ENS 52679: Difference between revisions
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| event date = 04/14/2017 00:15 EDT | | event date = 04/14/2017 00:15 EDT | ||
| last update date = 04/14/2017 | | last update date = 04/14/2017 | ||
| title = Drywell | | title = Drywell and Suppression Chamber Simultaneously Aligned for Venting | ||
| event text = On April 14, 2017, at approximately 0015 Eastern Daylight Time (EDT), during a control board walk-down, it was discovered that the drywell and the suppression chamber were simultaneously aligned for venting. This alignment created a flow path from the drywell to the suppression chamber, which would have bypassed the pressure suppression function of the suppression chamber water volume during a Loss of Coolant Accident (LOCA). This condition existed tor approximately 43 minutes, from 2347 EDT on April 13, 2017, when Unit 2 transitioned from Mode 4 to Mode 2, until 0030 on April 14, 2017, when the proper alignment was restored. This condition is reportable in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) as a condition that at the time of discovery could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function of structures or systems that are needed to mitigate the consequences of an accident. Additionally, the change from Mode 4 to Mode 2 with primary containment inoperable constitutes operation prohibited by Technical Specifications (i.e., reportable in accordance with 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B)). | | event text = On April 14, 2017, at approximately 0015 Eastern Daylight Time (EDT), during a control board walk-down, it was discovered that the drywell and the suppression chamber were simultaneously aligned for venting. This alignment created a flow path from the drywell to the suppression chamber, which would have bypassed the pressure suppression function of the suppression chamber water volume during a Loss of Coolant Accident (LOCA). This condition existed tor approximately 43 minutes, from 2347 EDT on April 13, 2017, when Unit 2 transitioned from Mode 4 to Mode 2, until 0030 on April 14, 2017, when the proper alignment was restored. This condition is reportable in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) as a condition that at the time of discovery could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function of structures or systems that are needed to mitigate the consequences of an accident. Additionally, the change from Mode 4 to Mode 2 with primary containment inoperable constitutes operation prohibited by Technical Specifications (i.e., reportable in accordance with 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B)). | ||
The condition did not impact public health and safety. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. | The condition did not impact public health and safety. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. | ||
Latest revision as of 20:42, 1 March 2018
| Where | |
|---|---|
Brunswick  North Carolina (NRC Region 2) | |
| Reporting | |
| 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D), Loss of Safety Function - Mitigate the Consequences of an Accident | |
| Time - Person (Reporting Time:+3.37 h0.14 days <br />0.0201 weeks <br />0.00462 months <br />) | |
| Opened: | Alan Schultz 07:37 Apr 14, 2017 |
| NRC Officer: | Bethany Cecere |
| Last Updated: | Apr 14, 2017 |
| 52679 - NRC Website
| |
Brunswick with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D), Loss of Safety Function - Mitigate the Consequences of an Accident | |