ML20007E849

6-WC-2019-12 Draft Operating Test Comments

ML20007E849
Person / Time
Site:	Wolf Creek
Issue date:	12/14/2019
From:	Greg Werner Operations Branch IV
To:	Wolf Creek
References
Download: ML20007E849 (16)

Text

Wolf Creek 2019-12 Draft Operating Test Comments NOTE: This summary is being provided in lieu of Form 301-7, Operating Test Review Worksheet, because the licensees operating test submittal was reviewed and overall deemed SATISFACTORY.

Scenario 1:

1. Event 6, specify in narrative the names of each of the valves that fail to close.

Valve names added to narrative in the description of Event 6.

2. Specify in initial conditions that plant is in MODE 2.

Unit is MODE 2 added to cover page initial conditions and narrative initial conditions.

3. CT2 specify start time within 30 minutes of SIS.

CT2 critical task updated to state within 30 minutes of SIS on both the D1 and D2 forms

4. CT2: Cueing says Green lights are lit on both Yellow train hand switches 21 and 23 are red train components correct?

Yes, cueing changed to remove reference to train color since both trains are now affected.

5. CT2: If I understand this correctly, Yellow Train equipment is still available and being cooled by yellow train CCW, is this correct? If so, then this is not an NRC critical task because the plant design basis accommodates a loss of one train, and therefore this is not critical to safety. Failing both trains of CCW equipment would make it critical.

Updated form D1 with the following information:

On the cover page, Event No. 7 now reads B CCW pump trips, A, C, and D CCW Pumps fail to autostart on SIS.

Critical task page updated to read:

CT2: Manually start A, C, or D CCW pump to cool one Train of ECCS equipment within 30 minutes of SIS to prevent the loss of CCP or SI pumps.

Failure to maintain CCW flow to ECCS components would result in a reduction of margin of safety due to loss of all CCW flow only by improper crew response. AI 21-016 specifies TSA to trip CCPs and SIPs on a loss of CCW cooling within 30 minutes.

Green lights are lit on CCW hand switches

• EG HIS-21 and

• EG HIS-23 and

• EG HIS-24 Amber light lit on CCW hand switch

• EG HIS-22 On Panel RL-019, Manually start one Red or Yellow Train CCW Pump.

Either:

• EG HIS-21 or

• EG HIS-23 or

• EG HIS-24 Red Light on the manipulated hand switch,

• EG HIS-21 or

• EG HIS-23 or

• EG HIS-24 Scenario Narrative now states: Event 7: B CCW pump trips, A, C, and D CCW Pumps fail to autostart on SIS. The BOP, after completing Immediate Actions, should note no operating CCW Pump running to cool Red or Yellow Train Safety Loads and manually start either A, C, or D CCW Pumps. The ATC also has guidance per EMG E-0, ATTACHMENT F, Step F6, to manually start one of the two pumps in each train if one is NOT running at that time.

Scenario Files changed to reflect the additional failures Updated form D2 with the following information Event Nos.: 5/6/7/8 Event description changed to read Earthquake causes Large Break LOCA (6) on Loop 4 Cold Leg. 3 valves fail to Auto CLOSE on CISA. B CCW pump trips, A, C, and D CCW Pumps fail to autostart on SIS. B RHR pumps trips on SIS due to suction valve BN HV-8812B failing closed.

On page 15 of 42 CT2 updated with new Critical Task description.

6. Note to ILT: Ensure applicants know that they are expected to evaluate RPS/ESF/PAMS/etc Tech Specs at the function level, not just the action statement.

Pass this along, this is not cueing it is an NRC expectation.

Discussed with Licensed Senior Instructor (LSI) Bill Isom on October 23rd, 2019. Bill stated he will communicate expectation to the class.

7. Nice ES-301-5 table at the bottom of D1.

Thank you, this is something that benefited us in development and we will continue to use.

8. Event 2, TS 3.8.7.A is listed in body of D2 on p. 6 but is not listed on D1.

LCO 3.8.7 COND A added to D1 cover page in the event description for Event No. 2.

9. Event 3: TS call, where it specifically says which LCO he enters, include the functions there as well.

Functions for LCO 3.3.1 & 3.3.2 have been added to form D2 on page 10.

10. Major Event: Include EMG C-11 Figure 1 for reference.

Figure 1, RWST LEVEL VS SUMP LEVEL, from EMG C-11, LOSS OF EMERGENCY COOLANT RECIRCULATION, added as Attachment 2 to form D2. (Page 42)

Added Footer to form D1 to match form D2 Scenario 2:

1. Event 5: We are likely not going to delay the major for the time it takes to restore letdown. Leave the steps in, but specify that after the ATC has reduced charging to seals only, or at lead examiner discretion, team may proceed to next event.

At the end of Event No. 5, page 19, the Event Termination was updated to state After the crew has reduced charging flow to seals only and/or at the direction of the Lead Examiner. All ALR steps have been left in.

2. Event 1: Specify on D-1 and D-2 what type of bus (voltage, 1E or non-safety) SL-41 is.

On form D1, cover page and narrative section updated to read Breaker 4-16 to Non-Safety 4.16 KV Bus SL-41. On form D2, Page 1, Event Description updated to read Breaker 4-16 to No-Safety 4.16 KV Bus SL-41

3. CT-1: DOES Time sensitive action to Manual reactor trip by manually deenergizing the rod drive motor generators within 1 minute apply here? If so, that needs to be the bounding criteria. Is main feed still available?

Yes, CT-1 has been updated to read Given an ATWS, insert negative reactivity into the core by manually inserting control rods and de-energizing the control rod drive MG sets within 1 minute of the need to trip the reactor. This update has also been applied to form D1 in the Narrative as well as form D2, on page 21, where the actions are taken.

Main Feedwater IS available at the onset of the ATWS until the Main Turbine is tripped.

Following the ATWS the turbine can be tripped manually and is done so by procedure (EMG FR-S1 step 2). After the turbine is tripped, the resultant shrink of Steam Generator Water Level will result in Feed Water Isolation (S/G low-low <23.5% 2/4 coincidence on 1/4 S/G) as well as Auxiliary Feedwater Actuation (Both M and T).

4. Event 7: Why should A MDAFW pump have automatically started? What is the AFAS initiating parameter in this situation?

The same signal that feeds the Feedwater Isolation signal feeds the Auxiliary Feedwater Actuation Signal Motor (AFAS-M) for Auxiliary Feedwater. When the FWIS actuates, AFAS-M will actuate, and both Motor Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pumps should automatically start.

5. Event 8: I think I see the answer to my question above If Event 8 comes in immediately upon RX trip, then events 7 and 8 should be swapped in order.

The A Motor Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump failure to auto start is contingent on when the operators manually trip the turbine (being the series of events that lead to AFAS actuation). The Steam Generators Safeties opening is contingent on S/G pressure rise which is also a function of when the Turbine is manually tripped. Neither event is immediate, and the failed open safety valve failed open is initially masked by Safety Valves on the three active loop S/Gs opening in response to the high pressure.

During the transient, Safety valves on B and C S/Gs close while A remain open.

Through Operator validation, Event 7 was diagnosed prior to Event 8.

6. Simulator operator note on page 29: dont wait 5 minutes, give the response in 2 minutes.

Updated the Simulator Operator note on page 29 to 2 minutes.

Added Footer to form D1 to match form D2 Scenario 3:

1. Event 8 ES-D-1 narrative, Modify CT2 definition to reflect modifications made to CT, i.e.

remove Given an open ARV.

CT2 definition updated to reflect modifications. Given an open ARV on ruptured S/G added to the beginning of the CT2 Narrative for Event 8 on Form D1. On form D2, CT2 statement updated to match on pages 17, 20, 22, 23 & 24.

2. Major Event E-0 Step 6 (Verify Auto Actions per Att F): Specify in the step that ALL automatic actuations occur as expected in this step. Common to all scenarios, if no automatic actions fail to initiate.

Added ALL automatic actuations occur as expected in this step to Scenario 3, form D2, page 18. Also added to Scenario 2, form D2, page 26. These are the only two scenarios that have EMG E-0 attachment F entry with no required actions.

Added Footer to form D1 to match form D2 Scenario 4:

1. CT3 Safety significance says Feed and Bleed, is the correct term bleed and feed at WC? Yes, Form D1, CT3, has been updated to reflect correct bleed and feed wording.

2. Event 9 ES-D-1 narrative, Modify CT3 definition to reflect modifications made to CT, i.e.

3 OF 4 SGs < 12% WR level (bleed and feed criteria).

Event 9 ES-D-1 narrative modified to reflect modifications made to CT3.

3. Major Event 9 PAGE 24 Sim Operator Note - dont need to wait 5 min, just call back after 2 min.

Simulator Operator note on page 24 updated to wait 2 minutes.

Added Footer to form D1 to match form D2

Scenario 5 SPARE:

1. CT3 - What is the significance of CETC Temp = 712F? State it in CT definition.

At 712oF, there would be a transition from a Core Cooling ORANGE PATH to a RED PATH condition under EMG FR-C1. This represents a lack of decay heat removal vice the ORANGE path which is degraded core cooling. Failure to mitigate the condition while in the ORANGE path unnecessarily challenges the fission product boundary.

Updated CT3 to include and a transition to the RED path condition, EMGFR-C1 on Form D1, Event 8 narrative and on Form D2, Page 35.

Added Footer to form D1 to match form D2 JPM S1:

1. Add at 80 gpm to task standard, or provide a reasonable range of acceptable rate.

Ranges were added to both the total volume and rate to account for instrument inaccuracies while controlling flow. Updated task standard to read The Applicant added 120 +/- 5 gallons of water to the VCT at 80 +/- 3 gpm per SYS BG-200, Section 6.2.

2. JPM step 15 is not critical, it is just verifying.

Critical Task designation removed from JPM step 15.

3. Make the last step 120 gallons of makeup water were added to the RCS at 80 gpm, and critical.

Last step updated to read 120 +/- 5 gallons of Makeup Water were added to the RCS at 80 +/- 3 gpm to match the updated Task Standard.

Added Footer JPM S-2:

1. Since Yellow Train CSAS does work, make step 3 critical. Modify task standard to Applicant manually actuates Containment Spray Train B, and manually aligns Containment Spray Train A by Made JPM step 3 a Critical Task. Task Standard updated to read Applicant manually actuates Containment Spray Train B, and manually aligns Containment Spray Train A by starting A Containment Spray Pump (EN HIS-3), opening discharge valve (EN HIS-

6) and opening containment spray additive supply isolation valve (EN HIS-15)

Added Footer

JPM S-3:

1. Wow this is going to be long. Lets consider making this the RO only JPM.

The JPM scheduled for the RO will take just as long. We would like to leave for now and discuss after validation week.

2. Modify Task Standard to Applicant identified that Hot Leg recirculation cannot be aligned through RHR, and aligned.

Task Standard updated to read The Applicant identified that Hot Leg recirculation cannot be aligned through RHR, and aligned Hot Leg recirculation for the Safety Injection pumps per EMG ES-13.

Added Footer JPM S-4:

1. It looks like there are no actions to be taken after JPM step 23, is that correct? If so, end the JPM there.

JPM modified to stop at step 23. Terminating cue changed to state The JPM Is complete when the Applicant completes step 6.1.13 of SYS EG-201 Added Footer JPM S-5:

1. Modify Task Standard to, Applicant tested the operability of BB-HV-8000A by arming Cold O/P, isolating the PORV, cycling the PORV, and restoring system to original alignment.

Task Standard updated to read The Applicant tested the operability of BB HV-8000A by arming Cold O/P, isolating the PORV, cycling the PORV, and restoring system to original alignment.

Added Footer JPM S-6:

1. If I understand this correctly, the reason this procedure is being performed is because the CST is damaged and empty. So step 7 aligning ESW to AFW would be expected to need to be performed based on these conditions - it doesnt appear to be an alternate path, it is the expected path for the given alarm and initial conditions.

2. If you want to keep this credited as Alt Path, need to modify to require something be responded to that is unexpected from initial conditions.

Updated JPM initial conditions to remove any, and all mentions of the CST being affected by the tornado. Initial condition now reads A tornado has gone through the protected area causing a Unit Trip. The crew has completed actions of EMG E-0, REACTOR TRIP OR SAFETY INJECTION, and have transitioned to EMG ES-02, REACTOR TRIP RESPONSE Added Footer

JPM S-7:

1. Provide more initial conditions as to why the crew has entered OFN BB-005. Not telling an applicant why they are in an off-normal procedure is not a good practice - there would have been some alarm or parameter that would have driven the crew to enter the procedure - need to include in the initial conditions.

Initial conditions updated to state The unit is operating at 100% power. The crew has entered OFN BB-005, RCP MALFUNCTIONS due to annunciators 074A, RCP MTR CCW FLOW HILO and 070C, 071C, 072C, 073C, RCP THRM BAR CCW FLOW.

2. Only one critical step - not sufficiently discriminatory. Make one or more additional valves in step 7.c unexpectedly closed, BUT able to be opened. Then the alternate path is still opening the bypass valve for EG-HIS-71.

Updated plant conditions, valves EG HIS-58 & 71 are both closed. EG HIS-58 can be opened using the pushbutton, EG HIS-71 cannot be opened and operator proceeds to RNO step. Actions to OPEN valves made into bulleted statements for ease of evaluation. Made step 7.c a critical task.

Added Footer JPM S-8:

1. Step 6.3.2.3 is listed twice, one critical, one not.

The first mention of Step 6.3.2.3 has been removed. The Step 6.3.2.3 that was marked critical has remained in the JPM as JPM step 6 Added Footer JPM P-1:

1. This appears to be a very weak alternate path, unless there is more to this than I am seeing. JPM step 13 also doesnt describe how to reset the relays. Is this realistic that these relays and IA ISO valve would be found in the condition they are in if a surveillance was just completed, presumably sat, because the CRS is directing to place the EDG back in standby?

Initial Conditions updated to state The unit is stable in MODE 4. Maintenance has just been completed on the A Emergency Diesel Generator. This makes the conditions that lead to alternate success more likely to be encountered.

In JPM step 13, the relays are 86 lockout type, the handswitches to reset the relays are directly below the relay indicating lights (Lockout Relay Blue Lights). Added wording to the task standard that reads and simulated resetting the relays 186-1/DG and 186-2/DG by turning them to the 12 oclock position

2. Consider value added of picture of inside of breaker cubicle for step 6.1.6.

Will look to obtain current photo of breaker internals

3. This appears to be a very long in-plant JPM to be run 17 times.

This JPM is the only JPM being run in the plant on Wednesday, December 11th. Time is currently allotted for 15 minutes per Applicant, as was validated. With the JPM commencing at 0730 and ending at 1330. We can work within that time for breaks and/or lunch with the Evaluators and those assigned to sequester.

JPM P-2:

1. Find a K/A that matches this JPM better - this is not performed in the control room.

K/A Changed to 012 - 2.130, Reactor Protection System - Ability to locate and operator components, including local controls.

2. Is there a procedural handout for this?

There is no procedural guidance other than the direction from EMG FR-S1 to locally open Reactor Trip and Bypass Breakers. Applicant should know location and local breaker manipulations without guidance from a procedure.

Added Footer JPM P-3:

Added Footer ALL ADMIN JPMS COMMENT: For any JPM that the applicant has to use a plot or a form to conduct calculations, include a filled-out key for the examiner to quick-reference.

JPM A-1:

Examiner quick reference document developed. Added Footer JPM A-2:

1. Include final acceptable pressure values/range in task standard.

Final acceptable pressure values/range added to task standard. Added Footer. No quick reference guide for this JPM as no plots or forms are used.

JPM A-3:

1. Include actual required hang positions in task standard.

Actual hang positions added to Task Standard. Added Footer. No quick reference guide for this JPM as no plots or forms are used.

JPM A-4:

Added Footer. No quick reference guide for this JPM as no plots or forms are used.

JPM A-5:

1. JPM step 3, include required actions in standard.

JPM step 3 updated to include required actions from the Task Standard. Added Footer.

Added Examiner Quick Reference for 1/M plot.

JPM A-6:

1. Include specific NIs in task standard.

Updated task standard to include (NI 41B and NI 42B). Added Footer. No quick reference guide for this JPM as no plots or forms are used.

JPM A-7: Added Footer JPM A-8: Added Footer JPM A-9:

1. Critical is misspelled in initiating cue.

Corrected the spelling of Critical in the initiating cue.

2. On key, put a red asterisk or other identifier next to each item that is critical. Make step 4 standard read completed the Immediate Emergency Notification form, in accordance with the key. Do not make the Actual/Drill determination critical.

JPM step 4 standard updated to read Applicant completed the Immediate Emergency Notification form, in accordance with the key: critical tasks marked with a RED asterisk Actual/Drill determination removed as a critical task, signature added as a critical task.

Added Footer Generic:

ES-301-5 for RO1 shows 4 major events, but should only add up to 3.

Updated ES-301-5 for RO1 updated to show 3 major events.

Wolf Creek 2019 NRC Validation Week JPM Comments and Changes In-Plant JPMs:

P1: Line up EDG for Auto start per SYS KJ-121

[NRC 11/14 P1 OK]

Step 7: Cue changed to read Another Operator has performed this step and it has been verified Step 12: Cue updated to ask the applicant How many petcocks need to be checked? and All 14 petcocks are closed. Standard updated to reflect the applicant knowing there are 14 total petcocks.

Step 13: Standard updated to read by turning switch to the right and allowing it to return to the 12oclock position Step 22: Standard updated with valve location, Starting Air Skid - On East Wall Steps 26-28 were deleted. Terminating Cue updated to specify JPM complete when the Applicant has successfully completed step 6.1.21.

Handout - Steps in the procedure have are marked N/A by the CRS as they are discussed N/A in the initiating cue. Handout will be printed one sided.

Second JPM made for opposite train, accommodations made to perform both JPMs at the same time. Job Performance Measure number changed to P1A (Red Train) and P1B (Yellow Train).

Wolf Creek Procedure AI 22C-013, PROTECTED EQUIPMENT PROGRAM allows performance of JPMs with SM Permission:

P2: Open Reactor Trip Breakers as directed by EMG FR-S1

[NRC 11/14 P2 OK]

Photo of breaker is provided with cabinet door open as a reference. Removing the dust cover only exposes the Trip Push button.

Statement added to Examiner Note at the beginning of the JPM DO NOT remove breaker trip switch dust covers and to specify that if the applicant discusses opening the cabinet door to verify breaker position, show photo and specify Breaker Position is as indicated.

Updated the cues accordingly for each step as the Open indication is only visible with cabinet the door open.

The given conditions specify no testing was in progress at the time of the trip, so the bypass breakers are already open. Since the applicant performs no physical action to open bypass breakers, the critical step designations were removed from Steps 3 and 4.

P3: Isolate RCP seals per EMG C-0, Step 16

[NRC 11/14 P3 OK]

Step 2: Cue updated to state IF the Applicant discusses having to reach across a contaminated boundary Then: CUE: Rubber gloves have been obtained and donned. Standard updated, the following section was added Applicant may discuss allowances of RWP 19-005 to reach across Contaminated Area Boundary postings Simulator JPMs:

S1: Perform manual dilution per SYS BG-200 to maintain temperature during startup

[NRC 11/14 S1 OK]

Validation time updated to 10 min S2: Manually align Containment Spray per EMG E-0, ATT F, Step F12

[NRC 11/14 S2 OK]

Failure of Yellow Train Containment Spray to AUTO initiate added to simulator file Step 1: Standard updated to read Applicant recognizes that Containment Pressure HAS NOT remained less than 27 PSIG and proceeds to RNO step Step 3: Standard updated to read Applicant verified Yellow Train ACTUATED, Red Train DID NOT ACTUATE.

Step 5: Standard updated to read in any order Handout updated with procedure Rev 41A (No changes to JPM)

S3: Establish Hot Leg Recirculation per EMG ES-13

[NRC 11/14 S3 OK]

Validation time updated to 15 min.

S4: Start up A Train CCW and transfer Service Loop per SYS EG-201, Section 6.1

[NRC 11/14 S4 OK]

Validation time updated to 10 min Step 2: Updated to cue to read IF Applicant asks CRS if desired, THEN: CUE: The CRS desires BG HIS-129 be placed in the VCT position. Standard updated to read On Panel RL001 Applicant located and placed BG HIS-129 in VCT position VCT Red Light LIT, DEMIN Red Light OUT.

S5: Perform PORV Block Valve Cycle test per STS BB-201A, Section 8.1 No comments or additions S6: Restore AFW after LSP per ALR 00-127A

[NRC 11/14 S6 OK]

Validation time changed to 10 min Step 10: Cue and Standard updated to specify Turbine Building Watch S7: Restore RCP Cooling per OFN BB-005 No comments or additions S8: Set RM-11R Setpoints for a Radioactive Release

[NRC 11/14 S8 OK]

Validation time changed to 10 min Step 28: Cue updated to read Examiner Note: The applicant will attempt to enter the data for the other point. The JPM may be ended at this time. CUE: The JPM is complete Administrative JPMs:

A1: Calculate water addition required following downpower

[NRC 11/14 A1 OK]

Validation time changed to 10 min A2: Determine Final Accumulator Pressure

[NRC 11/14 A2 OK]

No comments or additions A3: Develop a Clearance for B Containment Cooler

[NRC 11/14 A3 OK]

Updated Task Standard by removing requirement for Containment Cooler Fan B Control Switch to be in Pull-To-Lock. This is not required by procedure and is not necessary.

Step 3: Updated standard to remove requirement for Containment Cooler Fan B Control Switch in Pull-to-Lock and specified in the cue that the applicant may specify a handswitch position, but that exceeds minimum requirements.

Updated Key to remove Containment Cooler Fan B Control Switch in Pull-to-Lock.

Provided Drawings will be printed on the plotter at the same size as drawings in the plant.

A4: Post Emergency event exposure control and personnel protection No comments or additions A5: Review completed 1/m plot and evaluate for further actions

[NRC 11/14 A5: JPM Stem 3, standard should read 520 x 2 = 1040 CPS to reflect new starting counts On 1/M plot, pull 5 Line crosses 0.0 axis less than halfway between C45 and C70, so it wouldn't be CBC 60, it would be more like CBC 55. Is there a procedural reason why they would write ECP CBC60?]

NRC 11/18 OK Updated initiating Cue to state As the Control Room Supervisor, review the completed 1/m plot and determine any/all follow up actions and why the actions are required.

Table updated with B85 Final Counts at 1020 to prevent indications of doubling prior to going below Critical Rod Height.

Handout 2 and Examiner Quick Reference updated to reflect new value for B85 counts A6: Review STS SF-002, Core Axial Flux difference, and determine ant T.S. required actions NRC 11/14 OK Updated key to state Examiner Quick Reference in RED at the top and bottom A7: Review a completed Clearance Order

[NRC 11/14 - JPM Step 1, GNV0064 Should be Open and also UNCAPPED, add to standard to match JPM task standard.]

NRC 11/18 OK Updated task standard, Control Switch in Pull-to-Lock (GN HIS-9) removed. As determined by the RO JPM A3, this switch is not required. The extra valve out of position (GNV0064) that was caught during validation has been added to the task standard in the place of the Control Switch.

All steps and supporting documentation have been updated to reflect this.

A8: Review submitted LRW release permit for approval NRC 11/14 OK Footer data added, validation time 10 min Updated Handout to circle Circ. This was NOT an intended error.

A9: Classify an event and determine PARs NRC 11/14 OK Part 1 and Part 2 times added to Validation Time block, both 15 min

Wolf Creek 2019 Validation Week Scenario Comments and Changes

• All wait times for building operators changed to 2 minutes.

Scenario 1:

[NRC 11/18 OK]

Event 1 - Statement added to specify the crew may start a standby Condenser Vacuum Pump without prior to referencing an SYS procedure.

Event 2 - Tech Spec LCO 3.4.1 COND A - 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> added to form D1 and D2 for the chance to enter DNBR conditions.

Event 3 - Tech Spec for Containment Spray Train updated on form D1 to LCO 3.6.6.

Event 3 - Examiner Note added to page 10 to discuss ALR 00-019F, ESF SWGR RM A TEMP HI, and how the applicants will not be able to clear the alarm.

Event 3 - Event Termination changed to After the crew has stabilized the plant Event 5/6/7/8 - Added Simulator Operator Cue on Page 21 of D2 for the TSC to call the Control Room to recommend maintaining both Containment Spray pumps running until further notice.

Step 12 also updated to say Yes both Spray pumps are running.

Attachment F Replaced with EMG E-0, Rev 41A.

Scenario 2:

[NRC 11/18 OK]

Event 3, Added Simulator Operator interaction on page 7 of the D2, when directed to investigate Heater Drain Pump B, building Operator will report Pump motor is hot to touch, and breaker is tripped on with overcurrent flag dropped.

Attachment F Replaced with EMG E-0, Rev 41A.

The SYS BG-200 ATTACHMENT B Boration Hard Card added to the end of the Scenario Guide for reference.

Scenario 3:

[NRC 11/18 OK]

Event 1 - D2, Page 1 Actions updated to include OFN AF-025 steps 4 & 5.

Event 7 - D2, Page 18 added an examiner note to specify RNO action may need to be performed for EMG E-0, Step 7, depending on timeliness of crew response. Turbine Sequential Trip logic will not be met to open the exciter breakers and main generator breakers given the turbine trip failure. The breakers will eventually open without Operator action.

Event 6 - D2, Page 22, Removed the Yes from ABS 112 for S/G C Rad indication.

Event 6 - D2, Page 25, Improved the expected conditions note for EMG E-3, Step 12 and Removed EMG E-3 Step 13. For the given conditions (MSIVs closed since Turbine failed to trip)

Steam Dumps are unavailable.

Event 8 - C ARV failing open changed from 20% to full open at 100% on forms D1 and D2 Event 8 - Critical Task #3 re-stated as Commence controlled RCS depressurization to allow for SI termination per EMG E-3 prior to overfilling the ruptured C S/G (90% WR).

Attachment F Replaced with EMG E-0, Rev 41A.

Event 5 page 13 - Radation from any SG steamline rad monitor - ABS 112 for SG C - Yes -->

validation crew could not identify leaking SG by steamline rad monitor, we discussed removing this Yes Scenario 4:

[NRC 11/18 OK]

D1 Header Critical Task #2 updated to correct critical task.

Event 3 - D2 Page 11, Step B29 of OFN NB-30 updated, Red Train IS aligned to the service loop and steps have been adjusted accordingly.

Event 3 stopped after step B30; extra steps removed. Terry Turbine will remain running but will still fail following the reactor trip Event 8, D2 Page 21, EMG FR-H1, Step 3 updated to specify which Blowdown Isolation valves failed to auto close ESFAS status panel lights are checked.

Event 8, D2 Page 21, Updated Simulator Operator response when asked to investigate the loss of AFW pumps. TDAFW Pump is not running and the TTV is closed, Overcurrent flag dropped on A MDAFW Pump power supply breaker.

Event 7 - Need to modify on the D-1 and in narrative that the TDAFP trips and cannot be restarted, to reflect modification to scenario.

D-2 Header from page 13 on still says Scenario 3 Scenario 5:

[NRC 11/18 OK]

Removed Spare from D1/D2s Removed EMG ES-11 from D1 and changed the attributes column to 2 for EOPs Entered (EMG E-1, EMG FR-C2)

Event #2, D2 Page 3 - Event Termination changed to state After the crew has restored letdown pressure control.

Event 3, D2 Page 4, Removed duplicate Cue to stop A EDG in ALR 00-018A. This action is also directed by OFN NB-030, Step A14 (D2, Page 9)

Event 3 - D2 Page 5 and D1 Cover, Tech Specs Updated to LCO 3.8.9 COND B & 3.8.7 COND A.

Event 4 - D1 Cover Updated the applicable tech specs to match what was in D2 (page 13)

Event 5, D2 Page 17, Added an Examiner Note to look at Attachment 2 to see SYS BG-200 Actions for Boration (ATC Laminated procedure actions)

Event 5, D2 Page 18, Event Termination changed to state After the crew has commenced load reduction and boration.

Event 6 - On D1 Sim File and Booth Instructions, Added Key 15 to Bypass GG RE-27/28 per EMG E-0, Step F17.

Event 6 - D2 Page 21. Removed RNO actions and CT1 Designation statement from Step F5.

With NB01 lockout and B SI Pump unavailable per initial conditions, neither pump may be started. Updated CT 1 to specify establish flow to the by opening EM HIS-8803B. Also updated D1 CT1 in the Table and Narrative. The update to CT1 in 3 locations matches the more generic by opening BIT Inlet valve(s) listed on the D1 Header.

Event 6 - D2 Page 21. Added an Examiner note to discuss bypassing GG RE-27/28 per EMG E-0, Step F17 actions for FBIS (result of NB01 bus lockout) coincident with SIS. These components are NOT modeled on the Simulator Boards but can be bypassed in the Simulator Software.

Event 6 - D2 Page 24, Event 6/7 Termination changed to state After the crew has secured the NCP Event 8 - D2 Page 25, Added an examiner note to specify the crew will perform EMG E-1 until ORANGE PATH on Core Cooling exists, at which time the crew will enter EMG FR-C2 (See Page 32). From the time the NCP is tripped, it takes 10-13 minutes for conditions to degrade. The first 20 steps of EMG E-1 are listed.

Event 8 - D2 Page 25, Added Simulator Operator communication that if contacted as the Aux Bldg watch to investigate the B CCP, report tripped on overcurrent.

Event 8 - D2 Page 32, Added an examiner note to see Page 34 for ATTACHMENT A Actions.

Event 8 - DE, Page 33/34, Added steps 3-10 of EMG FR-C2 as they are being performed while Attachment A is being performed. Stopped at Step 10 to preclude Accumulator Injection.

Event 8 - D2, Page 34, Added a Simulator Operator Note to respond to request to close Accumulator Isolation valve breakers.

Attachment F replaced with EMG E-0, Rev 41A.

The SYS BG-200 ATTACHMENT B Boration Hard Card added to the end of the Scenario Guide for reference.