  75  100  (1) Corrected for instrument uncertainty.
Table TA2-2 PVNGS Units 1, 2 and 3 Limiting RCS Temperatures through 32 EFPY Requirement RCS Temperature(1)  Minimum Boltup Temperature 80&deg;F  Minimum Hydrostatic Test Temperature 181.4&deg;F  Lowest Service Temperature 153.2&deg;F  Minimum Flange Limit (Hydrostatic Test) 163.2&deg;F  Minimum Flange Limit (Normal Operation) 193.2&deg;F  LTOP Heatup and Cooldown Enable Temperature 221&deg;F  (1) Corrected for instrument uncertainty. 
 
TRM Appendix TA PTLR __________________________________________________________________________ (continued) Palo Verde Units 1, 2, 3 TA-4 Rev 52  07/16/10 Table TA2-3 PVNGS Unit 1, 2 and 3 RCS Heatup P/T Limits through 32 EFPY Indicated RCS Pressure (psia)
(1)  @ Heatup Rate Indicated Temperature
(&deg;F)(1) Pressure Isothermal (psia) @10&deg;F/hr @20&deg;F/hr @30&deg;F/hr @40&deg;F/hr @50&deg;F/hr @75&deg;F/hr Hydrostatic Test (2) (psia) 80  680.6  680.6  680.6  671.1  650.2  622.2  602.2  954.4  83.2  690.2  690.2  690.2  676.2  650.2  622.2  602.2  967.2  93.2  727.2  727.2  705.2  676.2  650.2  622.2  602.2  1016.2  103.2  772.2  772.2  710.2  676.2  650.2  622.2  602.2  1075.2  113.2  826.2  826.2  735.2  681.2  650.2  622.2  602.2  1148.2  123.2  893.2  893.2  778.2  700.2  653.2  622.2  602.2  1237.2  133.2  974.2  974.2  839.2  738.2  672.2  627.2  602.2  1346.2  143.2  1074.2  1074.2  918.2  790.2  705.2  645.2  602.2  1478.2  153.2  1195.2  1195.2  1018.2  862.2  754.2  676.2  604.2  1640.2  163.2  1344.2  1335.2  1142.2  954.2  819.2  721.2  617.2  1838.2  171.5  1494.8  1467.5  1269.5  1049.0  889.9  772.8  638.0  2039.1  172.1  1507.0  1478.3  1279.9  1057.0  896.0  777.3  598.0  2053.6  173.2  1525.2  1494.2  1295.2  1068.2  904.2  783.2  600.2  2080.2  183.2  1747.2  1689.2  1484.2  1213.2  1014.2  865.2  637.2  2375.2  186.7  1841.7  1772.5  1565.4  1275.5  1062.2  902.0  655.4  2500.0  193.2  2017.2  1927.2  1716.2  1391.2  1151.2  970.2  689.2 203.2  2347.2  2217.2  1998.2  1610.2  1320.2  1101.2  757.2 207.0  2500.0  2351.5  2129.3  1713.2  1399.2  1162.4  790.6 211.2  2500.0  2274.2  1827.0  1486.6  1230.0  827.6 213.2    2343.2  1881.2  1528.2  1262.2  845.2 213.2    2327.2  1865.2  1512.2  1246.2  829.2 217.3    2500.0  1998.9  1616.3  1327.8  874.7 223.2      2191.2  1766.2  1445.2  940.2 230.8      2500.0  2008.6  1634.4  1045.8 233.2      2085.2  1694.2  1079.2 243.2    2474.2 2000.2 1250.2 243.7    2500.0 2018.8 1260.8 253.2      2372.2 1461.2 256.0      2500.0 1533.4 263.2      1719.2  273.2      2034.2  283.2      2418.2  284.9      2500.0  (1)  Corrected for instrument uncertainty and for RCS pressure and elevation effects. (2)  A gradual change in reactor coolant system temperature of +/-10&#xba;F in any 1-hour period is the maximum permitted during inservice hydrostatic and leak testing.
TRM Appendix TA PTLR __________________________________________________________________________ (continued) Palo Verde Units 1, 2, 3 TA-5 Rev 52  07/16/10 Table TA2-4 PVNGS Unit 1, 2 and 3 RCS Cooldown P/T Limits through 32 EFPY Indicated RCS Pressure (psia)
(1)  @ Cooldown Rate Indicated Temperature
( F)(1) Isothermal
@10 F/hr @20 F/hr @30 F/hr @40 F/hr @50 F/hr @75 F/hr @100 F/hr 80  680.6  612.3  589.0  527.1  469.5  416.6  329.2  237.6  83.2  690.2  623.2  601.2  541.2  485.2  433.2  329.2  272.2  90.9  718.6  655.4  638.0  583.4  533.5  492.2  402.8  372.6  91.3  720.1  657.2  598.0  585.7  536.1  495.4  406.8  378.1  93.2  727.2  665.2  607.2  596.2  548.2  510.2  425.2  403.2  99.6  756.1  698.0  644.5  638.0  597.1  559.7  501.1  493.2  99.9  757.5  699.6  646.3  598.0  599.4  562.1  504.7  497.5  103.2  772.2  716.2  665.2  619.2  624.2  587.2  543.2  543.2  104.7  780.4  725.6  676.1  631.3  638.0  604.8  565.0  565.0  104.9  781.6  727.0  677.7  633.1  598.0  607.3  568.2  568.2  107.6  795.8  743.4  696.7  654.2  622.1  638.0  606.3  606.3  107.8  796.8  744.4  698.0  655.6  623.6  598.0  608.7  608.7  109.8  807.8  757.0  712.6  671.9  642.1  621.6  638.0  638.0  109.9  808.5  757.9  713.6  673.0  643.4  623.2  598.0  598.0  113.2  826.2  778.2  737.2  699.2  673.2  661.2  645.2  645.2  123.2  893.2  854.2  823.2  798.2  781.2  776.2  776.2  776.2  133.2  974.2  947.2  929.2  918.2  918.2  918.2  918.2  918.2  143.2  1074.2  1060.2  1057.2  1057.2  1057.2  1057.2  1057.2  1057.2  153.2  1195.2  1195.2  1195.2  1195.2  1195.2  1195.2  1195.2  1195.2  163.2  1344.2  1344.2  1344.2  1344.2  1344.2  1344.2  1344.2  1344.2  173.2  1525.2  1525.2  1525.2  1525.2  1525.2  1525.2  1525.2  1525.2  183.2  1747.2  1747.2  1747.2  1747.2  1747.2  1747.2  1747.2  1747.2  193.2  2017.2  2017.2  2017.2  2017.2  2017.2  2017.2  2017.2  2017.2  203.2  2347.2  2347.2  2347.2  2347.2  2347.2  2347.2  2347.2  2347.2  207.1 2500.0 2500.0 2500.0 2500.0 2500.0 2500.0 2500.0 2500.0 (1)  Corrected for instrument uncertainty and for RCS pressure and elevation effects. 
 
TRM Appendix TA PTLR __________________________________________________________________________ (continued) Palo Verde Units 1, 2, 3 TA-6 Rev 52  07/16/10 Figure TA2-1 PVNGS Units 1, 2 and 3 RCS Heatup Limits(1)(2) through 32 EFPY  (Formerly TS Figure TS 3.4.3-2)
  (1) Corrected for instrument uncertainty and for RCS pressure and elevation effects. (2) A gradual change in reactor coolant system temperature of +/-10&#xba;F in any 1-hour period is the maximum permitted during inservice hydrostatic and leak testing.
 
TRM Appendix TA PTLR __________________________________________________________________________ (continued) Palo Verde Units 1, 2, 3 TA-7 Rev 52  07/16/10 Figure TA2-2 PVNGS Units 1, 2 and 3 RCS Cooldown Limits(1)(2) through 32 EFPY  (Formerly TS Figure TS 3.4.3-2)
(1) Corrected for instrument uncertainty and for RCS pressure and elevation effects. (2) A gradual change in reactor coolant system temperature of +/-10&#xba;F in any 1-hour period is the maximum permitted during inservice hydrostatic and leak testing.
 
TRM Appendix TA PTLR __________________________________________________________________________ (continued) Palo Verde Units 1, 2, 3 TA-8 Rev 52  07/16/10
_______________________________________________________________________________ TA3.0 Neutron Fluence The design value of peak fast neutron fluence through 32 EFPY for determining the limiting reactor vessel beltline material adjusted reference temperature
 
is 3.29E+19 n/cm 2 (E > 1.0 MeV) and corresponds to the fluence at the vessel clad-to-base metal interface. For conservatism, this peak fluence is assumed to apply to each of the PVNGS reactor vessel beltline plates and welds; i.e., no reduction factor is applied to account for axial or azimuthal variations
 
from the peak value.
A summary of fast neutron fluence and fluence factors through 32 EFPY determined at the 1/4T and 3/4T locations in the vessel wall is given in Table TA3-1. These fluence values are used to calculate the adjusted
 
reference temperature at PVNGS Units 1, 2 and 3.
Table TA3-1 Summary of Fluence and Fluence Factors Location 1/4T f (n/cm 2)(1) 1/4T ff (2) 3/4T f (n/cm 2)(1) 3/4T ff (2) Intermediate Shell 1.681E+19 1.1431 4.390E+18 0.7711 Lower Shell 1.910E+19 1.1770 6.438E+18 0.8766 (1)  f = fast neutron fluence (2)  ff = fluence factor TA4.0 Reactor Vessel Material Surveillance Program The PVNGS reactor vessel material surveillance program, as described in Section 5.3 of the PVNGS Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR), is in compliance with 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix H "Reactor Vessel Material Surveillance Program Requirements."  The surveillance capsule withdrawal
 
schedules are presented in UFSAR Tables 5.3-13 through 5.3-19A and summarized in WCAP-16835 (Ref. 3). Test results and analyses of withdrawn surveillance specimens were reported in References 6, 7, and 8. TA5.0 Adjusted Reference Temperature A summary of limiting adjusted reference temperatures associated with PVNGS beltline materials at the 1/4T and 3/4T locations along with RTPTS values through 32 EFPY is given in Table TA5-1. Conservatively, the most limiting (highest) adjusted reference temperature value from the three PVNGS units is TRM Appendix TA PTLR __________________________________________________________________________ (continued) Palo Verde Units 1, 2, 3 TA-9 Rev 52  07/16/10
_______________________________________________________________________________
applied to all three units. Chemistry factors and adjusted reference temperatures for PVNGS are determined in accordance with Regulatory Guide 1.99 (Ref. 9). Table TA5-1 Summary of Limiting ART and RTPTS Values PVNGS Location Material 1/4T ART (&deg;F) 3/4T ART (&deg;F) RT PTS (&deg;F) Unit 1 Inter. Shell Plate M-6701-2 116 103 123 Unit 2 Inter. Shell Plate F-765-6 74 64 78 Unit 3 Lower Shell Plate F-6411-2 65 57 68 Limiting adjusted reference temperatures are incorporated into the calculation of pressure-temperature curves and limits for heatup, cooldown, LTOP, and
 
hydrostatic and leak tests.
Seven reactor vessel surveillance capsules have been removed from PVNGS Units 1, 2 and 3 through December 2007, with a minimum of two credible data sets
 
available for each PVNGS unit. Even though WCAP-16835 shows that the post-irradiation surveillance capsule test results for PVNGS units are credible, the calculation of ART takes no credit for those credible results. TA6.0 Application of Reactor Vessel Surveillance Data TA6.1 Applicability to Adjusted Reference Temperature Data from the reactor vessel surveillance program or from other supplemental sources were not used to determine the adjusted reference temperature (ART)
 
values for the PVNGS beltline materials described in Section 5. The surveillance program data from each of the three Palo Verde units were evaluated for credibility; chemistry factors were also derived for those
 
surveillance materials.  (This assessment is further detailed in Report
 
WCAP-16835 [Ref. 3].)
Chemistry factors determined following Position 1.1 of Regulatory Guide 1.99 are shown to be conservative relative to those derived from surveillance plate
 
and weld measurements for each of the PVNGS units. Therefore, no credit is
 
taken for those credible results in the calculation of ART.
TRM Appendix TA PTLR __________________________________________________________________________ (continued) Palo Verde Units 1, 2, 3 TA-10 Rev 52  07/16/10
_______________________________________________________________________________
Each new set of surveillance results, as new data becomes available, will be evaluated to ascertain that the Position 1.1 chemistry factors remain conservative relative to the surveillance results. This will ensure that the
 
existing RCS P/T limits remain conservative for continued plant operation or
 
will be revised as needed to provide conservative RCS pressure-temperature limits. TA6.2 Evaluation of Surveillance Data Credibility Regulatory Guide 1.99 describes general procedures acceptable to the NRC staff for calculating the effects of neutron radiation embrittlement of low-alloy steels used in the PVNGS reactor vessels when credible surveillance capsule data is available. Position C.2 of Regulatory Guide 1.99 describes the method
 
for calculating the adjusted reference temperature and Charpy upper-shelf
 
energy of reactor vessel beltline materials using surveillance capsule data.
The methods of Position C.2 apply when two or more credible surveillance data sets become available from each unit.
Post-irradiation surveillance capsule test results for PVNGS were evaluated with respect to the credibility criteria of Regulatory Guide 1.99 Revision 2. 
 
Results of the credibility assessment found that:
The surveillance program plates and welds are those judged to be most likely controlling with regard to radiation-induced embrittlement,  Charpy data scatter does not cause ambiguity in the determination of the 30 ft-lb shift,  Measured RTNDT shifts are consistent with the predicted shifts,  Capsule irradiation temperature matches that of the vessel wall, and  Correlation monitor data falls within the scatter band for that material and therefore meets the credibility test.
Revision 2 of Regulatory Guide 1.99 defines five requirements that must be met for surveillance data to be judged credible. The purpose of the following
 
discussion is to apply these credibility requirements to PVNGS to show that
 
the reactor vessel surveillance data are credible. Criterion 1: Materials in the capsules should be those judged most likely to be controlling with regard to radiation embrittlement.
TRM Appendix TA PTLR __________________________________________________________________________ (continued) Palo Verde Units 1, 2, 3 TA-11 Rev 52  07/16/10
_______________________________________________________________________________
The beltline region of the reactor vessel is defined in Appendix G(II)(F) to 10 CFR Part 50, "Fracture Toughness Requirements," as:
"Beltline or beltline region of the reactor vessel means the region of the
 
reactor vessel (shell material including welds, heat affected zones, and
 
plates or forgings) that directly surrounds the effective height of the
 
active core and adjacent regions of the reactor vessel that are predicted
 
to experience sufficient neutron radiation damage to be considered in the
 
selection of the most limiting material with regard to radiation damage."
Table TA6-1 identifies the Units 1, 2, and 3 reactor vessel base metal
 
beltline plate materials selected for the PVNGS surveillance program.
Table TA6-1 Base Metal Materials Selected for Surveillance Program PVNGS Plate ID Number Plate Location Unit 1 (1) M-4311-1 Lower Shell Unit 1 (1) M-6701-2 Intermediate Shell Unit 2 F-773-1 Lower Shell Unit 3 F-6411-2 Lower Shell (1) Unit 1 has two different base metal surveillance materials.
The weld materials for the PVNGS Units 1, 2, and 3 surveillance programs are
 
selected to duplicate the materials in the lower shell axial weld seams. Test
 
specimens from these materials are heat-treated to a condition representative
 
of the final metallurgical condition of the weld metal in the completed
 
reactor vessel. These surveillance weld metals were made with the same weld
 
wire heat as that of the vessel beltline weld seams and are, therefore, representative of all beltline weld seams.
Intermediate shell plate M-6701-2 in Unit 1 has the highest initial RTNDT and the highest ART of all PVNGS plate materials in the beltline region.
Therefore, the PVNGS Units 1, 2, and 3 surveillance material meets the intent
 
of this criterion. Criterion 2: Scatter in the plots of Charpy energy versus temperature for the irradiated and unirradiated conditions should be small enough to permit the determination of the 30 ft-lb temperature and upper
 
shelf energy unambiguously.
TRM Appendix TA PTLR __________________________________________________________________________ (continued) Palo Verde Units 1, 2, 3 TA-12 Rev 52  07/16/10
_______________________________________________________________________________
Evaluation of Charpy energy versus temperature for the unirradiated and irradiated condition is presented in References 6, 7, and 8. Based on
 
engineering judgment, the scatter in the data presented is small enough to
 
permit the unambiguous determination of the 30 ft-lb temperature and the upper
 
shelf energy of the PVNGS Units 1, 2, and 3 surveillance materials. Thus, the
 
PVNGS surveillance program meets this criterion. Criterion 3: When there are two or more sets of surveillance data from one reactor, the scatter of RTNDT values about a best-fit line drawn as described in Regulatory Position 2.1 normally should be less than 28&deg;F for welds and 17&deg;F for base metal. Even if the
 
fluence range is large (two or more orders of magnitude), the
 
scatter should not exceed twice those values. Even if the data
 
fail this criterion for use in shift calculations, they may be
 
credible for determining decrease in upper shelf energy if the
 
upper shelf can be clearly determined, following the definition
 
given in ASTM E 185-82.
The surveillance program for PVNGS Units 1, 2, and 3 is based on ASTM E185-79, which presents criteria for monitoring changes in the fracture toughness
 
properties of reactor vessel beltline materials. References 6, 7, and 8
 
describe the post-irradiation evaluations of PVNGS surveillance materials.
The credibility results shown in Tables TA6-2, TA6-3 and TA6-4 for Units 1, 2, and 3, respectively, present the shift measurements available to date. Those
 
values are compared to predictions based on a chemistry factor determined
 
following Position 1.1 of Regulatory Guide 1.99. In all cases, the difference
 
between the measured and predicted shift is less than 17&#xba;F for the
 
surveillance plates and less than 28&#xba;F for the surveillance welds. Therefore, this criterion is met for the PVNGS Units 1, 2, and 3 surveillance program
 
plate and weld materials.
TRM Appendix TA PTLR __________________________________________________________________________ (continued) Palo Verde Units 1, 2, 3 TA-13 Rev 52  07/16/10 Table TA6-2 PVNGS Unit 1 Credibility of Surveillance Measurements Plate, Weld and Correlation Monitor Materials Material  Capsule CF ff (2) Measured Shift (&deg;F)
Predicted Shift (CF*ff) (&deg;F)
Difference
(&deg;F) 137 27.5 0.7216 34.2 19.8 + 14.4 Plate  M-6701-2 Longitudinal 230 27.5 0.9629 15.3 26.5 - 11.2 137 27.5 0.7216 13.0 19.8 - 6.8 Plate M-6701-2 Transverse 230 27.5 0.9629 31.9 26.5 + 5.4 137 4.9 0.7216 - 2.8 3.5 - 6.3 38 4.9 0.8697 6.7 4.3 + 2.4 Weld  (Heat 90071) 230 4.9 0.9629 5.1 4.7 + 0.4 137 131.7 (1) 0.7216 101.3 95.0 + 6.3 38 131.7 (1) 0.8697 114.1 114.5 - 0.4 Correlation Monitor Material 230 131.7 (1) 0.9629 129.2 126.8 + 2.4 (1) Chemistry factor based on 0.174 Cu and 0.665 Ni using Table 2 of Regulatory Guide 1.99, Rev. 2. (2) ff = fluence factor = f(0.28 - 0.1*log f)
 
TRM Appendix TA PTLR __________________________________________________________________________ (continued) Palo Verde Units 1, 2, 3 TA-14 Rev 52  07/16/10 Table TA6-3 PVNGS Unit 2 Credibility of Surveillance Measurements Plate, Weld and Correlation Monitor Materials Material Capsule CF ff (2) Measured Shift (&deg;F)
Predicted Shift (CF*ff) (&deg;F)
Difference
(&deg;F) 137 17.5 0.7372 13.3 12.9 + 0.4 Plate F-773-1 Longitudinal 230 17.5 0.9978 17.7 17.5 + 0.2 137 17.5 0.7372 9.5 12.9 - 3.4 Plate F-773-1 Transverse 230 17.5 0.9978 19.3 17.5 + 1.8 137 1.6 0.7372 0 1.2 - 1.2 Weld  (Heat 3P7317) 230 1.6 0.9978 2.5 1.6 + 0.9 137 131.7 (1) 0.7372 116.0 97.1 + 18.9 Correlation Monitor Material 230 131.7 (1) 0.9978 132.4 131.4 + 1.0 (1) Chemistry Factor based on 0.174 Cu and 0.665 Ni using Table 2 of Regulatory Guide 1.99, R02. (2) ff = fluence factor = f(0.28 - 0.1*log f)
Table TA6-4 PVNGS Unit 3 Credibility of Surveillance Measurements Plate, Weld and Correlation Monitor Materials Material  Capsule CF ff (2) Measured Shift (&deg;F)
Predicted Shift (CF*ff) (&deg;F)
Difference
(&deg;F) Plate F-6411-2 Longitudinal 230 10.2 0.9726 6.3 9.9 - 3.6 142 10.2 0.7090 13.1 7.2 + 5.9 Plate F-6411-2 Transverse 230 10.2 0.9726 9.2 9.9 - 0.7 142 29.6 0.7090 27.5 21.0 + 6.5 Weld  (Heat 4P7869) 230 29.6 0.9726 24.1 28.8 - 4.7 142 131.7 (1) 0.7090 82.5 93.4 - 10.9 Correlation Monitor Material 230 131.7 (1) 0.9726 141.8 128.1 + 13.7 (1) Chemistry Factor based on 0.174 Cu and 0.665 Ni using Table 2 of Regulatory Guide 1.99, R02. (2) ff = fluence factor = f(0.28 - 0.1*log f)
 
TRM Appendix TA PTLR __________________________________________________________________________ (continued) Palo Verde Units 1, 2, 3 TA-15 Rev 52  07/16/10
_______________________________________________________________________________ Criterion 4: The irradiation temperature of the Charpy specimens in the capsule should match the vessel wall temperature at the cladding/base metal interface within +/- 25&deg;F.
All reactor vessel surveillance specimen capsule holders are attached to the
 
inside vessel wall cladding in the beltline region at PVNGS. This capsule
 
holder attachment method meets the design and inspection requirements of the
 
ASME Code, Sections III and XI. The location of the specimens relative to the
 
reactor vessel beltline provides assurance that the reactor vessel wall and
 
the specimens experience equivalent operating conditions such that the
 
temperatures will not differ by more than 25&deg;F. Hence this criterion is met. Criterion 5: The surveillance data for the correlation monitor material in the capsule should fall within the scatter band of the data base for that material.
As shown in Tables TA6-2, TA6-3, and TA6-4, the correlation monitor materials
 
from PVNGS Units 1, 2, and 3 meet the credibility test to be within the
 
scatter band of the database for that material. TA6.3 Derivation of Chemistry Factors from Surveillance Data The derived chemistry factor (CF) values for each of the Palo Verde Units 1, 2, and 3 surveillance materials is provided in Tables TA6-2, TA6-3, and TA6-4. 
 
The derived chemistry factor for the Unit 1 surveillance plate (M-6701-2) and
 
surveillance weld (Heat 90071) are 27.5&#xba;F and 4.9&#xba;F, respectively. These
 
chemistry factor values compare favorably with their respective values of 37&#xba;F
 
and 27.8&#xba;F determined following Position 1.1 of Regulatory Guide 1.99. 
 
Similar conservative results are found for Unit 2 plate (F-773-1) and
 
surveillance weld (Heat 3P7317), and for Unit 3 plate (F-6411-2) and
 
surveillance weld (Heat 4P7869). Therefore, chemistry factors determined
 
following Position 1.1 of Regulatory Guide 1.99 are shown to be conservative
 
relative to those derived from surveillance plate and weld measurements for
 
each of the PVNGS units.
TA7.0 References 1. PVNGS Units 1, 2, and 3 Technical Specification 5.6.9, "Reactor Coolant System Pressure and Temperature Limits Report."
: 2. CE Owners Group Topical Report CE NPSD-683-A, Revision 6, "Development of a RCS Pressure and Temperature Limits Report for the Removal of P/T TRM Appendix TA PTLR __________________________________________________________________________ Palo Verde Units 1, 2, 3 TA-16 Rev 52  07/16/10
_______________________________________________________________________________
Limits and LTOP Requirements from the Technical Specifications,"
April 2001. 3. Westinghouse Report WCAP-16835, Revision 0, "Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station Units 1, 2 and 3, Basis for RCS Pressure-Temperature
 
Limits Report," June 2008. 4. APS letter No. 102-05960 to NRC, "Request for Technical Specification Amendment to Relocate the Reactor Coolant System Pressure and
 
Temperature Limits and the Low Temperature Overpressure Protection
 
Enable Temperatures," dated February 19, 2009. Supplemented by APS
 
Letter No. 102-06112, "Response to Request for Additional Information
 
for Technical Specification Amendment and Exemption from 10 CFR 50, Appendix G, to Relocate the Reactor Coolant System Pressure and
 
Temperature Limits and the Low Temperature Overpressure Protection
 
Enable Temperatures," dated December 22, 2009. 5. Letter, NRC to APS, "Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station, Units 1, 2, and 3 - Issuance of Amendments Re: [Relocation of RCS Pressure and
 
Temperature Limits] (TAC NOS. ME0698, ME0699, AND ME0700)," dated
 
February 25, 2010 (Amendment No. 178). 6. APS letter no. 102-05242 to NRC, Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station Unit 1 Reactor Vessel Material Surveillance Capsule at 230&deg;," April 5, 2005 (transmittal of WCAP-16374-NP, "Analysis of Capsule 230&deg; from
 
Arizona Public Service Company Palo Verde Unit 1 Reactor Vessel
 
Radiation Surveillance Program," February 2005). 7. APS letter no. 102-05457 to NRC, Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station Unit 2 Reactor Vessel Material Surveillance Capsule at 230&deg;," April 4, 2006 (transmittal of WCAP-16524-NP, "Analysis of Capsule 230&deg; from
 
Arizona Public Service Company Palo Verde Unit 2 Reactor Vessel
 
Radiation Surveillance Program," February 2006). 8. APS letter no. 102-05348 to NRC, Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station Unit 3 Analysis of Reactor Vessel Material Surveillance Capsule at
 
230&deg;," September 26, 2005 (transmittal of WCAP-16449-NP, "Analysis of
 
Capsule 230&deg; from Arizona Public Service Company Palo Verde Unit 3
 
Reactor Vessel Radiation Surveillance Program," August 2005). 9. Regulatory Guide 1.99, Revision 2, "Radiation Embrittlement of Reactor Vessel Materials," U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, May 1998.}}

Latest revision as of 23:41, 13 January 2025

Technical Requirements Manual, Revision 54
ML110610758
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Site: Palo Verde  Arizona Public Service icon.png
Issue date: 01/26/2011
From: Stephenson C
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