ENS 50227: Difference between revisions

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Created page by program invented by Mark Hawes
 
Created page by program invented by StriderTol
 
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| event date = 06/25/2014 15:55 CDT
| event date = 06/25/2014 15:55 CDT
| last update date = 06/25/2014
| last update date = 06/25/2014
| title = Potential Loss Of Ultimate Heat Sink Capacity Due To Low Level
| title = Potential Loss of Ultimate Heat Sink Capacity Due to Low Level
| event text = At approximately 1555 CDT on Wednesday, June 25, 2014, during a review of several station abnormal operating procedures for actions related to low ultimate heat sink (UHS) level, it was discovered that the procedures do not incorporate design assumptions for shutting down the non-essential service water (WS) pumps following a loss of cooling lake dike. The pumps that take suction from the UHS include the WS, circulating water (CW) and fire protection (FP) pumps. Based on current procedural guidance, the only pumps that are secured due to a low ultimate heat sink level are the circulating water (CW) pumps based on low net positive suction (NPSH)
| event text = At approximately 1555 CDT on Wednesday, June 25, 2014, during a review of several station abnormal operating procedures for actions related to low ultimate heat sink (UHS) level, it was discovered that the procedures do not incorporate design assumptions for shutting down the non-essential service water (WS) pumps following a loss of cooling lake dike. The pumps that take suction from the UHS include the WS, circulating water (CW) and fire protection (FP) pumps. Based on current procedural guidance, the only pumps that are secured due to a low ultimate heat sink level are the circulating water (CW) pumps based on low net positive suction (NPSH)
Failing to secure the non-essential pumps on a loss of cooling lake dike failure significantly reduces the 30 day design basis UHS volume to approximately 4 days.
Failing to secure the non-essential pumps on a loss of cooling lake dike failure significantly reduces the 30 day design basis UHS volume to approximately 4 days.

Latest revision as of 20:50, 1 March 2018

ENS 50227 +/-
Where
Braidwood 
Illinois (NRC Region 3)
Reporting
10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed Condition
Time - Person (Reporting Time:+2.07 h0.0863 days <br />0.0123 weeks <br />0.00284 months <br />)
Opened: Joe Conquest
22:59 Jun 25, 2014
NRC Officer: Jeff Rotton
Last Updated: Jun 25, 2014
50227 - NRC Website
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