ENS 47850: Difference between revisions
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| event date = 04/19/2012 07:53 EDT | | event date = 04/19/2012 07:53 EDT | ||
| last update date = 04/20/2012 | | last update date = 04/20/2012 | ||
| title = Manual Reactor Scram Following Loss | | title = Manual Reactor Scram Following Loss of Recirculation Pumps | ||
| event text = Limerick Unit 1 was manually scrammed from 100% power at 0753 hours on 4/19/12 in accordance with plant procedure OT-112 'Recirculation Pump Trip' when both 1A and 1B Recirculation Pump Adjustable Speed Drives (ASDs) tripped due to an electrical fault affecting the 144D and 114A non-safety related 480V Load Centers. The shutdown was normal and the plant is stable in Hot Shutdown with normal pressure control via the Main Steam Bypass valves to the main condenser and normal level control using feedwater. The manual RPS actuation is reportable under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2). | | event text = Limerick Unit 1 was manually scrammed from 100% power at 0753 hours on 4/19/12 in accordance with plant procedure OT-112 'Recirculation Pump Trip' when both 1A and 1B Recirculation Pump Adjustable Speed Drives (ASDs) tripped due to an electrical fault affecting the 144D and 114A non-safety related 480V Load Centers. The shutdown was normal and the plant is stable in Hot Shutdown with normal pressure control via the Main Steam Bypass valves to the main condenser and normal level control using feedwater. The manual RPS actuation is reportable under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2). | ||
The Technical Support Center (TSC) Normal Air conditioning systems shut down due to loss of power from the 144D Load Center. The loss of power also affects the flow indication for the Emergency Ventilation system. This is considered a Loss of Emergency Assessment Capability, and reportable under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii). The Emergency TSC Ventilation system is available but flow cannot be verified. During a required activation the TSC, responders would report to the TSC. If conditions required use of the Emergency Ventilation system, the Station Emergency Director would assess habitability in accordance with Station procedures. TSC relocation of personnel would be directed as required until such time that the TSC ventilation system is returned to service | The Technical Support Center (TSC) Normal Air conditioning systems shut down due to loss of power from the 144D Load Center. The loss of power also affects the flow indication for the Emergency Ventilation system. This is considered a Loss of Emergency Assessment Capability, and reportable under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii). The Emergency TSC Ventilation system is available but flow cannot be verified. During a required activation the TSC, responders would report to the TSC. If conditions required use of the Emergency Ventilation system, the Station Emergency Director would assess habitability in accordance with Station procedures. TSC relocation of personnel would be directed as required until such time that the TSC ventilation system is returned to service | ||
Latest revision as of 22:04, 1 March 2018
| Where | |
|---|---|
Limerick  Pennsylvania (NRC Region 1) | |
| Reporting | |
| 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B), RPS Actuation 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii), Loss of Emergency Preparedness | |
| Time - Person (Reporting Time:+-0.72 h-0.03 days <br />-0.00429 weeks <br />-9.86256e-4 months <br />) | |
| Opened: | Brandon Shultz 11:10 Apr 19, 2012 |
| NRC Officer: | Karl Diederich |
| Last Updated: | Apr 20, 2012 |
| 47850 - NRC Website
| |
Limerick with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B), RPS System Actuation, 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii), Loss of Emergency Preparedness | |