ML20070D291

Forwards marked-up FSAR Pages Transmitted as Supplemental Info Re Conformance W/Srp (NUREG-0800).Changes Will Be Incorporated Into Subsequent FSAR Amend

ML20070D291
Person / Time
Site:	Satsop
Issue date:	11/30/1982
From:	Bouchey G WASHINGTON PUBLIC POWER SUPPLY SYSTEM
To:	Knighton G Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
References
RTR-NUREG-0800, RTR-NUREG-800 GO3-82-1227, NUDOCS 8212150021
Download: ML20070D291 (13)

Text

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Washington Public Power Supply System P.O. Box 968 3000 GeorgeWashingtonWay Richland, Washington 99352 (509)372-5000 I

Docket 50-508 November 30, 1982 G03-82-1227 Mr. G. W. Knighton, Chief Licensing Branch No. 3 US Nuclear Regulatory Comission Washington, D.C.

20555

Subject:

NUCLEAR PROJECT 3 SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION ON CONFORMANCE OF WNP-3 TO STANDARD REVIEW PLAN

Reference:

a) Letter #G03-82-1015, G. D. Bouchey to J. D. Kerrigan, dated October 6, 1982.

Reference a) transmitted amendment #1 to the WNP-3 FSAR. This amend-ment contained the initial phase of the WNP-3 Review for conformance with the Standard Review Plan (SRP) NUREG-0800, required by 10CFR50.34(g).

In those cases where differences between the WNP-3 design criteria and the SRP acceptance criteria were identified in the initial Supply System review, a schedule was provided detailing when the bases would be presented for concluding that the WNP-3 design criteria are in com-pliance with the Commission Regulations.

Presented herewith is the material promised for the month of November.

Included are marked up FSAR pages to show the changes which will be incorporated into a subsequent amendment.

In those cases where we take exception to the SRP acceptance criteria a reference is provided to the FSAR section where further information is provided.

If neces-9 g )

sary, additional information will be added to the appropriate FSAR u

section as shown.

[DO*e NG68 css 8212150021 821130 PDR ADOCK 05000500 A

PDR

v, Mr. G. W. Knighton Page 2 November 30, 1982 SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMANTION ON CONFORMANCE OF WNP-3 TO STANDARD REVIEW PLAN In certain instances, following a detailed review, we have been able to conclude based on information presented in the FSAR that the WNP-3 design criteria do, in f act, conform to the SRP acceptance criteria.

For these cases, with the exception of a change to the FSAR confor-mance review table (Table 1.8-3), no further change will be necessary.

If you require further information of clarification, the Supply System point of contact for this matter is Mr. K. W. Cook, Licensing Project Manager (206/482-4428 ext. 5436).

Sincerely, MD' G. D. Bouchey, anager Nuclear Safety and Regulatory Programs GDB/ss cc:

D. J. Chin - Ebasco NY0 N. S. Reyonds - D&L E. F. Beckett - NPI J. A. Adams - NESCO D. Smithpeter - BPA Ebasco - Elma WNP-3 Files - Richland A. A. Tuzes - Comb. Engr.

I

W"P-3 F 5fJt T AFLI E 1.h 1 989M C - CNei sac <Txer*wn cr 19 J it ri t4P I P ei m Aers nxer rat te nt A m No s; 1.7.7 set =te 1tyer Analyet. new. 1 - July 19nt fr.=,'4)

In general, develepeent of the floor response spectra is accepteble if a X

time history opf. reach is used. If a opdal response spectra mothed of analysts is used to develop the floor response spectra, the justification for its coeservatism emd eovivalency to that of a time history method sust be dennestrated by representative esemples.

6.

Three Components of Farthquate seetten Dependtag upon what basic orthods are used in the selseic analysis, t.e.,

response spectra er time history method. the folloutng tuo approaches are considered acceptable for the cos41natten of three-dimenstenal earthquake effects. (Ref. 4) e a.

Response $pectes parthed when the response spectra method ts adopted for selselC ansi sls, X oce resurk (l)

(t) he pr i mme 4 ( analywm of all Seismic Y

the maalmum structural responses due to each of the three Ceaponents

(',e t er.*e v I st em turce. ire perlor c.

3 of earthquate motion should be combloed by taking the square root of Ih ' medal t ier hist ry sellioil.

• • • e ne the sum of the squares of the samlaun codf rectional responses caused g"

by each of the three components of earthquake motion at a particular point of the structure or of the oathematical podel.

b.

U m L M.,ste3 p a_!ysis flethod K pg(gggathM When the time history analysts method is employed for selsof t analy-g sts, tuo types of analysis are generally performed depending on the gyghhtes ygt.#f complealty of de problem. (1) To obtain seulmum responses due to

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g p g[4 y / g,

each of the three enaponents of the earthquake sotton: in this case the method for combining the three-dloensional effects is fdentical to that described in llee 6.e encept that the easteum responses are 37gf g

calculated vsing the time history method f astead of the spectrum method.

M-S t.c.[ M (2)

.f i.To obtain tioe history respo.nses from each of the three components r-in *Lgd u/ "*'

,e earte,quaie.etion.nd co.,ine te e. at each ti.e sie,. ige-ce braically; the manimum response in this case can be obtained from

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the enabined time solution. When this method is used, to be accept-Se e

able, the earthquale motions specified la the three dif ferent direc-g tiens should be statistically independent.

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Wu r-1 FcAs TADLE I.8 3 i

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IrtC STM* d D eEVIF# PLAM I

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trNots T7s_3n1_uf A S 9 F/.Arff FT AME_fSI_TYST A 1.e.s ranrrere a =d steel Internal 5erwe t-ree of Steet of tr,.ne 'en c,.act.ee rame n ta eat e p v. t. July 19 sit Deficlent areas of descriptlee informatten are Identified by the reviewer and a request for additlenal informatten is inttlated at the aggilcotten acceptance review. Iseu er unique design features that are not speelfica ally covered la the " Standard f ormat" may require e more detailed review.

The reviewer deteref ws if additlenal infereetten is required to acces-plish a meanlagful review of the structural espects of such new or unique f e at ures.

F.

Aprilceble Codes. Standerdsand_5pecificetfeas the design, esterlais, f abricetten, erectlen, inspectlen, testing, sauf In-service survellisace, if any, of laterter structures of cer4alameets ice covered by the fe11 ewing codes, standards, and guides that are ef ther applicable la their entirety er la pertions thereef, 5tenderda Code,jlfic~Usn Title 15pe e pe.ek (t) ft) Art Me was wolltred as a reference in the ACI 349 Code Seguirements for Nuclear Safety-Related Concrete Structures ealsa d ich lav tved scoperature essect or et. car i

rear of. :L at entherane, Code for Concrete Wessels and Contatneente, O

AU4E A9IE Seller and Pressure Wessel Code, 3

Section lit, Olvisten 2 AC.T 3I[f w, & m W 4Ml'"g gSa,ges MpWQ Seller end Pressure vessel Code, Sectlen III.

x ASME Subsettlens IIE and NF A!$C 5peelficatten for the Design, fabrication sad 3

trectlen of 5tructurel Steel for Sulldlags ANSI M45 F.4 Supplementary Quality Assurance negatrements fev Installation Inspection and Testing of Steuctural 3

Concrete sad structural Steel curing the C m tructlen Phase of nucteer Power rients e

I 8r941 story _Culdes L

I 3.30 Mechaalce) (telenell) Spilces in Seinforcing g

Sars of Category I Concrete structures 3.15 Testing of Reinforcing Sars for Category I g

Concrete structures 1.55 Concrete Placeernt la Category I structures x

j-1.57 0+ sten tielts and leading toebinattens for Ketal 3

I Pelaary Reacter Containeemt a

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1. 0! I

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l$E wu r-1 FSaR TAasF 1.8-I jftf9FC - nnon 1830 STNrPapp eEvt FW F1dJ8 ftirffi. lHerE 98fl.Fff.Tf;*Qc9.].ft9f 4 yrs nn _M amancs 9.5.7 Frecese AM raet Aceteent R==rlina Syereen

'Pev. 2 - July 1941 frone'an gro9 classification of sampilng ifnes, components and instruments for both

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To peet the requfrements of GDC 1 and 2, the selsmic design and quality y

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I

II'd the P55 and PA$ ghogld conform to the ClassiflCatton of the systee to which h* *" I'

• • • • 3

'"" ***' " ' " ' *3 each saerling line and component is connected (e g., a sampf f ag line con-

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ccted to a Quality Group A and selselc Category I systee should be seesigned to Quality Grnup A and selsele Category I classification), in accordance L

with regulatery posittens C.I. C.2, and C.3 in Aegalstery Guide 1.26 (refer-ence 6), regulatory positions C.I, C.2. C 3, and C.4 In segulatory Guide 1.29 (reference 7), and the guldelines of #egulatory Guide 1.97 (reference 8).

Camponents and pfptng downstress of the second isolation valve may be designed to Quality Group D and nonselselc Category I requirements, In accordance with regulatory position C.3 in Regulatory Guide 1.26 (refer-ence 6).

5.

the post-arcfdent sampilnq system and operatforat procedures should meet I

g the guidelines of itee 11.8.3 in NUREG-0737 (reference 9) and of Regula-tory Guide 1.97 (reference 8), and the following additional clarifications:

h To saet the requirements of GDC 11 and 14 in Appendf u A to 10 CFR E

u, a.

y Part 50, ff cheetcal analyses show that chloride concentrat:wi in the reactor coolant exceeds the Technical Specification Ilmits, then verf fication that the dissolved orygen concentration is below the Technical Specification lletts will be mandatory. Verification of hydrogen residual in escess of 10 cubic centimeters (at standard temperature and pressure) per kilogram of reactor coolant will be acceptable In lieu of direct analysis of dissolved osygen for 20 days.

M (4) b.

To meet the requ'Irements of GDC 60 in Appendia A to 10 CFR Part 50 I su a~**h %

""'I '"' "*' 'h"""*'a*'arhy l e not uaed f or the ar r a n, f f on-line gas chromatography is used for reactor coolant analyses.

C" I""' A**'Y***-

special prowlstens (e.g., pressure relief and purging) should be available to prevent high pressure carrier gas from entering the reactor teolant.

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M To meet the requirements of GDC 60 In Appendts A to 10 CF2 Part 50, x s " Remark

% r==sive ra w n.eren s

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I passive flow restrictfons in the sampling lines may be replaced by

'h'**"'*8**"' '* 88*8' *'8a' ca*1*at laa-e-s o a-redundant, fully quallffed, remotely operated Isolatton valves to

'"P'" 'I

'h' ***P ' 30**.

I Ifelt potential leakage from the sample Ifnes. The automatic contain-I g

rent isolation valves should close on containment isolation signals

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or safety injection signals. All remotely operated valves should have l

assured power supplies and control so that they can be reopened after an accident without Clearing the flotation signal. Valves which are l

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Inaccessthle during an accident should be environmentally quellfled to ensure operability under artfdent conditions.

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wwP-3 FSAa TAER.E l.8-1 wenEc - 08n0 WRC STANDARD PEY!!V FLAP COPG11 ANCE REMARR$

TES NO M/A

$_Fr/Arr7_FTAprE CRITFal A And Trenefer System 9 %4 Fuergency Steeel Festne Fuel Oil Storate fee, 2 - July 1991 (rm e'd)

Stanch Techalcal Position IC58-17 (P58) et related to diesel engine I

c.

fuel oli systens' protective interlocks during accident conditions.

eteer estat tween e WF-3 sign I See Reserk (1)

(1) E[e d d.

NURf C/CR-06f 0, " Enhancement of Onsite Emergency Diesel Cenerator gater and e acce, nee es t sta aden fled in Rellablilty."

is

,the ases f conct og that o WP-3 f

I des a crite la are a campit e utth Caust ton' t

Iftf Standard 387 as related to the ***stgn of the diesel engine fuel I

r stattoa vill be provided y asevesb

1982, e.

oil systee.

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% ggp.3 sI

.a esses f:es at{L %

f.

ANSI Standard N195, "f uel Oil Systems for Standby Diesel Generators."

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8flUhM UN

• f a s e en % des es+ S sJa 4KCf f.'shs b

.'S csssgcd a.s %ed 5dd.'#v%

e g.

Diesel Engine Manufacturers' Association (DfMA) Standard as related I

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to the design of the diesel fuel oli system.

i fi'. 3, l.1,1 7.

9.L4 Foergency Ptesel Fnatne Coallag Water Systes Bee. 2

.I41F 1961

_ACC[PT ANCE CRIT [RI A Arceptability of the emergency dlesel engine cooling system design, as descelbed la tD2 ocplicant's safety analysis refsort (SAR), is based on specific General Destgn Crlierta, regulatory guldes, and industry standards. Information obtained free other Federal agencies and reports, oltriary specifications, avall-I able technical literature, and eperat tamat performance data obtilned free stellarly designed systees at other plants hadng satisf actory operational esperleece will also be utilfred in deteretnis.g EDECWS acceptability.

E The (Df CWS is acceptable if the lategeated systee design is in accordance with l

the following celteria:

g 1.

General Design Criterton 2 es related to structeves housing the system I

and the system itself being capable of withstandng the effects of natural phenneena such as earthquakes, tornadoes, hurriemes, and floods, as established in Chapters 2 and 3 at the SAR. Acceptance is based on meeting O

Appendis Positten 13 of Regulatory Guide I.117 as related to the protection E

of structures, systems, and components tapertant to safety free the ef fects

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of tornada missiles.

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s WWP-)

FSAR TABLE t.8-3 wusrc - onoo ifRC STANDARD RETTEW Ft,All c erttANcs m ARF 3 TEL,,1c $

serLArrF rTANcE_ CELT [2! A 9.1.5 Feargency filesel Fagine feating Weter Systems Bee. 2 - July 1991 front *d)

General Design Criterion 4. with respect to s.ructores housing the'systee s

x 2.

and the system itself being capable of wlthstanding the ef fects of esternal

• *sslies and Internally generated elsslies. pipe whip. and jet lapingement

. rces associated with pipe breaks. Acceptance is based on meeting resition C.I of segulatory Calte 1.115 as related to the protection of structures, systees, and compo#*nts important to safety from the effects of turbine misslies.

x see peserk (I)

(1) There are

w. ehered ey.ecoe or er penant e 3.

General Design Celterion 5. as related to the capability of shared systees toportant to esfety es nau: b-and companents important to safety being capable of performing required A

I safety functions.

in Hetf 6;dul n

4 General Design Criterion 17. as related to the capability of the coeling M*

M4 r 5b.

water systes to meet independence and redundancy criteria, and General Design Criterlen 04, to assure:

the capability to transfer heat free systres and components to a heat x

5 a,

sink under transient or accident conditions.

b.

Redundanry of Components so that under accident conditions the safety I

functlen can be performed assuelag a slagle active component f ailure.

Ike rapahlilty to isolate components of the systee or plpIng. Si x

c.

required to maintain the system safety function.

To meet the requirements of these regulations the following guidance and positions are used:

Segulatory Culde 1.9. as related to the design of the diesel cooling x

g a.

water system.

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lc.,..s,t,on, m.,,,,$.,..s re,at.d to.ng,ne c.o, lag x

b.

water protective interloc6s during accident conditions.

IduR(C/CR-0660. " Enhancement of Onsite fuergency Diesel Generator I see Feeerk (2)

(2' er ce ett between WWP-3 estra ert rio e the ace eence ett rte tde efted In c.

e SRF. he bee for emnet tan th the W'rP-Pellability."

ft x

estan leerle re to ensi ence =

the r melan' o

d.

Iff f Standard MF, as related to the design of the diesel engine coolleg

)reso/

le lane w I he prow ed by p-coher 19.

water systee.

w fd [, b ij llg g g,*K g "u

Diesel Engine Manufacturers Association (OfMA) Standard. os related 3

e.

in the design of the engine conting water systee.

tu,, ee Mf.,- 5 f ff&/d-664D WiHs exu b*msps eNsgussad e%

1r. t. l. f. l.7.

Su b s

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'**n p.,

e

- a

& 'd i

A a

t.

I y?

i Wu P-3 FsAR TAet t

&.n.3 pr"erc onno a

1. 7C STANDAPP Riff fv ft As CtW11.t AJNC

_ ser!AcCfunscr_rs:Tytt A 7ts no 'n/A pr3,3,c3 1.f.4 se t eetc Inse rva-ne s 1pn sev. 3. J.1,Iset (Cant *4)

In addition, the tefaulal itse history accelerograph located in the con-tainment foundation er in the free field should be connected to the control roce, se that reek acceleratten level espertenced in the basement of the reactor containment structure or in the free field is f adicated to the con-teol rnne operator. The response spectrus recorder in the reactor contain-m".s foundation or in the free field is also connected to the centrol roce t., 13 f r ee if re design.esponse spectra values for discrete frequencies '

are eats aed during an eart> ate.

4.

Casparison of Measured and predicted Responses In t%e event of en earthquake, the control room operator should be tenedt-x stely fpfereed through the event Indicators. If the lastrsmentatten sPJus that the peak acceleretten er the respon e spectra esperienr9d at the foundetton of the containment but1 ding or in the free f feld exceed the OSE acceleration level er resgense spectra, the plant should be shut down (Def. 3) pending perefssten to resume operattens. To help predict the cara-g tellity of the plant for resuming operations, field f aspection of safety-related items should be laplemented and the measured responses from both the peak recording and strong setten accelerographs should be come4 red with these assumed in the design.

g r)

' (I to ffere es est bet a th r3 eel E

The procedures for comparlsen of measured and predicted responses are see e and he ece eene, rge, e ed, ggg gn acceptable 11 a cosalteent is made to prowlde detaties comparisons, es thi sur, e base ter e 34 g the the p.3 owtllped below, between measured setselc responses of Category I struca d ign c.

terte ede/p=rit ce we th c-s son' tures end equfpeent with calculated responses determined free dynastc esutey(ene et be p A vided by p, a er 1982 analysts, first, the time history receeds are digittred and corrected j_

for time sf o^al variations and baseltne warlations. The tfee history records free the trientet sensors located in the free field er at the foundation of the containment building are used to calculate response opertra et *Prrartlete critical deeping values. The response spectre thus et.tatned, or the response spectre free the response spectrum recorder, ere tempered with the desfgn response spectra. In addition, the tjee history terneds free the free field trfaulal sensor are used as input ground motion for the reactor building dyneelt model including soll where app 11 cable.

j llf fed response spectra are then caIculated at the locations of the Asf 2

etber seasers in the reactor buildf ag for comparison and terrelation uf th the respanse spectre directly seasured. Structural responses and asp 11-3 fled response spectra are calculated estpe the free field time history records =1th the dyneef t endel for cooperl4en with the erfginal design and

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analysts parameters. This comparlson permits evaluation es sofsefc effects on strue.tures and equipment and forms the easts for remodeltag, detailed enalyses, aad physleal laspection.

5.

Intervice Surveillance g

Fech of the sefselc tastruments shall be demonstreted operable by the performance of the channel check, channel callbratten, and chaanel func*

tlanal test operations at the laterests specified la table 3.7.4-2.

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trMF-3 FSAR TABLE 1. 61 - 3 NUREG - 080p NRC STANDARD _ REVIEW IL*JE ccMrt.lAner yFS 1e0 W3 RTNARES 5tf1ArrFTUNCE_CRITTRIA 9.5,7 Foergency plesel Fngine 1.ubricet tan Systese Rev, 7 =.Fuly 1981 N!.UANFfftI1FRIA Accer illfly of the emergency diesel engine lubrication system, as described la the aspilcant's safety analysis report (SAR), is based on specific general The reviewer will also utilf re informa-design criteria and regulatary guides.

tion obtained from other meres such as other Federal ogencies, published reports, ladust y standards, allitary scecifications, and technical literature on toener-An additlenal basis foe the acceptability of the clally available products, systee =111 be the degree of stellarity with systems la previously rewlewed plants with satisfactory operating esperience.

The design of the (Dit$ is acceptable If the Integrated design of the systee is in arcordance with the following criteria:

(eneral Design Crfferien 2, as related to structures housing the systee x

1.

and the system its*1f being capable of withstanding the ef fects of natural I

phenneena such as earthquates, tornadnes, hvericanes, and floods, as estab-lished in Chapters 2 and 3 of the SAR, Acceptance is based en meeting Position 13 of the appendla to Segulatory Guide I.317, as related to the y

protection of structures, systems, and compet enf4 leportant to safety f rom 4

the effects of tornado alssiles.

3 Ceneral Design Criterion 4 ulth respect to structures housing the systes and the system itself being capahle of withstanding the effects of enternal F.

alstiles and laterna11y generated missiles, pfpe whip, and jet lapingement Acceptance is based on meeting Post-f orces associated with pipe breaks.

tion C.) of Regulatory Culde 1.115 as related to the protection of structures, systems, and components leportant to safety from the effects of turbine alsslies.

x see Re. ek (t)

(n) 11,er, er, n..h.,ea,,,,,..,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,

Ceneral Design Criterton 5, as related te shaced systems and components su. pag e ant en. fce,. e,,% t w z.,s4.,

3.

imenrt ant to safety being capatile of performing required safety fesactions.

Cencral Design Criterion 17, as related to the capahllity of the diesel N b b'***$****

Sk

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4, engine lubrir.ation systee to meet independence and redundancy criteria.

Arrep' enre is based on meeting the following speciflC criteria:

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. egislatory Culde 1.9, as related to the design of the diesel engine ggggg% ggg gg y,g

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g, g, x

s.

e,stees.

o Branch lethalcal Position ICW17 (P58), as related to diesel engine x

b.

lubrication syetess' protective interlocks during accident conditions.

h

• s' ffere ce e et het ese th uwt.)

.ge,

-E e l'e' a**'

h-a ert mar ersee. odea u.e Mnefc/CR-Duo, *f nhanceeent of Dnsite toergency Diesel Generatet x see 9, rk (r) le. Br, e be, far ant l***l R t h.

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a c.

f U

Rellshility."

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rn e lett are I r eu rl f e wit the E.

leg awls) aae gli be fieveale.

y un, e g.

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m

Ni m P-1 FSAR TAlti E 1.0-)

Nt. REG - 0800 189C STANDARD REVIEW PLAll cMPt!AMCE Yl_S N0 m/A REMATAS 5RffArCTTIANCE CBIT_Yat A Fev. I 9.4.4 Feargency Dieset Fnstne C=buetten Atr Intehe And Enhavet system July 1981 (rane'd)

General Design Criterion 2, as related to the ability of structures housing x

1.

the systes and systes components to withstand the effects of natural phenceena such es earthquakes, tornadoes, hurricanes, and floods, as estabilshed in Chapters 2 and 3 of the SAR. Acceptance Is based on setting Appendis Position 13 of Regulatory Gui4e 1.117 as related to the protection of structures, systees, and components leportant to safety from the effects o* tornado missiles.

I 2.

General Design Criterton 4, with respect to structures housing the sys-teos and the system compenents being capable of withstanding the effects of enternal alssiles aad internally generated missiles, pfpe whip, and jet lapingement forces asseclated with pipe breaks. Acceptance is based on setting Position C.1 ef Regulatory Calde 1.115 as related to the pro-tection of structures, systees, and components toportant to safety free g

the effects of turbine missiles.

4 J.

General Design Criterion 5, as related to shared systees and components I see menerk (1)

(1) There are no shared afstems or components k

toportant to safety being capable of performing required safety functions.

torortant to safety - -

. &4 th(t O'

b'**

O 8'"

4.

General Design Criterton 17 as related to the capahility of the diesel

[M%f gf /4.

engine air start

• 4 systes to meet ladependence and redundancy criteria.

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Acceptance is based on meeting the following specific criteria:

Regulatory Calde 1.9 as related to the design of the diesel engine a.

cembustion air intabe and exhaust systees.

b.

Branch lechnical Position IC58-17 (PS8) as related to diesel engine

'P combustion att intake and enhaust systees' protective laterlocks dur-Ing accident conditions.

(2rdyte2d (fere e ea/ts

&n

'T

• erve the w 4 d, i See temark (2)

NURf G./CR- 0660. *f nhanceeent of Onsite foergency Olesel Generator c.

.e

.n.e iterta on, s

.eii. iiity.-

Ji.sar..

.e. meg.,,e ain,

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..e.

e,j g

x

/ de gn erf erte a e in e tience geh c

g,.

(

d.

If f! Standard 387 as related to the design of the diesel engine com-8, bustion air intake and exhaust system.

y sulattAns wil e pro ded by Mesh te

=T =g.,,, WN9 ) ok.V. E cawef s's 6 a=Pe M M I

Diesel Engine Manufacturers Association (OfMA) $tandard as related

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g to the design of the diesel cost >ustion air intake and exhaust system.

pg g6 ggg g.gg e.

L.1.A d. A ct. e*+ 5; as M.*> c es t 5 M ** *=.

O f.

fach emergenry diesel engine should be provided with on laderendent y

and reliable caebustlen air intake and exhaust system. The system b** N '4*

I* b ' S* g* !

• 7

• o should be stred and physically arranged such that no degradation of eagine function will be espertenced when the diesel generator set is I

required to nperate continunusly at the esuleum rated power nutput.

vur. 3 Ts Ap TAEl E 1.9 3

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]81*fG - 0800 WRC STANDARD REVIEW FL48 COMrt.1 ANCE YES ND N/A R830ABES SWPArhr_rT_AMrpcalTlalA L

9.5.6 Foersency pleset Fantee Storting System se,. 2 - July 1981 front *d) 4.

General Design Criterlen 17 as related to the capability of the diesel engine air starting system to meet ind rendence and redundancy criteria.

Specific criteria and guidance necessary to meet the relevant requirements of CDC 17 are as follows:

Regulatory Culde 1.9 as related to the design of the diesel air start

• x e.

Ing systees.

b.

8 ranch Technical Position IC58-17 (P58) as related to diesel engine x

air starting systems' protective interlocks durlag accident conditions.

J' tot /tre the)ditP-(t)[crg t des e wher di ere es NuptG/CR-0660 *fnhancement of Onsite fuergency Olesel Generator x see aceerk (1) rte and e

cept e

iterifid rif di c.

I Reliability."

udin[th the NP.

th 8

.t lie e fe con ec=e tancy vs the C y eat er)ert,/are n

a d.

IFff Standard 347 as related to the design of the diesel engine air x

et starting system.

,,,g.plettymsjllbe rev6ded bV ber 9v.

3 Q ggp.3 My p[/,g y,-g g Olesel Tagine Manuf acturers Association (0(MA) Standard as related x

se.co.u.sweslAl.% }s d ASEf G/l* A -CMO e.

to the design of the diesel air starting system.

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f.

Each diesel engine should be provided with a dedicated air starting systes consisting of an air compressor, an air dryer, one or more air (g, k gegg

[.,*M A5 de's M FM les i

receiver (s), piping, injection lines and valves, and devices to trant the engine as recnamended by the engine manufacturer, hg f.,.p g

, g, g, { af, g

g.

As a minimime, the air starting systre should be capable of cranting g

a cold diesel engine five times without rechargine the receiver (s),

the air starting system capacity should be detereIned as follows:

(1) each cranking cycle duration should be appronfeately 3 seconds;

(?) ransist of two to it.ree engine revolutions; or (3) air start requf re-sents per engine start provided by the engine manufacturer; whichever air start requirement is larger.

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Alares should be provided which alert operating personnel if the air x

l recalver pressure f alls below the einlesse allowable value.

g 1.

Prowlstens should be made for the periodic or automatic blowdown of x

accessulated solsture and foreign eaterlal in the air receiver (s),

and other critical points of the system.

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Starting air shnu14 he dried to a dew point of not enre than 50*F x

when Installed in a normally controlled 70*F environment, otherwise

-y the starting air dew point shnuld be controlled to at least 10*F less than the lowest espected mehlent teeperature, dIIE+

d.

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,e 1760'*-10 WNP-3 FSAR 3.10.

The redundant diesel generators are physically separated and electrically independent from each other.

Physical separation for fire and missile protection is provided by locating the diesel generators in separate

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rooms in the Reactor Auxiliary Building.

Power and control cables for the 4

redundant diesel generators and associated auxiliaries are routed in separate raceways.

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8.3.1 1.2 Specific Features of the Class IE Onsite AC Power System

8. 3.1.1. 2.1 Pbwer Supply Feeders All Class IE loads are powered directly or through step-down transformers and dis tribution panels from Clas s IE 4.16 kV buses A3-SA and B3-SB.

Each Clas s IE 4.16 kV bus is supplied from a non-Class IE 4.16 kV bus (A2 or B2) through a bus tie connection and from one standby diesel generator through a power f eeder. Each Class.IE 4.16 kV bus Jupplies power to three 4.16 kV - 480V station service transformers (and the associated power centers or MCCs and

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motors through power feeders cables.

The bus ties connecting the Class IE 4.16 kV distribution buses A3-SA and B3-SB to the respective non-Cass IE buses A2 and B2 each consist of a 2000A, copper, nonsegregated phase bus duct rated at 5 kV and prov,ided with two tie breakers which are connected in series'and are physically separated from each other.

Diesel Generators DG-A-SA and DC-B-SB are connected to buses A' 4 33-SE respectively through cable feeders, each consisting of four 750.

.spper conductors per phase.

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Power to the 4000V motors and 4160-480V s tation service transf ormers are supplied through power feeder cables. From the 480V power centers, power f eeder cables supply the motors above 100 hp, MCCs and other static loads. '

Power feeder cables also serve motors below 100 hp, 480V panels, lighting transformers and other smaller static loads from the MCCa.

Power feeder cables for the 4.16 kV system are copper, rated at 5 kV,1/c shielded with flame retardant jacket. All conductors are insulated with ethylene propylene rubber rated for 90C conductor temperature.

Power f eeder cables f or use at 480V or less are copper, rated at 600V. All conductors are non-s,hielded and are insulated with cross-linked polyethylene rated f or 90C conductor t emperature. In addition, multi conductor cables are provided with a flame-retardant jacket.

All five kV and 600V cables have been designed for operation as f ollows:

a)

Cables are suitable for installation inside containment, in metal trays, in conduits and in underground duct banks.

v 8.3-10

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INSER. 1 The WNP-3 design complies with the recommendations of'NUREG/CR-0660, " Enhancement of on-site Emergency Diesel Generator Reliability" presented in Section Task V -

.9 Recomr.endations with the following exceptions:

NUREG/CR-0660 Rec ommendations WNP-3 Design Provisions i

A.1 The WNP-3 design utilizes the refrigerated type f

air dryers as recommended by A.1 but its capacity is approximately 50 scfm in accordance with I

manufacturers recommendations.

fi A.2.a The WNP-3 design uses NEFA Type 12 control cabinets with dust tight gasketed doors.

d A.2.c Ventilating air for the diesel generator is drawn fr m outside through an intake louver at center-aky bo line 10ft-61n above the ground for DG "A" and 1.2ft for DG "B".

The. surrounding area is covered by greenery and no dust is expected to be present.

9 t-A.3 The WNP-3 diesel generators are 18-cylinder engines and therefore the recommendations of i

A.3 do not apply.

t' C.l.a Diesel panerator combustion air is drawn directly i

from the outside through a louver and a filter.

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The center-line elevation of the louver is 8 ft above ground for both DGs.

C.1.b Ventilating air for the diesel generator rooms is draun from outside through an intake lourer at l

center-line elevation of 10ft-61n above the ground j

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for DG "A" and 12ft for DG "B".

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The piping for the room ventilation air is separate j

from that used for the engine combustion air.

C.3 Class F insulation has been used for both the rotors and stators of the WNP-3 diesel generators.

As per ANSI C50.13, Class F insulation is capable

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of withstanding 105C temperature rise (by 5

resistance) at an ambient of LOC.

DG manufacturer's

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data indiwates that the WNP-3 generator has an i

80C rise at 40 C ambient temperature when carrying 110% of DG rated load.

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