ENS 46515: Difference between revisions
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| event date = 12/28/2010 12:20 EST | | event date = 12/28/2010 12:20 EST | ||
| last update date = 12/28/2010 | | last update date = 12/28/2010 | ||
| title = High Pressure Coolant Injection System Inoperable Due | | title = High Pressure Coolant Injection System Inoperable Due to Inoperable Minimum Flow Valve | ||
| event text = On December 28, 2010 at approximately 1220 hours, during surveillance testing of the High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) system, abnormal control room position indication was observed on the HPCI Minimum Flow Valve, E4150F012 as the valve was stroking closed. HPCI had been removed from service for quarterly surveillance testing at 0950 hours. The unplanned inoperability condition began at 1220 hours when position indication was lost on the minimum flow valve. The valve was manually closed to comply with the action of LCO 3.6.1.3 to isolate the penetration. A 14 day LCO was entered and back dated to the time that HPCI was removed from service per LCO 3.5.1. This report is being made pursuant to 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) as a condition that at the time of discovery could have prevented the fulfillment of a safety function needed to mitigate the consequences of an accident, based on loss of a single train safety system. RCIC was and has remained operable. The failure is currently under investigation. | | event text = On December 28, 2010 at approximately 1220 hours, during surveillance testing of the High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) system, abnormal control room position indication was observed on the HPCI Minimum Flow Valve, E4150F012 as the valve was stroking closed. HPCI had been removed from service for quarterly surveillance testing at 0950 hours. The unplanned inoperability condition began at 1220 hours when position indication was lost on the minimum flow valve. The valve was manually closed to comply with the action of LCO 3.6.1.3 to isolate the penetration. A 14 day LCO was entered and back dated to the time that HPCI was removed from service per LCO 3.5.1. This report is being made pursuant to 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) as a condition that at the time of discovery could have prevented the fulfillment of a safety function needed to mitigate the consequences of an accident, based on loss of a single train safety system. RCIC was and has remained operable. The failure is currently under investigation. | ||
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. | The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. | ||
Latest revision as of 21:08, 1 March 2018
| Where | |
|---|---|
Fermi  Michigan (NRC Region 3) | |
| Reporting | |
| 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D), Loss of Safety Function - Mitigate the Consequences of an Accident | |
| LER: | 05000341/LER-2010-004 |
| Time - Person (Reporting Time:+-0.88 h-0.0367 days <br />-0.00524 weeks <br />-0.00121 months <br />) | |
| Opened: | Greg Miller 16:27 Dec 28, 2010 |
| NRC Officer: | Donald Norwood |
| Last Updated: | Dec 28, 2010 |
| 46515 - NRC Website
| |
Fermi with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D), Loss of Safety Function - Mitigate the Consequences of an Accident | |