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| {{#Wiki_filter:2021NRCWritten Examination Facility: HopeCreek Vendor: GE ExamDate: 2021 ExamType: RO Examination Outline Cross-reference: Level RO SRO Tier # 2 Group# 1 K/A # 218000 K1.01 importance Rating 4.0 K/AStatement: Knowledge ofthe physicalconnections and/or cause- effectrelationships between AUTOMATIC DEPRESSURIzATION SYSTEM and the following: RHR/LPCI: Plant-Specific Question: RO#1 Given: | | {{#Wiki_filter:}} |
| = A small break LOCAexists ina RWCUpipe chase.
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| = Theleak hasnotbeenisolated.
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| = Thereare noother leaksfrom primary containment.
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| = HPCIisinjecting.
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| = RPVlevel is30inches abovethe topofactive andcontinues fuel tolower.
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| = pressure Drywell isat.75 psigandsteady.
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| Which ofthefollowing describes whenADSinitiates toallow LPCIinjection into theRPV?
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| A. 105seconds after the twoLPCI(RHR) first pumpsstart B. 105seconds ADSlogic after determines thatthere isa leak C. 405seconds ADSlogic after determines thatRPVlevel hasbeen less than the ADSsetpoint D. 105seconds RPVlevel after 1(-129 inches)isconfirmed witha RPVlevel 3 (12.5 inches) signal in Proposed Answer: C
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| | |
| 2021NRCWritten Examination Explanation (Optional): IAWHC.OP-SO.SN-0001(Q) section 3.3.1(see attached)
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| PlausibilityJustification:
| |
| A: Incorrect. The 105second timer isonlyfunctional RPVlevel if islowcoincident withhigh drywell pressure, A leak intheRWCUpipe chase isoutside ofcontainment anddoesnot affect drywellpressure the5 minute timer hastotime outfor leaksoutside thedrywell.
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| B: incorrect- The105 second timer isonlyfunctional RPVlevel if islowcoincident withhigh drywell pressure, A leak intheRWCUpipe chase isoutside ofcontainment anddoesnot affect drywell pressurethe 5 minute timer hastotime outfor leaksoutside thedrywell.
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| C: 'Correct- TheADSdrywell bypass timerwill timeout at300seconds andinitiated depressurization. TAFis-161" hence, the initial is-131" condition plus105second timer. The LPCI (RHR) pumps will berunningfrom theRPVlevel 1(-129 inches) signal.
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| start D: Incorrect. The105second timer isonly functional ifRPVlevel islowcoincident withhigh drywell pressure, A leak intheRWCUpipe chase isoutsideofcontainment anddoesnot affect drywell pressure the5 minute timerhas totimeoutfor leaksoutside thedrywell.
| |
| Technical Reference(s): HC.OP-SO.SN-0001(Q) (Attach if notpreviously provided)
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| NUCLEAR PRESSURE RELIEF AND AUTOMATIC DEPRESSURizATION SYSTEM OPERATION Proposed References tobeprovided toapplicants during examination: none Learning Objective:
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| Question Source: Bank # 30912 Modified Bank# (Note changesorattachparent)
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| New Question History:
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| Question Cognitive Level: Comprehension orAnalysis 10CFRPart 55Content: 55.41(7)
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| Comments:
| |
| | |
| 2021NRCWritten Examination Facility: HopeCreek Vendor: GE ExamDate: 2021 ExamType: RO Examination OutlineCross-reference: Level RO SRO Tier # 2 Group# 1 K/A # 239002 K1.06 Importance Rating 3.4 K/AStatement: Knowledge ofthephysical connections and/or cause- relationships effect between RELIEF/SAFETY VALVES andthe following: Drywell drywell instrument air/
| |
| pneumatics: Plant-Specific Question: RO#2 Given:
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| Theplant isoperating at100%power.
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| Then:
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| = A smallleakdevelops onthe H-T210 pneumatic accumulator tankfor thePSV-F013H SRV.
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| wil'I Whateffect this have onplant operatioris?
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| A. Drywell pressure will risesteadily duetothe inleakage. Containment venting '
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| berequired will tomaintaindrywell pressure inthe normalband.
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| B. Thefrequency ofnitrogenmakeup tothedrywell will duetodrywell rise oxygen concentrations rising from theleak.
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| C. Thefrequency ofnitrogenmakeup tothedrywell will duetolowering rise drywell pressure from theaccumulator leakage.
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| D. TheAuto-Lead PCIGcompressor cycle will morefrequently.There beNO will significant net changeindrywell pressure oroxygen concentration.
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| Proposed Answer: D
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| | |
| 2021NRCWritten Examination Explanation (Optional): SRVAccumulator ensures that theSRV's canbeopened andheld open following a failure ofthe pneumaticsupply, (PCIG), tothe valve.
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| ThePCIGsystem takes suction onthe drywellatmosphere, which isprimarily nitrogen wheninerted; compresses thatgasandreturns it tothe drywell foruse bypneumatic valves(SRVs). Normal operationisonecompressor inAUTOLEAD modecyclingon and off between 94-106 psig andthe other compressor inAUTOmodecycling onand off between 85-106 psig.
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| Plausibility Justification:
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| A: Incorrect- Thenitrogen isina closed loop. TheN2leaked intothe drywell would bedrawn back intothePCIGsystem whenthecompressor cycles.There would benonet changein drywell atmosphere.
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| B: Incorrect- TheSRVaccumulators arecharged N2from PCIG. There would benooxygen introduced into thedrywellasa result oftheleak. Thestudent hastounderstand thepneumatic supply tothe SRVaccumulators.
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| C: Incorrect- Thenitrogen isina closed loop. TheN2leaked intothedrywell would bedrawn back intothePClGsystem whenthe compressor cycles.There would benonetchange in drywell atmosphere.
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| D: Correct- PCIGcompressors normally take suction on the drywell atmosphere. PClGsupplies theSRVaccumulators. A leak onanaccumulator would resultisPCIGreceiver pressure lowering morequickly, which would result inmorefrequent PCIGcompressorruns. The nitrogen; however, isinaclosed loop. Since the leakedN2 would bedrawn back into thePCIG system whenthe compressor cycles, there would benonet change inthe drywell atmosphere.
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| Technical Reference(s): HC.OP-SO.GS-0001(Q) (Attach ifnotpreviously provided)
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| CONTAINMENT ATMOSPHERE CONTROL SYSTEM OPERATION HC.OP-SO.KL-0001(Q)
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| PRIMARY CONTAINMENT INSTRUMENTGASSYSTEM OPERATION Proposed References tobeprovidedtoapplicants during examination: none Learning Objective: Given a system that isphysically connectedtoorrequired for supportofthe MainSteam System, summarize the purposeofthat interrelationship Question Source: Bank# 62165 ModifiedBank# (Note changes orattach parent)
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| New Question History:
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| Question Cognitive Level: Comprehension orAnalysis 10CFRPart 55Content: 55.41(8)
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| Comments: -
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| | |
| 2021NRCWritten Examination Facility: HopeCreek Vendor: GE ExamDate: 2021 ExamType:RO Examination OutlineCross-reference: Level RO SRO Tier # 2 Group# 1 K/A # 203000 K2.01 Importance Rating 3.5 K/AStatement: Knowledge ofelectrical power supplies to following:Pumps-the RHR/LPCI:
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| Injection Mode Question: RO#3 Given:
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| a Theplantwasoperating at100%power ina normal electrical line-up.
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| When:
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| = A high drywell pressureconditionof1.68 psigoccurs.
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| After 30seconds,what willbethepower supply tothe RHRPumprunning
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| 'C' inthe LPCI mode ofoperation?
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| A. Station Service Transformer 1BX50'1 via10A403 Switchgear '
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| B. 1CG400 diesel generatorvia10A403 Switchgear C. 1CG400diesel generatorvia 10B430 USS D. Station Service Transformer 1AX501 via10A403 Switchgear Proposed Answer: D
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| 2021NRCWritten Examination Explanation (Optional):
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| 4.16KV buses 10A401 (Channel A)and10A403 (ChannelC)arenormally powered from section 7 of the13.8KVring bus via stationservice transformer 1AX501.Thissource(1AX501) isalso the alternate power supply for 10A402 (Channel B)and10A404 (ChannelD).
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| 4.16KV buses from 2 ofthe13.8KV 10A402 and 10A404 arenormally powered section ringbusvia station service transformer 1BX501. This source (1BX501)isalsothealternate power supply for 10A401 and10A403.
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| Ifboth the normal andalternate sources tothe 4.16KV Class 1Evitalbuses arelost (LOP), theEDGs will start torestore power totheir respective buses.
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| Each4.16KV Class 1Evital bussupplies two 480VAC USSsviastepdowntransformers.
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| 4.16KV Class Bus480VACUSS 10A401 10B410 and10B450 10A402 10B420 and10B460 10A403 (4.16KV) 10B430 and10B470 (480 VAC) 10A404 10B440 and10B480 Seeattached Table 1ofRHRpower supplies.
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| Plausibility Justification:
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| A: Incorrect. 1BX501 isanalternate power supplytothe10A403 switchgear.Since theplant isin a normal electricallineupandthere isnoLOP,the'C' RHRpumpispoweredfrom the 10A403 4.16KV Switchgear whichisnormally powered bythe1AX501 transformer.
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| B: incorrect- DuetotheLOCAsignal from high drywell pressurethe1CG400('C' EDG) will be' running but notloaded. Since there isnoLOPsignal, the'C"RHRpumpwill bepowered from the10A403 4.16KV Switchgear which isnormallypowered bythe1AX501 transformer.
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| C: Incorrect- Since thereisnoLOPsignal, thepumpwill bepowered fromnormal AC Distribution lineup. Thenormal power supply forthe'C' RHRpumpisthe4.16 KV 10A403 Switchgear. The 10B430 Unit Substationisa 'C' Channel 1Epower supplyforthe480VACdistribution not the 4.16 KV '
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| D: Correct. Since thereisnoLOPsignal, thepumpwill bepowered fromnormal AC Distribution lineup. The'C' RHRpumpispowered from the10A403 4.16KVSwitchgear which isnormally powered bythe1AX501 transformer.
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| | |
| 2021NRCWritten Examination Technical Reference(s): HC.OP-SO.BC-0001(Q) Table1 (Attach if previously not provided)
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| RESIDUAL HEATREMOVAL SYSTEM OPERATION Proposed References tobeprovided toapplicants duringexamination: none Learning Objective: Concerning the1EACdistribution switchgear:
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| Given a listofelectrical loads(motor/unit substations); choosewhich arepowered fromthe 1E4.16KV switchgear(s).
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| Question Source: Bank #
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| ModifiedBank # changes (Note parent) orattach New X Question History:
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| Question Cognitive Level: Memory orKnowledge 10CFRPart 55Content: 55.41(5)
| |
| Comments:
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| | |
| 2021NRCWritten Examination Facility: HopeCreek t
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| GE
| |
| ~
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| Vendor:
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| ExamDate: 2021 ExamType:RO Examination Outline Cross-reference: Level RO SRO Tier # 2 Group # 1 K/A # 215003 K2.01 Importance Rating 2.5 K/AStatement: Knowledge ofelectrical power supplies tothe following: IRM channels/detectors Question: RO#4 Given:
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| = Theplantisconducting a startupIAWHC.OP-IO.zz-0003, "Startupfrom ColdShutdown toRated Power".
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| = TheReactor ModeSwitch isinSTARTUP/HOT STANDBY. ,
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| When: '
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| = TheIRMSystem "A" UPSCALE/INOPERATIVE alarm (C3-C2) isreceived.
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| = -
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| RPSTrip System "A" isin-(half-scram).
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| Which oneofthefollowing distributionpanels' loss ofpower would bethecause ofthecurrent plantstatus?
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| A. 1AD307, +24VDCPower Distribution B. 1AD417, 1E125 VDCPower Distribution '
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| C. 1AD318, Non-1E 125VDCPower Distribution D. 1AJ483, Non-1E 120VACPower Distribution Proposed Answer: A
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| | |
| 2021NRCWritten Examination Explanation (Optional):TheIRMvoltage pre-regulator receives+ 24VDCfrom plant DCdistribution (1AD307/1BD307) andprovides therequired regulated output(+20 VDC) tothe IRMchannel voltage regulator. Thevoltageregulator receives theoutput (+20VDC) from thepre-regulator andgenerates the required operating voltages 15VDC) circuitry. Loss of eitherthe
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| (+
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| +15VDC for or-15VDC input tothehigh power voltage supplywill power cause supply anINOPtrip andthe IRMelectronic oftheaffected channels and a resultant halfscram.
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| Plausibility Justification:
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| A: Correct. With the lossofpower from the1AD307 +24VDCdistribution panel the "A"& "C" channel IRMswould lose the electronic power circuitry andwould cause a low voltage onthe High Voltage Power Supply to the IRMdrawers andbring inanINOPalarm which thenwould cause anRPStrip onthe "A"channel (half-scram).
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| B: Incorrect- IRMsarenotpowered bya 1EVDCsource. The1E125VDCprovides control power to1Eloads. Thestudent has to decipher between a 1Esource versus a Non-1E sourceand also theproper DCdistribution125 VDC versus24VDC.TheIRMsarepowered from24VDC 1AD307 ("A" & "C"c hannelIRMs) and 1BD307 ("B"& "D"c hannelIRMs).
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| C: Incorrect- IRMsarenotpowered bya 125 VDC source. TheNon-1E 125VDCprovides control power tovarious Non-1E loads. Thestudent has todecipher between a 125VDCversus 24 VDCdistribution. TheIRMsarepowered from 24 VDC 1AD307 ("A"& "C" channel IRMs)and 1BD307 ("B" & "D"c hannelIRMs).
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| D: Incorrect. TheAPRMs,LPRMs(APRM slaves) andRBMs are poweredfrom two120VAC UPS buses, 1AJ483 (thruEPAbreakers 1AN413 and1BN413) and 1BJ483 (thru EPAbreakers 1AN414 and1BN414). Thestudent hastorecognize thatthe PRNMs are AC powered andthe IRMsareDCpowered even though they arepart oftheNuclear Instrumentation System.
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| Technical Reference(s): E-0010 (Attachifnot previously provided)
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| Single Line Meter andRelay Drawing 24VDCSystem Proposed References tobeprovided toapplicants duringexamination: none Learning Objective: Given a loss ofelectrical power tothe IRM Drives explain what response would be expected, IAWavailable ControlRoom Procedures.
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| Question Source: Bank#
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| ModifiedBank# (Note changes orattach parent)
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| New X Question History:
| |
| Question Cognitive Level: Memory orKnowledge 10CFRPart 55Content: 55.41(7)
| |
| Comments:
| |
| | |
| 2021NRCWritten Examination Facility: HopeCreek Vendor: GE j ExamDate: 2021 ExamType: RO -
| |
| Outline Examination Cross-reference: Level RO SRO Tier # 2 Group# 1 K/A # 262001 K3.01 Importance Rating K/AStatement:
| |
| Knowledge oftheeffectthata loss or malfunction oftheA.CELECTRICAL DISTRIBUTIONwill have onfollowing: Majorsystem loads Question: RO#5
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| . i
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| 2021NRCWritten Examination Given:
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| a Theplant isoperating at100%power.
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| a AII Circulating Water pumps arerunningwith their.
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| discharge valvesfullopen.
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| Then, power islost tothe Circulating Water4.16 KVBus,10A502.
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| a Ithas been sixty (60) seconds sincethe loss ofpowertothe bus.
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| a NOoperator actions have been performed onthe circulatingwatersystem.
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| Whatisthepresent Circulating Water systemconfiguration?
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| A. AP501 andCP501 pumps arerunning BP501 andDP501 pumps are tripped HV-2152A andHV-2152C Circ Water PumpDischarge Valves remain as-iswith NOposition indication HV-2152B andHV-2152D Circ WaterPumpDischarge Valves areinthe CLOSED position B. AP501 andCP501 pumps arerunning BP501 andDP501 pumpsaretripped Circ Water PumpDischarge ValvesHV-2152A,B,C &Dare intheOPENposition C. BP501 andDP501 pumps arerunning AP501andCP501pumpsaretripped HV-2152B andHV-2152D CircWater PumpDischarge Valvesremain as-iswith NOposition indication HV-2152A andHV-2152C CircWater PumpDischarge Valves areinthe CLOSED position D. BP501 andDP501pumps arerunning AP501andCP501pumpsaretripped Circ Water PumpDischarge Valves HV-2152A,B,C & D areinthe OPEN position ProposedAnswer: A (Optional):
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| Explanation HC.0P-SO.DA-0001, 3.3.8 Section Intheeventofa BusPower Failure:
| |
| Intheeventofa 10A501 buspower failure, the"A"and"C"Pumpswill tripwiththeirrespective valves closing within 30seconds. Thedischarge valves for"B"and"D"Pumpswill fail asiswith lossofposition indication.
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| Intheeventofa 10A502 buspower failure, the "B"and"D"Pumpswill tripwiththerespective closing valves within 30seconds. TheDischarge Valves for "A"and"C"Pumpswill remain aswith NOposition indication.
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| Plausibility Justification:
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| A: Correct. With the loss ofthe10A502, the"B"and"D"Circ Pumpswill immediately tripand their associated discharge valves willstrokeclose within30seconds. Since the "A" and"C" Circpumpsstill have power along with discharge their valvesthepumps willcontinuetorun the valves willnotmove, however they willloseposition indication.
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| | |
| 2021NRCWritten Examination B: incorrect- "A" and"C"pumps willberunning andthe"B" and"D"pumps betripped, will however the "B" and"D" discharge valves will goclosed toprevent spinning thetripped pumps backwards andrunning out the "A" and"C" pumps. '
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| C: Incorrect- The10A502 powers the "B" and"D"pumps. They would tripimmediately andthe respective discharge valves would goclosed.
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| D: Incorrect. The 10A502 powers the"B" and"D"pumps. Theywould trip immediately andthe respective discharge valveswould goclosed.
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| Technical Reference('s): HC.OP-SO.DA-0001 (Attachif provided) notpreviously Circulating WaterSystem ProposedReferences tobeprovided toapplicants during examination: none Objective: Given Learning a set ofconditions anda drawing of thecontrols, instrumentation, and/or alarms located intheMain Control Room, assess the status ofthe Circulating Water System byevaluation ofthecontrols, instrumentation, andalarms.
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| Question Source:Bank # 34417 Modified Bank# (Note changes orattach parent)
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| New QuestionHistory:
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| QuestionCognitive Level: Comprehension orAnalysis 10CFRPart 55Content: 55.41(5)
| |
| Comments:
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| | |
| 2021NRCWritten Examination Facility: HopeCreek Vendor: GE ExamDate: 2021 ExamType: RO .
| |
| Examination Outline Cross-reference: Level RO SRO Tier # 2 Group# 1 K/A # 262002 K3.02 Importance Rating 2.9 K/AStatement: Knowledge oftheeffect thata loss or malfunction oftheUNINTERRUPTABLE POWERSUPPLY (A.C./D.C.) will have o nfollowing: Recirculation pumpspeed: Plant-Specific Question: RO#6
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| | |
| 2021NRCWritten Examination Given:
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| = The'A' Reactor Recirculationpumpisoperating at88%speed withallcellsinservice.
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| = The'A' NXGController wasincontrol with the 'B"NXGController available.
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| = The1AD131VFD120VUPSwasoperating inNORMAL.
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| When:
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| a Dueto a manipulation error, the480VAC supply tothe 1AD131 isinadvertently opened.
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| = 'A' NXG Controller failureoccurs.
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| = AutomaticNXG Controller switchover to'B' NXGController occurs.
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| = (C1-D4 )REACTOR RECIRC A TROUBLE O HA isreceived Noother operator actions have been taken.
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| Whatistheexpected condition ofthe 'A' Recirculation pump/VFD following theNXGController Switchover?
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| A. Thepumpremains operating at 88% speed.
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| B. Thepumpisoperating atless than 88% speed.
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| C. Thepumpisoperating atgreater than88% speed.
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| D. Thepumptrips.
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| ProposedAnswer: B (Optional):
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| Explanation Twodedicated 120VACUPSunits areprovided tosupplythe control power for the 480VACsupply VFD's. power istransformed into two120VACfeeds that supplythe UPS. The redundant controlpower supplies ofthe VFD's arepowered byseparate 120VACsources, one from eachUPS.The1A-D-131 UPSis the normal supply tothe A components andthe backup supply tothe B components.The1B-D-131 UPSisthei normal supply totheB components andthebackup supply to theA components. ifthereisa loss ofAC power, whenAC input power isrestored, theInverter will automatically switch backtoAC input andtheUPSwill begin recharging thebatteries.
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| The'A'NXGcontroller isnormally incontrol with the'B' instandby. If afault occurs onthe'A' NXG control controller, swaptothe'B' will NXGcontroller. Drive output will shutdown forapproximately 0.5seconds during theswap, which will resultinasmall decrease inpumpspeed. ThemainDrive synchronizestothenewlower pumpspeed andinitiates anAutomatic SpeedHold.
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| Plausibility Justification:
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| A: Incorrect. Drive output shutdown will for approximately 0.5 seconds during theswap, which willresult inasmall decrease inpumpspeed.
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| B: Correct-Wheninput power isrestored, theUPSwill automatically swapback toNORMAL. If a
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| faultoccurs onthe'A' NXGcontroller, control will swaptothe'B' NXGcontroller. Drive outputwill shutdown for approximately 0.5 seconds during theswap, which willresult ina small decrease inpumpspeed. Themain Drive synchronizes tothenewlower pump speed.
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| | |
| 2021NRCWritten Examination C: incorrect- TheUPSwill automatically swapback toNORMAL uponrestorationofinput power.
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| The main Drive synchronizes tothenewlower pumpspeed.
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| D: incorrect. TheUPSwill only swaptoBYPASS operation duetoaninternalfault. TheUPS wouldstill be operating andable toautomatically transfer backtoNORMAL wheninput power wasrestored. Drive output will shutdown for approximately 0.5secondsduring theswap, which will result inasmall decrease inpumpspeed. Themain Drivesynchronizes tothe newlower pump speed.
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| Reference(s):
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| Technical HC.OP-SO.NQ-0003(Q) if (Attach notpreviously provided)
| |
| OPERATION OFREACTOR RECIRC VFDUNINTERRUPTIBLE POWER SUPPLIES NOH01RECCON-16 Recirc. VFDLP Proposed References tobeprovided toapplicants during examination: none Objective: Identify Learning theresponse ofthe Reactor RecirculationVFDUPStothe following:
| |
| Loss ofNormal ACsupply Restoration ofNormal ACSupply Identify theresponse ofthe VFD to a Power CellBypass andNXGController failure.
| |
| Question Source: Bank#
| |
| Modified Bank # changes (Note or attach parent)
| |
| New X Question History:
| |
| Cognitive Question Level: Comprehension orAnalysis 10CFRPart 55Content: 55.41(6)
| |
| Comments:
| |
| | |
| 2021NRCWritten Examination Facility: HopeCreek Vendor: GE ExamDate: 2021 ExamType: RO Examination Outline Cross-reference: Level RO SRO Tier # 2 Group# 1 K/A # 259002 K4.09 Importance Rating 3.1 K/AStatement: Knowledge ofREACTOR WATER LEVEL CONTROL SYSTEMdesign feature(s) and/orinterlocks which provideforthe following: Single element control Question: RO#7 Given:
| |
| a Theplant isconducting IAWHC.OP-IO.zz-0003, a startup "Startup from Cold Shutdown toRated Power"
| |
| = TheDigitalFeedwater ControlSystem isinSingle Element Control.
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| Whichofthefollowing describes whyRPVwater level isthesingle controllingparameter during lowpoweroperations?
| |
| A. Steamflow/Feed flow signals aremoreaccurate atlowpower.
| |
| B. RPVlevel changes arefaster atlowpower than-athigh power.
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| C. Steam flow/Feed flowsignals areless accurateatlowpower.
| |
| D. Narrow RangeRosemount Level Detectors areinaccurate atlowpower.
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| Proposed Answer: C
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| | |
| 2021 NRCWritten Examination Explanation (Optional): Single element control isused asthe controlling parameterduring lowpower operation andmeans thatvessel water level ismonitored asthe controlling parameter. Atlowpower operations: Vessel level changes areslower, Steam/feed flow signals areless accurate,thecontrol signal is developed bytaking themedian value ofthe three Narrow Range Rosemou.nt Leveldetectors (PDT-N004 A, B &C)
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| Plausibility Justification:
| |
| A: Incorrect. Steam flow/feedflow areparameters usedbytheDFCS,however atlowpowers theses parameters areless accurate andtherefore the RPVwater level bethecontrolling will parameter.
| |
| B: Incorrect- Actual RPV level changesare slower atlower powers ascompared power tohigher level changes.
| |
| C: Correct Steam flow/feedflow are parameters used bythe DFCS,however atlowpowers theses parameters areless accurate andtherefore the RPVwater levelwillbethecontrolling parameter. TheFeedwater flow transmitters N002A/B- C32indicate theFeedwater flows tothe reactor vessel. Theassociated instrument loops arecalibrated for Power Operation (OPCON 1) andthus mayindicate inaccurate values inother conditions.
| |
| D: Incorrect. Narrow Range (0" to+60") isthe most accurate level indication during normal operations. Itisreferenced toinstrument zero and calibrated forsaturated steam-watermixture at1000 psig, 135FDrywell temperature, 75F Reactor Building temperature. Provides level input tothe Main Control Room,DFCS,ADS,RPS, and NS4 Technical Reference(s): HC.OP-IO.22-0003(Q) (Attach if notpreviouslyprovided)
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| STARTUP FROMCOLD SHUTDOWN TORATEDPOWER HC.OP-SO.AE-0001(Q)
| |
| FEEDWATER SYSTEM OPERATION Proposed References tobeprovided toapplicants duringexamination: none Learning Objective: Frommemory, describe thebasic control scheme for single element (startup) and three element (master), anddifferential pressure Feedwater control modes including process variables thatareused asinput signals for eachmode Question Source: Bank# 30946 Modified Bank# (Note changes orattach parent)
| |
| New Question History:
| |
| Question Cognitive Level: Memory orKnowledge 10CFRPart 55Content: 55.41(5)
| |
| Comments:
| |
| | |
| 2021NRCWritten Examination Facility: HopeCreek Vendor: GE ExamDate: 2021 ExamType: RO Examination Outline Cross-reference: Level RO SRO Tier # 2 Group# 1 K/A # 205000 K4.05 Importance Rating 3.6 K/AStatement: Knowledge ofSHUTDOWN COOLING SYSTEM (RHR SHUTDOWN COOLING MODE) feature(s) design and/orinterlocks which provide for following:
| |
| the Reactor cooldown rate Question: RO#8
| |
| | |
| 2021NRCWritten Examination Given:
| |
| = Theplant isinthe Shutdown Cooling modeofoperation onthe'A'RHRloop.
| |
| = RHRShutdownCooling flowisnormal.
| |
| When:
| |
| = Thecrew recognizes that the cooldown rate isexcessive.
| |
| = TheCRSdirects the RO/POtoreduce the cooldown rate.
| |
| Thecurrent valve status/lineup for the 'A' RHRloop:
| |
| > BC-HV-F048A, RHRHX A SHELL SIDEBYPVLVis100%open.
| |
| > BC-HV-F003A, RHRHXA OUTLET VLVis80%open.
| |
| > BC-HV-F015A, RHRLOOPRET TO RECIRC VLVis60%open.
| |
| Which oneofthe following valvemanipulations would reduce the cooldown IAWplant rate procedures?
| |
| A. Throttling CLOSED ontheBC-HV-F048A RHRHXSHELLSIDEBYPVLV.
| |
| B. Throttling OPENontheBC-HV-F003A RHR HX A OUTLET VLV.
| |
| C. Throttling OPENontheBC-HV-F015A RHRLOOP RET TOREC1RC VLV.
| |
| D. Throttling CLOSED ontheBC-HV-F003A RHRHXA OUTLET VLV.
| |
| Proposed Answer: D Explanation (Optional):Seeattached HC.OP-SO.BC-0002 Section 5.2.40 Plausibility Justification:
| |
| A: Incorrect. ClosingtheF048A would send moreflow through the'A' RHRHXwhich would increase thecooldown rate.Thestudent needs tounderstand the operational effects of manipulating theF048A andF003AandhowtheF048A being full opened theF003A requires to beclosed todecrease cooldown rate.
| |
| B: Incorrect With the F048Afully opened andthen throttlingtheF003A open further would increase thecooldown rate. Moreflow through the'A' RHRHX.
| |
| C: Incorrect- F015A isthrottled tomaintain Shutdown Cooling flow atrequired flow The rates.
| |
| F015A isnot for throttled temperaturecontrol IAWprocedure.
| |
| D: Correct. ClosingtheF003A wouldreduce theflow through the'A' RHRHXwhich would decrease cooldown rate. Thestudent needs tounderstand the of effects operational manipulating theF048A andF003A andhowtheF048A being ope'ned full requires theF003Ato beclosed todecrease cooldown rate.
| |
| | |
| 2021NRCWritten Examination Technical Reference(s): HC.OP-SO.BC-0002(Q) notpreviously if (Attach provided)
| |
| Proposed References tobeprovided toapplicants duringexamination: none Learning Objective: Givenprocedure HC.OP-SO.BC-0002, "Decay HeatRemoval Operation",
| |
| explain thelisted prerequisites, precautions, and/or limitations during operation.
| |
| Question Source: Bank#
| |
| Modified Bank # (Note orattach changes parent)
| |
| New X Question History:
| |
| Question Cognitive Level: Comprehension orAnalysis 10CFRPart 55Content: 55.41(14)
| |
| Comments:
| |
| | |
| 2021NRCWritten Examination f
| |
| Facility: HopeCreek Vendor: GE ExamDate: 2021 ExamType: RO Examination OutlineCross-reference: Level RO SRO Tier # 2 Group # 1 K/A # 263000 K5.01 importance Rating 2.6 K/AStatement: Knowledge ofthe operational implications ofthe following concepts asthey apply toD.C.ELECTRICAL DISTRIBUTION: Hydrogen generation during battery charging.
| |
| Question: RO#9 Given:
| |
| = Theplantisoperating at100%power.
| |
| = HPCI250VDCbattery hasjust completed deep discharge rate surveillance testing.
| |
| = TheHPCIBattery charger hasbeenplaced inservice andischarging theassociated HPCIbattery bank.
| |
| Then:
| |
| OHADiesel Area HVACPanel 1EC483 E6-C2 isreceived.
| |
| * Thefieldoperator reports a loss ofall Battery roomventilation.
| |
| Theapplicable Abnormal procedure(s) is(are) entered.
| |
| Whichofthefollowing describes anoperational implication associated with theabove conditions onthe HPCI250VDCDistribution System?
| |
| A. Heat induced crackingofthebattery cells B. Buildup ofhazardous lead sulfate (PbSO4) dust onBattery Roomcomponents C. Explosive hydrogen-air mixture intheBattery Room D. Electrical firecaused whenmoisture condenses across battery terminals Proposed Answer: C
| |
| | |
| 2021NRCWritten Examination Explanation (Optional): Seeattached HC.OP-AB.HVAC-0001 Plausibility Justification:
| |
| A: incorrect. Thebattery roomtemperature will notbehigh enough tocausecracking. However, the student could seethis asapossible answer duetothehigher than normaltemperatures in thebattery room. Theroom temperature willactually comedown withoutventilation.The battery rooms arekept between 740F and800F.Thebatteries areinoperable at<740F.
| |
| B: Incorrect-As long asthe batteries areintact there will benolead sulfate onthe batteriesand certainly nodust will accumulate duetohigher temperatures.
| |
| C: Correct- During charging thebattery produces hydrogen which canbuild toexplosive conditions without ventilation. Even though this would take a long timefor anexplosive amount ofHydrogen tobuild up,the HVAC abnormalspecifically directs monitoring both temperature andhydrogen concentration during each (see shift attached).
| |
| D: Incorrect. With thebattery cells intact, nomoisture will build up.With noventilation the student might think thehumidity would risein the room. A rise inhumidity wouldnotcause aspark across terminals. Thetemporary ventilation.would control batteryroomtemperature between 740F and800F Technical Reference(s): HC.OP-AB.HVAC-0001 (Attach notpreviously if provided)
| |
| HVAC Proposed References tobeprovided toapplicants during examination: none Learning Objective: Given a setofplant conditions/malfunctions associated with battery ventilation, evaluate whether a loss ofventilation toa battery roomcan result inequipment failure.
| |
| Question Source: Bank#
| |
| .Modified Bank # (Note changesorattach parent)
| |
| New X Question History:
| |
| Question Cognitive Level: Memory orKnowledge 10CFRPart 55Content: 55.41(10)
| |
| Comments:
| |
| | |
| 2021NRCWritten Examination Facility: HopeCreek Vendor: GE ExamDate: 2021 ExamType: RO Examination OutlineCross-reference: Level RO SRO Tier # 2 Group# 1 K/A # 264000 K5.05 Importance Rating 3.4 K/AStatement: Knowledge oftheoperational implications ofthe following concepts asthey apply toEMERGENCY GENERATORS (DIESEL/JET) :Paralleling A.C. p ower s ources Question: RO#10 Given:
| |
| = HC.OP-ST.KJ-0003, EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATOR1CG400 OPERABILITY TEST MONTHLY isinprogress.
| |
| = ThePOispreparing tosynchronize "C"Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) toits vital bus. i Priortosynchronizing, the"C"EDGgovernor isplaced inthe mode, to ensure the "C"EDG A. ISOCHRONOUS; exhibits proper sharing load characteristics.
| |
| B. DROOP;exhibits proper load sharing characteristics.
| |
| C. DROOP;vital busfrequency ismaintained.
| |
| D. ISOCHRONOUS; vital busfrequency ismaintained.
| |
| Proposed Answer: B Explanation (Optional):ISOCHRONOUS MODEplaces thegovernor inisochronous (frequency governing). DROOP MODEplaces thegovernor indroop (loadsharing). SPEED DROOP control:
| |
| permits load andparallel division operation ofunits whencontrolled bythemechanical governor. if the diesel generator isrunning output intest breaker (paralleled istripped with open. This isdone source) anoffsite whenanautostart toprevent severe power signal andvoltage isreceived, surges the when the governor isshifted toisochronous andthe voltage regulator isset for 4160 volts. After thebreaker is tripped, will it recloseonthe busif required tosupply power. This isthenormal EDGstandby lineup.
| |
| | |
| 2021NRCWritten Examination Plausibility Justification:
| |
| A: Incorrect. TheEDGnormal standby line uphasthe governor control intheIsochronous mode to provide 4160KV/60 Hz.inthe caseofanAutoStart (LOP/LOCA). However, this mode of operation isused for frequency governing andnot for manual synchronizing oftheEDG.
| |
| B: Correct- The EDGgovernor control willbeswitched toDROOP ISOCHRONOUS from mode whenmanually synchronizing .the sharing withthe mechanical governor.
| |
| EDG (see attached). TheDROOPmodeallows forload C: Incorrect- Isochronous mode ofoperation isused for frequency TheDROOP governing. mode allows forload sharing with the mechanical governor.
| |
| D: Incorrect. TheEDGgovernor control will beswitched toDROOPfrom ISOCHRONOUS mode whenmanually sharing with synchronizing the EDG themechanical governor.
| |
| (see attached). The DROOP mode allowsforl oad Technical Reference(s): HC.OP-ST.KJ-0003 if (Attach notpreviously provided)
| |
| EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATOR 1CG400 OPERABILITY TEST -
| |
| MONTHLY Proposed References tobeprovided toapplicants during examination: none Learning Objective: Given a labeled diagram/drawing of, or access to,theDiesel Generator controls located inthe main control room:
| |
| Explain theeffect ofeach control switch onthe emergency dieselgenerators.
| |
| Determine plant conditions orpermissive required for thecontrol switches to perform theirintended function.
| |
| Question Source: Bank# 110708 Modified Bank # . (Note changesorattachparent)
| |
| New Question History:
| |
| Question Cognitive Level: Memory orKnowledge 10CFRPart 55Content: 55.41(7)
| |
| Comments:
| |
| | |
| 2021NRCWritten Examination Facility: HopeCreek Vendor: GE ExamDate: 2021 Exam Type:RO .
| |
| Examination Outline Cross-reference: Level RO SRO Tier# 2 Group# 1 K/A # 212000 K6.04 Importance Rating 2.8 K/AStatement: Knowledge ofthe effect that a loss or malfunction ofthe following will have on theREACTOR PROTECTION SYSTEM :D.C. electrical distribution Question: RO#11
| |
| /
| |
| | |
| 2021NRCWritten Examination Given:
| |
| = Theplant wasoperating at100%power.
| |
| When: -
| |
| = The power toboth RPSElackup Scram valveswaslost.
| |
| Then:
| |
| = A full actuation (de-energized) RPSsystem ofthe occurs.
| |
| Thepower lost toboth Scramvalveswasthe (1)
| |
| RPS Backup .
| |
| A full Reactor Scram will (2)
| |
| I A. -
| |
| (1) 125VDCdistribution (2) NOToccur B. (1) 120VACdistribution (2) occur C. (1) 125VDCdistribution (2) occur D. (1) 120VACdistribution (2) NOToccur Proposed Answer: C Explanation(Optional): TheRPSBackup Scram valves consistoftwo1E powered DCsolenoid operated,three-way, normally de-energized, pilot valvesinstalled inseries.The1E125VDC distributions(1AD417/1BD417) supply thepower tothenormallyde-energizedBackup Scram valves.
| |
| at70 75psig Air -
| |
| issupplied tothe scram airheaderviatheBackup Scramairheader viatheBackup scram theevent (see valves attached).
| |
| ofboth RPSchannels TheBackup receiving Scram atrip Valvesautomatically TheBackup signal. Scram tothe energize valves will vent position in depressurize the scramair header tovent air from the scram pilot valvesandscram dumpvalves toallow thecontrol rods toscram ona RPStrip signal. WhentheRPSsystem sendsa trip signaltothe Backup Scram valves thevalves willnot beable tobeenergized duetotheloss ofpower andreposition tovent theScram Air header.
| |
| Plausibility Justification:
| |
| A: Incorrect. TheBackup Scram valves arepowered from the1E125VDCdistribution systems (1AD417/1BD417). However, due tothe BackupScram v alves not repositioningto vent the scramair header, theheader will still bepressurizedanda RPSreactor scram will not have occurred. Thestudent will have todecipher theRPSscram if wassuccessful ornotbased onthe scramair header still being pressurized.
| |
| B: Incorrect- The120VAC distribution from RPSwillpower thenormallyenergized scram valves (scram pilot anddumpvalves). TheBackup Scram valvesarepoweredfrom the1E125VDC distribution systems (1AD417/1BD417) andarenormally Theywill de-energized. energize ona RPStrip signal.
| |
| | |
| 2021NRCWritten Examination C: Correct- TheBackup Scram valves arepowered the1E125VDCdistribution from systems (1AD417/1BD417) Due to theBackup Scram v alves not to repositioning vent t scram he air header, theheader willstillbepressurized andaRPSreactor scram will nothaveoccurred.
| |
| D: Incorrect. The 120VAC distribution from RPSwill power thenormallyenergized scram valves (scrampilotanddumpvalves). DuetotheBackup Scram valves notrepositioning to vent the scram airheader, the header willstill anda RPSreactor bepressurized scramwill nothave occurred.
| |
| Technical Reference(s):HC.OP-SO.SB-0001(Q) if (Attach notpreviously provided)
| |
| REACTOR PROTECTION SYSTEM OPERATION M-47-1 CRDH P&ID HC.OP-AB.zz-0001 ScramHard Card ProposedReferences tobeprovided toapplicants during examination: none Learning Objective: Given plant conditions, evaluate the response ofRPStoanelectrical failure.
| |
| Question Source: Bank#
| |
| Modified Bank# changes (Note orattach parent)
| |
| New X History:
| |
| Question Question Cognitive Level: Memory orKnowledge 10CFRPart 55Content 55.41(6)
| |
| Comments:
| |
| | |
| 2021NRCWritten Examination Facility: HopeCreek Vendor: GE ExamDate: 2021 ExamType: RO Examination Outline Cross-reference: Level RO SRO Tier # 2 Group# 1 K/A # 211000 K6.03 Importance Rating 3.2 K/AStatement: Knowledge ofthe effect that a loss or malfunction ofthefollowing willhave on the STANDBY LIQUID CONTROL SYSTEM:A.C. power Question: RO#12 Given:
| |
| = A lossofoff-site power (LOP)hasoccurred.
| |
| = The"A"and"D"Diesel Generators did NOTstart.
| |
| = Allothersystems responded as designed.
| |
| Whichofthefollowing describes theStandby LiquidControl (SLC) systeminjection capabilities forthese conditions?
| |
| A. SLCcaninject at50%capacity the until "A"Diesei Generator isstarted.
| |
| B. SLCcaninject at100%capacity andboth squib valvescanfire.
| |
| C. SLCcaninject at50%capacity andboth squib valvescanfire.
| |
| D. NOSLCinjection capabilityexistsuntilatleast the"A"or"D"Diesel Generator is started.
| |
| Proposed Answer: A Explanation 480V1EACDistribution (Optional): -
| |
| Power supplied tothebelow listedcomponents originates fromtheEmergency Diesel Generator Buses. "A" SLCpumpandsquib valve F004A, and isolation valve F006A supplied byMCC10B212 (EDG"A"), "B"'SLC pumpandsquib valve F004B supplied byMCC10B222 (EDG"B"), Isolation valve F006B supplied byMCC10B242 (EDG"D"), SLC Tank Heater Operating supplied byMCC10B252 (EDG"A") Non1Efrom 1ESLCTankMixing Heater supplied byMCC10B282 (EDG"D") Non1Efrom 1E.Automatic ormanual both initiation, SLCpumps STARTandboth explosivevalves FIRE, developing aflowpath from the storagetank tothe "A" core
| |
| | |
| 2021NRCWritten Examination spray sparger inthereactor vessel. Thesolution will pass through explosivevalvesF004A,B,enter a common header, flow throughboth outboard isolation stopcheck valves F006A, B,andtheninto a common header, terminating in 'A'core spray header between thenozzle andtheinboard penetration manualisolation valve F007A.
| |
| I PlausibilityJustification:
| |
| A: Correct. With the "B"EDGrunning andloaded (MCC10B222) the"B"SLCpumpwill berunning along withits squib valve firing andallowing flow through the stopcheckvalvetotheCore Spray header. The"A" SLC pumpandits squib valve will nothave poweruntil the EDGisrestored.
| |
| "A" B: Incorrect- The"A"EDG needs toberestored andpower the 10B242 MCC.
| |
| C: Incorrect- Thesquib valve power comes from the associatedpumppower therefore (breaker),
| |
| only the "B" SLCpumpand squib valvewill have power.
| |
| D: Incorrect. With-the"B" EDGrunning andloaded (MCC10B222) the"B"SLCpumpwill be running along with squib its valvefiring andallowingflow throughthestop checkvalvetothe Core Spray header.Restoration of"A" EDG will allow 100%capacity. of"D" Restoration EDGwill not haveaneffect onthe SLCinjectionflowpath duetotheF006Bstopcheck valveina normal open(allow flow) standby condition.
| |
| Technical Reference(s): HC.OP-AB.zz-0170 if (Attach provided) notpreviously LOSSOF4.16KV BUS10A401 A CHANNEL HC.OP-AB.zz-0171 LOSSOF4.16KV BUS10A402 B CHANNEL Proposed References tobeprovided toapplicants during examination: none Learning Objective: Frommemory identify thepower supply (i.e.,1EorNon-1E) toeach ofthe following:
| |
| Standby Liquid Control Pumps.
| |
| Standby Liquid Control System Squib valves.
| |
| Standby Liquid Control System Storage TankHeaters.
| |
| Question Source: Bank# 32602 Modified Bank# (Notechanges orattach parent)
| |
| New Question History:
| |
| Question Cognitive Level: Memory orKnowledge 10CFRPart 55Content: 55.41(6)
| |
| . Comments: . .
| |
| | |
| 2021NRCWritten Examination Facility: HopeCreek Vendor: GE ExamDate: 2021 ExamType: RO Examination Outline Cross-reference:' Level RO SRO Tier # 2 Group# 1 K/A # 271000 A1.05 Importance Rating 37 K/AStatement: Ability topredict and/or monitor changes inparameters associated with operating theREACTOR COREISOLATION COOLING SYSTEM (RCIC) controls including:
| |
| RCICturbine speed Question: RO#13 Given:
| |
| = TheReactor CoreIsolation Cooling (RCIC) isoperatinginFullFlow Recirc Operation.
| |
| = TheRCICflow controllerisin"Automatic"
| |
| = RCICturbine speed is4500rpm.
| |
| Whichofthefollowing describes theresponse ofRCICturbine speed andsystemflow (after conditions if stabilize), the operator momentarily throttlestheRCICPumpDischargeTest Return toCSTValve(BD-HV-F022) "open" inthe direction forthegivenconditions?
| |
| A. RCICturbine speedlowers System flow lowers B. RCICturbine speedlowers ,
| |
| System flow isunchanged C. RCICturbine speedrises System flow isunchanged D. RCICturbine speedrises System flow rises Proposed Answer: B
| |
| | |
| 2021NRCWritten Examination Explanation (Optional): Flow Controller -
| |
| Theflow controller isa Bailey station control allows that the operator toselect either themanual orautomatic modeofoperation. MANUALInthis modethe operator sets desired RCICturbine speed. AUTOMATICInthe-automatic modeRCICturbine speed isautomatically adjusted tomaintain desired RCICpumpdischarge flow establishedbythe operator.
| |
| Plausibility Justification:
| |
| A: Incorrect. In"Automatic" flow control, theRCICflow controllerwill reduceturbine speed tomaintain flow at thesetpoint.
| |
| B: Correct- WhenFO22is throttled open, system flow will rise.InAuto flowcontrol, controller will reduce turbine speed tomaintain flow atthesetpoint.
| |
| C: Incorrect- Throttlingopen onthe FO22 will cause a riseinsystem flowandtheRCICflow controller will actuallylower the turbine speed tomaintain the system flow atthesetpoint.
| |
| D: Incorrect. System flowwill lower notrise when openingthe FO22. TheRCICflow controller will actually lower theturbine speed tomaintain the system flow atthesetpoint.
| |
| Technical Reference(s): HC.OP-SO.BD-0001(Q) (Attachifnot previously provided)
| |
| REACTOR COREISOLATION COOLING SYSTEM OPERATION Proposed References tobeprovided toapplicants during examination: none Learning Objective: Explain theeffect ofeachcontrol onthe RCICSystem.
| |
| Summarize plant conditions or permissives required forthecontrol switches toperform their intended function.
| |
| Question Source: Bank# 35775 .
| |
| ModifiedBank# (Note changes orattach parent)
| |
| New Question History:
| |
| Question Cognitive Level: Comprehension orAnalysis 10CFRPart 55Content: 55.41(7)
| |
| Comments:
| |
| | |
| 2021NRCWritten Examination Facility: HopeCreek Vendor: GE ExamDate: 2021 ExamType: RO Examination Outline Cross-reference: Level RO SRO Tier # 2 Group# 1 K/A # 400000 A1.04 Importance Rating K/AStatement: Ability topredict and/ormonitorchanges inparameters associated with operating CCWScontrols the including:
| |
| Surge TankLevel Question: RO#14
| |
| | |
| 2021NRCWritten Examination Given:
| |
| a Theplant isoperating at100%power.
| |
| a "A","B", and"C"SACSpumps areoperating.
| |
| a "D"SACSpump isinAUTO.
| |
| Then:
| |
| a EG-LT-2508A, "A" Expansion Tanklevel transmitter failsproviding a low-low-lowlevel signal.
| |
| Which ofthefollowingdescribes theresponse ofthe SACSsystem?
| |
| This low-low-low tank level A. causes "A"and"C" SACS pump to trip,closes the associated SACStoTACS supply andreturn isolation valves. Valve closure produces a lowSACStoTACS flow from Loop "A" andsends astartsignal tothe"D" SACSpump. The"D" pumpstart signalopens theHx inlet valve,andthe associated SACStoTACS supply andreturn valves.
| |
| B. sends a closesignal totheassociated TACS supply andreturn Isolation-valves.
| |
| Valve closureproduces a low SACStoTACS flow from Loop"A". This produces a "D"SACSpumpstart andsubsequentopen signal totheassociated Hxinlet valve andthe "B" SACSLoop SACStoTACS supply andreturnisolation valves.
| |
| C. causes "A"SACSpumptotrip. This produces a low SACS toTACSflow from Loop "A".Thisproduces a"D" SACSpumpstart and subsequent open signal to the "B"SACSLoopSACStoTACSsupply andreturnisolation valves.Loops are nowcross-connected.
| |
| D. sendsanopensignal tothe"B" SACSLoopSACStoTACSsupply andreturn isolation valvesanda start tothe signal "D"SACSpump. Thepump start opens the associated HXinlet valve. Loops arenowcross-connected.
| |
| Proposed Answer: B Explanation (Optional): TheSTACSwill automatically swapover tothe standby loopuponreaching a low-low-low levelcondition inthe associated SACSexpansion tank. SACS/TACS Supply Isolation (HV-2522A,B,C,D)
| |
| Valves AUTOCLOSEonLow-Low-Low level inthe associated SACSloop expansion tank (LSLLL-2508A,B,C,D). These valves AUTOOPENwhena lowflow condition exists intheopposite SACSloop (FSL-2544A,B,C,D) andthe control switch for the respectiveSACSpump isinAUTO. SACS/TACS Return isolation Valves-(HV-2496A, -
| |
| D)will AUTOCLOSEon Low-low-low inthe level associated SACSloop expansion tank (LSLLL-2508A,B,C,D). These valves AUTO will OPENwhena lowflow condition existsintheopposite SACSloop (FSL-2544AiB,C,D) andthe SACSpumpcontrol respective switch isintheAUTOposition. AnySACSpurrip start(manualor automatic) opens itsassociated Hxinlet valve (HV-2491A(B), HV-2494A (B)).
| |
| | |
| 2021NRCWritten Examination Plausibility Justification:
| |
| A: Incorrect. NoPumptrip onLO-LO-LO tank level, LowTACSicop flowintheopposite loop sends a signal toautostartthe "D" pumpandall supply andreturn valveopening.
| |
| The student hastounderstand that the "A" and"C"pumps will not onthelowlowlowtank trip level butona running loop lowflow condition.
| |
| B: Correct-Low-low-low tanklevelcloses theassociated loop valves, causinga.Iowflow inthe operating TACS loop.LowTACSloop flow isinontheopposite Autopumpstart loop. andall supply and return valves opening willoccur.
| |
| C: Incorrect-loops NoPump trip onLO-LO-LO tank will level.
| |
| NOTbecross connected duetotheclosure LoopLowflow ofthe
| |
| (<
| |
| condition 9,900 loop associated gpm). The SACStoTACS valves.
| |
| D: Incorrect. The"D"pumpauto start comes from theoppositelooplowflowcondition notfrom theLOLOLOexpansion tank level signal. TheSACStoTACSvalves also receivetheir open signal from theopposite loop low flow condition.Theloops NOTbecross will connected duetothe closureofthe associated loop SACStoTACSvalves.
| |
| Technical Reference(s): HC.OP-SO.EG-0001(Q) if (Attachnotpreviously provided)
| |
| SAFETY ANDTURBINE AUXILIARIES COOLING WATER SYSTEM OPERATION HC.OP-AB.COOL-0002 SAFETY/TURBINE AUXILIARIES COOLING SYSTEM Proposed References tobeprovided toapplicants during examination: none Learning Objective: Given asetofconditions and/ora drawing ofaccess tothe controls, instrumentation and/oralarms located intheMain Control Room;assess the status oftheSACSor itscomponents byevaluation ofthe controls/instrumentation/alarms.
| |
| Question Source: Bank# 34022 Modified Bank# (Note changes orattach parent)
| |
| New Question Cognitive Level: Comprehension orAnalysis 10CFRPart 55Content: 55.41(7)
| |
| Comments:
| |
| k
| |
| | |
| 2021NRCWritten Examination Facility: HopeCreek Vendor: GE ExamDate: 2021 ExamType:RO Examination Outline Cross-reference: Level RO SRO Tier # 2 Group# 1 K/A # 261000 A2.11 Importance Rating 3.2 K/AStatement:
| |
| TREATMENT (a) to predict Ability SYSTEM;and(b)'based theimpacts onthose of the following onthe predictions, STANDBY GAS useprocedurestocorrect, control, theconsequences ormitigate ofthose abnormal conditions oroperations:High containment pressure Question: RO#15
| |
| | |
| 2021NRCWritten Examination Given:
| |
| e Theplant isoperating at100%power.
| |
| a RBVSandRBVEfans arerunning ina normal lineup.
| |
| = FRVS is ina normal standby configuration.
| |
| When:
| |
| A high drywell pressure of 1.68 psig occurs.
| |
| a RBVSand RBVE systemisolates.
| |
| = FRVSauto initiates.
| |
| Then:
| |
| Twominutes laterthe operators completethe required actions FRVSAuto for Initiation Observation IAWHC.OP-SO.GU-0001, Filtration, andVentilation Recirculation System Operation.
| |
| HowmanyFRVSRecirculation Fans andVent Fans will beinservice following theaction's taken IAWHC.OP-SO.GU-0001, Filtration,Recirculation andVentilation SystemOperation?
| |
| FRVSRecirculation Fans FRVS Vent Fans A. 6 2 B. 4 1 C. 6 1 D. 4 2 ProposedAnswer: B (Optional):
| |
| Explanation FRVSRecirculation Fans AV213through FV213 inAUTOandFRVSVentFan inAUTOLEADwill automatically startunder anyofthe followingconditions:
| |
| HighDrywell Pressure (1.68 psig).
| |
| LowRPVWater Level (Level 2, 38").
| |
| Refueling FloorExhaust Duct High Radiation (22x10-3micro Ci/cc).
| |
| Building Reactor Exhaust Air High Radiation (21x10-3micro Ci/cc).
| |
| Thereare2 FRVSVent Fans. OneinAuto Lead the other inAuto. TheAutoLeadwill start onthe 1.68psigsignalwhile theFRVSVent FaninAUTOwill automatically start uponfailure oftheoperating FRVSVent Fanotherwise the Auto Vent fanisina standby condition notrunning.
| |
| So,anautoinitiationoftheFRVSsystem will have all sixRecirculation Fansrunning andtheAuto LeadVentFanrunning. Theoperators will then IAWplant procedures (HC.OP-SO.GU0001) secure the"E"and"F"Recirculation fans andplace them ina standby condition lookingfor a low flow condition from theother four Recirculation fans that auto started.Post LOCAlineup for theFRVS system have will four Recirculation Fansinservice withthe oneAutoLeadVentFaninservice.
| |
| | |
| 2021NRCWritten Examination Plausibility Justification:
| |
| A: Incorrect. All six Recirculation fans willauto start onthe1.68 drywell high pressure signal, however theoperators will secure twoRecirculation fans("E""F").
| |
| and There are two Vent fans, however only the Auto Lead willstartonthehigh drywellpressure signal.Theother Vent fanis ina standby condition tostart onafailure ofthe Auto Lead Vent fan.
| |
| B: Correct-Four Recirculation fans willberunning afterthe actionsofHC.OP-SO.GU-000.1 are completed ("E" and "F" fans areinstandby for low flowcondition onthe runningRecirculation fans). TheAuto Lead VentFanwill auto start andwillcontinue torunwiththe Auto Vent fanin a standby condition (the Auto Vent fan will NOTreceive a start onthe1.68 highdrywell pressure signal).
| |
| C: Incorrect- All sixRecirculation fanswill auto start onthe 1.68 highdrywell pressure signal, however the operators secure two will Recirculation fans("E""F")
| |
| and IAW HC.OP-SO.GU-0001 D: Incorrect. FourRecirculationfans willberunning afterthe actionsofHC.OP-SO.GU-0001 are completed ("E" and"F" fans areinstandby for lowflow condition).TheAuto Vent fan will NOT receive a start onthe1.68 high drywell pressure.
| |
| Technical Reference(s): HC.OP-SO.GU-0001(Q) (Attach ifnotpreviously provided)
| |
| FILTRATION, REC1RCULATION AND VENTILATION SYSTEM OPERATION Proposed References tobeprovided toapplicants during examination: none Learning Objective: Concerning theFiltration Recirculation Ventilation System (FRVS):
| |
| Distinguish between theautomatic starts andstops associated with theFRVSVent andRecirc Fans.
| |
| Question Source: Bank#
| |
| Modified Bank # (Notechanges orattach parent)
| |
| New X Question History:
| |
| Question Cognitive Level: Comprehension orAnalysis 10CFRPart 55Content: 55.41(7)
| |
| Comments
| |
| | |
| 2021NRCWritten Examination Facility: HopeCreek Vendor: GE ExamDate: 2021 ExamType:RO Examination OutlineCross-reference: Level RO SRO Tier # 2 Group # 1 K/A# 215005 A2.01 importance Rating 2.7 K/AStatement: Ability (a) to predict the impacts of the following onthe AVERAGEPOWER
| |
| ,RANGE MONITOR/LOCAL POWER RANGE MONITOR SYSTEM ;and(b) onthose based predictions,useprocedures tocorrect, ormitigate the consequences control, ofthoseabnormal conditions oroperations:Power supply degraded Question: RO#16
| |
| | |
| 2021NRCWritten Examination Given:
| |
| i
| |
| = Theplant isoperating at100%power. j
| |
| = AllNeutron monitoring systems areOPERABLE.
| |
| When:
| |
| = TheNeutron Monitoring ElectricalProtection Assembly (EPA) breakers 1AN413 AND 1BN413 from 1AD483 tripopen.
| |
| ThefollowingAbnormal procedures havebeen entered:
| |
| = HC.OP-AB.IC-0003, Reactor Protection System
| |
| = HC.OP-AB.IC-0004,Neutron Monitoring
| |
| = HC.OP-AB.zz-0136,Loss of 120VACInverter
| |
| = Thecause ofthe trip isunknown atthis time.
| |
| (1)Whatisthe current status ofthePower Range Neutron Monitoring System?
| |
| (2)What additionalaction is required IAW abnormal plantprocedures?
| |
| A. (1) "A" AND"C"APRM's areDE-ENERGIzED; "A"AND"C''' 2/4 voters areDE-ENERGIzED.
| |
| (2) Bypass "A" AND"C" APRMs.
| |
| B. (1) "A" AND"C" APRM's remain energized; "A"AND "C" 2/4voters are ENERGIzED.
| |
| (2)Reset theEPAbreakers 1AN/BN413 once thecause is known.
| |
| C. (1) "A"AND"C"APRM'sareDE-ENERGIzED; "A"AND"C" 2/4 voters are ENERGIzED. ,
| |
| (2)Bypass "A" AND"C" APRMs.
| |
| D. (1)"A" AND"C" APRM's remain "A" energized; AND"C" 2/4 voters areDE-ENERGIzED.
| |
| (2)Reset the EPAbreakers 1AN/BN413 oncethe causeisknown.
| |
| Proposed Answer: D Explanation TheAPRMs,LPRMs(APRM (Optional): andRBMsarepowered slaves) from two120VAC UPSbuses, 1AJ483 (thru EPAbreakers 1AN413 and1BN413) and1BJ483 (thruEPAbreakers 1AN414 and1BN414).Each APRM,LPRM,andRBMhave twoauctioneered power supplies from their respective QuadLowVoltage PowerSupply (QLVPS) providing
| |
| +5VDC, andt15VDC. A loss ofone 120VACbuswill notresult ina loss ofpower tothePRNMinstruments. The2/4 Voter Modules are notpowered fromQLVPSbut directly fromtheir associated EPAbreakers. Voter Modules A & C are poweredfrom1AJ483, Voter Modules B& D arepowered from1BJ483. A loss ofpower from oneofthe
| |
| | |
| 2021NRCWritten Examination 120VAC UPS's willresult intwo(2) voters tochange state,fail-safeandall their indications OFF with no lights. This will result ina "half scram" as%ofRPSwill betripped. Theother two(2) voters will remain energized andthelogic isstill "any 2 outof4"APRMsontheremaining two voters.
| |
| PlausibilityJustification:
| |
| A: Incorrect. Due tothe fact that only oneofthe120VAC UPSpower supplies waslost (1AJ483),
| |
| the"A"& "C" APRMs (PRNMs) will stillhavepower through 1BJ483 andtheauctioneered power supply from the respective QLVPS. However, the 2/4 Voters Modules A &C supplied by the 120VAC 1AJ483 will bede-energized andtherefore a RPStrip onA1/A2 RPStrip logic (half scram). Since theAPRMs arestill powered andindicating they DONOTneedtobebypassed.
| |
| B: incorrect- The2/4 Voters Modules A &C supplied bythe120VAC 1AJ483 will bede-energized andtherefore have a RPStrip tobecorrected on A1/A2 RPStrip logic scram).
| |
| (half resetting Thesource the RPStrip.
| |
| ofthe problem would (Resetthe EPA breakers) before C: Incorrect- The"A" & "C" APRMs(PRNMs) will stillhavepower through 1BJ483 andthe auctioneered power supply from therespective QLVPS.The2/4 Voters Modules A &C supplied bythe120VAC1AJ483 will bede-energized andthereforea RPStrip onA1/A2 RPStrip logic (half scram).
| |
| bypassed.
| |
| Since the A PRMs a re still powered and indicating theyDONOT need t o be D: Correct. The"A" & "C" APRMs(PRNMs) will have power from still 1BJ483 andtheauctioneered power supply from therespective QLVPS. The2/4Voters Modules A &C supplied bythe120VAC 1AJ483 willbede-energized oftheproblem would andtherefore have a RPStripon A1/A2 RPStrip tobecorrected logic scram).
| |
| (half The resetting source (Resetthe EPA breakers) before the RPStrip.
| |
| Technical Reference(s): PN1-C51-1080-0026, Sheet 6 (Attach ifnotpreviously provided) 120VAC Power Supply toPRNMs HC.OP-AB.IC-0003, RPS HC.OP-AB.IC-0004, Nis ..
| |
| HC.OP-AB.zz-0136, Loss of120VAC Proposed References tobeprovided toapplicants dunng examination: none Learning Objective: Frommemory, determine therodblocks and/or scrams initiated bythe PRNM System.
| |
| Question Source: Bank #
| |
| Modified Bank# -
| |
| (Note changes orattach parent)
| |
| New X Question History:
| |
| Question Cognitive Level: Comprehension orAnalysis 10CFRPart 55Content: 55.41(7,10)
| |
| Comments:
| |
| | |
| 2021NRCWritten Examination Facility: HopeCreek Vendor: GE ExamDate: 2021 ExamType: RO Examination Outline Cross-reference: Level RO SRO Tier # 2 Group# 1 K/A # 223002 A3.02 Importance Rating 3.5 K/AStatement:Ability tomonitor automatic operations ofthePRIMARYCONTAINMENT ISOLATION SYSTEM/NUCLEAR STEAMSUPPLYSHUT-OFF including:Valve closures Question: RO#17
| |
| | |
| 2021NRCWritten Examination Given:
| |
| = Drywell pressure isat1.3psig
| |
| = Reactor water level isat-56inches
| |
| = Main condenser pressure isat22inHgA
| |
| = Reactor pressureisat75psig Which oneof the following describes the system valves thatareisolated basedonexceeding isolations signals?
| |
| > BB-SV4310/SV4311- Reactor Recirculation Sample Line isolation valves.
| |
| > BG-HVF001/F004 -
| |
| RWCU isolation valves.
| |
| > AB-HVFO22/FO28 MSlVs. -
| |
| > AB-HVFO16/F019 MSL Drainisolation valves.
| |
| > GB-HV9531Drywell Chilled Water isolation valve.
| |
| A. Reactor Recirculation Sample Line isolation valves, DrywellChilled Water Isolation valves, MSIVs ONLY B. RWCUisolation valves, MSIVs and MSLDrain isolation Drywell valves, Chilled Water isolation valves ONLY.
| |
| C. Reactor Recirculation Sample Lineisolation valves,MSlVs andMSLDrain isolation valves, RWCUisolation valves ONLY.
| |
| D. RWCUisolation valves, MSLDrain isolation valves, DrywellChilled Water isolation ONLY.
| |
| Proposed Answer: C, Explanation (Optional): Seeattached HC.OP-SO.SM-0001 Tables ofvalve isolations Plausibility Justification:
| |
| A: Incorrect. RXSample valves close onRPVlevel (-38 inches). Drywell Chilled Watervalves close onDWpress (1.68 psig) or RPV level(-129inches), MSlVs a nddrains areclosed onlow vacuum (21.5 inHgA).
| |
| B: Incorrect- Drywell Chilled Water valves close onDWpress (1.68 psig)orRPVlevel(-129 inches), RWCUisolated onRPVlevel (-38 inches), MSlVs anddrains areclosedonlow vacuum (21.5 inHgA).
| |
| C: Correct- MSIVsanddrains areclosed onlowvacuum (21.5 inHgA), RWCUisolatedonRPV level(-38 inches), RXSample valvesclose onRPVlevel (-38 inches).
| |
| D: Incorrect. MSlVs anddrains areclosed onlowvacuum (21.5 inHgA), RWCUisolatedonRPV level(-38 129inches).
| |
| inches), Drywell ChilledWater v alves close on DW press (1.68 or psig) RPV (-
| |
| level
| |
| | |
| 2021NRCWritten Examination Technical Reference(s): HC.OP-SO.SM-0001(Q) if (Attach previously not provided)
| |
| ISOLATION SYSTEMS OPERATION Proposed References tobeprovided toapplicants examination: none during Learning Objective: Interpret andapply graphs charts, and tables contained withinPrimary Containment.
| |
| Question Source: Bank # 35757 ModifiedBank # (Note orattach changes parent)
| |
| New Question History:
| |
| Question Cognitive Level: Memory orKnowledge 10CFRPart 55Content: 55.41(7)
| |
| Comments:
| |
| | |
| 2021NRCWritten Examination Facility: HopeCreek Vendor: GE ExamDate: 2021 ExamType: RO Examination Outline Cross-reference: Level RO SRO Tier # 2 Group# 1 K/A # 206000 A3.01 Importance Rating 3.6 Ability K/AStatement: tomonitor automatic operations oftheHIGHPRESSURECOOLANT INJECTION SYSTEM including: speed:
| |
| Turbine BWR-2,3,4 Question: RO#18
| |
| | |
| 2021NRCWritten Examination Given:
| |
| = HPCIhasinitiated from avalid HiDrywell Pressure signal of1.68 psig
| |
| = RPVWater level isat35"
| |
| = Reactor pressure isat980psig Then:
| |
| = Theoperator observes that theHPCIturbine control valve (FV-4879) isinthe throttled position AND'that turbine speed islowering. .
| |
| theoperator Additionally, observes the following valves going closed:
| |
| > FV-4880, HPCIturbine stopvalve
| |
| > HV-F006, HPCIpump discharge toCore Spray
| |
| > HV-8278, HPCIpumpdischarge toFeedwater
| |
| > HV-F012, HPCIminimumflow with Later, theHiDrywell Pressure signal still in,theoperatornotices thatHPCIturbine speed is againrisingandHPCIrealigns forinjection without taking anyactions.
| |
| Which ofthefollowing couldhave caused thisHPCI response?
| |
| A. A mechanical overspeed 'HPCI trip B. Anautomatic reset ofa HPCIisolation C. Anautomatic swapofthe HPCIpumpsuctionsource D. A HPCIflow controller incorrectly set ProposedAnswer: A Explanation (Optional): Uponreaching anoverspeed condition (approximately 5200rpm),hydraulic oil beremoved will from theHPCIturbine stop valve actuator, allowing spring tension toclose it. This causesa lossofsteamflow totheturbine. Whentheturbine hasslowed sufficiently, hydraulic oil
| |
| - bere-applied will tothe stop valve actuator andtheHPCISystem will restart ifaninitiation signal is still present.A mechanical overspeed tripwillcause theturbine stopvalve (FV-4880) toclose. This causesthefollowingvalves toclose: HPCIpumpdischarge valve toCoreSpray (HV-F006) andHPCI pumpminimum flow valve (HV-F012). TheHV-8278 automatically will close uponreceipt ofFV-4880 fully closed.
| |
| Theturbine control valves (FV-4879) will bethrottled bythe turbine governor control system tolimit overspeed. HPCItrips, isolations,andinterlocks (see attached HC.OP-SO.BJ-0001).
| |
| Plausibility Justification:
| |
| A: Correct. Uponreaching anoverspeed condition (approximately 5200rpm), hydraulic oil will be removed from theHPCIturbine stop valve actuator, allowing spring tension toclose it.This causes a loss ofsteamflow totheturbine. Whentheturbine hasslowed sufficiently, hydraulicoilwillbere-applied tothe stop valve actuator andtheHPCISystem willrestart if an initiation signal isstill present.
| |
| B: Incorrect-determine There that isnoHPCIisolation thevalves that signal areisolating (see present attached).
| |
| areduetoa mechanical Thestudent overspeed will trip not have a
| |
| to isolation.
| |
| 1 .
| |
| | |
| 2021NRCWritten Examination C: Incorrect- BJ-HV-F042, PMPSUCTFROMSUPPCHBAuto closes onHPCIDiv1Isolation signal. Auto opens onCSTlowlevel ORSuppression Chamber high level. There isnochange in CST orSuppression pool level. TheBJ-HV-F042 hasnointerlock with thegovernor control orthe other valvesmentioned.
| |
| D: Incorrect.Placing HPCIFIC-R600 inMANresults inanopen loop control with theflow controller output becoming afixed speed demand signal totheturbine governor. This will provide stable,constant turbine speed control, but require will operator action tomaintain the desired vessel injection flowrate.
| |
| Technical Reference(s): HC.OP-SO.BJ-0001(Q) (Attachifnot previously provided)
| |
| HIGHPRESSURE COOLANT INJECTION SYSTEM OPERATION Proposed References tobeprovided toapplicants during examination: none ,
| |
| Objective: ForHPCISystemtrips andisolations:
| |
| Learning Given plantconditions, determine the sequence ofevents following receipt of a HPCIturbine trip signal Question Source: Bank # 30478 Modified Bank# (Note changes orattachparent)
| |
| New QuestionHistory: . .
| |
| QuestionCognitive Level: Comprehension orAnalysis 10CFRPart 55Content: 55.41(7)
| |
| Comments:
| |
| I
| |
| | |
| 2021NRCWritten Examination Facility: HopeCreek Vendor: GE ExamDate: 2021 ExamType:RO Examination Outline Cross-reference: Level RO SRO Tier # 2 Group# 1 K/A # 300000 A4.01 Importance Rating 2.6 K/AStatement: Ability tomanually and/or monitor in operate the control Pressure room:
| |
| gauges- Instrument Air.
| |
| Question: RO#19
| |
| | |
| 2021NRCWritten Examination Given:
| |
| a The10K107 ServiceAir compressor isrunning.
| |
| = Both the 00F-104 and10F-104 AirDryers arein-service.
| |
| a The00K107Service Air compressor isinstandby
| |
| = The 1AF-104 Air Dryer isinstandby.
| |
| The 10K100 EmergencyInstrument Air Compressor isinstandby.
| |
| The KAHV-7595, Service AirSupply Header Isolation Valve,isopen.
| |
| A" Then:
| |
| a Thefollowingannunciators are received:
| |
| > A2-A1, INST AIR HEADER A PRESSURE LO
| |
| > A2-A2, INST AIRHEADER B PRESSURE LO
| |
| > A2-B1, COMPRESSED AIR SYSTEM TROUBLE
| |
| > A2-B2, COMPRESSED AIR PANEL 00C188
| |
| = Current air pressures are:
| |
| > Service Airpressure is90psig.
| |
| > Instrument pressure air atthe.Emergency instrument AirReceiveris82psig.
| |
| > instrument air pressure is77psig.
| |
| Afteroneminute withthesameair pressures above, Whatistheconfiguration oftheService andInstrument Air System?
| |
| A. The00K107 Service Air Compressor isrunning Instrument Air Dryer1AFi04 isin-service.
| |
| TheEmergency Instrument Air Compressor isrunning.
| |
| TheKAHV-7595 isopen.
| |
| B. The00K107 Service Air Compressor isinstandby notrunning Instrument Air Dryer1AF104 isinstandby.
| |
| TheEmergency Instrument Air Compressor isrunning.
| |
| TheKAHV-7595 .
| |
| isclosed. .
| |
| C. The00K107 Air Service Compressor isinstandby notrunning.
| |
| Instrument Air Dryer1AF104 isin-service.
| |
| TheEmergency Instrument Air Compressor isinstandby notrunning.
| |
| TheKAHV-7595 isclosed.
| |
| D. The00K107 Air Service Compressor isrunning.
| |
| Instrument Air Dryer1AF104 isinstandby.
| |
| TheEmergency Instrument AirCompressor isinstandby notrunning.
| |
| TheKAHV-7595 isopen.
| |
| Proposed Answer: A
| |
| | |
| 2021NRCWritten Examination Explanation (Optional): Normal Service/Instrument AirSystem line upwill have theLEADair compressor in-service withthe L AG compressor in standbyalong with theElACinstandby. With thetwo ofthethree Air Dryers in-service thethird air dryer (1AF-104)will beinstandby. Theservice airheader isolationvalve (7595) will benormally opened. Asthe airpressures lower there arespecific setpointsfor the above equipment toAuto Start orisolate along withspecificairpressure gauge readings (see attached table).
| |
| Plausibility Justification:
| |
| A: Correct. Withthe Service AirPressure <92psig andthe pre-lube timer timed out(the timeris set for 1minute), the standby air compressor00K107 willauto start. With the Instrument Air Pressure $85psig,the standby Air Dryer 1AF-104 will gointo service. With theEmergency Instrument AirCompressor Receiver Pressure 5 85psig theEIAC will auto start. Forthe KAHV-7595 toisolate (close) the Instrument AirPressure has to reach 5 70 psig.
| |
| B: Incorrect-With the Service Air Pressure <92psig andthe pre-lube timer timed out(thetimeris set for 1minute), the standby aircompressor 00K107 willauto start. With the Instrument Air Pressure 5 85psig, the standby AirDryer 1AF-104 will gointo service. Forthe KAHV-7595 to isolate (close) theInstrument AirPressure hastoreach 5 70psig.
| |
| C: Incorrect- With the Service AirPressure<92 ps'ig andthepre-lube timer timed out(thetimer isset for 1minute), the stand.by air compressor00K107 will auto start. With theEmergency Instrument AirCompressor Receiver Pressure$ 85 psig the EIACwill auto start. Forthe KAHV-7595 toisolate (close) the Instrument AirPressure has to reach 5 70 psig.
| |
| D: incorrect. With theInstrument AirPressure $85psig,the standby Air Dryer 1AF-104 will go into service. With the Emergency instrument AirCompressor Receiver Pressure 5 85psig theEIACwill auto start.
| |
| Technical Reference(s): HC.OP-AB.COMP-0001(Q) (Attach if not previously provided)
| |
| INSTRUMENT AND/ORSERVICE AIR Proposed References tobeprovided toapplicants during examination: none Learning Objective: Given a list ofpossible determine trips, -
| |
| which arevalid compressor trips.
| |
| Summarize/identify the operationofthe emergency instrument aircompressor.
| |
| Question Source: Bank #
| |
| Modified Bank# (Note changes orattach parent)
| |
| New X Question History:
| |
| Question Cognitive Level: Comprehension orAnalysis 10CFRPart 55Content: 55.41(7)
| |
| Comments:
| |
| | |
| 2021NRCWritten Examination Facility: HopeCreek Vendor: GE ExamDate: 2021 ExamType: RO '
| |
| Examination Outline Cross-reference: Level RO SRO Tier # 2 Group # 1 K/A # 2150004A4.06 Importance Rating 3.2 K/AStatement: Ability tomanually operate and/or monitor inthecontrol room: Alarms andlights-Source RangeMonitor.
| |
| Question: RO#20 Given:
| |
| = Theplantisperforming control rod withdrawalswith the mode switch inSTARTUP.
| |
| When:
| |
| = The"RODOUTMOTIONBLOCK"overhead windowilluminates.
| |
| = IRMrange All switches areonrange 3or4.
| |
| = "A"SRMhasfailed downscaleto1cpsandisbeing withdrawn.
| |
| = "A"SRM"DNSC" isilluminated.
| |
| light
| |
| = "B"SRMisfully withdrawnandreading 95cps.
| |
| = "C"SRMispartially withdrawnandreading 98,000cps.
| |
| = "D"SRMispartially withdrawnandreading 103,000cps.
| |
| SRMis Which the cause ofthe rodblock?
| |
| A. "A" SRM B. "B" SRM C. "C"SRM D. "D"SRM
| |
| /
| |
| '. Proposed Answer: D
| |
| | |
| 2021NRCWritten Examination Explanation (Optional):.SRM.1lpscaje.rod blo4: SRMreading 10E5cpsorgreater. Bypasses: Joystick selected for theassociated SRMchannel orRange 8orgreater onassociated IRM's orReactor Mode Switch inRUN (See attached). SRMdownscale rodblock: Lessthan3 cps. Bypasses:
| |
| Joystickselected forthe associated SRMchannel orassociated IRMrange switchespositionedtorange3 orgreateror Reactor ModeSwitch inRUN(See attached).
| |
| Plausibility Justification:
| |
| A: Incorrect. With the IRMs onrange 3and the4 "A"SRMdownscale rodblock isbypassed. The student hastoknow the bypass interlocks for the SRMs.
| |
| B: Incorrect- "B" SRMisnot at a level that would eitherbeupscale ordownscale fora RodBlock.
| |
| Thedetector notfully inserted and countsless than 100cpsisa RodBlock, however this rodblock isbypassed with theIRMson range 3orgreater (See attached).
| |
| C: Incorrect- "C" SRMisbelow theupscale setpoint andgreaterthan 100cpswiththedetectornot fully inserted along with the bypass of the IRMs onrange 3 orgreater.
| |
| D: Correct.."D" SRMis above theRodBlock setpoint for cpsat> 10ES cps.Duetothe fact thatthe "A" SRMRodBlock isbypassed with the IRMs on range 3orgreater theonlySRMthat iscausing the RodBlock isthe"D" SRM.
| |
| Technical Reference(s): HC.OP-SO.SE-0001(Q) (Attach if notpreviouslyprovided)
| |
| Nuclear Instrumentation System Operations Proposed References tobeprovided toapplicants during examination: none Learning Objective: Frommemory, choose theparameter, setpoint, andbypass conditionsforeach SRMsignal which willinitiate a rodblock and/or scram.
| |
| reactor Question Source: Bank# 30618 Modified Bank# (Note changesorattach parent)
| |
| New Question History:
| |
| Question Cognitive Level: Memory orKnowledge 10CFRPart 55Content: 55.41(7)
| |
| Comments:
| |
| | |
| 2021NRCWritten Examination Facility: HopeCreek Vendor: GE ExamDate: 2021 ExamType:RO Examination OutlineCross-reference: Level RO SRO Tier # 2 Group# 1 K/A # 209001 A4.11 Importance Rating 3.7 K/AStatement: Conduct ofOperations: Abilitytomanually operateand/or monit'or inthe control room: System flow Question: RO#21 A Caution/Step inHC.OP-SO.BE-0001, Core Spray System Operation states that:
| |
| If ANDSEALEDINA (B, INIT C,D)isonandCore Spray autoinitiation has occurred, BOTH not pumpsina loopmustbemanually started.
| |
| WHICHONE(1) ofthe following describes thebasis for thisCaution/Step?
| |
| A. Both pumpmanual startpushbuttons mustbedepressed tostartthe associated diesel generator incase ofLoss ofoffsite Power.
| |
| B. Both pumps mustbestarted tosatisfy theinterlock foropening theOutboard Injection Valve.
| |
| C. Both pumpsmustbeoperating toprovidesufficient driving headtoopen check valve HV-F006A(B).
| |
| D. Both pumpsmust berunning toprevent pumprunout Proposed Answer: D
| |
| | |
| 2021NRCWritten Examination Explanation (Optionai):A Caution inHC.OP-SO.BE-0001, CoreSpray System Operationstatesthatif INIT AND SEALED INA(B,C,D) isonandCoreSpray auto hasnot initiation occurred,BOTHpumps ina loopmust bemanually started. (Seeattached)
| |
| HC.OP-SO.BE-0001 -
| |
| 3.0Precaution andLimitations 3.1.3. Arming AND pressing A(B)MANINITPBwill starttheassociatedCore SprayPumpANDopen the Outboard Injection Valve(WHENthelowReactor pressure interlock issatisfied).
| |
| Arming ANDpressing C(D) MANINIT PBwill start theassociated pump. W Plausibility Justification:
| |
| A: incorrect. TheEDG's start onthe CSinitiation notthepumpstart logic logic B: Incorrect- Theinjectionvalve needs toseeeither the"A"or"B" logicandthe< 461pressure permissive C: Incorrect- Whenpumpdischargepressure is> RPVpressurethe check valvewill open= 380 psi.
| |
| D: Correct. Both pumpsmustberunning toprevent pumprunout Technical Reference(s): HC.OP-SO.BE-0001(Q) (Attachif not provided) previously CoreSpraySystem Proposed References tobeprovided during toapplicants examination: none Learning Objective: Summarize/identify thesequence of eventsfollowing receiptofanautomatic or manualCoreSpraySystem initiation signal Question Source: Bank # 29633 Modified Bank# (Notechanges orattachparent)
| |
| New Question History:
| |
| Question Cognitive Level: Memory orKnowledge 10CFRPart 55Content: 55.41(10)
| |
| Comments:
| |
| | |
| 2021NRCWritten Examination Facility: HopeCreek Vendor: GE ExamDate: 2021 ExamType: RO Examination Outline C'ross-reference: Level RO SRO Tier # 2 Group# 1 K/A # 211000 2.1.30 Importance Rating 4.4 K/AStatement: Conduct ofOperations: Ability tolocate andoperate components, including local SLC controls-Question: RO#22 Given:
| |
| = Theplant at90%power.
| |
| isoperating
| |
| = HC.OP-IS.BH-0003,STANDBY LIQ UIDCONTROL PUMP AP208 INSERVICE TEST, flow tocheck ratesduring power operations istobeperformed.
| |
| Howisthefiring ofthe squibvalve(s)avoided, whenstartingthepump(s)forthissurveillance?
| |
| A. TheSLCsquib valve firing comesdirectly circuitry from RRCSandisunaffected duringthistest.
| |
| B. Thesquib valve(s) mustbephysically removedfrom the system before running theSLCpump(s).
| |
| C. Thebreaker(s)forthe appropriate squib must valve(s) beopened prior torunning the SLCpump(s).
| |
| D. theStandby Starting Liquid Control pumpwiththelocalcontrol switch bypasses the squib circuit.
| |
| firing Proposed Answer: D
| |
| | |
| 2021NRCWritten Examination Explanation (Optional): Local START-STOP ofeach SLCpumpcanbeaffected fromlocalcontrol panel 10C011. Operation ofeither localswitch will STARTonly theassociated pumpandwill notFIRE either of the squib valves,orcause a RWCUsystem isolation. Thesurveillance requiresthelocal switches to bemanipulated sothat the squib valves donot fire andintroduce sodiumpentaborate into thereactor.(see attached). Primer circuits for thesquib valves arepowered froma Class1EPower Supply whichoriginates atthe SLCA/Bpumpbreakers. Theactuation ofthesquib circuitry valves prevents thefiring of theexplosive charges whenpumpoperation isinitiatedfrom theTESTswitches located onpanel 10C011 Plausibility Justification:
| |
| A: Incorrect. AnRRCS signal would automatically start both pumps andfirethesquib valves, however the squib valve circuitry comes directly from the pumpbreaker andisbypassed when using thelocal panel pump control switches.
| |
| B: Incorrect- Thesquib valves IAW the surveillance arenot removed duetothe factthat the using localcontrol switches will bypass the firing circuit for the squib valves andstill startthepumps.
| |
| C: incorrect- Thepower forthesquib valves come from the associated pumpbreaker andthe firing circuitry willbebypassed bythemanipulation ofthelocal controlswitch fortheassociatedpump.
| |
| D: Correct. Operating thelocal controlswitch for the "A" SLCpumpwill bypass the circuitry firing forthe associated squib valve andtherefore the"A" pump will start fortesting ofthe flowrate of thepumpwithout firing the squib valve andnot introducing sodium pentaborate intothereactor.
| |
| Technical Reference(s): HC.OP-IS.BH-0003(Q) (Attach ifnotpreviouslyprovided)
| |
| STANDBY LIQUIDCONTROL PUMP AP208INSERVICE TEST Proposed References tobeprovided toapplicants during examination: (none)
| |
| Learning Objective: Frommemory, summarize/identify the locations from which theStandby Liquid Control System pumpsmaybemanually started/stopped andsummarize theeffect that operating the pumps from each location will haveonStandby Liquid Control System response.
| |
| Question Source: Bank # 72736 Modified Bank# (Note changes orattach parent)
| |
| New Question History:
| |
| Question Cognitive Level: Memory orKnowledge 10CFRPart 55Content: 55.41(6)
| |
| Comments:
| |
| | |
| 2021NRCWritten Examination Facility: HopeCreek Vendor: GE ExamDate: 2021 ExamType: RO Examination Outline Cross-reference: Level RO SRO Tier # 2 Group # 1 K/A # 400000 K4.01 Importance Rating 3.4 K/AStatement: Knowledge ofCCWSdesign feature(s) andorinterlockswhich provide forthe following: Automatic start ofstandby pump Question: RO#23 Given:
| |
| = All servicewater pumpcontrolsareinAUTO.
| |
| a "A",
| |
| "C",and"D"SSWpumps arerunning.
| |
| = The'B'PCISMANInitiation Pushbutton (10C651C) isarmed anddepressed.
| |
| Select theresponse of"B"and"D"Service Water pumps.
| |
| A. TheDSWpumpwill trip, andthen bothB andDSWpumps will start in approximately 55seconds bytheLOCASequencer.
| |
| ascontrolled B. TheD SWpumpwill trip, andthen theBSWpumpwill only start immediately.
| |
| C. TheD SWpumpwill continue andtheB SWpumpwill running, start immediately.
| |
| D. TheDSWpumpwill continue running, andthe B SWpumpwill start in approximately 55seconds ascontrolled bythe LOCASequencer.
| |
| Proposed Answer: C
| |
| | |
| 2021NRCWritten Examination Explanation (Optional): EachPCISchannel canbemanually byARMING initiated (rotating respective collarfully clockwise) andDEPRESSING the respective CNTMTISLN MANINITIATION pushbutton.
| |
| Manually tripping a "PCIS channel" will initiate theRBE/RFE functions associated with that respective channel. TheService water systems receive astart signal from: LOCALevel 1andLOCA Level 2/Reactor Building-Refuel Floor Exhaust Hi-Hi Radiation.(seeattached table).
| |
| Plausibility Justification:
| |
| A: Incorrect. The "D" SSW pump willcontinue torunsince it wasalready running. "B" channel PCIS does not send a tripsignal tothe "D" SSWpump.PCISalso doesnotsendasignal to starttheLOCAsequencer. The"D" SSWpumpwill receiveanAUTOstart from "D"PCIS the channel not the "B" PCIS channel. Thestudent needstoknowthat thePCISsystem issingle channelized.
| |
| B: Incorrect- There would benotrip signal tothe "D"SSWpumpfrom the "B"PCISchannel. The "B" SSWpumpwould startimmediately (see attached).
| |
| C: Correct- Since thePCISsystem ischannelized the manual initiation ofthe "B" channel would startthe "B"SSWpumpimmediately and since thereis noeffectonthe"D"SSWpumpthe pumpwould continuetorun since itwasalready running.
| |
| D: incorrect. PCISdoesnotsend asignal tostartthe LOCA sequencer. Themanual initiation of "B" PCISchannel will the"B" start SSWpumpimmediately withoutany time delays (see attached).
| |
| Technical Reference(s): HC.OP-SO.SM-0001(Q)(Attach if notpreviously provided.)
| |
| ISOLATION SYSTEMS OPERATION Proposed References tobeprovided toapplicants duringexamination: none.
| |
| Learning Objective: Given anAutomatic orManual Initiation of thePrimary Containment Isolation System (PCIS), evaluate the effect onthe individualsystem anddeterrnine the overallplant effect onplant operations Question Source: Bank # 30000 Modified Bank# (Notechanges orattach parent)
| |
| New Question History:
| |
| Question Cognitive Level: Comprehension orAnalysis 10CFRPart 55Content: 55.41(7)
| |
| Comments:
| |
| | |
| 2021NRCWritten Examination Facility: HopeCreek Vendor: GE ExamDate: 2021 ExamType:RO Examination OutlineCross-reference: Level RO SRO Tier # 2 Group# 1 K/A # 259002 A4.01 Importance Rating 3.8 K/AStatement: Ability tomanually operate and/or monitor in thecontrol AII room: individual component inthemanual controllers mode. ReactorWater LevelControl.
| |
| Question: RO#24 Given:
| |
| = Theplant wasoperating at100%power.
| |
| When,avalid Reactor Vessel HighDomePressure signalisreceived:
| |
| = Thereactor failed toscram.
| |
| = APRMsareNOTDOWNSCALE.
| |
| = FEEDWATER RUNBACK INITIATED ison.
| |
| = All threeRFPcontroller speeds indicate 2500RPMs.
| |
| = All applicable emergency operating procedureshavebeenentered.
| |
| RFPspeed controllers arereduced tolimit feedwater flowto0%
| |
| A. until reference APRMsaredownscale, thenautomatic oftheRFP control controllers isavailable.
| |
| B. for 30seconds, then manual controloftheRFPcontrollers isavailable.
| |
| C. until reference APRMsaredownscale, thenmanual oftheRFP control controllers isavailable.
| |
| D. for 30seconds, then automatic controloftheRFPcontrollers isavailable.
| |
| Proposed Answer: B
| |
| | |
| 2021NRCWritten Examination Explanation (Optional): TheRRCSrunback limits RFPTspeed to2500rpmif: 25seconds after Reactor pressure 21071 psig andAPRMpower isnotdownscale (below 4%) o risINOP. RFP control is returned atthe DFCS controller inManual attheminimum setting after 30seconds asindicated by theMAN CONTROL AVAILlight on10C651B being illuminated.This runback lowers subcooling inlet which provides a negative reactivity effect(See attached).
| |
| Plausibility Justification:
| |
| A: Incorrect.The APRMs > 4%along with the 21071 psigreactor pressure willcausetheRFPT runback. TheRFP speed controllerswill have MANUALcontrol available after 30seconds ofthe RRCSrunbackregardless ofwhat theAPRMsare reading. Duetothe factthattheAPRMs caused the runback, the student will have todecipher ifthe APRMDownscales allows automatic control ofthe RFPsornot.
| |
| B: Correct- RFPcontrol isreturned atthe DFCScontroller inManual attheminimum after setting 30seconds.
| |
| C: Incorrect- TheAPRMs> 4%along with the 21071 psig reactor pressurewillcausetheRFPT runback. TheRFPspeed controllerswill have MANUAL control available after 30seconds ofthe RRCSrunback regardless ofwhattheAPRMs arereading.
| |
| D: Incorrect. RFPcontrol isreturned attheDFCS controller inManual attheminimum setting after 30seconds. Thestudent could decipher that the controllers wouldbebackinautomatic.
| |
| Technical Reference(s): HC.OP-SO.SA-0001(Q) (Attach ifnotpreviously provided)
| |
| REDUNDANT REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEM OPERATION HC.OP-AR.zz-0013 Proposed References tobeprovided toapplicants during examination: none Learning Objective: From memory, predict the sequence of events which occur withintheRedundant Reactivity Control System upon:
| |
| Automatic initiationinresponse toa high reactor vessel pressure condition with or without the APRMpermissive.
| |
| Question Source: Bank #
| |
| Modified Bank # (Note changes orattachparent)
| |
| New X Question History:
| |
| Question Cognitive Level: Memory orKnowledge 10CFRPart 55Content: 55.41(7)
| |
| Comments: -
| |
| | |
| 2021NRCWritten Examination Facility: HopeCreek Vendor: GE ExamDate: 2021 ExamType: RO Examination Outline Cross-reference: Level RO SRO Tier # 2 Group # 1 K/A # 262001 2.1.20 Importance Rating 4.6 K/AStatement: Conduct ofOperations:
| |
| Abilitytointerpret andexecute A.C steps.-
| |
| procedure ElectricalDistribution.
| |
| Question: RO#25
| |
| | |
| 2021NRCWritten Examination Given:
| |
| = A unit startup isinprogress.
| |
| = Themain generator isbeingsynchronized tothegridIAWHC.OP-SO.MA-0001, MAIN GENERATOR & EXCITER OPERATION & SWITCHING Section 5.2.
| |
| Thefollowing indications areobserved:
| |
| = Keylocked SYNC SCOPE switchisinthe ONposition.
| |
| = TheSYNCH WINDOW isNOTilluminated.
| |
| light
| |
| = SyncScope is rotating slowlyinthe Clockwise direction.
| |
| = Generator and Grid voltages aresetIAWthe SOP.
| |
| E M "2;,, @ @9" 7"
| |
| ,,m.
| |
| 3 @ @ -"
| |
| o .o 0 30 o 2o
| |
| ,o .
| |
| so b
| |
| With theSYNCWINDOWlight NOTilluminated A. theSYNCCHECKOFFpushbutton mustbedepressedbefore depressing the breaker BS6-5 (BS2-6) CLOSE pushbutton.
| |
| B. themaingenerator exciter field breaker isopen.
| |
| C. the Generator Voltagemus't belowered toless thegrid than voltage before depressing thebreaker BS6-5 (BS2-6)CLOSEpushbutton.
| |
| D. the52x60 Generator Disconnect isopen.
| |
| Proposed Answer: A
| |
| | |
| 2021NRCWritten Examination Explanation (Optional): Seeattached section 5.2 oftheHC.OP-SO.MA-0001, MAINGENERATOR &
| |
| EXCITER OPERATION & SWITCHING forSynchronizing andLoading theMain Generator.
| |
| Plausibility Justification:
| |
| A: Correct. SYNCH CHECKOFF(momentary pb)De-energizes thesynchcheckrelay and removes the requirement for synch check relay input toenable breaker Whenthesynch closure.
| |
| check isnot relay functioning properly,this pbmustbedepressed while its closing associated main generator andB allowsthe operator output tobypass breaker.
| |
| thesynch IAWSection check relay (see 5.2 attached) andclose the Steps5.2.13.A maingenerator breaker tosynchronizethe unit tothe grid.
| |
| B: Incorrect- Forthe sync scope andvoltages toindicate that themachine isproperly synchronized the exciter fieldbreaker and52x60 mustboth beclosed.
| |
| Theexciter field breaker isclosed IAWstep 5.2.5. (See attached)
| |
| C: Incorrect- Generator voltagemust begreaterthan gridvoltage IAWstep 5.2.11.
| |
| (Seeattached).
| |
| D: Incorrect. The52x60 MainGenerator Disconnect isclosed IAWStep5.4.15 (Seeattached) as a prerequisite toSection 5.2being performed.
| |
| Technical Reference(s): HC.OP-SO.MA-0001 (Attachif provided) notpreviously MAINGENERATOR & EXCITER OPERATION & SWITCHING Proposed References tobeprovided toapplicants during examination: Synchronization Unit instem Figure Learning Objective: Given a labeleddiagram/drawing of, or access to,theMain Power System controls/indication bezel:
| |
| Explain thefunction ofeach indicator.
| |
| Predict theconditions that willcause the indicators tolightorextinguish.
| |
| Determine theeffect ofeachcontrol switch ontheMain Power System.
| |
| Explain theconditions orpermissives required for thecontrol switches to perform their intended functions.
| |
| Question Source: Bank# 32750 Modified Bank # (Note changes orattach parent)
| |
| New Question History:
| |
| Question Cognitive Level: Comprehension orAnalysis ,
| |
| 10CFRPart 55Content: 55.41(10)
| |
| Comments:
| |
| | |
| 2021NRCWritten Examination Facility: HopeCreek Vendor: GE ExamDate: 2021 ExamType:RO Examination Outline Cross-reference: Level RO SRO Tier # 2 Group # 1 K/A # 261000 A3.02 importance Rating 3.2 K/AStatement: tomonitor Ability automatic operations oftheSTANDBYAS TREATMENT SYSTEM Fanstart including:
| |
| Question: RO#26 Given:
| |
| = Theplant isoperating at100%power.
| |
| = OHAE6-A5 RBEXHRADIATION ALARM/TRBL hasannunciated.
| |
| = ThePlant Operator reportsthatRBVentilation Exhaust isreading 1.5 x 10-3 pCi/cc on allthreechannels.
| |
| Based thePlant onthis, Operator IAWHC.OP-AB.CONT-0004, Radioactive Gaseous Release is required to A. manually place FRVSinservice andmonitorOffSiteRelease Rates.
| |
| B. ensure reactor building ventilation andbuilding isinservice dPis> -0.30 inches water gauge.
| |
| C. ensure reactor building ventilation andFRVSstarted.
| |
| isisolated D. ensure reactor building ventilation andFRVSstarted, isisolated ifRBVentilation Exhaust reaches 2.0 x 10-3 pCi/cc.
| |
| Proposed Answer: C
| |
| | |
| 2021 NRCWritten Examination Explanation (Optional): Air exhausted from thereactor building ismonitored forradiation, priorto passing through the secondary containment isolation dampers, bythree radmonitors. If 2 outof3 monitors sense a radlevel of 1x10-3 pCi/cc; then, the1Ebreakers fortheRBVEandRBVSfans trip, thesecondary containment supply andexhaust dampers close, FRVSstarts.
| |
| Plausibility Justification:
| |
| A: Incorrect.The FRVS system will auto start ontheRBExhaust radiationlevel of2 1x10-3 micro Ci/cc. on 2 out of3 channels. Thestudent will havetounderstand that thesetpoint is reached for hirad level startofthe FRVSsystem. Manually starting theFRVSsystem isan optionwhen radlevel are rising, however the auto startsetpointhasbeen reached.
| |
| B: Incorrect- TheRBVSsystem willautomatically isolateonthe RBExhaust radiationlevelof2 1x10 -3micro Ci/cc. on2 out of 3channels. lf the RBVSsystem wasstill inservice then the procedure would guide theoperator tomaintain secondary containment dP.
| |
| C: Correct TheFRVSsystem will auto start andthe RBVSsystem willautomatically isolate ontheRBExhaust radiation level of2 1x10 -3micro on2 out Ci/ce. of3channels. (See attached).
| |
| D: Incorrect. Air exhausted from therefuel floor to the RBVEsystem ismonitored forradiation, priortopassing through secondary containmentisolation dampers, bythree radmonitors. If2 out of3sense a radlevel of2x10-3 micro ci/cc thefollowing occurs: the 1Ebreakers fortheRBVE andRBVSfans trip,thesecondary containment supply and exhaust dampers close, FRVS starts. Theradlevels areat1.5 x 10-3 pCi/cc ontheRB Exhaust soall oftheautomatic actions above wouldalready have happened.
| |
| Technical Reference(s): HC.OP-AB.CONT-0004(Q) (Attach ifnotpreviously provided)
| |
| RADIOACTIVE GASEOUS RELEASE HC.OP-SO.GU-0001(Q)
| |
| FRVSSystem Operation Proposed References tobeprovided toapplicants during examination: none Learning Objective: Given plant conditions andplant procedures, determine required actionsof theretainment override(s) andsubsequent operator actions inaccordance with Radioactive Gaseous Release.
| |
| Question Source: Bank# 113146 Modified Bank# (Note changes orattach parent)
| |
| New Question History:
| |
| Question Cognitive Level: Memory orKnowledge 10CFRPart 55Content: 55.41(7)
| |
| Comments:
| |
| | |
| 2021NRCWritten Examination Facility: HopeCreek Vendor: GE ExamDate: 2021 ExamType: RO Examination Outline Cross-reference: Level RO SRO Tier # 2 Group # 2 K/A # 256000 K1.07 Importance Rating 2.9 K/AStatement: Knowledge ofthe physicalconnections and/or cause-effect relationships between REACTOR CONDENSATE SYSTEM andthe following: SJAEcondenser.
| |
| Question: RO#27 Given:
| |
| e A plant startup isinprogress.
| |
| = Theoperators wereplacing thefirst PCP(Primary Condensate Pump) in-service IAW HC.OP-SO.AD-0001, Condensate System Operations, the'A'PCP pump.
| |
| When:
| |
| a ThePO(Plant Operator) noticed thatthePRICNDSPUMP'A' STARTENABLE status wasNOTilluminated.
| |
| light ofthe Which following would bethecause oftheabove condition?
| |
| A. HV-1680A, PC-P'A'DISCHVLV 100%CLOSED.
| |
| B. PDV-1719, SJAE/SPE BYPASS VLV 90%OPEN.
| |
| C. Condenser level at9 inches for 2 out of3shells.
| |
| D. HV-1639A, PCP'A' SUCTVLV 100% -
| |
| OPEN.
| |
| Proposed Answer: B
| |
| | |
| 2021NRCWritten Examination Explanation (Optional): A (B, C)P102START-STOP pbcontrol andindication on10C651A. Asa permissive for a pumpSTART, theSTARTENABLElight mustbeilluminated, identifyingthe following conditions are satisfied:Condenser level greater than6"for 2/3shells,HV-1639A (B, C) pumpsuction valve 100%OPEN,HV-1680A C)
| |
| (B, pump discharge valve 100% CLOSED,and SJAE/SPE Bypass valve PDV-1719 100%OPEN.SJAE/SPE Condenser Bypass Valve (PDV-1719) maintains a differential pressure across theSJAE/SPE condensers toprovidedesign flowthrough the tube side ofthe' heat exchangers. PDV-1719 mustbe100%OPENtoenable STARTofthefirst primary condensate pump. This canonly beidentified bythepresence oftheSTARTENABLE status light(s) attheprimary condensate pumpcontrol bezel(s).
| |
| Plausibility Justification:
| |
| A: incorrect. Thedischarge valve 100%closed isa permissive fortheSTARTENABLE ofthe PCP.
| |
| B: Correct- TheSJAE/SPE bypass valve willbenormally throttledtocontrolthe d/p andtherefore flow across theSJAEcondensers,however, for the firstPCPgoing intoservice this valve hasto be100%opentoprovide thepermissive input into theSTARTENABLEstatus andalso light provide a flowpath for thePCP.
| |
| C: Incorrect- Thecondenser level'hastobegreater than 6 inches in2 ofthe3 shellsisalso a permissive fortheSTARTENABLE statuslight. The student will have torealize that thelevel even though lowisstill above theLowLowsetpoint.
| |
| D: Incorrect. Thesuction valve 100%openisa permissive for theSTARTENABLE ofthePCP.
| |
| Technical Reference(s): HC.OP-SO.AD-0001(Q)(Attach if notpreviouslyprovided)
| |
| CONDENSATE SYSTEM OPERATION Proposed References tobeprovided toapplicants during examination: Pump controlsinstem Learning Objective: .Concerning theprimary condensate pumps: Select the four conditions that, whensatisfied, illuminatetheStart Enable lightatthepumpcontrol bezel.
| |
| Concerning theSJAE/SPE bypass valve, explain the oftheBYPASS functions ON andBYPASS OPENpushbuttons used to control theSJAE/SPE bypass valve Question Source: Bank #
| |
| Modified Bank # (Notechanges orattach parent)
| |
| New X Question History:
| |
| Question Cognitive Level: Memory orKnowledge 10CFRPart 55Content: 55.41(7)
| |
| Comments: ' -
| |
| | |
| 2021NRCWritten Examination Facility: HopeCreek Vendor: GE ExamDate: 2021 ExamType: RO Examination Outline Cross-reference: Level RO SRO Tier # 2 Group# 2 K/A # 223001 K2.10 Importance Rating 2.7 K/AStatement: Knowledge ofelectrical power supplies tothe following: Drywell chillers:Plant-Specific Question: RO#28 Given:
| |
| a Theplant isoperating at100%power.
| |
| a TheAK111,BK111, andDK111Turbine Building ChilledWater Units are in-service.
| |
| = Drywell parameters arereadingnormal.
| |
| Then:
| |
| = A loss ofpower transientoccurs.
| |
| a pressure Drywell andtemperature start torise.
| |
| a 'A'PrimaryCondensate Pumptrips.
| |
| a 'A'Secondary Condensate Pumptrips.
| |
| = OnlyoneTurbine BuildingChillerremains running.
| |
| Whichofthefollowing loss ofpower caused this transient?
| |
| A. 10A101, 4.16KV Switchgear B. 10A120, 7.2KV Switchgear C. 10A102, 4.16KV Switchgear D. 10A110, 7.2KV Switchgear Proposed Answer: D
| |
| | |
| 2021NRCWritten Examination Explanation (Optional): K/Aismatched because TBCWunits supplyDrywell Cooling.Power supplies (Turbine Building Chilled Water c ompressors): 1AK111 -10A110*; 1BK11110A120*;
| |
| 1CK111 -
| |
| 10A101; 1DK111 -
| |
| 10A110* 7.2KV toa step-down transformerto4.16KV for theAK111andDK111 chillers. Along with powering the AK111andDK111, the10A110 switchgear powers also the'A' PCP and'A' SCP. (See attached).
| |
| Plausibility Justification:
| |
| A: Incorrect.The 10A101 isthe power supplytotheCK111,Since theChillers are4.16KV power the student might select 4.16KV switchgear even thoughthey should realize the trip ofthe PCP andSCPwhichare 7.2 KVpowered.
| |
| B: Incorrect- The10A120 powers the BK111 alongwith the'B'PCPand'B' SCP.TheBK111 would bethe remainingchiller running.
| |
| C: Incorrect- The10A102 doesnot power anyofthe however chillers, thestudent could decipher the BK111andDK111becauseof the 'B' channelstatusof10A102 andthe fact that itisatthe right voltage tosupply aTurbine Chilled Water chiller.
| |
| D: Correct. The10A110 suppliesboth theAK111 andDK111with a 7.2KV transformer to4.16KV tosupply thechillers. The'A' PCPand'A'SCP alsocomeoff ofthe10A110 7.2KV switchgear.
| |
| Technical Reference(s): HC.OP-SO.NA-0001(Q) (Attachif previously not provided) 7.2KVSystem Proposed References tobeprovided toapplicants duringexamination: none Learning Objective:
| |
| Question Source: Bank#
| |
| Modified Bank # (Notechanges orattachparent)
| |
| New X Question History:
| |
| Question Cognitive Level: Memory orKnowledge 10CFRPart 55Content: 55.41(5)
| |
| Comments:
| |
| | |
| 2021NRCWritten Examination Facility: HopeCreek Vendor: GE ExamDate: 2021 ExamType: RO Examination OutlineCross-reference: Level RO SRO Tier # 2 Group# 2 K/A # 243000 K3.04 Importance Rating 2.9 K/AStatement: Knowledge ofthe effect that a loss or malfunction ofthe FUELHANDLING EQUIPMENT willhave onfollowing: Reactormanual control system: Plant-Specific Question: RO#29 Given:
| |
| = TheModeSwitch isinREFUEL.
| |
| = All Control Rodsarefull in.
| |
| = TheRefuel Platform thecore.
| |
| isover
| |
| = TheMain Fuel Grapple Hoist/Fuel isNOTloaded.
| |
| Then:
| |
| a TheRefuel Bridge System RodOutRelay (ROR) contact fails all indicating rods are NOTfullin.
| |
| Whatisthe if effect, any, ontheReactor Manual Control System duetothis (RMCS) malfunction?
| |
| A. REACTORCONTROLSYSTEMINOP B. RODSELECTION BLOCK C. Noeffect D. ACTIVITY CONTROLS DISAGREE Proposed Answer: B Explanation The"one (Optional): rodout" interlock requiredbyTechSpec3.9.1 doesnotactually produce a rodblock.Instead, theinterlock isenforced bylogic within RMCSthat prevents the selection ofasecond control rodfor movement with anyother rodnotfully inserted while inthe
| |
| | |
| 2021NRCWritten Examination refuel mode. Themain fuel hoistmotion willbeinhibited andtheFuel Hoist Interlock light will be illuminated whenthe following conditions exist.TheRodOutRelay (ROR) contact is opened indicating atleast one control rodiswithdrawn inthereactor. ANDTherefueling platform isover the reactorvessel. i.e. (RS1 contact isopen). Refueling RodBlocks: Fuel Grapple Loaded ANDRefuel Platform Over Reactor Cavity orRefuel Platform Over Reactor Cavity ANDReactor ModeSwitch in STARTUP (seeattached). Activity Control Cards compare control rodselection data, plant and status, RWMdata todetermine if control rodmovement isallowed orshould beblocked. Theyreceive input from theFuel bundle loaded onservice platform,Hoist loaded orgrapple downorloaded, Refueling platform over core. The Reactor Controls System INOP, this informs theoperator that theRDCS(Rod Drive Control System)has shutdown duetoafault (Acknowledge andCommand signals No disagree).
| |
| control rod rnotion ispossible. The RORrelay does not produce anINOPcondition.
| |
| Plausibility Justification:
| |
| A: incorrect. TheReactor Controls System INOP, this informs the operator that the RDCS(Rod Drive Control System) hasshutdown duetoafault (Acknowledge andCommand signals disagree). Nocontrol rod motion is possible. TheRORrelay does not produce anINOP condition. TheRDCSisstill available.
| |
| B: Correct-With the RORcontact failedopen and indicating to the RMCSsystem that allrods are NOTfull in; a RODSELECTBLOCKwill be enforced.
| |
| C: Incorrect- Themainfuel hoist interlockwillbein, however theRMCSisaffected through the RODSELECT BLOCK(one-rod-out interlock).
| |
| D: incorrect. With inputs from theRefuel System, the Activity Control Cards will process the information andwill eitherallow orblock rodmotion, but only ifthey disagree. In thisscenario there isnomention ofa malfunction ofthesignals going tothe RMCS ActivityControl Cards.
| |
| Technical Reference(s): HC.OP-SO.KE-0001(Q) (Attach if not previously provided)
| |
| Refuel Platform Operation HC.OP-ST.KE-0001(Q)
| |
| Refuel Interlock Functional Test Proposed References tobeprovided toapplicants during examination: none Learning Objective: Frommemory, explain the .
| |
| interrelationships between theReactor Manual Control System andthe following:
| |
| Refueling System Question Source: Bank#
| |
| Modified Bank # (Note changes orattach parent)
| |
| New X Question History:
| |
| Question Cognitive Level: Memory orKnowledge 10CFRPart 55Content: 55.41(7)
| |
| Comments:
| |
| (
| |
| | |
| 2021NRCWritten Examination Facility: HopeCreek Vendor: GE ExamDate: 2021 ExamType: RO Examination OutlineCross-reference: Level RO SRO Tier # 2 Group# 2 K/A # 271000 K4.01 Importance Rating 2.9 K/AStatement: Knowledge ofOFFGAS SYSTEM design feature(s) and/or interlocks which provide forthefollowing:Dilution ofhydrogen gasconcentration Question: RO#30 WhichONEthefollowing statements correctly explainsthe consequences the if Off Gas Recombinercatalystweretodeteriorate orbecome wet.
| |
| Thedesign of(dilution) rate recombination ofhydrogen andoxygen will A. remain thesame,however there will bemoisture tothe carryover adsorber beds.
| |
| B. rise, because oftherise intemperature inthe Recombiner vessel.
| |
| C. lower, because thediatomic oxygen will notcomeincontact with theplatinum.
| |
| D. remain the same,however Recombiner vessel temperature will increase.
| |
| Proposed Answer: C Explanation (Optional):
| |
| TheOff GasRecombiners cause freeH2andO2torecombine towater vapor.
| |
| This willcontrol theHydrogen concentration inthe offgastrain. Therecombiners a homogeneous utilize platinum andpalladium mixture asacatalyst. AstheO2comes intocontact withtheplatinum itcauses the diatomic O2toseparate making iteasierfor itocombine with the H2andform water. Thepalladium acts toraisesurfaceareaandthereby helpcontrol therecombination reaction. isactually This a form of combustion andgivesoffheat. Therecombiner temperature isexpected torise 135Fper 1%H2.If water theplatinum, coats splitting ofthediatomic O2cannot take place andrecombiner efficiency Whentherecombiner lowers. issuspe'cted ofbeing wet(high content),
| |
| moisture then the recombiner bepurged will with nitrogen IAWradwaste operating procedures.
| |
| | |
| 2021NRCWritten Examination Plausibility Justification:
| |
| A: Incorrect. If there isexcessive moisture intheoffgas flow, this could makeit totheadsorber beds downstream ofthe feedgas recombiner. Theguard bedfor the adsorber beds would alarm on hid/p towarn ofexcessive moisture onthe adsorber beds. However, duetothe moisture content,splitting ofthediatomic O2cannot take place andrecombiner efficiency lowers.
| |
| B: Incorrect- The recombiner temperatureis expected torise 135Fper 1%H2.However, dueto the moisture content, splitting ofthe diatomic O2cannot take placeandrecombiner efficiency lowers.
| |
| C: Correct- Ifwater coats the platinum, splitting ofthe diatomic O2cannot take place and recombiner efficiency lowers.
| |
| D: Incorrect.'The recombiner temperature isexpected torise 135Fper1%H2.If water coats the platinum, splitting ofthediatomicO2 cannot take place andrecombiner efficiency lowers.
| |
| Technical Reference(s): HC.RW-OP.HA-0001(R) if (Attach notpreviously provided)
| |
| Gaseous Radwaste Operations Proposed References tobeprovided toapplicants during examination: none Learning Objective: Explain/identify theeffect ofmoisture in theprocess gasstream onthe following components: Recombiner Question Source:Bank # 33172 Modified Bank # (Notechanges or attach parent)
| |
| New Question History:
| |
| Question Cognitive Level: Comprehension orAnalysis 10CFRPart 55Content: 55.41(13)
| |
| Comments:
| |
| | |
| 2021NRCWritten Examination Facility: HopeCreek Vendor: GE ExamDate: 2021 ExamType: RO - -
| |
| Examination Outline Cross-reference: Level RO SRO Tier # 2 Group# 2 K/A # 230000 K5.04 Importance Rating 2.5 K/AStatement: Knowledge oftheoperational implications ofthefollowing concepts asthey apply toRHR/LPCI: TORUS/SUPPRESSION POOLSPRAY MODE:Evaporative cooling Question: RO#31 Given:
| |
| = A LOCAhasoccurred intheDrywell.
| |
| = Allplantequipment functioned asdesigned.
| |
| = Theapplicable EOPshavebeenentered.
| |
| = "A"RHRisplaced inTorus Cooling andSpray IAWHC.OP-AB.zz-0001, Transient Plant Conditions (Hard Card).
| |
| Which ofthe following describes the status ofTorus parameters?
| |
| Suppression Pool temperature andpressure arelowered by A. evaporative cooling,convective cooling,andheat rejectiontotheRHRHeat Exchanger.
| |
| B. evaporative cooling andheat rejection totheRHRHeat Exchanger ONLY.
| |
| C. convective cooling andheat rejection totheRHRHeat Exchanger ONLY.
| |
| D. heat rejection totheRHRHeat Exchanger ONLY.
| |
| Proposed Answer: A Explanation (Optional): Suppression Pool Cooling- RHRloops A and/or B canbealigned tosupport Suppression Pool cooling.Pumpsuction isreceived from the Suppression Poolthrough F004A(B).
| |
| Pumpdischarge isdirectedthrough theRHRHXvia theshell side HV-F047A(B) inlet andHV-F024A(B) test return totheSuppression Pool.
| |
| | |
| 2021NRCWritten Examination Suppression Chamber Spray- RHRloops A and/or B canbealigned Suppression tosupport Pool chamber spray. Pumpsuction isfrom Suppression RHRHXandtoSuppression Pool through H~V-F004A(B) throughRHRpumpA(B).
| |
| Discharge is directed through Pool airspace viaHV-F027A(B).
| |
| PlausibilityJustification:
| |
| A: Correct.
| |
| evaporative Torus Spray cooling andTorus andconvective cooling flowpaths cooling ofspray are flow aligned andheat (see simultaneously attached) so totheRHRHxwill rejection occur simultaneously.
| |
| B: Incorrect- Convective cooling will beasignificant cooling mechanism along withEvaporative cooling andthe flow through theRHRheat (see exchanger attached bases).
| |
| C: Incorrect- Evaporativecooling will contribute tothe reduction ofpressure ofthe andtemperature suppression chamber.
| |
| D: Incorrect. With both flowpaths(Spray andCooling) lined upthroughtheRHRheat exchanger, theRHRheat exchanger will actasa heat sink, however, the ofthesuppression spraying chamber air space will provide both evaporative andconvective cooling mechanismwhich will reduce pressure (condenses) andtemperature.
| |
| Technical Reference(s): HC.OP-EO.zz-0102-BASES (Attach notpreviously if provided)
| |
| HC.OP-AB.zz-0001 Att. 2 Transient Plant Conditions Proposed References tobeprovided toapplicants during examination: none Learning Objective: Explain thereasons for howplant/system parameters respond whenimplementing a given Abnormal Operating Procedure.
| |
| Given anystep oftheemergency operating procedure, determine the reason for performance ofthat step and/or predict expected system response to control manipulations Question Source: Bank# 32645 Modified Bank # (Notechanges parent) orattach New Question History:
| |
| Question Cognitive Level: Comprehension orAnalysis 10CFRPart 55Content: 55.41(14)
| |
| Comments:
| |
| | |
| 2021NRCWritten Examination Facility: HopeCreek Vendor: GE ExamDate: 2021 ExamType:RO Examination Outline Cross-reference: Level RO SRO Tier # 2 Group# 2 K/A # 216000 K6.01 Importance Rating 3.1 K/AStatement: Knowledge ofthe effect thata loss or malfunction ofthe following will have on theNUCLEAR BOlLER INSTRUMENTATION :A.C.electrical distribution Question: RO#32 HowwilltheNuclear Boiler Instrumentation systembeaffected by the lossofthe 1BD481?
| |
| A. ECCSRosemount Trip Units NOTprovide will initiation/permissive signals and RPVlevel indications willfailupscale.
| |
| B. ECCSRosemount Trip Units provide still will initiation/permissive signals; however, RPVlevel indications fail will downscale.
| |
| C. ECCSRosemou.nt Trip Units NOTprovide will initiation/permissive signals and RPVlevel will indications faildownscale.
| |
| D. ECCSRosemount Trip Units provide still will initiation/permissive signals; however, RPVlevel indications fail will upscale.
| |
| Proposed Answer: C Explanation (Optional):
| |
| AD-DD481 supply Inverters 120VACpower tothe instruments utilized by ECCS.The1(A-D)D481 Inverters power theECCSAnalog Trip Units. Lossof1BD481inverter causes theloss ofDIVII"B"Channel ECCS/RCIC Auto Trip UnitsandStart Relays -
| |
| ingeneral, Process Signal Transmitter failures affecting signals, initiation Min. FlowValves, pressure permissives, etc. Channels "B"and"F" affected alongwithloss ofinstrument power affecting various systems.
| |
| Instrument indicationswill fail (see low attached).
| |
| | |
| 2021NRCWritten Examination Plausibility Justification:
| |
| A: Incorrect. TheECCStransmitters willlose power andtherefore the toprovide ability initiation/permissive signals forECCSsystems. Theloss will oftheinverter cause theRPVlevel indications tofail downscale.
| |
| B: Incorrect- The ECCStransmitters willlose powerandtherefore toprovide theability initiation/permissive signals forECCSsystems.
| |
| C: Correct- Thestudent will have todetermine ifthe481inverter power provides totheECCS transmitters andfrom a control roomawareness ofindications they have will todetermine that the loss ofthe 481inverter willcause the levelindications downscale.
| |
| tofail D: incorrect. TheECCStransmitters willlose power andtherefore theability toprovide initiation/permissive signalsfor ECCS systems. Theloss oftheinverter cause will theRPVlevel indications tofaildownscale.
| |
| Technical Reference(s): HC.OP-AB.zz-0136(Q) notpreviously if (Attach provided)
| |
| Loss of120VAC Inverter Proposed References tobeprovided toapplicants duringexamination: none Learning Objective: Given a system that interrelateswiththe Nuclear BoilerInstrumentation System, evaluate the effectsonthat system dueto loss oformalfunctions with theNuclear Boiler Instrumentation System and/or associated components.
| |
| Question Source: Bank#
| |
| Modified Bank# (Note changesorattach parent)
| |
| New X Question History: -
| |
| Question Cognitive Level: Memory orKnowledge 10CFRPart 55Content: 55.41(7)
| |
| Comments:
| |
| | |
| 2021NRCWritten Examination Facility: HopeCreek Vendor: GE ExamDate: 2021 ExamType:RO -
| |
| Examination Outline Cross-reference: Level RO SRO Tier # 2 Group# 2 K/A # 202001 A1.13 Importance Rating 3.1 K/AStatement: Ability topredict and/or monitor changes inparameters associated with operating theRECIRCULATION SYSTEM controls including: Recirculation loop temperatures:
| |
| Plant-Specific Question: RO#33
| |
| | |
| 2021NRCWritten Examination Given:
| |
| a Theplant isinOPCON 3.
| |
| a NOReactor Recirculation Pumpsare running.
| |
| a RWCU is in-service.
| |
| = RPV pressure is at985psig.
| |
| = "A" Recirculation Loop Temperature isat499F.
| |
| = "B" Recirculation Loop Temperature isat483F.
| |
| RPVBottom HeadDrain Coolant Temperature isat391F.
| |
| (Assume thereadings are takenwithin 15minutes toattempting prior a pumpstart)
| |
| Which oneofthe following describes whether the starting "A" "B" and/or Reactor Recirculation Pumpsispermitted?
| |
| START"A" RECIRC START"B" RECIRC A. YES NO B. YES YES C. NO YES D. NO NO Proposed Answer: D Explanation (Optional): Tostart anidle Reactor Pumpthefollowing Recirculation have to be satisfied:
| |
| 15minutes Within prior to starting pump, VERIFY temperature differential between Reactor coolant within idleloopANDcoolant inpressure vessel is5 50*F.
| |
| Within 15minutes prior tostarting pump, VERIFYtemperature differential between Reactor coolant domeANDbottom within head drain is5 145*F.
| |
| RPVPressure Is985psig (1000 psia)using steam tables thecorresponding temperature is544.6*F for RxPressure Vessel SteamSpace Coolant SaturationTemperature. D/TforIdlelooptosteam space tempis"A"Pump=45.6*F and"B"Pump=61.60F. Limit is<50*F. "B" PumpisUNSATfor start. "A" PumpisSAT.
| |
| D/TSteam dome(steam space temp) tobottom headis544.6F391*F
| |
| - = 153.6*F. Limit is5 145*F.
| |
| Therefore, neither pumpmaybestarted. "B" Pumpisoutside D/Tlimit forstart."A" Pumpis within limitsinloop toRPVtemp, however outside limits for steam dometobottom head. Both D/Ttempcriteria have tobemet.
| |
| Plausibility Justification:
| |
| A: Incorrect. "B"Pumpisoutside D/Tlimit forstart."A" Pumpiswithin limits inloop toRPV temp, however outside limitsfor s teamd ome tobottom head.Both D/Ttemp criteria havetobemet.
| |
| B: Incorrect-"B" Pumpisoutside D/Tlimit for "A" start. Pumpiswithin limits inloop toRPV temp, however outside limitsfor steam dometobottom head.
| |
| | |
| 2021NRCWritten Examination C: Incorrect"B" Pumpisoutside D/Tlimit for start. "A" Pumpis within inloop limits toRPV temp, however outside limitsfor steam dometobottom head.
| |
| D: Correct. See abovecalculations andexplanation.
| |
| TechnicalReference(s): HC.OP-SO.BB-0002(Q) (Attachif not provided) previously Reactor Recirculation Operations HC.OP-AB.RPV-0003(Q)
| |
| Recirc System/Power Oscillations Proposed References tobeprovided to applicants during examination: none Learning Objective: Given plant conditions andplant procedures, determine required actions of theretainment override(s) andsubsequent operator actions inaccordance with the Recirculation System/Power Oscillations.
| |
| QuestionSource: Bank # 68133 Modified Bank # (Note changesorattach parent)
| |
| New Question History:
| |
| Question Cognitive Level: Comprehension orAnalysis 10CFRPart 55Content: 55.41(10)
| |
| Comments:
| |
| i
| |
| /
| |
| | |
| 2021NRCWritten Examination Facility: HopeCreek Vendor: GE ExamDate: 2021 ExamType: RO Examination Outline Cross-reference: Level RO SRO Tier # 2 =
| |
| Group# 2 K/A # 201003 A2.05 Importance Rating 4.1 K/AStatement:
| |
| DRIVEMECHANISM (a) to predict Ability
| |
| ;and(b) the based impacts onthose of the following predictions, ontheCONTROL RODAND control, useprocedures tocorrect, ormitigate theconsequences ofthose abnormal conditions oroperations: Reactor Scram Question: RO#34
| |
| | |
| 2021NRCWritten Examination Given:
| |
| = A reactor startup isinprogress.
| |
| = Reactor pressure isat900psig.
| |
| -When:
| |
| = A reactor scram occurs.
| |
| = Thescram inletvalves for twocontrol rodsfail toopen.
| |
| (1)Which ofthefollowing describe the effect failure?
| |
| ofthis (2)Abnormal/emergency operating procedures areentered dueto A. (1-)
| |
| Thecontrol rods insertandtheir blue scram lightsonthe full core display illuminate.
| |
| (2) the fullcore reactor scram.
| |
| B. (1)Thecontrol rods insert and theirblue scram lightsonthe core full display do NOTilluminate.
| |
| (2) the fullcore reactor scram.
| |
| C. (1)Thecontrol rods failtoinsertand their bluescram lightsonthefull core display doNOTilluminate.
| |
| (2)the ATWS.
| |
| D. (1)Thecontrol rods fails toinsertandtheirblue scram lights onthe fullcore display illuminate.
| |
| (2)theATWS.
| |
| Proposed Answer: B Explanation (Optional): Reactor pressure will insertthe rodat900psig. Theblue are actuated by lights scram both andoutlet inlet valves picking upthere limitswitches. Thecontrol rods arescramtime tested at>800psigandthescram inletandoutlet blue lightsonthe fullcoredisplay areobserved (seeattached surveillance).
| |
| Pressure from the scram accumulators cannotdrive therods duetothe Scram Inlet being valves closed. However, theScram Outlet valves opening causea significant DPbetween the andscram reactor discharge volume (vented to atmosphere) to allowthe rods t oscram. S ince thetwo control rodswillscram, therewillbea full core reactor scram. With noATWScondition (Reactor shutdown under allconditions without Boron), the crew will enter EOP-101 orAB.zz-0000 for the successful reactor scram.
| |
| Justification:
| |
| Plausibility A: incorrect. The- scram inletvalves did not move,therefore thelimit switchesfortheblue lightson the full core display for the twocontrol rods willNOTilluminate.
| |
| B: Correct-Thescram inletvalves did not move, therefore the switches limit fortheblue lightson thefull core display for the twocontrol rods willNOTilluminate. Duetothelarge DPacross the CRDMthe twocontrol rods will fully insert andthereactor will beshutdown under all conditions without Boron. Thisisa fullcore reactor scram which would require entryintoAB.zz-0000 ReactorScram orEOP-101 RPVControl. There isnoATWScondition.
| |
| | |
| 2021NRCWritten Examination C: Incorrect- Duetothelarge DPacross theCRDMthe twocontrol rods will fully andthe insert reactor willbeshutdown under aII conditions without Boron. This isa fullcore scram reactor which would require entry into AB.zz-0000 Reactor Scram orEOP-101 RPVControl. is There noATWS condition.
| |
| D: Incorrect. The scram inlet valves did not move, therefore thelimit switches for on lights theblue the full coredisplay for thetwocontrol rods NOTilluminate.
| |
| will Thisisa fullcore scram reactor which would require entry into AB.zz-0000 Reactor Scram orEOP-101 RPVControl. is There noATWScondition.
| |
| Reference(s):
| |
| Technical HC.RE.ST-BF-0001 (Attach if not provided) previously Control Rod Scram Time HC.OP-AB.zz-0000 Reactor Scram ProposedReferences tobeprovided toapplicants during examination: none Objective: Given Learning P&lDM-47-1,select thevarious riserisolation valves, scram pilot valve assemblies, scram valves,directional flow control valves, accumulatorsand instrumentation assemblies.
| |
| QuestionSource: Bank#
| |
| Modified Bank # 30889 (Added part tomatch (2) theK/A)
| |
| New QuestionHistory:
| |
| QuestionCognitive Level: Comprehension orAnalysis 10CFRPart 55Content: 55.41(2)
| |
| Comments:
| |
| | |
| 2021NRCWritten Examination Facility: HopeCreek Vendor: GE ExamDate: 2021 ExamType: RO Examination Outline Cross-reference: Level RO SRO Tier # 2 Group# 2 K/A # 219000 A3.01 Importance Rating 3.3 K/AStatement: Ability tomonitor automatic operations oftheRHR/LPCI:
| |
| TORUS/SUPPRESSION POOLCOOLING MODEincluding: Valve operation.
| |
| Question: RO#35 Given:
| |
| = Theplantisoperating at89%power.
| |
| = "B"RHRPumpisrunning inSuppression Pool mode.
| |
| Cooling Then:
| |
| = A completeloss ofoffsitepower occurs.
| |
| = AllEmergency Diesel Generators have started automatically andaligned totheir respective busses oneofthefollowing Which describestheresponse oftheBC-HV-F024B,"B"RHRTest Return Valve?
| |
| A. Receives a closesignal immediately after thebusisreenergized.
| |
| B. Remains openuntilAUTOCLOSEOVERRIDE PBispressed.
| |
| C. Remains open CLOSEPBispressed.
| |
| until D. Receives a closesignal 5 seconds thebusisreenergized.
| |
| after Proposed Answer: C
| |
| | |
| 2021NRCWritten Examination Explanation (Optional): HV-F024A(B) willautomatically CLOSEinresponse toa manual orautomatic LPCIinitiation signal intherespective loop logic.Toreopen FO24A(B) following the Auto closure,the following permissive/ operator actions arerequired: A LPCI signal initiation ispresent (in therespective loop logic)and LPCI injection valve for the respective loop (HV-F017A(B) is100%CLOSED.
| |
| Depressing the AUTO CLOVRDpushbutton on10C650 willthen enable the valve(s) tobeoperated as desired. Thestem of thequestion hasnoreference toa LOCAcondition andtherefore theFO24B will notisolate andcan be CLOSED bythenormal CLOSEPB.The"B" RHRpumpwill start immediately after the busisenergized bythe "B" EDG.
| |
| Plausibility Justification:
| |
| A: Incorrect. With a LPCI initiation theFO24B would isolate immediately after thebuswas energized, however theLPCI initiation signal isnotpresent onlya LOP,therefore theFO24B will NOTisolate.
| |
| B: Incorrect- With a LPCI initiation signal present andtheF017B, injection valve closed, the FO24B canbeoperated with the AUTO CLOSE OVERRIDE PBpressed, however thereisno LPCI signal present.
| |
| C: Correct- With noLPCI initiation signal present andthe factthatthe valve isanMOVthevalve willfailasisandwhenpower isrestored tothe bus, the valvecanbeoperated with thenormal CLOSEPB.
| |
| D: Incorrect. With noLPCIinitiation signal the FO24B will NOT isolate. lf theLPCIinitiation signal wasinthen thevalve would close immediately after power was restored to thebus. Thestudent could decipher thatthere isa time delay duetothepumphaving tostart firstthen the valve opening. There isa 5second time delay onthe "C"and"D"RHR pumps starting offofnormal power.
| |
| Technical Reference(s): HC.OP-SO.BC-0001(Q) (Attach ifnot previously provided)
| |
| RHRSystem Operations Proposed References tobeprovided toapplicants during examination: none Learning Objective: Given a set ofconditions anda drawing of thecontrols, instrumentation and/or alarms located inthemain control room, assess the status oftheResidua~l Heat Removal System orits components by evaluation ofthe controls/instrumentation/alarms Question Source: Bank # 36238 Modified Bank # (Note changes orattach parent)
| |
| New Question History:
| |
| Question Cognitive Level: Memory orKnowledge 10CFRPart 55Content: 55.41(7)
| |
| Comments:
| |
| t
| |
| | |
| 2021NRCWritten Examination Facility: HopeCreek Vendor: GE ExamDate: 2021 ExamType:RO Examination Outline Cross-reference: Level RO SRO Tier # -
| |
| 2 Group# 2 K/A # 201006 A4.03 Importance Rating 3.0 K/AStatement: Ability tomonitor automatic operations ofthe RODWORTHMINIMIzER SYSTEM (RWM) (PLANT SPECIFIC) including: Latched group indication Question: RO#36 Given:
| |
| = A startup isinprogress.
| |
| = TheRodWorth (RWM)
| |
| Minimizer indicates STEP04.
| |
| = AllRodPull Listing -
| |
| RWMSTEP04rods areattheir withdraw limit -
| |
| position 08.
| |
| Whichstatementdescribes whentheRWMwill latch toSTEP05?
| |
| A. Whena control rodinthenext RWMGroup (STEP isselected.
| |
| 05)
| |
| B. Whenacontrol rodinthenext RWMGroup (STEP isselected
| |
| : 05) and withdrawn atleast twonotches.
| |
| C. TheRWMwill remainlatched atSTEP04since the Banked Position Withdrawal Sequence Groupisthe same.
| |
| D. Whena control rodinthe next RWMGroup (STEP isselected
| |
| : 05) andwithdrawn onenotch.
| |
| Proposed Answer: D
| |
| | |
| 2021NRCWritten Examination Explanation (Optional): EachRWMSTEPconsists of1ormoreControl Rodsthataretobemoved withinthe specified notch limits.NOTE:RWMSTEPsarelisted asRWMGROUPS ontheRodPull Listings.The RWM will allow anyorderofcontrol rodmovement within anRWMSTEP,but RWMSTEPs mustbewithdrawn insequence. TheRWMdetermines the STEPbya process Current called "Latching".
| |
| Oncethe RWM "Latches" the CurrentSTEP, iw follow till controlrodmovements, andwillchange the Current STEPwhen a StepBoundaryisreached andcrossed. Ata step boundary, ifacontrol rodis selected from the next STEP'such asduring astartup orshutdown andoncethecontrol rodis moved, theSTEPassociated with that controlrodwill bedisplayed. Selection ofa controlrod which ifmoved couldcause deviation fromthe sequence, will resultinINSERT andWITHDRAW Blocks.
| |
| Plausibility Justification:
| |
| A: incorrect. Since therods are the sameinboth groups,the RWMwill uptoSTEP05 notlatch untilitsees a STEP05rod withdrawn atleast onenotch.
| |
| B: Incorrect- Since therodsarethe same inboth groups, the RWMwill notlatchuptoSTEP05 untilitseesa STEP-05 rodwithdrawn atleast onenotch.
| |
| C: Incorrect- TheRWMSTEPSare notthe same asthe BPWSGroups.
| |
| D: Correct TheRWMwill latchuptoSTEP05when it sees a STEP05rodwithdrawn atleast onenotch since all ofSTEP04have been withdrawn totheirlimit, Technical Reference(s): HC.OP-SO.SF-0003(Q) (Attach notpreviously if provided)
| |
| RWMOperations Proposed References tobeprovided toapplicants during examination: none Learning Objective: Given a setofconditions, summarize the used criteria bytheRWMtoselect therod grouptobelatched.
| |
| Question Source: Bank# 36040 Modified Bank# . (Note changesorattachparent)
| |
| New Question History:
| |
| Question Cognitive Level: Memory orKnowledge 10CFRPart 55Content: 55.41(7)
| |
| Comments:
| |
| | |
| 2021NRCWritten Examination Facility: HopeCreek Vendor: GE ExamDate: 2021 ExamType: RO Examination Outline Cross-reference: Level RO SRO Tier # 2 Group# 2 K/A # 204000 2.4.9 Importance Rating 3.8 K/AStatement: Emergency Procedures/Plan: Knowledge oflowpower /shutdown implications (e.g.,
| |
| inaccident loss ofcoolantaccident or loss ofresidual heatremoval) mitigation RWCU.
| |
| strategies.
| |
| Question: RO#37
| |
| | |
| 2021NRCWritten Examination Given:
| |
| = Thereactor hasbeeninCOLDSHUTDOWN fortwo(2) days following power operations.
| |
| = Reactor vessel water level is+30inches.
| |
| = Neither Reactor Recirculation Pumpisavailable.
| |
| When:
| |
| = A lossof Shutdown Cooling occurs.
| |
| = Theshutdown cooling suction valves haveisolated andcannot bere-opened.
| |
| = HC.OP-AB.RPV-0009, ShutdownCooling hasbeen entered.
| |
| Which ofthe following operator actions will aid inpreventing reactorvessel thermalstratification andprovide alternate decay heat removal?
| |
| A. Place RWCUSystem in service, maximizingRACS totheNRHXandbypass the regenerative heat exchanger if necessary.
| |
| B. Line uptheCondensate Transfer system through theCoreSpray injection line to feed the vessel.
| |
| C. Start a second CRDpumpandmaximize CRD flow byopening thedrive water pressure control valve andadjusting both flow control valves.
| |
| D. Raise reactor vessel water level ONLYuntil the HIGH REACTOR LEVEL annunciator isreceived.
| |
| Proposed Answer: A Explanation (Optional): RWCUbottom headdrain suction maximizes vessel circulation to prevent/minimize thermal stratification (cold CRDwater). RWCUHeat Exchanger Bypassdiverts a portion of, oftheflow orall from going through theheat exchangers tothereturn linetothereactor.This limit.thermal helps stratification andcool downofthereactor vessel during periods ofno flow.
| |
| recirculation Justification:
| |
| Plausibility A: Correct.Persubsequent Recirculation action pumpsnotavailable "F"
| |
| along with thenormal (see ofAB.RPV-0009attached)
| |
| SDCflowpath with theReactor duetotheisolation valvesfailed closed, RWCUisanalternate decay heat removal system andcanbelined upina timely manner along with thereduction invessel therma.I stratification.TheRWCUpumps take off suction thebottom ofthe vessel andreturn through thefeedwater lines.
| |
| B: Incorrect-PerAB.RPV-0009, theCondensate Transfer system lined upthrough either Core SprayorRHRisalso a viable alternate decay heat removal ofthecore. However, thesuction temperature (CST) for the Condensate Transfer system ismuchcooler then thevessel bottom andtherefore suction would contribute tothermal stratification.
| |
| | |
| 2021NRCWritten Examination C: Incorrect- TheCRDpumps will provide increaseflow throughthe core,however the temperature ofthesuction ofthe CRDsystem Hotwell (Condensate/ Reject) will bemuch cooler then the vessel bottom suction andtherefore would tothermal contribute stratification.
| |
| D: Incorrect. PerAB.RPV-0009, raising RPVlevel whenthereisnocore will circulation provide natural circulation (cooling)andalso help with reducing thermal stratification.
| |
| However,thelevel needs to be raised to>- 80inches LEVELalarm isat+39inches.
| |
| (see and< 90inches attached). TheHIGHREACTOR Technical Reference(s): HC.OP-AB.RPV-0009 (Attach if not provided) previously Shutdown Cooling HC.OP-AB.zz-0001 Transient Plant Conditions ProposedReferences tobeprovided to applicants during examination: none Learning Objective: Explain thereasons forhowplant/system parameters respond when implementing Shutdown Cooling.
| |
| Question Source: Bank# 33592 Modified Bank# (Notechangesorattachparent)
| |
| New QuestionHistory:
| |
| QuestionCognitive Level: Comprehension orAnalysis 10CFRPart 55Content: 55.41(2)
| |
| Comments:
| |
| | |
| 2021NRCWritten Examination Facility: HopeCreek Vendor: GE ExamDate: 2021 ExamType:RO Examination OutlineCross-reference: Level RO SRO Tier # 2 Group# 2 K/A # 201002 K3.01 Importance Rating 3.4 K/AStatement: Knowledge ofthe effect thata loss or malfunction ofthe REACTOR MANUAL CONTROL SYSTEM willhave onfollowing:
| |
| Ability to move control rods Question: RO#38 Given:
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| = A reactor startup isinprogress.
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| = Reactorpower iscurrently onRange3 oftheIntermediate Range Monitoring system.
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| = Control rod30-31 isthenextcontrolrodtobemoved.
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| = Control rod30-31 iscurrently atnotch position12.
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| Followingtheselection ofcontrolrod30-31:
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| = The"ACTIVITY CONTROLS DISAGREE" ontheRodSelect light Module isilluminated.
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| Based ontheabove conditions,whichoneofthefollowing describes theability tomovecontrol-rod30-31?
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| UsingtheReactor Manual Control System, control rod30-31 canbe .
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| A. neither insertednorwithdrawn B. inserted ONLY C. withdrawn ONLY D. inserted orwithdrawn Proposed Answer: A
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| 2021NRCWritten Examination Explanation (Optional): Wheneach transmitter card hascoded the selected controlrodID,each transmitter card will illuminate onehalf oftheRodSelect Matrix pushbutton. lf atransmittercard isfaulty, it is possible to have only onehalf oftwoRodSelect Matrix pushbuttons illuminated. if Moreimportantly, a transmitter card is faulty, acomparator trip isgenerated inthe Analyzer oftheRMCS.An section ACTIVITY CONTROLS DISAGREE light will beilluminated andcontrol rodmotion willnotbe allowed.
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| Plausibility Justification:
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| A: Correct. neither inserted nor withdrawn. Activities Controls Disagree prevents rodmovement in either direction.
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| B: Incorrect- Insert error prevents rodinsertion.Wouldbecorrect Withdraw if error only.
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| C: Incorrect- Withdrawn only. Would becorrect if Inserterror only D: Incorrect- Activities Controls Disagree prevents rod movement ineither direction.
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| Technical Reference(s): HC.OP-SO.SF-0001(Q) if (Attach previously not provided)
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| RMCSOperation Proposed References tobeprovided toapplicants during examination: none Learning Objective: Given plant conditions anda drawing of the controls, instrumentation and/or alarms located inthe Control Room, assess thestatus ofthe Reactor Manual Control System.
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| Question Source: Bank # 66301 Modified Bank # .
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| changes (Note .
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| orattachparent)
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| New Question History:
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| Question Cognitive Level: Memory orKnowledge 10CFRPart 55Content: 55.41(6)
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| Comments:
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| | |
| 2021NRCWritten Examination Facility: HopeCreek Vendor: GE ExamDate: 2021 ExamType: RO Examination Outline Cross-reference: Level RO SRO Tier # 1 Group # 1 K/A # 295024 EK1.01 Importance Rating 4.1 K/AStatement: Knowledge ofthe operational implications ofthe following concepts asthey apply toHIGHDRYWELL PRESSURE Drywell integrity: Plant-Specific Question: RO#39 TheDrywell Spray Initiation Limit(DWSIL) isdefined tobethehighest drywell temperature at whichinitiation ofdrywell sprays willnotresult inanevaporativecooling pressure drop tobelow the .
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| A. drywell-below-suppression pool differential pressure capability o.r thehigh drywellpressure scram setpoint.
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| B. drywell-below-suppression pool differential pressure capability o.r thesuppression chamber spray initiation pressure. .
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| C. suppression pool below reactor building differential pressure capability or thehigh drywellpressure scram setpoint.
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| D. suppression below pool reactor building differential pressure capability or thesuppression chamber spray initiationpressure.
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| Proposed Answer: A Explanation (Optional):
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| Thepurpose ofEOP-102 istomaintain primary containment integrity,and protect intheprimary equipment containment. Changes indrywell temperature candirectly effect changes inprimary containment pressure. Priortospraying the drywell, thedrywell temperature must bebelow DWSILis curve thehighest (see DWT-P attached),
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| drywell temperature which represents atwhich the initiation Drywell ofdrywell Spray sprays Initiation will Limit notresult (DWSIL).
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| inan The evaporative coolingpressure droptobelowthehigh drywell pressure scramsetpoint. Thefinal pressure following evaporative cooling islimited tothe scram setpoint toensure that theoperator has
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| 2021NRCWritten Examination time toterminate sprays before convective cooling reduces pressure below 0 psig. This prevents developing and/or exceeding thenegative design pressure oftheprimary containment (-3PSID drywell below suppression pool D/P) andensures theintegrity oftheprimary containment.
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| Suppression chamber spray istheinitial mitigation strategy employed byEOP-102 inpreference to drywell spray as itdoesnot affect electrical components inthe drywell anditcanbeused prior to reaching 9.5 psig, which istheSuppression Chamber Spray Initiation Pressure (SCSIP). Seeattached EOP-102 Drywell Pressure Leg.
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| Plausibility Justification:
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| A: Correct. TheDWSIL isthe highest drywell temperature atwhich initiationofdrywell sprays will not result inanevaporative coolingpressure drop tobelow thehigh drywell pressure scram setpoint. This prevents developing and/or exceeding thenegative design pressure ofthe primary containment (-3 PSID drywell below suppression pool D/P) andensures the integrity oftheprimary containment.
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| B: Incorrect- Eventhough Suppression Chamber Spray willbetheinitial mitigation The strategy, DWSIListhehighest drywell temperature atwhich initiationofdrywell sprays will notresult inan evaporative cooling pressure drop tobelow the thehigh drywell pressure scramsetpoint.
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| C: incorrect- Suppression chamber sprays precludes air from theReactor Building beingdrawn ifthesuppression chamber wasallowed togo negative. However,Drywell Sprays will preclude a pressure drop tobelow theprimary containment D/P of-3PSID between drywell below suppression pool.
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| D: Incorrect. Eventhough Suppression Chamber Spray willbe the initialmitigation strategy, Drywell Sprays willpreclude a pressure drop tobelow theprimary containment D/Pof-3PSID between drywell below suppression pool Technical Reference(s): HC.OP-EO.zz-0102BASES (Attach ifnot previously provided)
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| EOP-102 BASES Proposed References tobeprovided toapplicants duringexamination: none Learning Objective: Define the term "Drywell Spray Initiation Limit" Question Source: Bank# 110262 Question History:
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| Question Cognitive Level: Memory orKnowledge 10CFRPart 55Content: 55.41(5)
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| Comments:
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| 2021NRCWritten Examination Facility: HopeCreek Vendor: GE ExamDate: 2021 ExamType: RO Examination Outline Cross-reference: Level RO SRO Tier # 1 Group# 1 K/A # 295037 EK1.03 Importance Rating 4.2 K/AStatement: Knowledge ofthe operationalimplications ofthe followingconcepts asthey apply toSCRAMCONDITION PRESENT ANDREACTOR POWER ABOVEAPRM DOWNSCALE ORUNKNOWN: Boron effects onreactor power (SBLC)
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| Question: RO#40 Given:
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| a A failure toscram hasoccurred.
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| a Thecrew istaking perHC.OP-EO.zz-0101A, actions ATWSRPVControl.
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| plant Current conditions:
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| a RPVpressure isbeing maintained 800-1000 psigwith SRVs.
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| = RPVlevel isbeing maintained-100 to-50inches withreactorfeedpumps.
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| = 50%ofthe SLCTankcontents have been injectedintotheRPV.
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| = Rodsarebeing insertedmanually.
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| = 3rodsat48will NOTmove.
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| ofthefollowing Which statements correctlydescribe the current status?
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| plant A. Thereactor isshutdown andcooldown maynowcommence.
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| B. Thereactor isNOTshutdown but cooldown ispermitted becauseSLCis injecting.
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| C. Thereactor willNOTbeshutdown untilthe Cold ShutdownBoronWeighthas beeninjected.
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| D. SLCmaybesecured ifpressure ismaintained within pressure current band.
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| ' Proposed Answer: C
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| | |
| 2021NRCWritten Examination Explanation (Optionallnjection oftheCold Shutdown Boron Weight (CSBW) ofboron into theRPValso provides adequate assurance thatthereactor isandwill remain shutdown. TheCSBWistheleast weight of soluble boron which, ifinjectedinto the RPVandmixed uniformly, will maintain thereactor shutdown under all conditions. CSBW hasbeeninjected intothecore whenthere is<1100 gallons leftin the SLCtank. (See attached EOP-101A BASES).
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| Plausibility Justification:
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| A: incorrect. Cooldown isnotpermitted untilCold Shutdown Boron Weight (CSBW) isinjected or only onerodnot at00.50%ofthe tank injected intotheRPVwould equate tomore than 2000 gallons remaining inthe SLCtank. Ifanyamount ofboron less than theCSBWhasbeen injected into theRPV, thecore reactivityresponse from cooldown ina partially borated core is unpredictable andsubsequent EPGsteps maynotprescribe thecorrect actions for such conditions ifcriticalitywere to occur.
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| B: Incorrect- CSBWmustbeinjected, whichis<1100 gallons remaining intheSLCtank. 50%of thetank injected intotheRPVwould equate tomorethan 2000gallons remaining inthe SLC tank. Thecooldown ispermittedwhen CSBW isinjected orif iwtill remain shutdown without boron. Dueto3 rods fulloutit take the injection of will CSBWfor thereactor toremain shutdown.
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| C: Correct- CSBWmustbeinjected, which is<1100 gallons remaining inthe SLCtank because morethan onerod (3rods stuck at48not shutdown under all conditions) will remain fullout.
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| Tank level isnormally between 4880 gal(Hi ALARM) and 4640 gal (Lo ALARM). 50%ofthe tank injected into the RPVwould equate tomorethan 2000 gallons remaining intheSLCtank.
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| If anyamount ofboron lessthan theCSBWhasbeeninjected into this RPV,thecore reactivity response from cooldown ina partially borated core isunpredictable andsubsequent EPGsteps maynotprescribe the correctactions for such conditions ifcriticality were tooccur.
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| D: Incorrect. SBLCisnotpermitted tobesecured untilCSBWhas been injected orthe reactor will remain SDunder all conditions without boron. Dueto3rods full out it will take theinjection of CSBWfor thereactor toremain shutdown.
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| Technical Reference(s): HC.OP-EO.zz-0101ABASES (Attach if not previously provided)
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| ATWSRPVControl Proposed References tobeprovided toapplicants during examination: none Learning Objective: Given anystep oftheprocedure, explain thebasis forperformance ofthat step and/or evaluate theexpected system response tocontrol manipulations ' "
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| prescribed bythat step.
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| Question Source: Bank # 35685 Modified Bank # (Note changes orattach parent)
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| New Question History: NRC2016 Question Cognitive Level: Comprehension orAnalysis 10CFRPart 55Content: 55.41(10)
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| Comments:
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| 2021NRCWritten Examination Facility: HopeCreek Vendor: GE ExamDate: 2021 ExamType: RO .
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| Examination Outline Cross-reference: Level RO SRO Tier # 1 Group# 1 K/A # 295030 EK1.03 Importance Rating 3.8 K/AStatement: Knowledge ofthe operational implications ofthefollowing concepts asthey apply toLOWSUPPRESSION POOLWATERLEVEL: Heat capacity Question: RO#41 WhichONE(1) ofthe following isthebases for theSuppression Pool level atwhich theprimary containmentpressure allowable limits could beexceeded andsteam may notbeadequately condensed?
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| A. HPCIexhaust linebecomes uncovered.
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| B. Ventheader drain linesbecome uncovered.
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| C. Downcomers become uncovered.
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| D. Suppression PoolTechnical Specification minimum level water value.
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| Proposed Answer: C Explanation (Optional):
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| Seeattached HC.OP-EO.zz-0102 BASES PlausibilityJustification:
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| A: Incorrect.suppression If pool level cannot bemaintained above26inches, andadequate core isassured cooling theoperator isdirected tosecure HPCI. OperationoftheHPCIturbine with its unsubmerged exhaust will tend todirectly pressurize thesuppression chamber. Action is already takenatthe38.5 inch levelbased ondowncomers becoming uncovered andloosing suppression capabilities oftheSuppression pool.
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| B: Incorrect-Thethreshold of55inches wasselected asthereisa 1%inch drain attached pipe to thelowpoint ofeach oftheeight ventpipes located inthe These torus. pipes drain openinto the atanindicated torus level of50IN; thislevel isbetween thelowlevel LCOandthe level at
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| 2021NRCWritten Examination whichthe downcomers become uncovered. Itisprudent totake theanticipatoryactions to shutdown thereactor prior totheuncovering ofthese drain pipes.
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| C: Correct- Suppression pool water levelmustbemaintained above theelevation ofthe W
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| suppression pool following toensure a primary that steam system discharged break will from thedrywell beadequately into the condensed. If '
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| suppression poolwater levelcannot bemaintained above the specifiedminimum value,steam maynotbe adequately condensedandprimary containment pressure couldexceed allowable limits.
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| D: Incorrect. Whensuppression pool levellowers tobelow the TechnicalSpecification lower limit, EOP-102 provides direction touseECCSandsafety-related service water systemsand alignments notnormally used tomaintain suppression pool water level ingeneralplant procedures.
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| Technical Reference(s): HC.OP-EO.zz-0102-BASES if (Attachnot previously provided)
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| EOP-102 BASES ProposedReferences tobeprovided toapplicants during examination: none Learning Objective: Given anystep ofthe procedure, determine thereason for performance of that stepand/or predict expectedsystem response tocontrol manipulations prescribed bythat step.
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| Question Source: Bank# 2019NRCExam(#15)
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| Modified Bank # (Note changes orattachparent)
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| New Question History: 2019NRCExam Question Cognitive Le.vel: Memory orKnowledge .
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| 10CFRPart 55Content: 55.41(10)
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| Comments:
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| 2021NRCWritten Examination Facility: HopeCreek Vendor: GE ExamDate: 2021 ExamType: RO Examination Outline Cross-reference: Level RO SRO Tier # 1 Group# 1 K/A # 295038 EK2.06 Importance Rating 3.4 K/AStatement: Knowledge RELEASE oftheinterrelationsbetween HIGHOFF-SITE RATE andthe following:
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| Process liquid radiation monitoring system Question: RO#42
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| 2021NRCWritten Examination Given: ,
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| a A discharge oftheRadwaste Floor Drain SampleTankisinprogresstotheDelaware River.
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| When:
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| a The Liquid Radwaste Discharge isolation (HV-5377A)
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| Valve tothe Cooling Tower Blowdown lineautomatically closes (isolates).
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| a TheRM-11 isinalarm.
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| (Assume NOoperator action)
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| Which condition below would cause this termination whenthe (isolation) setpoint listed was reached?
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| (1) LiquidRadwaste Effluent HIGH radiation (2) CoolingTower Blowdown dilution flow LOWflow (3) LiquidRadwaste Effluent sample flow rate HIGH (4) CoolingTower Blowdown RMS HIGH radiation (5) LiquidRadwaste Effluent HIGH discharge flow A. (1)and(3) ONLY B. (2)and(5) ONLY C. (2),
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| (3) and(4) ONLY D. (1),
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| (2) and(5) ONLY ProposedAnswer: D (Optional):
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| Explanation Wastedischarge from theliquid system radwaste shall besampledbefore shall discharge, bemonitored during discharge, andshall beautomatically terminated whenthe instantaneousradioactivity concentration wouldreach 10CFR20limits foranunrestrictedareaafter IAWHC.OP-AR.SP-0001 dilution. RM-11alarm response, isolation ofHV-5377A&B isdue.
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| toanyoneof thefollowing:
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| High (HIGH radiation LEDonOSP-RI-4861)
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| HighDisch Flow (setpointdetermined byLiquid Effluent )
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| Permit LowDilutionFlow (setpointdetermined byLiquid Effluent )
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| Permit LowSample Flow (0HBFIS-4861)
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| MonitorFailure Justification:
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| Plausibility A: incorrect. Lowsample flow rate would beanisolation setpoint.
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| Thehigh sampleflow rate would besufficientfortheRMStoaccurately measure thedischarge Ievels.
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| radiation B: Incorrect-Theeffluent high radiation which isupstream ofthecooling tower blowdown RMSwill isolate the discharge before itcanreach thedownstream RMS.Thecooling towerblowdown RMSisNOTanisolation signal tothe HV-5377A&B.
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| 2021NRCWritten Examination C: Incorrect- Thehigh sample flow ratewould besufficient theRMStoaccurately for measure the discharge radiation levels.Theeffluent highradiation which isupstreamofthecooling tower blowdown RMSwill isolate the discharge before itcanreach thecoolingtower RMS.
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| blowdown The cooling towerblowdown RMSisNOTanisolation signaltotheHV-5377A&B.
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| D: Correct. With lowdilution flow andhigh discharge effluent theRMSwill flow, notbeable to accurately sample the discharge andalso dilute thedischarge theradiation toreduce sufficiently levels ofthe discharge andtherefore reach the ofhigh setpoint radiation ofthedischarge.
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| Any oneoftheseparameter/setpoints willterminate (isolate) the discharge.
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| Technical Reference(s): HC.OP-AR.SP-0001(Q) (Attachif previously not provided)
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| RM-11 Alarm Response ProposedReferences tobeprovided to applicants during examination: none Learning Objective: Summarize/identify theconditions that will cause anAutomatic Isolation ofthe Radwaste ReleaseLine (HV-5377A&B).
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| QuestionSource: Bank # 120363 Modified Bank# (Note changesorattach parent)
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| New QuestionHistory:
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| QuestionCognitive Level: Comprehension orAnalysis 10CFRPart 55Content: 55.41(13)
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| Comments:
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| | |
| 2021NRCWritten Examination Facility: HopeCreek Vendor: GE ExamDate: 2021
| |
| ~
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| 'Exam Type:RO Examination Outline Cross-reference: Level RO SRO Tier # 1 Group # 1 K/A # 295003 AK2.02 Importance Rating 4.1 K/AStatement: Knowledge ofthe interrelationsbetween PARTIAL ORCOMPLETE LOSSOF A.C. POWER andthe following: Emergency generators.
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| Question: RO#43 Given:
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| = Theplant isina normal ACelectrical line up.
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| a The10A403 bustrips duetoa BUSDIFFERENTIAL OVERCURRENT.
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| Which ofthe following describes howthis affects the "C"Emergency DieselGenerator andits breaker?
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| output A. Thediesel canbemanually started andtheoutput breaker mustbemanually closed. .
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| B. Thediesel islocked outandtheoutput breakerislocked out.
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| C. Thediesel willautomaticallystart andtheoutput mustbemanually breaker closed.
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| D. Thediesel willautomaticallystart andthe output breaker willautomaticallyclose.
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| Proposed Answer: B
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| 2021NRCWritten Examination Explanation (Optional): TheEDGlockout iscomprised circuitry ofregular, backup, andtest lockouts.
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| Whenenergized, theregular lockout relaywillinitiate thefollowing actions: Trip andlockout theDiesel engine.Trip and lockout the Generator breaker. Enable Generator breaker failure protection.
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| Regular lockout relay (86R) actuation resultsfrom the following signals: Generator differential overcurrent, Bus differential overcurrent, Engineoverspeed, andLowlube oil pressure Emergency stop PB.Loss of the 10A403 1ESwitchgear abnormal HC.OP-AB.22-0172 will beentered alongwith other various abnormal procedures forthe affected (see systems attached).
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| Plausibility Justification:
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| A: Incorrect. Withoutthe 86R reset (will notreset with theBUSDifferential condition still the in),
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| EDGandits output breaker willNOTbeable tostart andclose eitherAutomatically ormanually.
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| Thestudent could decipher that the EDGisnot affected only the10A403 switchgear (bus).
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| B: Correct With the86Renergized the EDGwill belocked outalong with the output The breaker.
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| 10A403 buswill bede-energizedand theappropriate affected systems abnormal procedures will beentered.
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| C: Incorrect- TheEDGwill belocked outfrom the 86Renergizedduetothe BUSDIFFERENTIAL.
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| Thestudent could decipher thatthe EDGisnot affected only the10A403 switchgear (bus).
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| D: incorrect. Without the 86Rreset (will not resetwith the BUSDifferential condition still in),
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| the EDGandits output breaker willNOTbeable tostart and close Automatically. Thestudent could decipher that theEDGisnotaffected only the10A403switchgear (bus).
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| Technical Reference(s): HC.OP-SO.PB-0001(Q) 4.16 KV (Attach ifnot previously provided)
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| HC.OP-SO.KJ-0001(Q) EDG HC.OP-AB.22-0172(Q) 10A403 Proposed References tobeprovided toapplicants during examination: none Learning Objective: Frommemory, summarize/identify the response ofthe4.16KV busses toeach of the following conditions:
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| BusDifferential Overcurrent .
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| Given plant condi^tions, determine the automatic actionswhich resultfromthe following:
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| Diesel Generator regularorbackup lockout energized.
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| Question Source: Bank # 33973 Modified Bank # (Note changes orattach parent)
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| New Question History:
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| Question Cognitive Level: Memory orKnowledge 10CFRPart 55Content: 55.41(7)
| |
| Comments:
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| | |
| 2021NRCWritten Examination Facility: HopeCreek Vendor: GE ExamDate: 2021 ExamType: RO Examination OutlineCross-reference: Level RO SRO Tier # 1 Group# 1 K/A # 600000 AK2.03 Importance Rating 2.5 K/AStatement: Knowledge oftheinterrelationsbetween PLANT FIREONSITEandthe following:Motors.
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| Question: RO#44
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| | |
| 2021NRCWritten Examination Given:
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| a Theplant isoperating at100%power.
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| When :
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| a OHA A2-A5 FIREPROTPANEL10C671 isreceived.
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| a TheFire Computer screen shows afire inroom4303.
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| = Controlboard walkdownreveals that 'D' RHRpumphasspuriously started.
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| = NOother control room OHAalarms have beenreceived.
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| a NOother equipment hasspuriously started.
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| a Theoperators havesecured the 'D'RHRpump.
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| Which oneofthe following action(s) is (are)requiredfor thiscondition IAWHC.OP-AB.FIRE-0001, FIRE- Spurious Operations?
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| A. Place the'D'RHRpumpbreaker control switch ANDIockout inpull-to-lock the 'D' EDGbypressing both emergency stoppush buttons.
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| B. Place the'D'RHRpumpbreakercontrol switch inpull-to-lock C. Place the'D'Core Spray and'D' RHRpump breaker switches control inpull-to-lock.
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| D. Place the'D'Core Spray and'D' RHRpumpbreaker control switches inpull-to-lock ANDlockout the'D' EDGbypressing both emergency stoppush buttons.
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| Proposed Answer: B Explanation (Optional): Seeattached HC.OP-AB.FIRE-0001 Condition E andAttachment2. Spurious ofD Channel Activation equipment. . .
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| Plausibility Justification:
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| A: Incorrect. Oncethepumpissecured toprevent it from restartingbecause ofthefiredamage thepumpbreaker hastobetaken toPTL,theprocedure would requirethattheassociated EDG locked outonly ifthe'D' Core Spray pumpspuriously started.
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| B: Correct- With the spurious start attributedtothe damage fire the AB.FIRE-0001Condition E hasthe operators put the 'D'RHRpumpbreaker intoPTL.
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| C: Incorrect- IAWAB-Fire-0001 Condition Etherequired actions only pertaintotheequipment that spuriouslystarted. Eventhough the'D'Core Spray pumpisonthe NOTstart, samechannel (same roomaffected attachment 2)theCoreSpray pumpdid thepumpbreaker therefore does notneed tobeinPTL.
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| D: Incorrect. IAWAB-Fire-0001 Condition E therequired actions only pertain totheequipment that spuriouslystarted. TheCore Spray pumpdid NOTstart; therefore, thepumpbreaker does notneedtobeinPTL.Inaddition, the'D' EDGwill NOThave tobelocked out (seecondition E).
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| | |
| 2021NRCWritten Examination Technical Reference(s): HC.OP-AB.FIRE-0001(Q) (Attach if previously not provided)
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| FIRE- Spurious Operation Proposed References tobeprovided toapplicants duringexamination: none Learning Objective: Given plant conditions andplant procedures, determine required actions of the retainment override(s) andsubsequent operator actions inaccordance with the Fire -
| |
| Spurious Operations.
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| Question Source: Bank#
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| ModifiedBank # orattach changes (Note parent)
| |
| New X Question History:
| |
| ~
| |
| Question Cognitive Level: Comprehension orAnalysis 10CFRPart 55Content: 55.41(10)
| |
| Comments:
| |
| | |
| 2021NRCWritten Examination Facility: HopeCreek Vendor: GE ExamDate: 2021 ExamType:RO Examination Outline Cross-reference: Level RO SRO Tier # 1 Group# 1 K/A # 295004 AK3.02 Importance Rating 2.9 K/AStatement: Knowledge ofthereasons for the following responses asthey apply to PARTIAL ORCOMPLETE LOSSOFD.C. POWER: Ground isolation/fault determination.
| |
| Question: RO#45 Which ofthefollowing correctlydescribes the indication ofa direct negative short toground on oneofthe 125VDC class 1Epower supplies (10D410)?
| |
| A. A negative ground current willbeonly indicated onpanel 1AD417.
| |
| B. Both white lights onpanel 10D410 will bebrighter than normal.
| |
| C. A negative ground current willbeindicated onControl Roompanel 10C650D.
| |
| D. Both white onpanel lights 10D410 will bedimmer than normal.
| |
| Proposed Answer: C Explanation (Optional):Switchgear grounddetection lights: Normally both lightsare dim. Ifa ground exists, onelight willdimandtheother willbebrighter. Brightness isdetermined bymagnitude of ground. LOCAL/REMOTE ground detectionammeter selector switch.Located ontheassociated distribution panel. InLOCAL,indication ofaground (positive ornegative) ontherespective switchgear/distribution panel willbeprovided onthedistribution panel DCground detection ammeter. InREMOTE,indication ofa ground (positiveornegative) ontherespective switchgear/distribution panel willbeprovided oncontrol roompanel 10C650D.
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| | |
| 2021NRCWritten Examination Plausibility Justification:
| |
| A: Incorrect. InREMOTE,indication ofa ground (positiveornegative) ontherespective switchgear/distribution panel beprovided will oncontrol roompanel 10C650D.
| |
| B: Incorrect- Onelight will bedimandthe other willbebrighter ona ground(positive ornegative).
| |
| C: Correct- LOCAL/REMOTE ground detection ammeter selector switch.Located onthe associateddistribution panel. InREMOTE,indication ofa ground ornegative)
| |
| (positive onthe respective switchgear/distribution panelwillbeprovided oncontrol roompanel 10C650D.
| |
| D: incorrect. Normally both lightsare dim.Ifaground exists, will onelight dimandtheother be will brighter.
| |
| Technical Reference(s): HC.OP-AB.zz-0147(Q) (Attach ifnotpreviously provided)
| |
| D.C. System Grounds Proposed References tobeprovided toapplicants during examination: none Learning Objective: Explain thereasons forhowplant/system parameters respond whenimplementing, DCSystem Grounds, Abnormal Operating Procedure.
| |
| Given a setofplant conditions evaluate those conditions anddetermine ifa D.C.
| |
| ground exists.
| |
| Question Source: Bank# X Modified Bank# (Notechanges or attach parent)
| |
| New Question History:
| |
| Question Cognitive Level: Memory orKnowledge 10CFRPart 55Content: 55.41(5)
| |
| Comments:
| |
| | |
| 2021NRCWritten Examination Facility: HopeCreek Vendor: GE ExamDate: 2021, ExamType:RO Examination Outline Cross-reference: Level RO SRO Tier # 1 Group# 1 K/A # 295001 AK3.03 Importance Rating 2.8 K/AStatement: Knowledge ofthe reasons for thefollowing responses asthey apply to PARTIAL ORCOMPLETE LOSSOFFORCED CORE FLOW CIRCULATION :Idle flow loop Question: RO#46 Given:
| |
| = Theplant isoperating at100%power.
| |
| When:
| |
| = The"B" Reactor RecirculationPumptrips duetoaVariable Frequency Drive (VFD)fault.
| |
| Immediately following the the transient, plant stabilizes withthefollowingparameters:
| |
| = ReactorPower isat50%rated.
| |
| = "B"Reactor Recirculation Pumpistripped.
| |
| = "A"Reactor Recirculation Pumpspeed isat45%.
| |
| = JetPumpLoop "B"Flow (FI-R611B-B21) isat4 Mlbm/lhr.
| |
| = JetPumpLoop "A" Flow (Fl-R6.11A-B21) isat38.5Mlbm/hr.
| |
| = JetPumpFlow Recorder (FR-R613-B21) isat33.1Mlbm/hr.
| |
| core Whatisactual flow (WT)?
| |
| A. 42.5 Mlbm/hr., becauseflow inthe idle isnegative loop (reverse) flow.
| |
| B. 35.1 MIbm/hr., becauseflow intheidle loop isnegative (reverse) flow.
| |
| C. 35.1 Mlbm/hr., becauseflow intheidle loop ispositive flow.
| |
| (forward)
| |
| D. 42.5 Mlbm/hr., becauseflow intheidle ispositive loop (forward)flow.
| |
| Proposed Answer: D
| |
| | |
| 2021NRCWritten Examination Explanation (Optional): During single loop operations, the total core flow maybeincorrect.
| |
| indication This is due to the subtraction network inthe core flowinstrument subtracting outflow fromthesecured loopwhen this flow maybe FORWARD FLOWnot reverse flow. If operating looprecircdrive flow (loop flow) is<23,000 gpm[speed is<48%), theflow intheidle loopis positive (forward) flow. Theidle loop jet pump flow andtheoperating loop jet pumpflow should beadded toobtain actual core flow. IFOperating Recirc Loop flow 5 23Kgpm. DETERMINE Actual Core Flow byADDINGIdle Loop Jet PumpFlowAND Operating Loop Jet PumpFlow. (Fl-R611A-B21 andFl-R611B-B21)
| |
| IFOperating Recirc Loop flow > 23Kgpm. THEN:DETERMINE Actual Core Flow bySUBTRACTING 85%ofidle LoopJetPump Flow FROMOperating loop JetPumpFlow
| |
| [Fl-R611A(B)-B21 -
| |
| (0.85x FI-R611B(A)-B21))
| |
| VERIFY proper function ofthe subtraction circuit bychecking that calculated core flow (stepA6) isthe sameasTotal Jet PumpFlow (FR-R13-B21 OR A190).
| |
| Plausibility Justification:
| |
| A: Incorrect. Ifoperating loop recirc drive flow (loop flow) is<23,000 gpm[speed is<48%), the flow inthe idle loop ispositive (forward) flow. The idle loop jet p ump flowand theo perating loop jetpumpflow should beadded toobtain actual core flow of42.5 MIbm/hr.
| |
| B: Incorrect- IFOperating Recirc Loop flow > 23 Kgpm. THEN:DETERMINE Actual CoreFlow by SUBTRACTING 85%ofIdle LoopJetPumpFlow FROM Operating loop JetPumpFlow
| |
| [Fl-R611A (B)-B21 -
| |
| (0.85xFl-R611B (A)-B21)) [38.5 (.85)4)
| |
| - = 35.1 Mlbm/hr.
| |
| Theoperating loop recircdrive flow (loop flow)is<23,000 gpm [speed is<48%), thei flow inthe idle loop ispositive (forward) flow. Theidle loop jetpump flow and theoperating loop jet pump flow should beaddedtoobtain actual core flowof42.5 Mlbm/hr.
| |
| C: Incorrect- Theidle loop jetpumpflow andthe operating loop jet pump flow should beadded to obtain actual core flow. ,
| |
| D: Correct. Theoperating loop recirc drive flow(loop flow) is<23,000 gpm[speed is<48%),the flow intheidle loop ispositive (forward) flow. Theidle loop jet pumpflow and the operating loop jetpumpflow should beadded toobtain actual core flow of42.5 MIbm/hr.
| |
| Technical Reference(s): HC.OP-AB.RPV-0003(Q) (Attach ifnotpreviously provided)
| |
| Recirc System/Power Oscillati.ons Proposed References tobeprovided toapplicants during examination: none Learning Objective: Explain the reasons for howplant/system parameters respond whenimplementing Recirculation System/Power Oscillations.
| |
| Question Source: Bank#
| |
| Modified Bank # (Note changes orattach parent)
| |
| New X Question History:
| |
| Question Cognitive Level: Comprehension orAnalysis 10CFRPart 55Content: 55.41(10) . .
| |
| Comments:
| |
| | |
| 2021NRCWritten Examination Facility: HopeCreek Vendor: GE ExamDat,e: 2021 ExamType: RO Examination Outline Cross-reference: Level RO SRO Tier # 1 Group# 1 K/A # 700000 AK3.02 importance Rating 3.6 K/AStatement: Knowledge ofthereasons for the following responses asthey applyto GENERATOR VOLTAGE ANDELECTRIC GRIDDISTURBANCES: Actions contained in abnormal operating procedure for andgrid voltage disturbances.
| |
| Question: RO#47
| |
| | |
| 2021NRCWritten Examination Given:
| |
| = TheReactor isat16%power.
| |
| = A plant startup isinprogress.
| |
| When:
| |
| An SMD (Solar Magnetic Disturbance) AlertofK7occurs.
| |
| ESOC Excess MVARSisinalarm.
| |
| = DCNeutral Ground Current isinalarm.
| |
| = HC.OP-AB.BOP-0004, Grid Disturbances, isentered.
| |
| Then:
| |
| BX500Main Power Transformer Oil Temperatureexceeds theMaxPeakSetpoint.
| |
| Which ofthefollowing action(s) is(are) required IAWHC.OP-AB.BOP-0004, Grid Disturbance?
| |
| A. LOCKtheModeSwitch inSHUTDOWN ONLYduetoexceeding Main Power Transformer Oil Temperature.
| |
| B. REDUCE Recirc. Pumpspeed tominimum, LOCKtheModeSwitch in SHUTDOWN, andTRIPtheMain Turbine duetoExcess MVARSinalarm.
| |
| C. REDUCE Recirc. Pumpspeed tominimum and LOCK the ModeSwitch in SHUTDOWN ONLYduetoExcess MVARSin alarm.
| |
| D. TRIPthe Main Turbine ONLYduetoexceeding Main Power Transformer Oil Temperature.
| |
| Proposed Answer: D Explanation (Optional):Seeattached HC.OP-AB.BOP-0004 ConditionC Plausibility Justification:
| |
| A: Incorrect.With Reactor power <18%andtheMaxpeaktemperature setpoint reached IAW AB.BOP-0004 Condition C,Trip oftheMain Turbine isthe action only needed. <18%locking the modeswitch inshutdown isNOTrequired atthis power level.
| |
| Thereactor will still beatpower.
| |
| B: incorrect-With Reactor power >18%andthe oil temperature atMaxPeak Setpoint, thenIAW AB.BOP-0004 Condition C runrecirc tominimum, lock theM.S.inshutdown andthen tripthe mainturbine.
| |
| C: Incorrect- With Reactor power >18%andtheoil temperature atMaxPeakSetpoint, then IAW AB.BOP-0004 Condition C runrecirc tominimum, lock theM.S.inshutdown andthen tripthe main turbine.With Reactor power <18%andtheMaxpeak temperature setpoint reached IAW AB.BOP-0004 Condition C,Trip oftheMainTurbine isthe only action needed.
| |
| D: Correct. With Reactor power <18%andtheMaxpeaktemperature setpoint reached IAW AB.BOP-0004 Condition C,Trip ofthe Main Turbine isrequiredremoving themaingenerator fromthe gridandthe mainpower transformers.
| |
| | |
| 2021NRCWritten Examination Technical Reference(s): HC.OP-AB.BOP-0004(Q) if (Attach previously not provided)
| |
| Grid Disturbances Proposed References tobeprovided toapplicants during examination: none .
| |
| Learning Objective: Given plant conditions andplant procedures, determine required of actions the retainment andsubsequent override(s) operator actions in accordance with Grid Disturbances.
| |
| Question Source: Bank #
| |
| Modified Bank # (Note changes orattach parent)
| |
| New X Question History:
| |
| Question Cognitive Level: Comprehension orAnalysis 10CFRPart 55Content: 55.41(10)
| |
| Comments:
| |
| | |
| 2021NRCWritten Examination Facility: HopeCreek Vendor: GE ExamDate: 2021 ExamType: RO Examination Outline Cross-reference: Level RO SRO Tier # 1 Group# 1 K/A # 295026 EA1.03 Importance Rating 3.9 K/AStatement: tooperate Ability and/or monitorthe following asthey apply toSUPPRESSION POOLHIGHWATERTEMPERATURE: Temperature monitoring Question: RO#48 Given:
| |
| a Theplant isoperating at70%power.
| |
| CoreIsolation Reactor Cooling (RCIC) isoperating intheCSTtoCST mode ofoperation IAWHC.OP-IS.BD-0001(Q) -
| |
| Reactor Core isolation Pump OP203 Inservice Cooling - -
| |
| Test.
| |
| Suppression pool temperature is89Fandrising.
| |
| Pool Suppression cooling isinservice.
| |
| HC.OP-EO.zz-0102, Primary Containment Control, will beentered ONLYifSuppression Pool Average WaterTemperature reaches andcontinues torise onpanel asmonitored section (temperature recorder)
| |
| A. 95F;10C650E CAS(TR-4967 A1/B1- Suppression ChamberAtmosphericTemperature)
| |
| B. 105F;10C650C PAM(TR-3881 A1/B1- Suppression PoolTemperature)
| |
| C. 105F;10C650E CAS(TR-4967 A1/B1- Suppression ChamberAtmosphericTemperature)
| |
| D. 95F;10C650C PAM(TR-3881 A1/B1- Suppression PoolTemperature)
| |
| Proposed Answer: B
| |
| | |
| 2021NRCWritten Examination Explanation (Optional):EOPsare entered whenever anentry condition issatisfied, unless theentry condition istheresult ofa planned maintenance activity orapproved procedure. Theplanned maintenance orapproved procedure must evaluate the impact ofNOTperforming the EOPactions atthe entry condition setpoint. If suppression pool temperature isexceeded during theperformance oftesting fortwospecific system testing procedures: HC.OP-IS.BJ-0001(Q) andHC.OP-IS.BD-0001(Q) andno other heat input to the suppression pool exists,then entry into EOP-102 isnotrequired. Specific guidance forEOP-102 entry ata suppression pool temperature of105*F under these conditions is provided inthese procedures. Thespecific TR recorders that theoperators usetodetermine the Average SuppressionPool temperature areonthe10C650C (see PAMsection attached table) and this isalso IAWtheDL-26Attachment 3m (see attached). Duetothe variations intemperatures ofthe Suppression pool because ofthe large volume,Suppression Pool Average Water Temperature needs to bemonitored.
| |
| Plausibility Justification:
| |
| A: Incorrect. 95*F isthe normalEOP-102 entry temperature; however IAWT.S, EOPBases, and the In-service test procedure (IS.BD-0001), 105*F andcontinuing toriseisthe entry intoEOP-102with the given conditions. IAWthe DL-26 Attachment 3mfor Suppression Chamber Average Water temperature check, the TR-3881 A1/B1 on10C650C PAMsection isused.
| |
| B: Correct- 105*F andcontinuing torise istheentry intoEOP-102with thegiven conditions. IAW theDL-26 Attachment 3mfor Suppression Chamber Average Water temperature check,the TR-3881A1/B1 on10C650C PAMsection isused.
| |
| C: Incorrect- IAWtheDL-26 Attachment 3mfor Suppression Chamber Average Water temperature check, the TR-3881 A1/B1 on10C650C PAMsection isused.
| |
| D: Incorrect. 95*F isthe normal EOP-102 entry temperature; however IAWT.S, EOPBases, and theIn-service procedure test (IS.BD-0001), 105*F andcontinuing to rise istheentry intoEOP-102with the given conditions.
| |
| Technical Reference(s): HC.OP-EO.zz-0102BASES (Attach ifnotpreviously provided)
| |
| HC.OP-IS.BD-0001- RCIC HC.OP-DL.zz-0026 Att.3m T.S. 3.6.2.1 Suppression Chamber Proposed References tobeprovided toapplicants during examination: none Learning Objective: Given plant conditions, recognize thefive (5) entry conditions forthePrimary Containment Control Emergency Operating Procedure IAWHC.OP-EO.zz-0102 Question Source: Bank#
| |
| Modified Bank # #13on2019 *(ModifiedtofittheK/A)
| |
| New Question History:
| |
| Question Cognitive Level: Memory orKnowledge 10CFRPart 55Content: 55.41(7)
| |
| Comments:
| |
| | |
| 2021NRCWritten Examination Facility: HopeCreek Vendor: GE ExamDate: 2021 ExamType: RO ' '
| |
| )
| |
| Examination Outline Cross-reference: Level RO SRO Tier # 1 Group# 1 K/A # 295023 AA1.07 Importance Rating 3.6 K/AStatement: Ability tooperate monitorthe following asthey and/or apply toREFUELING ACCIDENTS: Fuel pool cooling andcleanup system Question: RO#49 Given:
| |
| = Theplant isina refueling outage performing fuel movesinthespentfuel pool.
| |
| = 'A'FuelPool Cooling (FPCC) pumpisinservice cooling thefuelpool.
| |
| = 'B'FPCCpumpisinstandby.
| |
| Then: '
| |
| = A pipebreak occurs, which results inatrip ofthe'A' FPCCpumpanda significant loss of fuel poolinventory.
| |
| TheIMMEDIATE operator action IAWHC.OP-AB.COOL-0004(Q), FuelPoolCooling isto A. evacuate theRefuel Floor andreturn theirradiated assembly fuel tothe vessel orpool.
| |
| B. addwater tothe fuel pool from Condensate Suppression Transfer, Pool via RHR,Fire Water, orService Water.
| |
| C. place 'B'FPCCpumpinservice, andverify actual fuelpooltemperature remains bounded within projected heat-up curves.
| |
| D. check linerdrains tolocatethe leakage path.
| |
| | |
| 2021NRCWritten Examination Proposed Answer: A Explanation (Optional): Seeattached HC.OP-AB.COOL-0004, FuelPool for Cooling 1.O.Aand subsequent operator actions.
| |
| Plausibility Justification:
| |
| A: Correct. Due tothe concerns ofALARA(radiation exposure)ofpersonnelontherefuel floor, the IMMEDIATE action is toevacuate thosepersonnel anyfuel andreturn backtoits original position ineither the vessel orpool for shieldingpurposes. Theother areappropriate actions to help mitigate the issue; however they arenottheIMMEDIATE concern.
| |
| B: incorrect-sources that Subsequent operator action canbeused to make uptothe for lowering skimmer fuel pool surge tank; (see level attached).
| |
| howeverthis These isnot the areall IMMEDIATE concern.
| |
| C: Incorrect- This isasubsequent operator action inHC.OP-AB.COOL-0004(Q) for loss offuel pool heat removal capability. Thisaction would certainlytakeplace;howeverthisisnot the IMMEDIATE concern.
| |
| D: Incorrect. This isa subsequent operatoraction in HC.OP-AB.COOL-0004(Q) for lossoffuel pool inventory. This isnot theIMMEDIATE concern.
| |
| Technical Reference(s): HC.OP-AB.COOL-0004(Q) notpreviously (Attachif provided)
| |
| Fuel Pool Cooling Proposed References tobeprovided toapplicantsduring examination: none Learning Objective: Frommemory, recallthe Immediate Operator Actions for agiven Abnormal Operating Procedure.
| |
| Question Source:Bank # .
| |
| #50onNRC2016 . . .
| |
| Modified Bank # (Note changes.or attachparent)
| |
| New Question History: NRC2016 Question Cognitive Level: Memory orKnowledge 10CFRPart 55Content: 55.41(10)
| |
| Comments:
| |
| / '
| |
| | |
| 2021NRCWritten Examination HopeCreek Facility:
| |
| Vendor: GE ExamDate: 2021 ExamType: RO ExaminationOutline Cross-reference: Level RO SRO Tier # 1 Group# 1 K/A # 295025 EA1.05 Importance Rating 3.7 K/AStatement: Ability tooperate and/or monitorthe following asthey apply toHIGH REACTOR PRESSURE: RCIC Question: RO#50
| |
| | |
| 2021NRCWritten Examination Given:
| |
| = Theplant wasoperating at100%power.
| |
| When:
| |
| = A reactor scram occurred.
| |
| Tenminutesafter thescram:
| |
| = An MSIVIsolation occurred.
| |
| = With the high reactor pressure condition,RCICisplaced inpressure control augmented bySRVs IAWHC.OP-AB.zz-0001, Transient Plant Conditions.
| |
| = With theRCICflow controller inAUTO,the plant operator (PO) observes RCICspeed oscillations.
| |
| Which ofthe following explains the RCIC speed oscillations?
| |
| A. Swings inRPVpressure areoccurring duetothe methods being used forpressure control. This causes theRCICspeed tochange asthecontroller maintains a constant flow.
| |
| B. Inpressure control, theRCICcontroller attempts tomaintaina constant speed,but CANNOTrespond fast enough tomaintainspeed asthe RPVpressure changes.
| |
| C. Using RCICfor pressure controlisinherently less stable than using itforlevel control duetothe lower pressure intheCSTcompared tothe RPV.Thegreater instabilityisseen asanincrease inoscillations.
| |
| D. Thecomparatively sma'll CSTvolume results intheRCICsuction anddischarge points intheCSTbeing close together, andathigh flow theturbulence causes oscillations.
| |
| Proposed Answer: A Explanation(Optional): MANUALInthis modetheoperator sets desired RCICturbine speed.
| |
| Placing RCICflow control inMANresults inanopenloop controlwith the flow controlleroutput becominga fixed speed demand. Although this willprovide stable, constant turbine speed, anoperator will have to maintain desired vessel injection flow rate.
| |
| AUTOMATICIntheautomatic modeRCICturbine speedisautomatically adjusted tomaintain RCICpumpdischarge desired flow established bytheoperator. So,asthe steam pressurechanges (SRVcycling) tothe RCICsystem, the speed hastochange tomaintain thedischarge flow.The would operators observe thisoperation ofthe RCICsystem with a high reactor pressure condition that controlled wasbeing byRCICalong with theSRVs.Theflow controller willnormally beinAUTO.
| |
| Plausibility Justification:
| |
| A: Correct. AstheSRVscycle thereactor pressure willchange, thischanges thesteam pressure.to operate theRCICpump. Tomaintain theconstant flow, thespeed must change. This wouldbea normal condition andobservation bytheplant operatorwhile monitoring theRCICsystem with theflow controller inAUTO.
| |
| | |
| 2021NRCWritten Examination B: Incorrect- InAUTOthe controller maintains flow andinmanual itmaintainsspeed.The candidate mayreverse themethods ofRCICcontrol.
| |
| C: Incorrect- Thecontroller isequally stable inthepressure andlevel control modes.The candidate maybelieve that the operation ofRCICinother than itsdesign function ofinjecting tothe core isless stable.
| |
| D: Incorrect. The CSThasa relatively small volume compared tothe Pool Suppression butit doesnotresult in oscillations. Theoperator mayaccept that the smaller volume flow results in suction/discharge interaction.
| |
| Technical Reference(s):HC.OP-AB.zz-0001(Q) Transient(Attach if notpreviously provided)
| |
| Conditions HC.OP-SO.BD-0001(Q) RCIC ProposedReferences tobeprovided to applicants during examination: none Learning Objective: Given a labeled diagram/drawing ofthe RCICSystem controls/indication bezel:
| |
| Explain the effect ofeach control onthe RCICSystem. Summarizeplant conditions orpermissives required for the control switches toperform their intended function.
| |
| Question Source: Bank # 119950 Modified Bank# (Note changes orattach parent)
| |
| New QuestionHistory:
| |
| QuestionCognitive Level: Comprehension orAnalysis 10CFRPart 55Content: 55.41(7)
| |
| Comments:
| |
| | |
| 2021NRCWritten Examination Facility: HopeCreek Vendor: GE ExamDate: 2021 ExamType: RO Examination OutlineCross-reference: Level RO SRO Tier # 1 Group# 1 K/A # 295006 AA2.04 Importance Rating 4.1 K/AStatement: todetermine Ability and/or interpret the following as they applytoSCRAM :
| |
| Reactor pressure Question: RO#51 Given:
| |
| = Theplant isoperating at100%power.
| |
| Then:
| |
| = 2 ofthe3 DEHCSteamHeader Pressure transmitters (PT-1001A
| |
| & PT-1001B) slowly driftUPSCALE.
| |
| With NOoperator action, theplantwillscram asreactor pressure (1)ANDthe Components/Systems availableforreactor pressure control following the scram include
| |
| . (2) .
| |
| A. (1) lowers (2) Bypass Valves,RCIC B. (1) lowers (2) SRVs,HPCI C. (1) rises (2) SRVs,HPCI D. (1) rises (2) Bypass Valves,RCIC Proposed Answer: B
| |
| | |
| 2021NRCWritten Examination Explanation (Optional):Twoofthe three DEHCpressure transmitters drifting upscale will cause the Turbine Control/Bypass valves toopenresulting inanUncontrolled Lowering ofRPVpressure. With theMode switch remaininginRUNandNOoperator action, asreactor pressure lowers to756psig, the MSIVs will close, the will reactor scram (MSlVs 8% closed RPS setpoint), and the b ypass valves will be unavailablefor pressure control. SRVs,RCICandHPCIwill beused for pressure control inthissituation.
| |
| Plausibility Justification:
| |
| A: Incorrect. With the twoDEHC pressure transmitters driftingUPSCALE, thehigh reactor pressure signalinput toDEHCwill cause the Turbine Control andBypass Valves toopen. This will cause anactual uncontrolled lowering ofactual reactor pressure. With nooperator action, thereactor pressurewill reach the setpoint of756#for theMSIVstoisolate andthereactor scrams. With theMSIVs isolated, thebypass valves will nolonger control pressure.
| |
| B: Correct-With thetwoDEHC pressure transmitters drifting UPSCALE, the high reactor pressure signal input toDEHC willcause the Turbine Control andBypass Valves toopen. This willcause anactual uncontrolled lowering of actual reactor pressure. With nooperator action, the reactor pressure will reachthe setpoint of756# forthe MSIVs toisolate andthe reactor scrams. Turbine Control andBypass valves willnolonger control reactor pressure. Reactor pressure will be controlled with SRVs, HPCI, andRCIC.
| |
| C: Incorrect- Thestudent could interpret the transmitter failureas'a high pressure condition, which will scram thereactor at1037#. Since reactor pressure actually lowers andwith no operator action, thereactor pressure willreach the setpoint of 756# for theMSIVs toisolate and thereactor scrams. Turbine Control andBypass valves will nolonger control reactor pressure.
| |
| Reactor pressure will becontrolled with SRVs,HPCI, and RCIC.
| |
| D: Incorrect. Thestudent could interpret thetransmitter failureas a high pressure condition, which will scram thereactor at1037#. Since reactor pressure actuaIlylowers andwith nooperator action, thereactor pressure willreach thesetpoint of756# fortheMSIVs toisolateandthe reactor scrams. Withthe MSIVs isolated, the bypass valves will nolonger control pressure.
| |
| Technical Reference(s): HC.OP-AB.RPV-0005(Q) (Attach ifnot previously provided)
| |
| Reactor Pressure Proposed References tobeprovided toapplicants during.
| |
| examination: none Learning Objective: Given plant conditions andaccess to control roomreferences (EHC Logic simplified drawing), determine system response tothe following:
| |
| Loss ofpressure orspeed signal inputs.
| |
| Question Source: Bank# 151506 Modified Bank # (Note changes orattach parent)
| |
| New Question History:
| |
| Question Cognitive Level: Comprehension orAnalysis 10CFRPart 55Content: 55.41(7) .
| |
| Comments:
| |
| | |
| 2021NRCWritten Examination Facility: HopeCreek Vendor: GE ExamDate: 2021 ExamType: RO Examination Outline Cross-reference: Level RO SRO Tier # 1 Group # 1 K/A # 295005 AA2.03 importance Rating 3.1 K/AStatement: todetermine Ability and/orinterpret the following asthey toMAIN apply TURBINE GENERATOR TRIP:Turbine valve position Question: RO#52 Given:
| |
| a Theplant isoperating at50%power.
| |
| a TheMainTurbine FirstStage Pressure isat243psig.
| |
| When:
| |
| a A maingenerator loadreject occurs.
| |
| = Thecrew enters theapplicable plant procedures.
| |
| Which ofthefollowing are theimmediate responses ofthe Control Turbine Valves (TCVs),
| |
| Valves Intercept (IVs) andtheReactor Protection System (RPS)?
| |
| A. TheTCVsandIVsFast Close.
| |
| RPSwill trip.
| |
| B. TheTCVsandIVs Fast Close.
| |
| RPSwill NOTtrip.
| |
| C. TheTCVsandIVs Throttle Close.
| |
| RPSwill trigi D. TheTCVsandIVs Throttle Close.
| |
| RPSwill NOTtrip.
| |
| Proposed Answer: A
| |
| | |
| 2021NRCWritten Examination Explanation (Optional):If a power-to-load unbalance (PLU) (alsocalled a loadreject)occurs:Theload signal isimmediately set tominimum (DigitalEHC). Thecontrol valve andintercept valvefast acting solenoids areactuated. A direct turbine trip isgenerated. This isdone toprevent theturbine overspeed condition that could result from a sudden loss ofsignificant generatorload. Withpower>30%,
| |
| thereactor will scram, RPSwill trip withfirststage pressure >98.1psig withaTCVfast closure.
| |
| Plausibility Justification:
| |
| A: Correct. With a power-to-load unbalance (PLU) condition,thefast actingsolenoidsforBOTH the TCVsand IVs willactuate causing a fast closure ofthe turbine valves.Also, the through digitalEHCsystem this will bea direct turbine trip. With power >30%, this will bea reactor scram. RPSwill trip with first stage pressure >98.1 psigwith theTCVfast closure.
| |
| B: Incorrect- With a power-to-load unbalance (PLU) condition,the fastactingsolenoidsforBOTH the TCVsandIVs will actuate causing a fast closure ofthe turbine valves.RPSWILLtrip dueto theTCVfast closure andpower level/first stage pressure.
| |
| C: Incorrect-With a normal turbine runback, theturbine valves would throttle, however, thePLU willinput a minimum value (0) intothe DEHC causing adirect turbine with trip ofthe activation fastacting solenoids for the TCVsandIVs.
| |
| D: incorrect. With a normal turbine runback, the turbine valves would throttle, however, thePLU willinput a minimum value (0) intothe DEHC causing a directturbine trip with activation ofthe fastacting solenoids for theTCVsandIVs. Withthe power level andfirst stage RPS pressure, WILLtrip.
| |
| Technical Reference(s): HC.OP-AR.zz-0014/0020 (Attach ifnotpreviouslyprovided)
| |
| HC.OP-BOP-0002 Main Turbine HC.OP-SO.SB-0001 RPS Proposed References tobeprovided toapplicants during examination: none Learning Objective: Regarding a power-to-load unbalance signal:
| |
| Determine whenthe power-to-load unbalance circuitisenabled/disabled.
| |
| Choose theparameters monitored to initiate the signal.
| |
| Explain whythis signal isgenerated.
| |
| Question Source: Bank# 119986 Modified Bank # (Note changes orattach parent)
| |
| . New Question History:
| |
| Question Cognitive Level: Comprehension orAnalysis 10CFRPart 55Content: 55.41(5)
| |
| Comments:
| |
| | |
| 2021NRCWritten Examination
| |
| ~
| |
| Facility: HopeCreek Vendor: GE ExamDate: 2021 ExamType: RO Examination Outline Cross-reference: Level RO SRO Tier # 1 Group# 1 K/A # 295019 AA2.01 Importance Rating 3.5 K/AStatement: Ability todetermine and/or interpret the following asthey toPARTIAL apply ORCOMPLETE LOSSOFINSTRUMENT AIR:Instrument air system pressure Question: RO#53 Given:
| |
| = Theplant isoperating at100%power.
| |
| When:
| |
| = A large leak ontheInstrument Air header occurs.
| |
| = TheInstrument Airheader pressure islowering at10psig/minute.
| |
| Whenislocking theModeSwitch inShutdown required andwhy? . .
| |
| A. More than onecontrol rodDRIFTS duetoa LowAccumulator Pressure.
| |
| B. Onecontrol rodDRIFTS duetoits Scram InletValve opening.
| |
| C. Morethan onecontrol rodDRIFTS duetotheir ScramOutlet Valves opening.
| |
| D. Onecontrol rodDRIFTS duetoa LowAccumulator Pressure.
| |
| Proposed Answer: C
| |
| | |
| 2021NRCWritten Examination Explanation (Optional):Thescram inlet andoutlet valves for each control rodHCUarenormally held closed bythe scram air header pressure (70 psig) from theinstrument airsystem. Astheinstrument air header lowers thescram air header will lower which willcause the scram inlets andoutlets tofailopen which will cause the control rods tostart todrift. Thelowaccumulator pressure condition isanindication ofeither a low nitrogen gaspressure onthe accumulator (possible leak atthe accumulator) without control rodmovement orif thecontrol rodisscrammed. Theaccumulator willdischarge ona scrammed control rod toassist the control rodtothe full inposition. With.the loss ofair theScramInlet andOutiet valves will start tofail open allowing the control rod todrift. A rod candrift without a loss ofairdueto other control rod movement operations.
| |
| Plausibility Justification:
| |
| A: incorrect. IAWAB.IC-0001 multiple rods drifting(not scramming) requires theM.S. tobe locked inShutdown. However, the low accumulator pressure isanindication ofeither a local accumulator trouble ora scrammed rod.
| |
| B: Incorrect-With the scram air header depleting due tothe .instrument air header lowering, the Scram InletandOutlet valves will failopen which will allow the control rodtodrift close.The I.O.A forAB.IC-0001 hasmultiple rods drifting not just onebefore locking themodeswitch in Shutdown. A rodcandrift without a loss ofair due toother control rodmovement operations.
| |
| C: Correct- With the scram air header depleting due to the instrument air header lowering,the ScramInlet andOutlet valves will fail open which will allow the control rod todrift close.IAW AB.IC-0001 multiple rods drifting (not scramming) requires theM.S. tobelocked inShutdown.
| |
| D: incorrect. Thelowaccumulator pressure isanindicationof either a local accumulator trouble or a scrammed rod. IAWAB.IC-0001 multiple rods drifting (nots cramming) requires theM .S. t obe locked inShutdown.
| |
| Technical Reference(s): HC.OP-AB.IC-0001(Q)(Attach ifnot previously provided)
| |
| Control Rod HC.OP-AR.zz-0011 Rod Drift/Accumulator Alarms Proposed References tobeprovided toapplicants during examination: none . .
| |
| Learning Objective: Regarding HC.OP-AB.IC-0001(Q), Control Rod: Frommemory, state the immediate operator actions.
| |
| Question Source: Bank# 118766 Modified Bank # (Note changes orattach parent)
| |
| New Question History:
| |
| Question Cognitive Level: Memory orKnowledge 10CFRPart 55Content: 55.41(10)
| |
| Comments: ' '
| |
| | |
| 2021NRCWritten Examination Facility: HopeCreek Vendor: GE ExamDate: 2021 ExamType: RO Examination Outline Cross-reference: Level RO SRO Tier # 1 Group# 1 K/A # 295018 AK2.02 Importance Rating 3.4 Knowledge K/AStatement: oftheinterrelationsbetween PARTIAL ORCOMPLETE LOSSOF COMPONENT COOLING WATERandthe following: Plant operations.
| |
| Question: RO#54
| |
| | |
| 2021NRCWritten Examination Given:
| |
| = Theplant isoperating at100%power.
| |
| "B","C", and "D" Station Service Water Pumps arein-service.
| |
| "A"StationService Water Pumpisinstandby.
| |
| When:
| |
| = The"C" Station Service Water Pumptrips ona lowflow condition.
| |
| The"A"Station Service Water Pumpauto starts.
| |
| HC.OP-AB.COOL-0001, StationService Water isentered.
| |
| 75seconds after thestart of the"A" Service Station Water Pump:
| |
| The"A"Service Water loop hasrisen flow byapproximately 2,000 GPM.
| |
| Based onthis, the "A" Station Service Water Pump A. flowisNOTresponding asdesigned. Recommend restarting the"C" Station Service Water Pump.
| |
| B. flowisresponding asdesigned. Ensure full pumpflow inapproximately 85 more seconds.
| |
| C. flowisNOTresponding asdesigned. Recommend securing thepumpto investigate thelowflow condition.
| |
| D. flowisresponding asdesigned. Ensure fullpumpflow inapproximately 25 moreseconds.
| |
| Proposed Answer: B (Optional)i Explanation Station Service Water PumpStart -
| |
| ifinAUTO,SSWPumpDischargeValve Opensinthefollowingsequence:
| |
| seconds Forty after opensignal, valve opens to4%,valve should beopen to4%by43seconds (from start).
| |
| initial Thirty seconds laterthevalve opens to8%,valve should beopento8%by75seconds initial (from start)
| |
| Thirty seconds latervalve opens to100%, valve should beopento100%by160seconds (from start) initial TheService Water Pumpsarerated for 16,500 gpm.TheService Water discharge valves are 28"motor operated butterfly valves.
| |
| Plausibility Justification:
| |
| A: Incorrect. With the discharge valve opento8%(75 seconds) andwith approximately 2000gpm offlowadded operation tothe would loop beresponding (a
| |
| flowfraction ofthe16,500 properly.Thecause gpm),
| |
| ofthe thepumpanddischarge "C" SSWpump would valve beknown, so thecrew theoretically could restart the"C"SSWpump, however therewould benoprocedural guidance inthis situation. . .
| |
| | |
| 2021NRCWritten Examination B: Correct- With thedischarge valve open to8%(75 seconds) andwith 2000gpm approximately offlow operation added tothe would loop beresponding (a
| |
| flow fraction properly ofthe16,500 andtheoperators gpm), thepumpanddischarge would continue tomonitor valve forthe discharge valve toindicate full open withfull flow inanother 85seconds.
| |
| C: incorrect- With the discharge valve open to8%(75 seconds) andwith 2000gpm approximately offlowadded totheloop (a flow fraction operationwould beresponding properly.
| |
| ofthe16,500 Therecommendation gpm), thepumpanddischarge tosecure the valve pumpwould be correct, however the pumpanddischarge valve areresponding correctly withthegiven conditions. This is not a lowflow condition.
| |
| D: Incorrect. With thedischarge valve open to8%(75 seconds), adding 25seconds would bethe start ofthe discharge valve opening to100%. Thevalve still hastotravel tofull open at160 seconds, sofull flow hasnot yet beenestablished.
| |
| Technical Reference(s): HC.OP-AB.COOL-0001(Q) (Attach if notpreviously provided)
| |
| Station ServiceWater ProposedReferences tobeprovided toapplicants during examination: none Learning Objective: Recognize abnormal indications/alarms and/or procedural requirements for implementing Station ServiceWater.
| |
| QuestionSource: Bank # 110944 Modified Bank# (Note changes orattachparent)
| |
| New QuestionHistory:
| |
| QuestionCognitive Level: Comprehension orAnalysis 10CFRPart 55Content: 55.41(7)
| |
| Comments:
| |
| | |
| 2021NRCWritten Examination Facility: HopeCreek Vendor: GE ExamDate: 2021 ExamType: RO Examination OutlineCross-reference: Level RO SRO Tier # 1 Group# 1 K/A # 295016 AA1.06 Importance Rating 4.0 Ability K/AStatement: tooperate monitorthe and/or following asthey applytoCONTROL ROOMABANDONMENT: Reactor level water Question: RO#55 .
| |
| | |
| 2021NRCWritten Examination Given:
| |
| = Theplant wasoperating at100%power.
| |
| When:
| |
| = A Control Roomfire causes a Main Turbine Trip andMSIVclosure.
| |
| = The Control Roomhasbeen abandoned.
| |
| = Control has been establishedIAWHC.OP-AB.HVAC-0002, Control RoomEnvironment.
| |
| = HC.OP-lO.zz-0008, Shutdown from Outside the Control Roomhasbeen entered.
| |
| Current plant conditions:
| |
| = A plant cooldownis in progress.
| |
| = Preparations arebeing made toplace "B"RHRin(SDC) Shutdown Cooling.
| |
| = Current Reactor Coolant temperature isat350F.
| |
| = RCICisin-service andmaintaining Reactor Water Level.
| |
| = Indicated RPVwater level isat 30" onWid.e Rangelevel instrumentation.
| |
| 'AsRPVpressure islowered, which ofthefollowing actionswill berequired IAWHC.OP-10.zz-0008, Shutdown from OutsidetheControl Room tocontinue the cooldown oftheplant?
| |
| [Reference attached)
| |
| A. Maintain greaterthan +80" indicatedon Shutdown Range. Place "B"RHRin SDCwhenReactor Coolant temperature is less than 324*F.
| |
| B. Maintain -38"to+54" indicated onWideRange with RCIC.Place "B"RHRin SDCimmediately.
| |
| C. Maintain greaterthan +80" indicatedonShutdown Range. Place "B"RHRin SDCimmediately.
| |
| D. Maintain -38"to+54" indicated onWideRange with RCIC. Place "B"RHRin SDCwhenReactor Coolant temperature isless than 324*F.
| |
| ProposedAnswer: D Explanation (Optional): 10-0008 step 5.2.2 direction states;maintain -38" to+54" WideRange(see 10for att. actual RPVlevel) andRPVpressure 800-1000 psig, SDCinterlocks arenot cleared until temperature valve onceit is< 324*F isopened, which butwill corresponds prevent with initial 80psig att valve (see opening 6)theinterlock until thepressure will not interlock the close iscleared (82psig).
| |
| Either AB.HVAC-0002 or10-0008 hasthecrewplace RCICin-service tomaintain level and will also reduce pressure (plant cooldown). With H PCI orRCIC not m aintaining level and norecirc pumpsavailable, promotenatural 10-0008 circulation hasthe crew tomaintain raising cooling.
| |
| RPVlevel to+80" TheAttachment Shutdown 10will give the (see Range att.10) operator to amore actual accurate RPVlevel. Attachment 6will allow thestudent todetermine what pressure theplant is atandthepermissives for placing "B" (<
| |
| RHRinSDC 82psig).
| |
| Plausibility Justification:
| |
| A: Incorrect. With RCICin-service, IAWI0-0008 theRPVlevel bandis-38" to+54",10-0008 does reference +80" for circulation natural ifnothingelse isavailable. RCICisproviding level andpressure control along witha cooldown ofthe plant.
| |
| | |
| 2021NRCWritten Examination B: Incorrect-greater than With thereactor theSDCvalves coolanttemperature interlock of82psig, at350F therefore (see "B"
| |
| 6)theRPVpressure att.
| |
| RHRcannot beplaced isstill inSDC until the RPVpressureislowered below 82psig which corresponds to324*F (80 psig).
| |
| C: Incorrect- With RCIC in-service, IAW10-0008 theRPVlevel bandis-38" to+54",10-0008 does reference +80"for natural circulation if nothing else isavailable."B" RHRcannot beplaced inSDCuntilthe RPV pressure islowered below 82psig which correspondsto324*F (80psig).
| |
| D: Correct. With RCIC in-service, IAW10-0008 the RPVlevel bandis38"to+54"With the reactor valves coolant interlock temperature at350F (see of82psig, therefore "B" att. 6)theRPVpressure RHRcannot beplaced isstill than greater inSDCuntil the SDC theRPVpressure islowered below 82psigwhich corresponds to324*F (80 psig).
| |
| Technical Reference(s): HC.OP-AB.HVAC-0002 Control Room(Attach if notpreviouslyprovided)
| |
| Environment HC.OP-IO.zz-0008 Shutdown from Outside theControlRoom ProposedReferences tobeprovided toapplicantsduring examination: HC.OP-lo.22-0008 Att.
| |
| 6/Att.10 Learning Objective: Interpret graphs charts, andtables contained the within SHUTDOWN FROM OUTSIDE THECONTROL ROOM Integrated OperatingProcedure to maintain plant operations within specified limits.
| |
| Source: Bank#
| |
| Question 31125 Modified Bank# (Note changes orattachparent)
| |
| New QuestionHistory:
| |
| Question Cognitive Level: Comprehension orAnalysis 10CFRPart 55Content: 55.41(10)
| |
| Comments:
| |
| | |
| 2021NRCWritten Examination Facility: HopeCreek Vendor: GE ExamDate: 2021 ExamType: RO . .
| |
| Examination OutlineCross-reference: Level RO SRO Tier # 1 Group# 1 K/A # 295031 EK2.12 Importance Rating 4.5 K/AStatement: Knowledge oftheinterrelations between REACTOR LOWWATERLEVEL and the following: Primarycontainment isolation system/NS4.
| |
| Question: RO#56 Given:
| |
| = Theplant isoperating at100%power.
| |
| ReactorEngineering isrunning aTIPtrace.
| |
| When:
| |
| A reactorscram occurs.
| |
| = Thereactor operator that reports reactor water levelreached-50" plant Current conditions:
| |
| Level hasrecovered andisbeing maintained between +12.5" to+54".
| |
| = Thereactor engineer reports thatthe TIPs failed toretract.
| |
| = There isNOevidence ofcontainment leakage.
| |
| IAWHC.OP-AB.CONT-0002, PRIMARY CONTAINMENT, whatisthe if action, next any?
| |
| A. Noaction requiredsinceTIPSdoes not receive signal anisolation until
| |
| -129" B. Fire the shear valve atthe discretionoftheSM/CRS.
| |
| C. Manually retract the TIPs andensure the- TIPvalve closes.
| |
| D. Noaction requiredsincereactor water levelhasbeenrestored toabove +12.5".
| |
| | |
| 2021NRCWritten Examination Proposed Answer: C Explanation (Optional): TIPsystem response toa Nuclear Steam Supply ShutoffSystem containment isolation signal: Lowreactor vessel level (-38 inches, LEVEL 2), orHigh d rywell pressure (1.68psig),
| |
| orActuation of theNSSSSChannel A manual isolation switch. AllTiPdetectors not inthe "in-shield" position willautomatically bewithdrawn. AllTIPball valves will automatically close oncetheir respective detectors havereached the "in-shield" position. Seeattached actions ofHC.OP-AB.CONT'0002 Primary Containment andthe NS4 isolations IAWHC.OP-SO.SM-0001, IsolationSystem Operations.
| |
| Plausibility Justification:
| |
| A: Incorrect. TIPs RPV level isolation is at-38". Onthe scram thelevel reached -50", thiswould cause anNS4isolationsignal, andthereforeTIPs would retractandisolate. Thestudent would have toknow what levelthe system isolates. Level 1(-129") isalso a primary containment level isolation (see setpointattached SM-0001 table forthe TIPssystem).
| |
| B: Incorrect- Shear valves whenfired, a chisel-type plunger (guillotine) isdriven into the TIPguide tube with enough force toshear thedrive/signal cable andseal the reactor endofthe guidetube.
| |
| This isaction isnecessary whenthe TIP cannot bemanually isolated andisthe source ofthe (no leak evidence ofleakage) (See attached subsequent action F ofAB.CONT-0002).
| |
| C: Correct With the-50"initiallevel after the scram, the TIPsshould have retracted andisolated.
| |
| IAWthe LO.AofAB.CONT-0002 andsubsequentaction G,theTIPs needtobemanually retracted which will isolate thesystem.
| |
| D: incorrect. TheLevel 2 (-38") will seal infor theNS4system toallow the TIPs toisolate immediately. Eventhough level wasrecovered from -50" toa normal level bandof+12.5" to54" theisolation that didnotoccur hastobemanually isolated.
| |
| Technical Reference(s): HC.OP-AB.CONT-0002 Primary (Attach ifnot previously provided)
| |
| Containment HC.OP-SO.SM-0001 Isolation Systems Proposed References tobeprovided toapplicants during examination: none Learning Objective: Frommemory explain theresponse ofthe TIPSystem following thereceiptofan isolation signal from theNuclear Steam '
| |
| Supply Shutoff System.
| |
| Question Source: Bank# 110478 Modified Bank # (Note changes orattach parent)
| |
| New Question History:
| |
| Question Cognitive Level: Memory orKnowledge 10CFRPart 55Content: 55.41(7)
| |
| Comments: -
| |
| | |
| 2021NRCWritten Examination Facility: HopeCreek Vendor: GE ExamDate: 2021 ExamType: RO Examination Outline Cross-reference: Level RO SRO Tier # 1 Group# 1 K/A # 295021 AA2.02 Importance Rating 3.4 K/AStatement: todetermine Ability and/or interpret the following asthey apply toLOSSOF SHUTDOWN COOLING :RHR/shutdown cooling system flow Question: RO#57 Given:
| |
| = A reactor cooldown isbeingperformed.
| |
| = Allvalveshave beenaligned for placing 'B' RHRinto Shutdown Cooling.
| |
| T=0:
| |
| = The'B'RHRpumpisstarted.
| |
| = Theoperator opens BC-HV-F015B, RHRLOOPBRETTORECIRC.
| |
| = BC-HV-F015B lights indicate thevalve isstroking open. -
| |
| T=30seconds:
| |
| = ThePlant Operator that reports the'B' RHRloop flow isindicating1200 gpm.
| |
| Continuing tooperate inthis condition will cause A. lowering ofRPVlevel B. overheating ofthe
| |
| 'B'RHRpump C. lowering ofsuppression pool level D. tripping ofthe'B' RHRpumponovercurrent Proposed Answer: A
| |
| | |
| 2021NRCWritten Examination Explanation (Optional):Theminimum flow valve isnormally open whentheRHRSystem isinstandby.
| |
| The valve will automatically close whenthepumpisrunning for >4seconds ANDRHRpumpflow exceeds 1270 GPM.Is fystem flowlowers below 1250 GPMfor tenseconds ormore(with thepump breakerclosed) theminimumflow valve will open. Theminimum flow valve sends flow tothe suppression pool. Exiting theRHRHX,flow isreturned totheRPVvia return valve HV-F015A (B) and testable check HV-F050A (B).Flow enters theRxRecirc Loop A (B)discharge piping where itreenters thevessel through the jet pumps.
| |
| Plausibility Justification:
| |
| A: Correct. With 1200 gpm flow indication, the minimum flowvalve (F007) willbeopenand therefore returningflow back to the suppression pool. Thissystem alignment would drain the RPVtothe suppression pool. Theforced circulation isnotmaking itthrough the core (establishing proper SDC flow) and AB.RPV-0009 would beentered for a loss ofshutdown cooling.
| |
| B: incorrect- With the minimum flow valve opened, the RHRpumpwill not overheat. Thestudent might interpret thenoflow asthe condition for overheating the pump.If thepumpisoverheating itwould have tobesecured andAB.RPV-0009 would beentered for a loss ofshutdown cooling.
| |
| C: Incorrect- Theminimum flow valve (F007) will beopenandtherefore returning flow backtothe suppression pool. Thissystem alignment would drain the RPVtothesuppression pool.The suppression pool level would berising notlowering. With thesuction from thesuppression pool theRHRpumpwould have a reduced NPSHwitha actual lowering suppression pooland therefore a potential securing ofthepump. AB.RPV-0009 would beentered for a loss of shutdown cooling.
| |
| D: Incorrect. With theampsrising the student might a high current condition interpret and therefore a trip ofthe"B" RHRpumpatthe breaker duetoovercurrent. AB.RPV-0009 would be entered fora loss ofshutdown cooling.
| |
| Technical Reference(s): (Attach if not previously provided)
| |
| Proposed References tobeprovided toapplicants during examination: none Learning Objective: Given a set ofconditions anda drawing of thecontrols, instrumentation and/or alarms located inthemain controlroom, assess the status ofthe Residual Heat Removal System.
| |
| Question Source: Bank# 34143 ModifiedBank # (Note changes orattach parent)
| |
| New Question History:
| |
| Question Cognitive Level: Comprehension orAnalysis 10CFRPart 55Content: 55.41(3)
| |
| Comments:
| |
| | |
| 2021NRCWritten Examination Facility: HopeCreek Vendor: GE ExamDate: 2021 ExamType:RO Examination Outline Cross-reference: Level RO SRO Tier # 1 Group# 1 K/A # 295028 2.4.18 Importance Rating 3.3 K/AStatement: Emergency Procedures /Plan: Knowledge ofthespecific bases for EOPs.
| |
| High DrywellTemperature Question: RO#58 Which following ofthe describes thenegative impact ofDrywelltemperature inexcess of340F?
| |
| A. All RPVwater level instrumentation isinvalidated.
| |
| B. Emergency depressurization capabilities withADScould become impaired.
| |
| C. Theoperation andeffectiveness ofdrywell sprays will beadversely affected.
| |
| wit'hin D. Containment venting berequired will toget thesafe area oftheDrywell Spray InitiationLimit Curve.
| |
| Proposed Answer: B Explanation (Optional):
| |
| EOP-102 (see Bases attached): Ifdrywelltemperature cannot becontrolled by operation ofall drywell available cooling,directionis provided run to b ack t he i ecirculationpumps t o minimum speed, a manual initiate scram. Thisisperformed inanticipation ofshutting downthe reactor recirculation pumpsasthemotors arenotqualified for continuous operation ina spray environment; drywell sprayisrequiredbefore both themaximumtemperature atwhich ADSisqualified (UFSAR Table andthedrywell 5.2-6) design temperature (UFSAR Table 1.3-4) limits arereached at340*F.
| |
| | |
| 2021NRCWritten Examination Plausibility Justification:
| |
| A: Incorrect. Inaccurate levelindication mayoccur whendrywell temperature exceedsthe saturation temperature forthe existing RPVpressure. Butthis isnotthebases thehigh for drywell temperature of340*F.
| |
| B: Correct- 340F isthemaximum drywell temperature atwhich ADSisqualified tooperate.
| |
| C: Incorrect- Sprays aremoreeffective with higher temperatures duetotheincreased evaporative cooling.
| |
| D: Incorrect. TheDSIL Curve permits Spray for awiderange ofpressures with Drywell temperature above 340F.
| |
| Technical Reference(s): HC.OP-EO.zz-0102-BASES (Attachif provided) notpreviously Primary Containment Control Proposed References tobeprovided toapplicants during examination: none Learning Objective:
| |
| Question Source: Bank# 34099 Modified Bank# (Note changes orattach parent)
| |
| New Question History:
| |
| Question Cognitive Level: Memory orKnowledge 10CFRPart 55Content: 55.41(10)
| |
| Comments:
| |
| | |
| 2021NRCWritten Examination Facility: HopeCreek Vendor: GE ExamDate: 2021 ExamType: RO Examination Outline Cross-reference: Level RO SRO Tier # 1 Group# 2 K/A # 295008 AK1.03 Importance Rating 3.2 K/AStatement: Knowledge ofthe operationalimplications ofthe asthey concepts following apply toHIGHREACTORWATERLEVEL:Feedflow/steam flow mismatch Question: RO#59
| |
| | |
| 2021NRCWritten Examination Given:
| |
| All 3 RFPT's areinmanualspeed control.
| |
| a RPVlevel ispresently@ 35 inches.
| |
| Feedwater pump flows:
| |
| > 'A' 3.2 Mlbm/hr -
| |
| > 'B' 3.6 Mlbm/hr
| |
| > 'C' 3.5MIbm/hr Main Steam flows:
| |
| > 'A' 2.6 Mlbm/hr
| |
| > 'B' 2.5Mlbm/hr
| |
| > 'C' 2.6Mlbm/hr
| |
| > 'D' 2.4Mlbm/hr Based onthese conditions,RFPTspeeddemand must beadjustedtoFIRST prevent anRPV IAWHC.OP-AB.RPV-0004, Reactor Level Control.
| |
| A. high levelalarm B. lowlevel scram reactor C. high levelmainturbine trip D. lowlevel alarm Proposed Answer: A Explanation(Optional): Total FeedFlowis10.3 Mlbm/hr.Total Steam flow is10.1Mlbm/hr. This mismatch will result ina rising RPVwater level. RPVspeed demand must.lower toprevent theLevel 7 alarm.TheLevel 7 high levelalarmwill occurif noactionistaken.IAWHC.OP-RPV-0004, Reactor LevelControl, theoperators would havemanual controlcontrolling between level Level 4 andLevel 7 (seeattached I.O.A ofAB.RPV-0004). Thesetwolevel preclude alarms theRPSsetpoint of+12.5" (Level Scram) (Level 3 Reactor and +54" 8)M ain T Trip.
| |
| urbine Justification:
| |
| Plausibility A: Correct. With themismatch betweenTotal FeedFlow andTotal SteamFlow at.2Mlbm/hr for feedwater flow, theRPVwater level would starttorise.
| |
| Theoperators havemanual controlof feedwater, therefore thespeed demand ontheRFPTswould beloweredtocompensate th.e for RPVlevel rising. IAWAB.RPV-0004 the operatorswould level maintain between Level 4 (low level alarm) andLevel 7(highlevel alarm).
| |
| B: Incorrect- With themismatch betweenTotal FeedFlow andTotalSteam Flow at.2MIbm/hr for feedwater flow, theRPVwater would level starttorise.
| |
| TheRFPTs wouldbelowered to compensate for theRPVlevel rising.
| |
| IAWAB.RPV-0004 would theoperators maintain level between Level 4 (low alarm) level andLevel 7 (high alarm).
| |
| level C: Incorrect- IAWAB.RPV-0004 theoperators wou.Id maintain between level Level 4 (lowlevel alarm) andLevel 7 (high alarm).
| |
| level Theoperators wouldpreventthelevelrising toa Main Turbine Trip setpoint.
| |
| | |
| 2021NRCWritten Examination D: incorrect. With themismatch between Total FeedFlowandTotal Steam Flow for at.2Mlbm/hr feedwater flow, theRPVwater level would start TheRFPTswould torise. beloweredto compensate for theRPVlevel rising.
| |
| Technical Reference(s): HC.OP-AB.RPV-0004 notpreviously if (Attach provided)
| |
| Reactor Level Control ProposedReferences tobe provided toapplicants duringexamination: none Learning Objective: Given a set of conditions anda drawing of thecontrols, instrumentation and/or alarms located in theMainControl Room, identify thestatus ofthe Feedwater Control System QuestionSource: Bank# 35529 Modified Bank # changes (Note orattach parent)
| |
| New QuestionHistory:
| |
| QuestionCognitiveLevel: Comprehension orAnalysis 10CFRPart 55Content: 55.41(10)
| |
| Comments:
| |
| | |
| 2021NRCWritten Examination Facility: HopeCreek Vendor: GE ExamDate: 2021 ExamType:RO Examination Outline Cross-reference: Level RO SRO Tier # 1 Group# 2 K/A # 295022 AK2.04
| |
| ~
| |
| Importance Rating 2.5 K/AStatement: Knowledge ofthe interrelationsbetween LOSSOFCRDPUMPSandthe following: Reactorwaterlevel Question: RO#60 Given:
| |
| = A plant startup isinprogress IAWHC.OP-IO.zz-0003, Startup from Cold Shutdown to RatedPower.
| |
| = ReactorPower isonrange 4 oftheIRMsandslowly rising.
| |
| = ReactorLevel isat+ 36inches andstable.
| |
| = ReactorPressure isat0 psig andstable.
| |
| = ReactorTemperature isat180Fandstable.
| |
| = TheplantisNOTatthepoint ofadding heat (POAH).
| |
| When:
| |
| = The'A'Control RodDrive Pump(CRD) trips.
| |
| = Thestandby, 'B' CRDPumptrips onthe attempted startbytheReactor Operator(RO).
| |
| = Control Rodmovement hasbeensuspended.
| |
| Reactorwaterlevel will andthe operators will have to A. rise;increase theRWCUblowdown flowrate totheMain Condenser.
| |
| B. lower; increase theFeedwater flowrate tothe vessel.
| |
| C. rise;reduce the Feedwater flowratetothe vessel.
| |
| D. lower; reduce the RWCUblowdown flowratetotheMain Condenser.
| |
| Proposed Answer: D
| |
| | |
| 2021NRCWritten Examination Explanation (Optional): RWCU blowdown operations isnormally balanced torejectthe makeup rate from CRD. Without theCRDpumprunning, RWCUisrejecting atapproximately the samerate. RPV level will lower. TheCRDpumps willprovide a continuous make-up rate duetothe lowpower andthe plant being below the POAH.Oncethe plant reaches thePOAHandstarts togenerate steam,the steam generation will begreater than theCRDpumpmakeup rate. Atthis point in10-0003, thecrewis toplace the Feedwater systemin-service feeding the vessel toprovide thenecessary make-up dueto the steam generation. .
| |
| Plausibility Justification:
| |
| A: Incorrect. With the reactor recirc pumps in-service (initial heatup andpressurization ofthe RPV), thepumps would beadding heat tothe vessel inventory, however theRWCUblowdown .
| |
| flowrate would exceed any heatexpansion bythe reactor pumps.
| |
| recirc. Level willlowerdueto RWCUblowdown flowrate and the loss ofthe CRDsystem.
| |
| B: Incorrect- Level will lower due to RWCU blowdown flowrate andtheloss oftheCRDsystem.
| |
| Theplant isbelow thePOAH,so the Feedwater system would notbefeeding thevessel atthis time. If thestudent does notrecognize thesignificance oftheplant being below thePOAH,they might select theFeedwater system feeding the vessel.
| |
| C: Incorrect- With thereactor recirc pumpsin-service (initial heatup andpressurization ofthe RPV), thepumps would beadding heat tothe vessel inventory, however the RWCUblowdown flowrate would exceed anyheat expansion bythe reactor recirc. pumps. Ifthestudent doesnot recognize thesignificance oftheplant being below the POAH, they might select theFeedwater system feeding the vessel.
| |
| D: Correct. Level will lower duetoRWCUblowdown flowrate and the loss ofthe CRDsystem.
| |
| Theplant isbelow thePOAH,sotheCRDsystem will provide vessel inventory and theRWCU blowdown flowrate will controltheCRDmake-up rate andtherefore RPV level.
| |
| Technical Reference(s): HC.OP-IO.zz-0003 (Attach if not previously provided)
| |
| S/Ufrom Cold S/D HC.OP-SO.BG-0001 RWCU Proposed References tobeprovided toapplicants during examination: none Learning Objective: Frommemory, determine whya method of reactorwater level control must be available prior toplacing theCRDH System in-service including thepreferred method oflevel control.
| |
| Question Source: Bank # 36244 Modified Bank # (Note changes orattach parent)
| |
| New Question History:
| |
| Question Cognitive Level: Comprehension orAnalysis 10CFRPart 55Content: 55.41(10)
| |
| Comments:
| |
| | |
| 2021NRCWritten Examination Facility: HopeCreek Vendor: GE ExamDate: 2021 ExamType:RO Examination Outline Cross-reference: Level RO SRO Tier # 1 Group # 2 K/A # 295009 AA2.01 Importance Rating 4.2 K/AStatement: todetermine Ability and/orinterpret the following asthey toLOW apply REACTOR WATERLEVEL: Reactorwater level Question: RO#61
| |
| /
| |
| | |
| 2021NRCWritten Examination Given:
| |
| = Reactor Power isat94%power.
| |
| = Allthree Reactor Feedpumps areinAuto.
| |
| > NarrowRange "A" (PDT-N004A) = 36inches.
| |
| > Narrow Range "B" (PDT-N004B) = 35inches.
| |
| > Narrow Range "C"(PDT-N004C) = 34inches Then:
| |
| = A large leak develops inthe"A" Steam flowdetectorpressure diaphragm causing a gross failalarm onthe instrument.
| |
| > OHAB3-F1 "DFCS ALARM/TRBL" alarm isin.
| |
| > CRIDSdisplay D5921- "DFCSTrouble" alarmisin.
| |
| Inresponse tothese conditions, the Digital Feed System Control willA andRPVlevel will A A. (1) remain inthree element (2) will remain constant B. (1) transfer tosingle element (2) remain constant C. (1) remain inthree element (2) will raise slowly duetothelower total steam flow input totheMaster Controller D. (1) transfer tosingle element (2) rapidly rise duetofeed flow steamflow mismatchresponse Proposed Answer: B Explanation(Optional HC.OP-SO.AE-0001 -
| |
| 2.3.21. TheMaster Level Controffer will automaticallyswitch single from element tothree element leve[control at> 31.4% totalsteam flow after a 1 minute timedelay ANDwillswitch from threeelement tosingle elementlevelcontrol instantaneously at< 27.8% totalsteam flow.
| |
| Seeattached.
| |
| HC.OP-AR.zz-0007 -
| |
| D5921DFCSTrouble RFPTs elementcontrol.Ona loss ofanySteam Flow signal,
| |
| . Additionally, Operator the Display screen(s) will digitally display the detector(s).
| |
| failed Seeattached.
| |
| Justification:
| |
| Plausibility A: Incorrect. With theloss ofthe steam flow signalandwith thegiven alarms,theDigital Feedwater System will transfer from 3-element tosingle element controlwith nochange in water reactor level duetoNarrow Range detectors matched toMaster controlleroftheDigital Feedwater System..
| |
| | |
| 2021NRCWritten Examination B: Correct- Transfer tosingle element, there will benolevel onNarrow based perturbation Range detectors matched toMaster controller.
| |
| C: incorrect- . With the lossofthe steam flow signal andwith thegiven the alarms, Digital Feedwater Systemwill transfer from 3-element tosingle element control D: incorrect. There willbenolevel perturbation based onNarrow Rangedetectors matchedto Master controller.
| |
| Technical Reference(s): HC.OP-SO.AE-0001(Q) (Attachif previously not provided)
| |
| Feedwater System Operations HC.OP-AR.22-0007 (B3-F1, D5921)
| |
| ProposedReferences tobeprovidedto applicants during examination: none Learning Objective: Frommemory, describe the responseof theFWLCsystem ifa system transmitter weretofail.
| |
| QuestionSource: Bank # 124703 ModifiedBank # orattach (Notechanges parent)
| |
| New QuestionHistory:
| |
| QuestionCognitive Level: Comprehension orAnalysis 10CFRPart 55Content: 55.41(7)
| |
| Comments: - '
| |
| | |
| 2021NRCWritten Examination Facility: HopeCreek Vendor: GE ExamDate: 2021 ExamType: RO Outline Examination Cross-reference: Level RO SRO Tier # 1 Group# 2 K/A # 295034 EA1.03 Importance Rating 3.8 K/AStatement:
| |
| Ability tooperate monitorthe following asthey and/or toSECONDARY apply CONTAINMENT VENTILATION HIGHRADIATION: Secondary Containment Ventilation:
| |
| Plant-Specific Question: RO#62 ..
| |
| =
| |
| | |
| 2021NRCWritten Examination Given:
| |
| a Theplant isoperating at100%power.
| |
| = AnI&CPCIS(Primary Containment isolation System) isinprogress.
| |
| surveillance When:
| |
| a The control roomreceives a High Reactor Building andRefuelFloorRadiation isolation signal.
| |
| a Reactor Building Ventilation Supply (RBVS)andReactor Ventilation Building Exhaust (RBVE) fans trip.
| |
| = All automatic actions occur forsecondary containmentventilation.
| |
| TheI&Csurveillance wassecured.
| |
| =
| |
| a ThePCIShigh radiation isolationsignals werereset.
| |
| WHATactions arerequiredto restore theReactor Ventilation Building Supply (RBVS) and Reactor Building Ventilation Exhaust (RBVE) fans?
| |
| The (1) breakers for both Reactor BuildingSupplyandExhaust fans must be manually closed, then the fans willberestarted fromthe (2)
| |
| A. (1) 1-E (2) controls local (10C382)
| |
| B. (1) 1-E (2) main controlroom(MCR)
| |
| C. (1) Non1-E main (2) control room(MCR)
| |
| D. (1) Non1-E (2) local controls(10C382)
| |
| Proposed Answer: A theRBVSsystem Explanation (Optional): (K/A Statement) AtHopeCreek isthesecondary containment TheRBVSfanunits ventilation. aresupplied power thru 1Eandnon-1E circuit anyofthe breakers.If conditions following occur, the1Ebreaker willtrip,causingthenon-1E onunder totrip voltage.(The Non-1E breaker opens/closes tostop/start thefan. Thebreakersareinseries.).
| |
| -38"RxLVL,1.68 psig Drywell Pressure, Reactor building ventilation exhaust High radiation 1x103mCi/cc, Refuel floor ventilation exhaust High radiation 2x10-3 mCi/cc.
| |
| TheClass1-Ebreakers arelocated inthe respective channel 1-EUnit SubStationswitchgears TheNon 1-Ebreaker isthebreaker actuated forroutine equipment operation vianormalSTOP/START control switches atthe local panel 10C382. Toreclose the1Ebreaker, all signals initiating mustbeclear andPCISreset; then, thebreaker mustbemanually reclosed atthe480V1Eunit substation.Indication of1Ebreaker position isprovided on10C650E (Main Room).
| |
| Control Justification:
| |
| Plausibility A: Correct. With theHigh radiationsignals in, theRBVS/RBVE fans trip will (1E breakerthen the Non-1E breaker). With PCISreset, the1Ebreakers willhavetobeclosedmanually (locally).
| |
| Then, the fans will bestarted atthelocal panel 10C382 toplacetheRBVSina normal lineup.
| |
| | |
| 2021NRCWritten Examination B: Incorrect-With PCISreset, the1Ebreakers will have tobeclosed manually (locally).
| |
| The RBVS system isoperated locallyatthe10C382 panel. Indication of1Ebreaker position is provided on10C650E (Main Control Room).
| |
| C: Incorrect- TheNon-1E breaker opens/closes tostop/startthefan. The1Ebreaker onthe trip will highradiation signal from PCIS. TheRBVSsystem isoperated locallyatthe 10C382panel.
| |
| D: Incorrect. The Non-1E breaker opens/closes tostop/startthe fan. The1Ebreaker will trip on the high radiation signal from PCIS.
| |
| Technical Reference(s): HC.OP-SO.SM-0001(Q) (Attach notpreviously if provided) isolation System Operation HC.OP-SO.GR-0001(Q) RBVS ProposedReferences tobeprovided toapplicants during examination: none Learning Objective: Given plantconditions associated withthe Reactor Building Ventilation Exhaust (RBVE) andSupply (RBVS) system:
| |
| Summarize/identifytheautomatic of trips the electric supply.
| |
| Question Source: Bank # 115987 Modified Bank# (Original attached)
| |
| New QuestionHistory:
| |
| QuestionCognitive Level: Comprehension orAnalysis 10CFRPart 55Content: 55.41(7) ~
| |
| Comments:
| |
| | |
| 2021NRCWritten Examination Facility: HopeCreek Vendor: GE ExamDate: 2021 ExamType: RO -
| |
| Examination Outline Cross-reference: Level RO SRO Tier # 1 Group# 2 K/A # 295032 EA2.01 Importance Rating 3.8 Ability K/AStatement: todetermine and/orinterpret the following asthey apply toHIGH SECONDARY CONTAINMENT AREATEMPERATURE :Area temperature Question: RO#63
| |
| | |
| 2021NRCWritten Examination Given:
| |
| a Theplant wasoperating at50%power.
| |
| When:
| |
| a A fire wasreportedinthe HPCIPumproom.
| |
| Current plant conditions:
| |
| a Thesmoke and heathas spread tothe RCICPumproomasa result offirefighting efforts.
| |
| a HPCIandRCIC have isolated duetohigh temperatures.
| |
| a Temperatures inboth the HPCIPumproom andRCICPumproom are at275*F.
| |
| a Firefighting efforts have been hampered duetopreviouslytaggedfire suppression systems.
| |
| TABLE 1 Column1 Column2 AreaDescription & RoomNumber MaxNormini MaxSafeOp OpTemp Temp CRDPumpRoom(4202) 115*F 140*F HPCI(4111) 115*F 250*F CoreSpray PumpRoomsA(4118) & C(4116) 115F 140*F RHRPumpRoomsA(4113) & C(4114) 115*F 140*F SACSA & C (4309) 115*F 140*F RCICPumpRoom(4110) 115*F 250*F CoreSpray PumpRoomsB(4104) & D(4105) 115*F 140*F RHRPumpRoomsB(4109) & D(4107) 115*F 140*F SACSB & D (4307) 115F 140*F RWCUPipe Chase(4402) 160*F 350*F Whichofthefollowing actions isrequired IAWEmergency Operating Procedures?
| |
| [Reference attached)
| |
| A. Manually scram thereactor andemergency depressurize.
| |
| B. Bypass High RoomTemperature isolationsfor RCICandrestore tostandby lineup.
| |
| C. Shutdown thereactor andcommence a normal cooldown.
| |
| D. Runback reactor recirculationandmanually scram thereactor.
| |
| Answer:
| |
| Proposed C
| |
| | |
| 2021NRCWritten Examination Explanation (Optional): Seeattached flowchart ofHC.OP-EO.zz-0103/4. Studentwilldetermine from Table 1thattheHPCIandRCICPumprooms areattheMaxSafe Oplevel whichwill leadthem tothe fact that the reactor will have tobeshutdown with a normal cooldown (IO.zz-0004). Butduetothe fact that there is NO reactor coolant discharge inprogress, the student willhave todetermine where togo downtheRB Leg ofEOP-103 (attached). There isnorequirement for a manual scram oremergency depressurization of thereactor.
| |
| Plausibility Justification: . .
| |
| A: Incorrect. A reactor coolantsystem isnotdischarging intothe Reactor Building, IAWEOP-103step RB-15 (seeattached). Emergency depressurization isnotrequired.
| |
| B: Incorrect Thebypassing ofthe RCICorHPCIhigh temperature isolations isdriven byaStation Blackout condition IAWHC.OP-AB.zz-0135 Attachment 10.There isnoSBOinprogress, therefore norequirementto bypass the RCIChigh temperature isolation andplace it instandby.
| |
| Duetothe factthat the is not in fire the RCICpumproom, thestudent might choose tohave RCICavailable andtherefore select thebypassing of the hightemperature isolations.
| |
| C: Correct- A reactor coolantsystemis not discharging into theReactor Building andtheMax Safe Operating Limit in2 areas (Table1) has beenexceeded.Therefore IAWRB-15, RB-21, andRB-22, thereactor isrequired tobeshutdown with a normal cooldown (IO.zz-0004).
| |
| D: incorrect. A reactor coolant system isnotdischarging into theReactor Building, IAWEOP-103step (see RB-15 attached). A manual reactorscram isnot required.
| |
| Technical Reference(s): HC.OP-EO.zz-0103/4 (Attach if notpreviously provided)
| |
| RXBldg andRADRelease Control Proposed References tobeprovided toapplicants duringexamination: Table 1ofEOP-103 in stem ofquestionand the Reactor Building Control Leg attached Learning Objective: Given anystep intheprocedure, describe thereason forperformance ofthat step and/orexpected system response to controlmanipulations prescribed bythe step.
| |
| Question Source: Bank # 66819 Modified Bank # (Note changes orattach parent)
| |
| New Question History:
| |
| Question Cognitive Level: Comprehension orAnalysis 10CFRPart 55Content: 55.41(10)
| |
| Comments: - .
| |
| | |
| 2021NRCWritten Examination Facility: HopeCreek Vendor: GE ExamDate: 2021 ExamType: RO Examination OutlineCross-reference: Level RO SRO Tier # 1 Group# 2 K/A # 295020 2.1.31 Importance Rating 4.6 K/AStatement: Conduct ofOperations: Ability tolocate control roomswitches, controls, and indications, andtodetermine that theycorrectly reflect the desired plant lineup. Inadvertent Containment Isolation.
| |
| Question: RO#64 Given:
| |
| a Theplant wasoperating at75%power.
| |
| a An I&Csurveillance wasinprogress.
| |
| When:
| |
| a Anerroneous loss ofmaincondenser vacuum signal causes aninadvertentisolation of allMain Steam IsolationValves (MSlVs).
| |
| a Alloperator actions fora reactorscram have been completed.
| |
| plant Current conditions:
| |
| a Theloss ofmain condenser vacuum signal hasbeen cleared.
| |
| a Main condenser vacuum indicationsareatnormal vacuum levels.
| |
| ofthe Which following would beREQUIRED toreset theNSSSS(NS4) MSlVisolation logic?
| |
| A. TheMSlVcontrol switches must bein"Close" B TheTurbine Stop Valves must beclosed.
| |
| C. TheReactor ModeSwitch mustbein"Shutdown".
| |
| D. TheMainCondenser LowVacuum Bypass Switches must bein"Bypass" Proposed Answer: A
| |
| | |
| 2021NRCWritten Examination Explanation (Optional): TheMSIVs will isolate ona lowvacuum signalof21.5"Hg.Abs (seeattached SM-0001). Toreset theMSlVisolation logic,maincondenser vacuum needs tobebelow of thesetpoint 21.5"Hg.Abs andtheMSIVcontrol roomswitc.hes have tobeinthe "CLOSE" (see positionattached section ofSM-0001).
| |
| Plausibility Justification:
| |
| A: Correct. With main condenser vacuum below theisolation setpointof21.5"HGAduetothe erroneousloss ofvacuum isolation signal cleared, toRESETtheMSlVlogic theMSlVvalve switches on10C651 will have tobeinthe "CLOSE" position.
| |
| B: Incorrect- Withthe scram actionscompleted, the main turbine willbetrippedandtherefore the TSVswill beclosed. However, duetothe fact that the loss ofmain condenser vacuum signal is cleared, the MainCondenser LowVacuumBypass Switches areNOTneeded. FortheBypass Switches tocomplete thebypass ofa21.5"HGAvacuum condition, theTSVshave tobe<90%
| |
| open. If a bypass wasneeded, then the TSVsbeing closed would berequired.
| |
| C: incorrect- ReactorModeSwitchnot inrunbypassesthe<8%closed RPSsetpoint forMSlVs.
| |
| Themodeswitchcan beinanyposition except "Run", therefore the MSIVisolation does logic not have toseethe ModeSwitch in"Shutdown" specifically.
| |
| D: Incorrect. Lowmain condenser vacuum of21.5"HGA canbebypassed via4 keylockswitches at10C609, 10C611 (NS4 Panels) when turbine stop valves are5 90%OPEN(main turbine tripped). Since the erroneous lossofvacuum signal iscleared, there isnoneed forthebypass switches tobein"Bypass".
| |
| Technical Reference(s): HC.OP-SO.SM-0001(Q)(Attach ifnotpreviouslyprovided)
| |
| IsolationSystem Operation Proposed References tobeprovided toapplicants during examination: none Learning Objective: Given ofNSSSSisolation a list signals, explain theplant conditions and/or operator actions necessary for automatic and/or manual bypass oftheisolation signal.
| |
| Question Source: Bank # 33823 Modified Bank# (Note changesorattach parent)
| |
| New Question History:
| |
| Question Cognitive Level: Comprehension orAnalysis 10CFRPart 55Content: 55.41(6)
| |
| Comments:
| |
| | |
| 2021NRCWritten Examination HopeCreek Facility:
| |
| Vendor: GE ExamDate: 2021 ExamType:RO Examination Outline Cross-reference: Level RO SRO Tier # 1 Group# 2 K/A # 500000 EK2.03 Importance Rating 3.3 Knowledge K/AStatement: ofthe interrelationsbetween HIGHCONTAINMENT HYDROGEN CONCENTRATIONS andthe following:Containment Atmosphere Control System Question: RO#65
| |
| | |
| 2021NRCWritten Examination Given:
| |
| = A large break LOCAhasoccurred intheDrywell
| |
| = Multiple Equipment failures have occurred.
| |
| a Drywell Pressure is16psig andrising.
| |
| = RPV level haslowered tobelow topofactive fuel (TAF) andcontinues tolower.
| |
| = The H2/O2 Analyzers must beplaced inservice duetothepotentially high Hydrogen and Oxygen concentrations inprimary containment.
| |
| ALLsample locations monitored bytheH2/O2 Analyzers are . (1)
| |
| AND Priortoopening the Containment Isolation Valves (CIVs) fortheH2/O2 Analyzers, the containment isolation signal (2) tobeoverridden.
| |
| A. (1) Theupper drywelland thetorus ONLY (2) isrequired B. (1) Theupper drywell andthetorus ONLY (2) isNOTrequired C. (1) Theupper drywell,lower drywelland the torus (2) isNOTrequired D. (1) Theupper drywell,lower drywellandthe torus (2) is required ProposedAnswer: D Explanation (Optional): Eachpackage (H202 analyzer) takes samples from threedifferent locations; High Drywell headregion, Low Drywell cylindricalregion, Suppression Chamber Air Space.
| |
| Eachofthe3 sample suction lines andthe onereturn lineisprovided with 2 MOVfor containment Containment isolation. Isolation Valves (16 Total) automatically close upon: High DRYWELL pressure
| |
| (+1.68psig),Reactor Water Level 2 (-38 inches), Reactor Building Vent Exhaust high-high Radiation (1 x mci/cc).
| |
| 10-3 AII 1 6containment isolation valves associated with HOAS have i dentical control bezels:
| |
| OPEN,CLSD,OVLD/PWR FAIL, andOVERRIDDEN. TheCIVs canbeindividually opened after the associatedisolation override P.B. isdepressed at(10C650E). (See attached figures of the c ontrols andthe H2/O2 drawing)
| |
| Plausibility Justification:
| |
| A: Incorrect. Eachpackage (H202 analyzer) takes samples from three different locations; High -
| |
| Drywell headregion, Low Drywell cylindrical region, Suppression Chamber Air Space.
| |
| Duetothe given conditions alltheCIVs would isolate oneither theDrywell pressure orRPV level. Therefore, they would all have tobeoverridden tobypass the automatic isolation.
| |
| B: incorrect- Eachpackage (H202 analyzer) takessamples from three different locations; High -
| |
| Drywell headregion, Low Drywell cylindrical region, Suppression Chamber Air Space.
| |
| TheCIVs have thecapabilities ofbeing overridden onthecontainment isolation signals from drywell high pressure andRPVlowlevel. TheH2/O2 analyzers canbeplaced in-service to '
| |
| monitor thehigh Hydrogen andOxygen concentrations intheprimary containment.
| |
| | |
| 2021NRCWritten Examination C: Incorrect Each. package (H202 analyzer) takes samples from three locations; different High Drywell headregion, Low Drywell cylindrical region, Suppression ChamberAirSpace.
| |
| ALL the CIVsfor theses sample points would beable tobelined upfor sampling.
| |
| D: Correct. Each package (H202 analyzer) takes samples from threedifferent High locations; -
| |
| Drywell head region, Low Drywell cylindrical region, Suppression ChamberAirSpace.
| |
| TheCIVs can be individually opened after theassociated isolationoverride P.B.is depressed at(10C650E)
| |
| Technical Reference(s):HC.OP-SO,GS-0002(Q) (Attach ifnot provided) previously H2/O2 Analyzer Operations ProposedReferences tobeprovidedto applicants during examination: none Objective: Select Learning thethree parameters, including setpoints, whichwill automatically isolate theHOASandpredict the required operator action to:Reset theisolation signal andrestore the HOAS toservice.
| |
| Manually override the isolation signal and restore theHOAStoservice.
| |
| Question Source: Bank# 120390 Modified Bank# (Note changes orattach parent)
| |
| New QuestionHistory:
| |
| QuestionCognitive Level: Memory orKnowledge 10CFRPart 55Content: 55.41(7)
| |
| Comments:
| |
| | |
| 2021NRCWritten Examination Facility: HopeCreek Vendor: GE ExamDate: 2021 ExamType:RO Examination OutlineCross-reference: Level RO SRO Tier # 3 Group#
| |
| K/A # 2.1.7 Importance Rating 4.4 K/AStatement: Conduct ofOperations: Ability toevaluate plant performanceandmake operational judgements based onoperating characteristics, reactor behavior, andinstrument interpretation.
| |
| Question: RO#66 Given:
| |
| = Theplant isinOperationalCondition 4,preparing forplant startup.
| |
| = RHRLoop
| |
| 'B' isinShutdown Cooling inaccordance with HC.OP-SO.BC-0002, Decay HeatRemoval Operations.
| |
| When:
| |
| = TheReactor Operator (RO) reports Total Core Flowhaslowered significantly.
| |
| = RPVlevel isslowly and is rising currently at +85inches.
| |
| = ReactorHeadVent temperaturereadings arealso rising. ,
| |
| following Whichofthe isthecauseofthe given plant conditions?
| |
| A. RHRPump'B' RHRloop test return MOVvalve BC-HV-FO24B isopen.
| |
| B. RHRPump'B' MinFlow valve BC-HV-F007B isopen.
| |
| C. RHRPump'B' Suppression Pool Spray Header isolation valve BC-HV-F027B is open.
| |
| D. Reactor Pump'B' Recirculation Discharge valve BB-HV-F031B isopen.
| |
| Proposed Answer: D
| |
| | |
| 2021NRCWritten Examination Explanation (Optional): Seeattached Precautions andLimitations ofHC.OP-SO.BC-0002, DecayHeat Removal Operations.
| |
| Plausibility Justification:
| |
| A: Incorrect. Opening this valvewhile inshutdown cooling would cause a lowering ofRPVlevel.
| |
| BC-HV-F024A(B), RHRLOOPTESTRETMOVwill drain the Reactor Vessel tothe Suppression Pool ifopened in Shutdown Cooling (Precaution 3.1.1).
| |
| B: Incorrect- Opening theF007valve while inshutdown cooling would cause a lowering ofRPV level. BC-HV-F007A(B), RHRPUMPA(B) MINFLOWMOVwill drain the Reactor Vesseltothe Suppression Pool if opened inShutdownCooling, duetoflow below the low-flow setpoint precluding automaticvalve closure. Toprevent thisfrom occurring, the BC-HV-F007A (B)is CLOSED andtagged while inShutdown Cooling (Precaution 3.1.3).
| |
| C: Incorrect- Opening this valvewhile inshutdown cooling would cause a lowering ofRPVlevel.
| |
| BC-HV-FO27A (B), RHRLOOPA (B) SUPP POOLSPRAYHDRISLN MOVwill drain the Reactor Vessel totheSuppressionPool if opened while the associated RHRPumpisin Shutdown Cooling. Toprevent this from occurring, theBC-HV-F027A (B-)isCLOSED andtagged while inShutdown Cooling (Precaution3.1.2).
| |
| D: Correct. Byopening BB-HV-F031B whileinshutdown cooling onthe 'B'RHRloop, acore bypass isinitiated, which causes head venttemperatures toincrease.Thecooled shutdown cooling flow isnotreturned tothe vessel via the jetpumps (cause oftotal core flow lowering),
| |
| but instead issent through the'B' recirc pumpduetoitsdischarge valve being open. This a creates bypass loop where hot reactor water isremoved from the vessel, but the cooled water isnot returned directly tothe vessel, thereby causing heatup and swell (causeofrising level)
| |
| (Limitations 3.2.4 and3.2.5).
| |
| Technical Reference(s): HC.OP-SO.BC-0002 (Attach if not previously provided)
| |
| Decay Heat Removal Operations Proposed References tobeprovided toapplicants during examination: none Learning Objective: Given plantconditions involving a Loss of Shutdown Cooling, summarize required actions tomitigate the condition.
| |
| Question Source: Bank# 30780 Modified Bank # (Note changes orattach parent)
| |
| New Question History: NRC2016 Question Cognitive Level: Comprehension orAnalysis 10CFRPart 55Content: 55.41(7)
| |
| Comments:
| |
| | |
| 2021NRCWritten Examination Facility: HopeCreek Vendor: GE ExamDate: 2021 ExamType: RO Examination Outline Cross-reference: Level RO SRO Tier # 3 Group#
| |
| K/A # C Importance Rating 3.8 K/AStatement: ConductofOperations: Abilitytoexplain andapply all system limits and precautions.
| |
| Question: RO#67 Given:
| |
| = A reactor cooldown isinprogress IAWHC.OP-IO.zz-0004,Shutdown from Rated Power toCold Shutdown.
| |
| = reactor Both pumps recirculation areinservice.
| |
| = Preparations arebeing madetoplace the'B'RHRsystem into shutdown cooling.
| |
| Duringthetransition from normal Reactor System Recirculation operations toestablishing Shutdown flow Cooling withthe RHRpump,
| |
| 'B' Whichofthefollowing isthepreferredReactor Pumplineup?
| |
| Recirculation A. Both Reactor Pumpsareinservice.
| |
| Recirculation B. ONLY'A' Reactor RecirculationPumpisinservice.
| |
| C. Both Reactor Pumpsaresecured.
| |
| Recirculation D. ONLY'B' Reactor RecirculationPumpisinservice.
| |
| Proposed Answer: B
| |
| | |
| 2021NRCWritten Examination Explanation (Optional):Seeattached Precautions andLimitations ofHC.OP-lO.zz-0004, Shutdown from Rated Power toCold Shutdown along with the C autionform inimizes thet ime atwhichthereisno forced flow through the core from either theReactor RecirculationSystemortheRHRSystem. The ReactorRecirc Pumpassociated with theRHRLoop tobeplaced inShutdown must Cooling besecured with its discharge valve shut. Thedischarge valve ofanyReactor Pumpwhich Recirculation isNOTin operation should remain closed throughout Shutdown Cooling operations.
| |
| Plausibility Justification: .
| |
| A: incorrect. The 'B' Recirc pumpmustbesecured prior the toplacing 'B'RHRpumpinservice andtheloop into SDC. TheReactor Recirc Pumpassociated with theRHRLoop tobeplacedin Shutdown Cooling must besecuredwith its discharge valveshut.
| |
| B: Correct- During transition from normalReactor RecirculationSystem operationsto establishment ofShutdown Cooling, only the AP201Reactor Pumpmaybeleft Recirc in operation until the BP202 (only) RHR Pump isoperating satisfactorily, andthen onlyuntil the required B RHRLoop flow ofapproximately 10,000 gpmisachieved.(See attached10-0004).
| |
| C: incorrect- Minimizes the time atwhich there isnoforced through flow thecorefrom either the Reactor Recirculation System orthe RHR System. TheAP201 Reactor RecircPumpmaybeleft inoperation until theBP202 (only) RHRPump isoperating satisfactorily.
| |
| D: Incorrect. TheReactor Recirc Pumpassociated with theRHRLoop tobeplaced inShutdown Cooling must besecured with discharge its valveshut.
| |
| Technical Reference(s): HC.OP-lO.zz-0004(Q) (Attach if provided) notpreviously S/Dfrom rated Power toCold S/D Proposed References tobeprovided toapplicants examination:
| |
| during none Learning Objective: Analyze plant conditions andparameters todetermine plant if operationisin accordance with theSHUTDOWN FROM RATEDPOWERTOCOLDSHUTDOWN Integrated Operating Procedure, supporting System OperatingProcedures andTechnical Specifications.
| |
| Question Source: Bank# 36162 Modified Bank # orattach (Note.changes parent)
| |
| New Question History:
| |
| Question Cognitive Level: Comprehension orAnalysis 10CFRPart 55Content: 55.41(5)
| |
| Comments:
| |
| | |
| 2021NRCWritten Examination Facility: HopeCreek Vendor: GE ExamDate: 2021 ExamType: RO Examination Outline Cross-reference: Level RO SRO Tier # 3 Group#
| |
| K/A # 2.2.12.
| |
| Importance Rating 3.7 K/AStatement: Equipment Control:Knowledge of surveillance procedures.
| |
| Question: RO#68 Given:
| |
| a Preparation for plant isinprogress Startup IAWHC.OP-IO.22-0002, Preparation for Startup.
| |
| Plant TheCRDsystem hasjust beenplaced inservice.
| |
| OncetheCRDsystem isinservice, the crew isrequired toexercise toensure proper tosatisfy rodmotion surveillance requirements forplant startup.
| |
| A. atnormal ONLYfor pressure those control rodswhich hadmaintenance performed onthem B. atelevated ONLYfor pressure those control rods which hadmaintenance performed onthem C. all control rodsatboth elevated ANDnormal pressure D. atelevated ONLYfor pressure those control rods which historically have had operational problems Proposed Answer: C
| |
| | |
| 2021NRCWritten Examination Explanation (Optional): With preparation for plant start up, theCRDsystem willbeplacedintoa normal system lineup to allow therequired control rodexercising surveillance prior criticality toreactor andto satisfy Tech Spec surveillance requirements. Seeattached sections ofHC.OP-IO.zz-0002 andthe surveillance requirements (purpose) ofHC.OP-ST.BF-0001.
| |
| Plausibility Justification:
| |
| A: Incorrect. There are requirements for retesting anycontrol rods thathavehadmaintenance performed on them; however, this requirement for operability pertainstoeverycontrol rod.
| |
| B: incorrect- Tosatisfy the requirements for prestart uptocriticality, control all rodswill have tobe exercised atboth normal andel elevated pressures IAWHC.OP-lO.zz-0002.
| |
| C: Correct- IAWHC.OP-lo.zz-0002 andTechSpecrequirements control all rods will beexercised toboth normal andelevated pressures along with the surveillance required couplingcheck. The control rods areexercised IAW HC.OP-ST.BF-0001.
| |
| D: incorrect. Tosatisfy therequirements for prestart uptocriticality, allcontrol rods will have tobe exercised.
| |
| Technical Reference(s): HC.OP-lO.zz-0002(Q) (Attach if notpreviously provided)
| |
| Preparation for Plant S/U HC.OP-ST.BF-0001(Q)
| |
| Control RodDrive Exercise Proposed References tobeprovided toapplicants during examination: none Learning Objective: Analyze plant conditionsandparameters todetermine ifplantoperation isin accordance with thePREPARATION FOR PLANTSTARTUP Integrated Operating Procedure, supporting System Operating Procedures andTechnical Specifications.
| |
| Question Source: Bank# 33038 Modified Bank# (Note changesorattachparent)
| |
| New Question History:
| |
| Question Cognitive Level: Memory orKnowledge 10CFRPart 55Content: 55.41(10) ~
| |
| Comments:
| |
| | |
| 2021NRCWritten Examination Facility: HopeCreek Vendor: GE ExamDate: 2021 ExamType:RO Examination Outline Cross-reference: Level RO SRO Tier # 3 Group#
| |
| K/A # 2.2.15 Importance Rating 3.9 K/AStatement: Equipment Control: Ability todetermine the expectedplant configuration using design control andconfiguration documentation, such as drawings, line-ups, tag-outs, etc.
| |
| Question: RO#69 IAWOP-AA-108-101, CONTROL OFEQUIPMENT ANDSYSTEM STATUS:
| |
| Component AnAbnormal PositionSheet (ACPS) isrequiredtobefilled out if . (1) eSOMS(WorkClearance Module) isupdated bytheNCO (2) .
| |
| A. (1) aligning equipment outside ofroutineoperations.
| |
| (2) atthe endofeach shift.
| |
| B..
| |
| (1) a change incomponent positionisperformed per anapproved maintenance.
| |
| activity.
| |
| (2) atthe endofeach shift.
| |
| C. (1) aligning equipment outside ofroutineoperations.
| |
| (2) oncedaily.
| |
| D. (1) a change incomponent positionisperformed per anapproved maintenance activity.
| |
| (2) oncedaily.
| |
| Proposed Answer: A
| |
| | |
| 2021NRCWritten Examination Explanation (Optional):Situations will occur whenit isdesiredtoreposition acomponent andno approved documentation exists. TheACPS(Abnormal Component Position Sheet) willbethe approved configuration control method. There are somelimitations, however tousing anACPS, for example an approved maintenance activitythat controls thecomponent position.Attheendofeach theNCO shift shall update the ACPS (See attached OP-AA-108-101).
| |
| Plausibility Justification:
| |
| A: Correct.With noformaldocument tocontroi thecomponent configuration anACPS (position),
| |
| will bethe controlling document. Duetotheimportance ofconfiguration from control oneshift to the next, the off going NCOwill update the eSOMs(Work Clearance Module)andthe ACPSwill befiled away with no changes (See attached sectiononupdating theACPS).
| |
| B: Incorrect- Anapproved maintenance activity thatcontrolscomponent isoneofthe position limitations ofusing aACPS document (See attachedsectiononthe ACPSLimitation^s).
| |
| C: Incorrect- Duetothe importance ofconfiguration control from oneshift tothenext,theoff going NCOwill update theeSOMs (Work Clearance Module) andthe ACPSwill befiled away with nochanges (See attached section on updating the ACPS).
| |
| D: Incorrect. Anapproved maintenance activity thatcontrolscomponent isoneofthe position limitations ofusing a ACPSdocument. Dueto the importance ofconfiguration control fromone shift tothe next, the offgoing NCOwill updatethe eSOMs (Work Module).
| |
| Clearance Technical Reference(s): OP-AA-108-101 (Attach notpreviously if provided)
| |
| CONTROL OFEQUIPMENT AND SYSTEM STATUS Proposed References tobeprovided toapplicants during examination: none Learning Objective: Frommemory State the responsibilities of the following personnel withregardto Component Configuration Control:
| |
| All personnel CRS Duty Operator[NCO/NEO Watch)
| |
| Building Question Source: Bank# 111253 Modified Bank# (Note changesorattachparent)
| |
| New Question History:
| |
| Question Cognitive Level: Memory orKnowledge 10CFRPart 55Content: 55.41(10)
| |
| Comments:
| |
| | |
| 2021NRCWritten Examination Facility: HopeCreek Vendor: GE ExamDate: 2021 ExamType: RO Examination OutlineCross-reference: Level RO SRO Tier # 3 Group#
| |
| K/A # 2.3.7 Importance Rating 3.5 K/AStatement: Radiation Control: Ability tocomply with radiation work permit requirements during normal orabnormal conditions.
| |
| Question: RO#70 Given:
| |
| = A RWCUsystem valve independentverificationisbeing completed inthe field.
| |
| When:
| |
| = Theon-duty NCOdiscovers thattwovalves ontheverification listarein the "A"RWCU pumproom(High RadiationArea).
| |
| = Theshiftradiation technician protection andthe independent verifierreviewed the Radiation WorkPermit (RWP)survey the for "A"RWCUpumproom.
| |
| = Thegeneral area doserateatthe valvesis110mRem/hr.
| |
| = Thejobisestimated totake sixminutes.
| |
| Whatistheestimated cumulative dosethe verifier will receive andisthe "Hands On" verification independent required IAWOP-AA-108-101-1002, Component Configuration Control?
| |
| A. 18mRem;independent isrequired.
| |
| verification B. 11mRem;independent isNOTrequired.
| |
| verification C. 11mRem;independent isrequired.
| |
| verification D. 18mRem;independent isNOTrequired.
| |
| verification Proposed Answer: B
| |
| | |
| 2021NRCWritten Examination Explanation (Optional): Doserate calculation- [6 minutes/ 60,then 0.1 hrx 110mRem/hr = 11mRem)
| |
| Calculation of 110mRem/hr/ 6 minutes = 18.3 mRem, estimate 18mRem,if did thecandidate not carry the units correctly. IAW OP-AA-108-101-1002 Attachment 5 (see attached) GeneralRulesfor Verification, If significant cumulative radiation exposure (10 mRem) would bytheperson bereceived performing the Independent Verification orbypersons assistingtheperformance oftheIndependent Verification."Hands On" Independent Verification isNOTrequired.
| |
| Plausibility Justification:
| |
| A: Incorrect. With a calculation of110/6 (carrying thewrong units), would thestudent get18 mRem.Thestudent would have toknowthe General of>10mRem Rule forthe"Hands On" independent verification NOTrequired.
| |
| B: Correct With a calculation of0.1 x 110, thestudent wouldget11mRem.This calculation is correct andthe fact that itis >10mRem, the "HandsOn" independent isNOT verification required.
| |
| C: Incorrect- Thecalculation of11mRem accumulative dose iscorrect,howevertheindependent verification isNOTrequired duetothe dose being>10mRem.Thestudent wouldhave toknow theGeneral Rule of>10mRem for the"Hands On"independent verification NOTrequired.
| |
| D: Incorrect. With a calculation of110/6 (carrying the wrong units), would thestudent get '18 mRem.With the total >10mRem,the student could pickthis ascorrect.
| |
| distractor Technical Reference(s): OP-AA-108-101-1002 (Attach notpreviously if provided)
| |
| Component Configuration Control Attachment 5 (1.5 and1.5.1)
| |
| Proposed References tobeprovided toapplicants during examination: none Learning Objective: Describe what the worker is acknowledging whensigning a RWPprior touse.
| |
| Question Source: Bank # NRC2019 Q#72(New)
| |
| Modified Bank # (Note changesorattachparent)
| |
| New Question History: NRC2019 Question Cognitive Level: Comprehension orAnalysis 10CFRPart 55Content: 55.41(10)
| |
| Comments:
| |
| | |
| 2021NRCWritten Examination Facility: HopeCreek Vendor: GE ExamDate: 2021 ExamType: RO Examination OutlineCross-reference: Level RO SRO Tier # 3 Group#
| |
| K/A # 2.3.13 importance Rating 3.4 K/AStatement: Radiation Control: Knowledge ofRadiological Safety Procedures pertaining to licensed operator duties,such asresponse toradiation monitor alarms, containment entry requirements, fuelhandling responsibilities, access tolocked highradiationareas, aligning filters, etc.
| |
| Question: RO#71 Which ofthefollowing isthe required action ifa Locked High Radiation Areakey islost bythe responsible whochecked individual it outfrom theRadiation Protection Department?
| |
| Theindividual shallimmediately notify A. Security andestablish positive control ofaccess tothe area.
| |
| B. theRadiation Protection Manager andverify the area locked afterchecking for unauthorized personnel.
| |
| C. theShiftManager, re-lock thearea andhaveRadiation Protection check exposures for in excess ofthoseexpected.
| |
| D. Shift RadiationProtection Technician andRadiation Protection Supervisor andcontrol allaccess tothearea.
| |
| Proposed Answer: D
| |
| | |
| 2021NRCWritten Examination Explanation (Optional):Seeattached section ofRP-AA-463, High Radiation Area KeyControls Plausibility Justification:
| |
| A: Incorrect. Security isplausible duetothe fact that thesecurity watchisalwaysonduty inall sections ofthe plant. Positive control ofaccess tothe area isa responsibility ofthekeyholder IAW RP-AA-463.
| |
| B: Incorrect- This wouldbethe responsibility oftheShift RadProTechnician andSupervisor after the keyholder has informed themofthe lost key. IAWRP-AA-463, theShiftRadProTech would normally verify the LHRA is locked oncethe operator returned thekey.
| |
| C: Incorrect- Thekey holder wouldhave toimmediately contact theShiftRadProTechandRad ProSupervisor before contacting the ShiftManager. TheShift Manager wouldensure that the RadProdepartment completed theproper investigation andalso hadtheLHRAre-locked.
| |
| D: Correct. IAWRP-AA-463, responsibilities ofthe keyholder includes controlling access tothe area andif thekeyislost toimmediately inform the SRPTandRPS.
| |
| Technical Reference(s): RP-AA-463 if (Attach not provided) previously High Radiation Area Key Controls Proposed References tobeprovided toapplicants during examination: none Learning Objective: State theresponsibilities ofthe following personnel for issuance ofkeys toLocked High Radiation Areas:
| |
| KeyHolder SM Shift Radiation Protection Technician (SRPT) IAW RP-AA-463, High Radiation AreaKeyControls Question Source: Bank# 30961 Modified Bank# (Notechanges orattachparent)
| |
| New Question History: NRC2016 Question Cognitive Level: Memory orKnowledge 10CFRPart 55Content: 55.41(10)
| |
| Comments:
| |
| | |
| 2021NRCWritten Examination Facility: HopeCreek Vendor: GE ExamDate: 2021 ExamType:RO Examination Outline Cross-reference: Level RO SRO Tier # 3 Group#
| |
| K/A # 2.4.35 Importance Rating 3.8 K/AStatement: Emergency Procedures/Plan: Knowledge oflocal auxiliary tasks operator during andtheresultant emergency operational effects.
| |
| Question: RO#72
| |
| | |
| 2021NRCWritten Examination Given:
| |
| = Theplant wasat100%power.
| |
| When:
| |
| a A Loss ofOffsite Power occurred.
| |
| The 'A' EDG failed toautomatically start.
| |
| = Operators were unable tostart the 'A'EDGfrom theControl Room.
| |
| HC.OP-AB.zz-0135, Station Blackout/Loss ofOffsite Power/Emergency Diesel GeneratorMalfunction is being implemented.
| |
| Which ofthe following sets ofactions accurately describes howtostart ANDload the'A'EDG under these conditions IAW HC.OP-AB.zz-0135?
| |
| Local andRemote EDGPanels:
| |
| 1A-C-421: Local Engine Control Panel (102' elev.)
| |
| 1A-C-422: Remote Generator Control Panel (130' elev.)
| |
| 1A-C-423: Remote Engine Control Panel(130' elev.)
| |
| After verifying that the READY FORAUTOSTART isON,Panel 1A-C-423, then A. PLACEEMERGENCY TAKE-OVER Switch in EMERG position onPanel 1A-C-422, PLACEtheREMOTE ENGINE CONTROL inSTARTon1A-C-423, and then 'A' EDGoutput breaker will auto-close.
| |
| B. Press theDIESEL ENGREMOTE pushbutton for the 'A'EDGon10C651(MCR) andensure REMOTE lightison10C651, PLACELOCAL ENGINE CONTROL Switch on1A-C-421 inSTART,andthen the'A' EDGoutput breaker willbe closed fromthe Main Control Room.
| |
| C. PLACEEMERGENCY TAKE-OVER Switch inEMERGposition on Panel 1A-C-422,PLACEREMOTE ENGINE CONTROL inSTARTatPanel1-A-C423, and then the'A' EDGoutput breaker will beclosed atPanel 1-A-C-422.
| |
| D. PLACE theREM/LOC/MAINT CONTROL SELECT switch on1A-C-421in REMOTE, Place LOCAL ENGINE CONTROL Switch on1A-C-421 inSTART, andthen the'A' EDGoutput breaker will beclosed fromtheMain Control Room.
| |
| ProposedAnswer: C Explanation (Optional): Placing theEmergency Takeover switch inEMERG enables thelocalstart.
| |
| Theauto-closure circuit fortheEDGoutput breaker alsoremains enabled. Whenthe EDGfrequency andvoltagesatisfy theDiesel Ready for Loadpermissive (>95% Frequency andVoltage),
| |
| thebreaker canbeclosed manually. REMOTE I.n onthe REM/LOC/MAINT switchatthe1A-C-421 panel,diesel control isestablished either inthecontrol roomorattheremote engine/generator controlpanels (422 423).
| |
| and IAW AB-135 Subsequent action B, ift EDG he does not s tartand loadfromt heMain Control Room, for allows either then a local anEDGstart start isrequires from local attheRemote panels orremote Panels panels. This (see 422and423 attached).
| |
| particular AB-135 isfor scenario a remotepanel start;however there.are distractors for localpanel Inanycase start. (remote orlocal panel theEDGoutput start) breaker willbeclosed from theremote panel (422).
| |
| | |
| 2021 NRCWritten Examination Plausibility Justification:
| |
| A: Incorrect. Placing theEmergency Takeover switch inEMERG thelocal enables start.
| |
| However, placing theEMERGENCY TAKE-OVER switch on1A-C-422 inEMERG defeats the automatic closureoftheEDGoutput breaker. Ithastobemanually closed frompanel 1A-C-422.
| |
| B: Incorrect- Se,lecting REMOTEfor the'A'EDGengine on10C651E does NOTenable the LOCAL ENGINE CONTROL switchon 1A-C-421. Itdoes enable control atthe Remote panels 1A-C-422 and423.
| |
| C: Correct Placing the Emergency Take over swith inEMERG enables the localstartofthe EDG from the remote panels (422 and 423).When the EDG frequency andvoltage satisfythe Diesel Ready forLoad permissive (>95% Frequency and Voltage), thebreaker canbeclosed manually.
| |
| D: incorrect. InREMOTE onthe REM/LOC/MAINT switch atthe1A-C-421 panel,diesel control is established either inthecontrol room orattheremote engine/generator control panels (422 and423).
| |
| Technical Reference(s): HC.OP-AB.zz-0135(Q) (Attach notpreviously if provided)
| |
| Station Blackout/LossofOffsite Power/EDG Malfunction HC.OP-AR.KJ-0001 1A-C-423Panel Proposed References tobeprovided toapplicantsduring examination: none Learning Objective: Discuss theoperationalimplications ofthe abnormal indications/alarms for system operating parameters related toStation Blackout/Loss Power OfOffsite Diesel Generator Malfunction,Abnormal Operating Procedure.
| |
| Question Source: Bank# 62474 Modified Bank # (Note changes orattach parent)
| |
| Question History:
| |
| Question Cognitive Level: Comprehension orAnalysis 10CFRPart 55Content: 55.41(10)
| |
| Comments:
| |
| | |
| 2021NRCWritten Examination Facility: HopeCreek Vendor: GE ExamDate: 2021 ExamType: RO Examination Outline Cross-reference: Level RO SRO Tier # 3 Group#
| |
| K/A # 2.4.28 Importance Rating 3.2 K/AStatement: Emergency Procedures/Plan: Knowledge ofprocedures relating toasecurity event.
| |
| Question: RO#73
| |
| | |
| 2021NRCWritten Examination Given:
| |
| = There wasanUnusual Event declared duetoa fire intheAuxiliary Buildingcaused by anexplosion.
| |
| = TheSite Protection isresponding tothe fire.
| |
| = The Security Department isresponding tothe Security Event.
| |
| = It is determined that thereisanon-going secunty threat atHopeCreek.
| |
| IAWEmergency Preparedness procedures relatingtothe Security Event, Theactivation oftheOperations Support Center (OSC) (1) -
| |
| AllONSITE personnel will (2)
| |
| A. (1) isrequired (2) report toAssembly/Accountability Stations B. (1) isNOTrequired take (2) cover andShelter-in-Place C. (1) isNOTrequired (2) report toAssembly/Accountability Stations D. (1) isrequired (2) take cover andShelter-in-Place Proposed Answer: D (Optional):
| |
| Explanation TheOperations Support Center (OSC) willbeactivated iftheUEclassification wastheresult ofa Security event. Otherwise, OSCactivation isoptionalat a UE classification.
| |
| Assembly isrequired atanAlert andoptional ata UE.Accountability isimplemented atanAlert or higher level.
| |
| Justification:
| |
| Plausibility A: Incorrect. Theactivation ofthe OSCisrequired duetothe Security Event. WiththeSecurity Eventon-going, thereporting toanAssembly/Accountability Station would notbeprudent with thepossible terrorist activitiesstill inprogress.
| |
| B: Incorrect- Normally during anUnusual Event classification,itwould beatthediscretion ofthe Emergency Coordinator toactivate theOSC(optional). However, duetothe Security Event the OSCactivation would berequired. Duetothe shift personnel manning theOSC,the OSC personnel would manthe OSCandshelter-in-place. ..
| |
| C: Incorrect- Normally during anUnusual Event classification,itwould beatthediscretion ofthe Emergency Coordinator toactivate the OSC(optional). However, duetotheSecurity Event the OSCactivation would berequired. With the SecurityEvent on-going, the reporting toan Assembly/Accountability Station would not beprudent with thepossible terrorist activities still in progress. -
| |
| D: Correct. Theactivation oftheOSCisrequired duetothe SecurityEvent. AllONSITE personnel will "Take Cover andShelter-in-Place" (see attached emergency procedure relating to thesecurity event).
| |
| | |
| 2021NRCWritten Examination Technical Reference(s): NC.EP-EP.zz-0102(Q) if (Attach previously not provided)
| |
| Emergency Coordinator Response Proposed References tobeprovided toapplicants examination: none during Learning Objective: List the fouremergency and classifications what happens during theclassification including:
| |
| a Facilitiesactivated e Facilities staffed Question Source: Bank#
| |
| ModifiedBank # (Note.changes orattach parent)
| |
| New X Question History:
| |
| Question Cognitive Level: Memory orKnowledge 10CFRPart 55Content: 55.41(10)
| |
| Comments:
| |
| | |
| 2021NRCWritten Examination Facility: HopeCreek Vendor: GE ExamDate: 2021 ExamType:RO Examination Outline Cross-reference: Level RO SRO Tier # 3 Group#
| |
| K/A # 2.2.42 Importance Rating 3.9 K/AStatement: Equipment Control: Ability torecognize system parametersthat areentry-level conditions forTechnical Specifications.
| |
| Question: RO#74 Given:
| |
| = Theplantisoperating at100%power.
| |
| = Delaware River isat82Fandrising temperature slowly.
| |
| = HC.OP-DL.zz-0026 3h,Plant Attachment Systems (River WaterTemperature) is implemented.
| |
| Noadditional Technical Specification actions arerequired until RiverWater Temperature reaches A. 83.1F B. 84.1F C. 85.1F D. 88.1F Proposed Answer: C
| |
| | |
| 2021 NRCWritten Examination Explanation (Optional):Seeattached procedures, HC.OP-SO.EA-0001, HC.OP-DL.zz-0026,andT.S.
| |
| 3.7.1.3 Plausibility Justification:
| |
| A: incorrect. With river temperature > 82F,the Attachment 3hisimplemented.Once temperature is>840F,then the SOPsection for elevated river isimplemented, temperature but only after river temperature exceeds 85F.This isalsothe entrycondition forT.S.3.7.1.3 ,
| |
| Ultimate Heat sink specification. At84.5*F, the crew would continue tomonitorriver temperature for >85F.IAW T.S. 3.7.1.3 at88Fall SSWS,SACS,EDGsandSACScross tiesnot cross connected would allow continued power operations.
| |
| B: Incorrect- Oncetemperature is>84F,then theSOPsection for elevated temperature river is implemented, but onlyafter river temperature exceeds 85F.
| |
| C: Correct- With river temperature >85*F, the crew would enter T.S.
| |
| 3.7.1.3 andimplement the actions IAWSSWSOPsectionfor elevate'd river temperature would which require opening the yard dumpvalves toestablish analternate discharge path for SSWsystem the D: incorrect. IAWT.S. 3.7.1.3 at88*F all SSWS, SACS,EDGsandSACScross ties notcross connected would allowcontinued poweroperations.
| |
| Technical Reference(s): HC.OP-DL.zz-00026(Q) Att. 3h if (Attachnotpreviously provided).
| |
| HC.OP-SO.EA-0001(Q) Sect.5.9 T.S. 3.7.1.3 Ultimate Heat Sink Proposed References tobeprovided toapplicants during examination: none Learning Objective: Given specific plant operating conditions which require operator actions within 1hourFromMemory select the correct Technical Specification action(s) for the following:
| |
| T.S3.7.1.3 Ultimate Heat Sink Question Source: Bank# - -
| |
| Modified Bank # (Notechangesorattachparent)
| |
| New X Question History:
| |
| Question Cognitive Level: Memory orKnowledge 10CFRPart 55Content: 55.41(10)
| |
| Comments:
| |
| | |
| 2021NRCWritten Examination Facility: HopeCreek Vendor: GE ExamDate: 2021 ExamType: RO Examination OutlineCross-reference: Level RO SRO Tier # 3 Group#
| |
| K/A # 2.3.14 Importance Rating 3.4 K/AStatement: Radiation Control: Knowledge of radiation or containment hazards that may arise during normal,abnormal, oremergency conditions oractivities.
| |
| Question: RO#75 IAWHC.OP-EO.zz-0318, Containment Venting:
| |
| Withhigh radioactivity conditions inprimary containment, venting the primary containment via either theSuppression Chamber 2"or24"Exhaust lines would bethepreferred vent paths.
| |
| However, whatisthe concern forusingeither ofthese vent paths?
| |
| A. High radiation conditionsinthereactor building.
| |
| B. Unmonitored radioactive release. . . .
| |
| C. Releasing ofradioactivitywithout the scrubbing effect.
| |
| D. Inability toreduce pressure toprevent containment damage.
| |
| Proposed Answer: A Explanation (Optional):
| |
| Ifthecontainment atmosphere isbelieved tobecontaminated, vent lineups should beselected soastominimize theamount ofradioactivity released while achieving still the objective ofthe venting requirement. Thesuppression pool isthe preferred primary containment vent path under accidentconditions.Venting from thesuppression chamber isgenerally preferred, toobtain the benefits ofsuppression pool scrubbing. However, the vent path passes through ductwork that contains Back DraftDampers Blow-out and Panels causing elevated radiological conditions inthe Reactor Building.
| |
| | |
| 2021NRCWritten Examination Plausibility Justification:
| |
| A: Correct. Using thepreferred vent path through the suppression chamberfor scrubbing andthen through theReactor Building, thiswill cause elevated radiological inthe conditions personnel spaces oftheReactor Building. Goodengineering radiation controls protection will have tobein place.
| |
| B: Incorrect- The ventpath isscrubbe.d bythesuppression pool, byFRVSandmonitored treated prior tobeing released.
| |
| C: incorrect- Byutilizing thevent path through thesuppression chamber(2"or'24" Exhaust line seeattached), thescrubbing effect will help reduce theradioactive release.
| |
| D: incorrect. Venting thecontainment isstill accomplished through thepreferredvent pathof either suppression- chamber exhaust line, however there isanadded benefit through the suppression chamber forscrubbing (reducing theradioactivity oftherelease).
| |
| Technical Reference(s): HC.OP-EO.22-0318(Q) if (Attachnotpreviously provided)
| |
| Containment Venting Proposed References tobeprovided toapplicants duringexamination: none Learning Objective: Explain thebasis/reason forall prerequisites, precautions, andlimitations ofeach ofthe 300series Emergency Operating Procedures.
| |
| Question Source: Bank # 113307 Modified Bank # (Notechangesor attach parent)
| |
| New Question History:
| |
| Question Cognitive Level: Memory orKnowledge 10CFRPart 55Content: 55.41(10)
| |
| Comments:
| |
| | |
| 2021NRCWritten Examination Facility: HopeCreek Vendor: GE ExamDate: 2021 ExamType:SRO Examination Outline Cross-reference: Level RO SRO Tier # 1 Group# 1 K/A # 295026EA2.01 importance Rating 4.2 K/AStatement: Ability todetermine and/orinterpret the following asthey apply to SUPPRESSION POOLHIGHWATERTEMPERATURE: Suppression pool temperature water Question: SRO#76
| |
| . . +
| |
| | |
| 2021NRCWritten Examination Given:
| |
| = Theplant wasoperating at75%power.
| |
| When:
| |
| = One reliefvalve stuck open andcould not beclosed.
| |
| = The reactor hasbeen manually shut down.
| |
| Current plant conditions:
| |
| = Suppression pool temperature isat96Fandslowly rising.
| |
| = Suppression Pool level is at79inches andslowly rising.
| |
| = Drywell pressureis at 1.1psig andstable.
| |
| = Drywell temperature is at 100F andstable.
| |
| Whatactions IAWemergency operating procedures isrequired?
| |
| I. Place allavailable Drywell Cooling in service.
| |
| II. Place allavailable Suppression Pool Cooling in service.
| |
| III.Initiate Suppression Chamber Sprays.
| |
| IV. Reject water from thesuppression pool through 'B' RHR toRadwaste asnecessary.
| |
| A. II& IVONLY B. I, & IVONLY C. II, III, & IVONLY D. I, II,& Ill ONLY
| |
| ~ '
| |
| A ProposedAnswer:
| |
| Explanation(Optional): Seeattached EOP-102 legs for suppression pool parameters.Ifit isdetermined that suppression pool temperature cannot bemaintained below 95F using normal methods,subsequent provide instructions guidance oncontrolling suppression pool temperature using all available suppression pool cooling. Whensuppression pool level risesabove the Specification Technical upper EOP-102 limit, provides direction touseECCSand/oralignments notnormally usedtomaintain suppression poolwater level ingeneral plant procedures. 'B' RHRtoRadwaste isusedinaneffort to maintain primary containment inits normal configuration andtoprevent level from tothe rising point wherethemoresevere actions ofreactor scram, termination ofdrywellsprays, ofexternal termination injection sources, andemergency RPVdepressurization will berequired.
| |
| Justification:
| |
| Plausibility A: Correct.See attached SP/T-3. With Suppression Pool temperature >95Fandrising,the action IAWEOP-102 istoplace all available Suppression Pool Cooling inservice.
| |
| Seeattached SP/L-12.With Suppression Pool levelHigh >78.5 inches andrising,the IAWEOP-102 action isto lower theSuppression Pool level using 'B' RHRtoRadwaste lineup.
| |
| | |
| 2021 NRCWritten Examination B: Incorrect- Maximizing drywell cooling would have been directed from theHC.OP-AB.CONT-0001 for the elevated drywell pressure, however duetothe plant shutdown andthecurrent primary containment parameters, drywell cooling isnot orderedfrom theEOPsspecifically EOP-102. Drywell pressure iscurrently stable.
| |
| C: Incorrect- Suppression Chamber Sprays arenotdirected untilsuppression chamberpressure exceeds 9.5 psig, andare not required atthis time.
| |
| D: Incorrect. See attached SP/T-3, SP/L-12, DW/T-2, andDW/P-2. Suppression ChamberSprays arenot directed until suppression chamber pressure exceeds 9.5 psig,andarenotrequiredat this time Reference(s):
| |
| Technical HC.OP-EO.zz-0102-FC (Attach if not provided) previously PrimaryContainment Control HC.OP-AB.CONT-0001 Drywell Pressure ProposedReferences to be provided toapplicants during examination: none Objective: Given Learning anystep ofthe procedure, determine thereason for performance of that step and/or predict expected system response tocontrol manipulations prescribed bythat step Question Source: Bank# 152245 Modified Bank # (Note changes parent) orattach New QuestionHistory:
| |
| QuestionCognitive Level: Comprehension orAnalysis 10CFRPart 55Content: 55.43(5)
| |
| Comments:
| |
| | |
| 2021NRCWritten Examination Facility: HopeCreek Vendor: GE ExamDate: 2021 ExamType: SRO =
| |
| Examination Outline Cross-reference: Level RO SRO Tier # 1 Group# 1 K/A # 295016 AA2.03 Importance Rating 4.4 K/AStatement: todetermine Ability and/or interpret the following asthey toCONTROL apply ROOMABANDONMENT :Reactor pressure Question: SRO#77
| |
| | |
| 2021NRCWritten Examination Given:
| |
| = Thecontrol room wasevacuated.
| |
| = Thereactor isshutdown.
| |
| = Alternate Shutdown Offsite Power Cooling isbeing from performed.
| |
| theRemote Shutdown Panel(RSP')
| |
| following a Lossof
| |
| = All RSP controls are functional.
| |
| During theapproach toCold Shutdown, IAWHC.OP-lO.zz-0008, ShutdownFromOutside the ControlRoom, IfReactor Pressure does NOT stabilize below 160psig above theSuppression Pool, SRVs
| |
| -(1) canbeopened as required fromtheir RSPcontrols.
| |
| ifthecooldown rateexceeds 90F/hr., then direct the crewtoreduceLPCIinjection theRPV into UNTIL Reactor Pressure lowers to within (2) psigofSuppression Chamber Pressure.
| |
| A. A andE (1)
| |
| (2)100 B. (1)F,H,andM
| |
| -(2) 50 C. (1)A andE (2)50 D. (1)F,H,andM (2)100 ProposedAnswer: B (Optional):
| |
| Explanation Seeattached I0-0008 Att. 11.Thefoll.owing SRV'scanbeoperated from the shutdown remote panel (10C399): F013F (non-ADS),F013H (LLSSRV,nonADS),and F013M (non-ADS) If theRSP-10C399 Channel B transfer switch isplacedinEMERGENCY, theF,H& MSRV's become inoperable from themaincontrol room. TheA andE SRV's haveAUTO-OPEN keylock switches inthelower roomonpanel relay 10C631, (Div.
| |
| 4 Relay Panel). reactor Vertical Controlling pressure with thegiven conditions,SRVswill beusedasrequired. Inthecaseofoperating SRVsfrom theRSPlocal controls, theF,H,orM SRVscanbeoperated.
| |
| only A andESRVsareavailable akeylock through switch,however theircontrols are atthelower relaiy panel10C631. Ifthecooldown isbeing rate exceeded (90F/hr)with theabove conditions, IAW10-0008 Att.
| |
| 11,thedirection toreduce LPCIinjection until ReactorPressure lowers towithin 50psig ofSuppression CharnberPressure orthe cooldowndecreases below100F/hr. isthemitigation strategyatthis point.
| |
| Plausibility Justification:
| |
| A: Incorrect. A andE SRVsareavailable through a keylock however switch, theircontrols areat thelower relay panel10C631. 10-0008 gives theoptiontousetheA andE SRVs,however the stem ofthequestion asks forthe controls atthe RSP.Whenexceeding thecooldown the rate, directiontoreduce LPCI injection until Reactor Pressurelowerstowithin 50psig ofSuppression Chamber Pressure orthe cooldown decreases below 100F/hr.isthemitigation strategyatthis point.
| |
| | |
| 2021NRCWritten Examination B: Correct- F013F (non-ADS), F013H (LLS SRV,nonADS), andF013M(non-ADS) canbe operated fromtheremote shutdown panel (10C399). Whenexceeding thecooldown rate,the direction toreduce LPCI until injection Reactor Pressure lowers towithin 50psigof Suppression Chamber Pressureorthe cooldown decreases below 100*F isthemitigation
| |
| /hr.
| |
| strategy atthispoint.
| |
| C: Incorrect- A andE SRVsareavailable through a keylock switch, however controls their areat thelowerrelay panel 10C631. 10-0008 gives theoption tousethe A andE SRVs,however the stem ofthequestion asks for the controls atthe RSP.
| |
| D: Incorrect. When exceeding the cooldown rate, the direction toreduce LPCI until injection Reactor Pressure lowers to within50psig ofSuppression Chamber Pressure orthecooldown decreases below 100F /hr. is themitigationstrategy atthis point.
| |
| TechnicalReference(s): HC.OP-IO.zz-0008(Q) (Attach if notpreviouslyprovided)
| |
| Shutdown From Outside Control Room Proposed References tobeprovided toapplicants during examination: none Objective: Analyze Learning plant conditions and parameters todetermine ifplant operation isin accordance with the SHUTDOWN FROM OUTSIDE THECONTROL ROOM IntegratedOperating Procedure, supporting System Operating Procedures andTechnical Specifications.
| |
| QuestionSource: Bank # 125070 Modified Bank# (Note changes orattachparent)
| |
| New QuestionHistory:
| |
| QuestionCognitive Level: Memory orKnowledge 10CFRPart 55Content:55.43(5)
| |
| Comments:
| |
| | |
| 2021NRCWritten Examination Facility: HopeCreek Vendor: GE ExamDate: 2021 ExamType: SRO Examination Outline Cross-reference: Level RO SRO Tier # 1 Group# 1 K/A # 295037 EA2.07 Importance Rating 4.2 K/AStatement: todetermine Ability and/or interpret the following asthey toSCRAM apply CONDITION PRESENT ANDREACTOR POWER ABOVE APRM DOWNSCALE OR UNKNOWN :Containment conditions/isolations Question: SRO#78
| |
| | |
| 2021NRCWritten Examination Given:
| |
| a While operating at60%reactor power, a reactor scramonlowreactor water level occurs.
| |
| = Thereactor fails toscram.
| |
| = All control rods remain attheir pre-trip conditions.
| |
| T=30minutes after thetransient:
| |
| = SLCtank level isat2600gallons. -
| |
| = Rxpoweris <4%.
| |
| a RPVpressure is at900psig.
| |
| = RPVlevel wasintentionally lowered andmaintained within -50inches to-120 inches.
| |
| = Suppression poollevel is at79inches andsteady.
| |
| = Suppression pool temperature isat1550F andslowly lowering.
| |
| a Drywell pressure isat4.5 psig andsteady.
| |
| Main condenser vacuum is at 6 inches Hgabs andslowly degrading.
| |
| = NOindications ofafuel failure or steam line break exist.
| |
| Whichofthe following action(s) is(are) required IAWemergency operating procedures?
| |
| A. Lower reactor pressure tostaybelow theHeat Capacity Temperature Limit Curve.
| |
| B. Emergency depressurize thereactor.
| |
| C. Bypass interlocks asrequired andmaintainthe MSlVs open.
| |
| D. Depressurize the reactor andmaintain cooldownrate below 90*F/hr.
| |
| ProposedAnswer: C (Optional):
| |
| Explanation Under failure-to-scram conditions, certainisolations maybedefeated toprevent closure oftheMSlVs andpermit continued use the of m ain c asa heat ondenser sink. lfthe main steam wereallowed lines toclose, theenergy addition tothecontainment would likely increase and the Heat Capacity Temperature Limit could bereached ina relatively short Defeating time. themainsteam line mayth.us isolations bea principal contributor tosuccessful ofafailure-to-scram mitigation event.
| |
| Defeating thelow level isolations anticipates the possible level reduction and prevents unnecessary loss ofthemaincondenser. Seeattached EOP-101A FC.
| |
| Justification:
| |
| Plausibility A: Incorrect. Thecombination ofRPVpressure andSuppression pool temperature forHCTLdo notchallenge the Action required area ofHCTL.Seeattached HCTLcurve.
| |
| B: Incorrect-RPVwater level canbemaintained above185inches, emergency depressurization isnotrequired. Seeattached LP18.
| |
| C: Correct- Isolations maybedefeated toprevent closureoftheMSIVs andpermit continued use ofthemain condenser asa heat sink. LowRPVwater level isolations aredefeated since subsequent steps maylower RPVwater level tobelow thelowRPVwater MSlVisolation level setpoint.Seeattached LP-8andRC/P-17.
| |
| D: Incorrect. Cooldown isnotpermitted until the Cold Shutdown Boron weight hasbeen added.
| |
| (1100gallons in the S LC tank). See attached RC/P-19.
| |
| | |
| 2021NRCWritten Examination Technical Reference(s): (Attach if provided) previously not Proposed References tobeprovidedtoapplicants during examination: none Learning Objective: Given anystep oftheprocedure, explain the basis for performance ofthat step and/or evaluate theexpectedsystem response tocontrol manipulations prescribed bythat step.
| |
| Question Source: Bank # 33931 ModifiedBank# changes (Note parent) orattach New Question History:
| |
| Question Cognitive Level: Comprehension orAnalysis 10CFRPart 55Content: 55.43(5)
| |
| Comments:
| |
| | |
| 2021NRCWritten Examination Facility: HopeCreek Vendor: GE ExamDate: 2021 ExamType: SRO Examination Outline Cross-reference: Level RO SRO Tier # 1 Group# 1 K/A # 295021 2.2.40 Importance Rating 4.7 K/AStatement:
| |
| Equipment Control:Ability toapply Technical Specifications for a system- Loss ofShutdown (RHR).
| |
| Cooling Question: SRO#79
| |
| | |
| 2021NRCWritten Examination Given:
| |
| = Theplant isshutdown.
| |
| = Detensioning oftheReactor Headisinprogress.
| |
| = 'A' RHRisinshutdown cooling.
| |
| = 'B' RHRisinstandby.
| |
| = Reactor coolanttemperature isat135*Fandsteady.
| |
| = RHR flow is at10,000 gpm.
| |
| = ThePlant Operator (PO) determines thatthe'A' RHRHeat Exchanger hasfailed dueto leakage into theStation Auxiliary CoolingSystem (SACS).
| |
| = ThePOremoves 'A' RHRLoop from andisolates service the'A'RHRHeat Exchanger.
| |
| With the above plant conditions and (1) RPVlevel asdefined inTechnical Specifications, theCRSdetermines that (2)
| |
| A. (1) low (2) atleast oneshutdowncooling modeloop ofthe residual heat removal (RHR) system SHALLbeOPERABLE oneRHRpumpandoneheat with exchanger in operation.
| |
| B. (1) high (2) shutdown two modeloopsof the cooling residual heatremoval (RHR) system SHALLbeOPERABLE andatleast one loop is inoperation with oneRHR pumpandoneheat exchanger OPERABLE ineach loop.
| |
| C. (1) high (2) atleast oneshutdown cooling modeloop oftheresidual heat removal (RHR) system SHALLbeOPERABLE oneRHRpump and oneheat with exchanger inoperation.
| |
| D. (1) low (2) twoshutdown coolingmodeloopsoftheresidual heatremoval (RHR) system SHALLbeOPERABLE oneloop andatleast isinoperationwith one RHR pumpandoneheat OPERABLE exchanger ineachloop.
| |
| Proposed Answer: D Explanation (Optional): With a loss ofSDConthe'A' RHRloop andthe 'A'RHRheat exchanger isolated duetotheleak, the 'A' RHRloop ofSDCisINOPERABLE. Thecurrent statusoftheplant with RPVlevel<22feet 2 inches above the top pressure ofthereactor vessel flange(lowlevel) and heat toambient losses arenot sufficient tomaintainOPERATIONAL CONDITION 5,the CRSwould have to determine that T.S. 3.9.11.2 isapplicable whichwouldrequiretwoshutdown coolingmodeloops ofthe residual heat removal (RHR) system OPERABLE andatleastoneloop isinoperationwith oneRHR pumpandoneheat exchanger OPERABLE ineachloop.This isthe entry conditions for T.S. 3.9.11.2.
| |
| conditions Theentry forT.S. 3.9.11.1 withthehighlevelasdefined as>22feet 2 inches above thetop ofthe reactor pressure vessel flange andheatlosses toambient arenotsufficient tomaintain OPERATIONAL CONDITION 5would beatleast oneshutdown cooling modeloop oftheresidual heat (RHR) removal system SHALL be OPERABLE withone RHR pump and one heat exchanger OPERABLE. (See attached entry conditionsandapplicability's for T.S. High 3.9.11.1 Level and3.9.11.2 LowLevel). ~
| |
| | |
| 2021NRCWritten Examination Plausibility Justification:
| |
| A: Incorrect. Asdefined inT.S.3.9.11, <22feet 2 inchesabove thetopofthereactor pressure vessel flangeisapplicable toT.S. 3.9.11.2 LOWWATERLEVELspecification. Theentry condition for T.S3.9.11.2 istwoshutdown cooling modeloops oftheresidual heat removal (RHR) system SHALLbeOPERABLE andatleast oneloop isinoperation withoneRHRpump andone heat exchanger OPERABLE ineachloop. Thestudent will have todetermine either T.S. 3.9.11.1 HIGH WATER LEVEL orT.S. 3.9.11.2 LOWWATERLEVEL andthen the entry condition for each TechSpec.
| |
| B: Incorrect- T.S. 3.9.11.2 LOWWATERLEVEL isapplicable for thegiven conditions.
| |
| Detensioning ofthe head isOPCON 5,however theRPVlevel is<22feet above 2 inches the top ofthe reactor pressure vessel flange(the refuel cavityabove ofthe vessel headhasnot been filled yet).
| |
| C: incorrect T.S. 3.9.11.2 LOWWATER LEVELisapplicable for thegiven conditions.
| |
| Detensioning oftheheadisOPCON 5,however theRPVlevel is<22feet 2inchesabove the top ofthereactor pressure vessel flange (the refuel cavity above ofthe vessel headhasnotbeen filled yet). Theentry conditionfor T.S3.9.11.2 is twoshutdown modeloops cooling ofthe residual heat removal (RHR) system SHALL beOPERABLE andatleast oneloopisinoperation with oneRHRpumpandoneheat exchanger OPERABLE ineach loop.
| |
| D: Correct. T.S. 3.9.11.2 LOWWATERLEVELisapplicable for thegivenconditions. Theentry condition for T.S3.9.11.2 istwoshutdown coolingmode loops ofthe residual heat removal (RHR) system SHALLbeOPERABLE andatleast one loop is inoperationwith oneRHRpump andoneheat exchanger OPERABLE ineachloop.
| |
| Technical Reference(s): T.S. 3.9.11.1 and3.9.11.2 (Attach if notpreviously provided)
| |
| Refueling Operations Proposed References tobeprovided toapplicants during examination: none Learning Objective: Assess Residual Heat Removal System operability anddetermine requiredactions associated withResidual Heat Removal System inoperability.
| |
| Question Source: Bank#
| |
| Modified Bank # (Note changes orattachparent)
| |
| New X Question History:
| |
| Question Cognitive Level: Comprehension orAnalysis 10CFRPart 55Content: 55.43(2)
| |
| Comments:
| |
| | |
| NRCWritten
| |
| .2021 Examination Facility: HopeCreek Vendor: GE ExamDate: 2021 ExamType:SRO Examination Outline Cross-reference: Level RO SRO Tier # 1 Group# 1 K/A # 295001 2.4.50 Importance Rating 4.0 K/AStatement: Emergency Procedures/Plan: Ability toverifysystem alarm setpoints and operate controls identifiedinthealarm response manual. Partial orCompleteLoss ofForced Core Flow Circulation Question: -
| |
| SRO#80
| |
| | |
| 2021NRCWritten Examination Given:
| |
| = Theplant wasoperating at100%power.
| |
| When:
| |
| = Reactor flowandpower begantotrend downward.
| |
| = RPT breakers CN205andDN205are tripped open.
| |
| (1)Whatistherequired action IAWHC.OP-AB.RPV-0003, Recirculation System abnormal?
| |
| (2)Based ontheabove conditions andIAW10CFR50.72, what isthe earliest reporting requirement?
| |
| A. (1)locktheReactor Mode Switch intheShutdown position.
| |
| (2)eighthours.
| |
| B. (1) check power-to-flow relationship for'A'Reactor Recirculation Pumpin single loop operation.
| |
| (2) four hours.
| |
| C. (1) check power-to-flow relationship for 'B'Reactor Recirculation Pumpin single loop operation.
| |
| (2) eighthours.
| |
| D. (1) locktheReactor ModeSwitch intheShutdown position.
| |
| (2) fourhours.
| |
| ProposedAnswer: D Explanation (Optional): TheRPT' breakers function tointerrupt power from therecirc Variable Frequency Drive unittothereactor pumps, recirc thusproviding a rapid cessation ofcore flow andsubsequent rise
| |
| - incore voidingtoreduce power.
| |
| reactor Eachrecirc pumpissupplied power through twobreakers arrangedinseries. "A" RecircPump: RPTBreakers AN205 & CN205, "B" Recirc Pump: RPTBreakers BN205& DN205. With CN205andDN205tripped, both "A" and"B" reactor recirculation pumps are therefore, tripped, there norecirc tare pumps running with thereactor critical.
| |
| Theimmediate operator actions IAWHC.OP.AB.RPV-0003 A
| |
| 0003). 4-hour report isrequired istoLockTheModeSwitch for a n involving event a critical scram u nless (see inShutdown attached it r esulted RPV-from andwas ofa pre-planned part sequence. Manual RPSactuation inanticipation ofreceiving anautomatic RPS isreportable actuation (RAL 11.3.2).
| |
| | |
| 2021NRCWritten Examination Plausibility Justification:
| |
| A: Incorrect. An8 hour reportiscorrect for anyother actuation (forexample PCIS andECCS).
| |
| Due tothe manual RPSactuation, isreportable this tothe NRCwithin 4 hours IAWRAL11.3.2.
| |
| B: Incorrect- DuetotheRPTbreaker arranged inseries the'A'RecircpumpRPTbreakers are AN205 and CN205. Withthe tripoftheCN205the'A' Recircpumpwill betripped, alongwiththe
| |
| 'B' Recircpump duetotheDN205breaker trip.
| |
| Therefore; IAWAB.RPV-0003 immediate operator actions is toLock theModeSwitch inShutdown (RPS Thestudent trip). will haveto determine theRPT arrangement andunderstand that theplant isnotinsingle loop operation and the 1.O.A will have to betaken. Dueto the manualRPSactuation, this isreportable totheNRC within 4hours IAWRAL 11.3.2.
| |
| C: incorrect- DuetotheRPT breaker arrangedinseries the'B'RecircpumpRPTbreakers are BN205 andDN205. Withthe trip of the DN205the'B' Recircpumpwill betripped, alongwiththe
| |
| 'A' Recirc pumpduetotheCN205 breaker trip. Therefore; IAWAB.RPV-0003 immediate operator actions istoLock the Mode Switch in Shutdown (RPS Thestudent trip). will haveto determine theRPTarrangement and understand that theplant insingle isriot loop operation and the I.O.A will have tobetaken. Dueto the manual RPSactuation, this isreportable totheNRC within 4 hours IAWRAL11.3.2.
| |
| D: Correct. Theimmediate operator actions IAW HC.OP.AB.RPV-0003 istoLockTheMode Switch inShutdown. Duetothe manual RPSactuation, this isreportable totheNRCwithin 4 hours IAWRAL11.3.2.
| |
| Technical Reference(s): RAL11.3.2 System Actuation (Attach if notpreviously provided)
| |
| HC.OP-AB.RPV-0003 Recirculation HC.OP-SO.BB-0002 Recirc. Ops.
| |
| Proposed References tobeprovided toapplicants during examination: EALs andRALs without the attachments Learning Objective: Given plant conditions andplant procedures, determine requiredactionsof theretainment override(s) andsubsequent operatoractions inaccordance with the Recirculation System/Power Oscillations.
| |
| Question Source: Bank#
| |
| Modified Bank# (Notechanges orattach parent)
| |
| New X Question History:
| |
| Question Cognitive Level:Memory orKnowledge 10CFRPart 55Content: 55.43(5)
| |
| Comments:
| |
| | |
| 2021NRCWritten Examination Facility: HopeCreek Vendor: GE ExamDate: 2021 ExamType: SRO Examination Outline Cross-reference: Level RO SRO Tier # 1 Group# 1 K/A # 295018 2.4.4 Importance Rating 4.7 K/AStatement: Emergency Procedure/Plan: Ability to recognize abnormalindications for system operating parameters that areentrylevel conditions for emergency andabnormal operating procedures:
| |
| Partial orTotal Loss ofCCW Question: SRO#81
| |
| | |
| 2021NRCWritten Examination Given:
| |
| = Theplant isat100%rated power.
| |
| Then:
| |
| = The plant experiences agrassing event.
| |
| = HC.OP-AB.COOL-0001, "Station ServiceWater"hasbeenentered.
| |
| = Allactions to cleartheSSWSStrainer HiHidifferential pressurealarmhave failed.
| |
| = 'A'SSWS Strainer dPis 6 psid.
| |
| = The'A' SSW Pump is inservice at3500gpmonthe loop TACS.
| |
| supplying
| |
| = SSWTemperature is53*F.
| |
| 'A'SSWSStrainer operationis considered (1) Additional
| |
| . include(2) actions .-
| |
| [Reference attached)
| |
| A. (1)inoperable (2)placingthestandby SSW pump in service.
| |
| B. (1) degraded (2)ensuring thestandby SSWpump isinManual.
| |
| C. (1) inoperable (2)ensuring the standby SSWpumpisinManual.
| |
| D. (1) degraded (2)placing the standby SSWpumpinservice.
| |
| Proposed Answer: B Explanation (Optional): With thegiven parameters forSSW,the studentwill havetodetermine that the condition entry intosubsequent action C ofAB.COOL-0001 (see isapplicable attached). With strainer ofthe 'A' SSW dP.above5 psid, the attachment 4 graph will have tobeusedtodetermine theoperabili.ty screen.
| |
| traveling Placing thestandby SSWpumpinthe "A"SSWloop inMAN.UAL isalso required IAW subsequent C ofAB.COOL-0001 action toprevent automatic a possible ofthestandby start pumpfrom a lowflowcondition intheassociated loop.Normal would alignment haveoneSSWpumpinservice per loopofSSWandthestandby pumps inAUTO.
| |
| Justification:
| |
| Plausibility A: Incorrect. With thegiven SSWparameters offlow andtemperature, thepointonthe graph of attachment 4,places the'A' SSWstrainer intheacceptableregionforoperations. However, the
| |
| 'A'SSWtraveling screen isconsidered degraded. Duetoa potentiallowflowcondition inthe associated loop the standby SSWpumpwill beplaced inMANUAL. Thestudent willhave to both determine fromthe graph theoperability ofthe andthe strainer fact thatthestandby pump could autostart duetotheconditions onthe "A"SSWloop.
| |
| B: Correct- Thepoint onthe graph ofattachment 4,placesthe'A'SSWstrainerinthe acceptable region for operations. However, IAWthe instruction ofattachment4,the'A'SSWstrainer is considered degraded. With thehistrainer dPontheloop ofSSWsupplying TACSanda potential ofa lowflow automatic start C)thestandby (condition pumpisplaced inMANUAL.
| |
| | |
| 2021NRCWritten Examination C: Incorrect- With the'A' SSWpumpthe only pumpinservice,the standby pumpwill beplaced in MANUAL. Thepoint onthe graph ofattachment the'A' 4,places SSWstrainer intheacceptable region for operations (degraded).
| |
| D: Incorrect. With the
| |
| 'A' SSWpumpthe only pumpinservice,the standby pumpwill beplacedin MANUAL to prevent the auto startonassociated loop lowflowcondition.
| |
| Technical Reference(s): HC.OP-AB.COOL-0001 Station(Attach if previously not provided)
| |
| Service Water Condition C andAttachment 4 ProposedReferences tobeprovided toapplicants during examination: HC.OP-AB.COOL-0001Attachment4 Learning Objective: Given plant conditions andplant procedures,determine requiredactions of theretainmentoverride(s) andsubsequent operator actions in accordance with Station Service Water.
| |
| Question Source: Bank # 73176 Modified Bank# (Modifiedstem with SSWflowand temperature tochange theanswer from degradedto inoperable)
| |
| New QuestionHistory: #78onNRC2018 QuestionCognitive Level: Comprehension orAnalysis 10CFRPart 55Content: 55.43(5)
| |
| Comments:
| |
| | |
| 2021NRCWritten Examination Facility: HopeCreek Vendor: GE ExamDate: 2021 ExamType:SRO Examination Outline Cross-reference: Level RO SRO Tier # 1 Group # 1 K/A # 600000 AA2.03 Importance Rating 3.2 K/AStatement: todetermine Ability andinterpretthe following asthey toPLANTFIRE apply ON SITE:
| |
| Fire alarm Question: SRO#82
| |
| | |
| 2021NRCWritten Examination Given:
| |
| a Theplant hasjust started upafter a refuelingoutage.
| |
| When:
| |
| a A fire alarm for the Service/RadwasteBuilding hasalarmedonthe MCRfire computer.
| |
| a A fire has brokenout inthe Radwaste Trash Compacter Area.
| |
| a AII applicable procedures have been entered.
| |
| Current plant conditions:
| |
| a TheFire Brigade has beenfighting thefire for18minutes.
| |
| a Levels ofairbornecontamination have beenrising intheRadwaste Building.
| |
| a South Plant Vent Radiation effluent levels are9.12 E+2uCi/sec NG.
| |
| a NOsafety systems have been affected bythe fireatthistime.
| |
| With theabove conditions, declare an A. Unusual Event fora plant fire.
| |
| B. Unusual Event fora radiological release.
| |
| C. Alert for a plant fire. ..
| |
| D. Alert for a radiological release.
| |
| Proposed Answer: A Explanation (Optional): HU4.1UNUSUAL EVENT:This EALaddresses themagnitude andextent of FIRESthatmaybeindicative ofa potential degradation ofthelevel ofsafety oftheplant. The Table H-1 (see attached
| |
| : receipt, EAL) operators will Fire Areas take prompt include those actions plant toconfirm structures the identified validity asSeismic ofaninitial fire Category alarm, I.Upon indication, or ForEALHU4.1 report. theintent ofthe15-minute duration istosize theFIREandtodiscriminate against small FIRES that arereadily extinguished. With the duration ofthefirefightingefforts at18 andinanarea minutes onTable oftheSPVdoNOTexceed H-1, the CRSwould declare (see anU.EIAWHU4.1 attached). The radiation levels therequirement ofanU.EorAlert (RU1.1 orRA1.1).
| |
| Escalation oftheU.Eduetothe firewould occur if thefire hadaffected ofa Safety atrain System (SA8.1).
| |
| Thestudents will beprovided the EALandRALs' without attachments.
| |
| Thestudent will have to determine both theextent ofthefire (Radwaste isontheTable H-1)andtheoffsite release oftheSPV.
| |
| Justification:
| |
| Plausibility A: Correct. With the fire (alarm) intheRadwaste area (Table H-1)andfirefightingefforts have.
| |
| beeninprogress for greater than 15minutes, theCRSwould declareanUnusual Event with HU4.1 duetothe fire. TheSPVrelease isbelow the setpointforeither theU.EorAlert foroffsite release.
| |
| B: Incorrect- Thegiven value for the SPVeffluent level isbelow thethresholdfor declaring anU.E foroffsiterelease (RU1.1). .
| |
| | |
| 2021NRCWritten Examination C: Incorrect- With thefire (alarm) intheRadwaste area(Table H-1)andfirefighting efforts have been inprogress forgreater than15minutes, theCRSwould anUnusual declare with Event HU4.1 due tothe fire.Escalation oftheU.Eduetothe fire would if occurthe hadaffected fire a train of a Safety System (SA8.1).
| |
| D: Incorrect. Thegiven valuefortheSPVeffluent level isbelow threshold the fordeclaring anU.E for offsite release (RU1.1) andtherefore not f or a n Alert (RA1.1).
| |
| level Technical Reference(s): EALHU4.1, SA8.1, RU1.1, & RA1.1 (Attach if previously not provided)
| |
| Fire andOffsiteRelease ProposedReferences tobeprovided toapplicants during examination: EALsandRALs without the attachments Objective: ECG/E-Plan/Fire & Medical Questions:
| |
| Learning Knowledge ofthe reasons for thefollowing responses astheyapply tothe implementation ofsiteemergency plan.
| |
| Question Source: Bank# 35661 Modified Bank# (Notechanges orattach parent)
| |
| New QuestionHistory:
| |
| QuestionCognitive Level: Comprehension orAnalysis 10CFRPart 55Content: 55.43(5)
| |
| Comments:
| |
| | |
| 2021 NRCWritten Examination Facility: HopeCreek Vendor: GE ExamDate: 2021 ExamType: SRO Outline Examination Cross-reference: Level RO SRO Tier # 1 Group # 2 K/A # 295015 AA2.01 Importance Rating 4.3 Ability K/AStatement: todetermine and/or interpret the following asthey apply to INCOMPLETE SCRAM :Reactor power Question: SRO#83
| |
| | |
| 2021NRCWritten Examination Given:
| |
| = Theplant wasoperating at100%power.
| |
| When:
| |
| = A Main SteamLine break occurred intheSteam Tunnel causing anMSIVisolation anda reactor scram.
| |
| Current plant conditions:
| |
| = All control rods did NOTinsert.
| |
| = HC.OP-EO.22-0101A, ATWS-RPV Control wasentered.
| |
| = All SCRAMHardCard actions arecompleted.
| |
| = Reactor Power isat5% and slowlylowering.
| |
| = Suppression Pool Temperature isat115Fandslowly rising.
| |
| = SRVsare cycling.
| |
| = RPVlevel wasintentionally lowered to-129 inches andisnowbeing maintained between -129 inches and-185inches.
| |
| = Secondary Containment isbeingmaintained.
| |
| = Secondary Containment area temperatures andradiation monitors arestable.
| |
| = Drywell Pressure isat1.8 psig slowly rising.
| |
| and
| |
| = Reactor Coolant Sample Activity is250pCi/gm Dose equivalent I-131.
| |
| Whatdescribes the classification level forthis eventandthe cause oftheclassification?
| |
| A. Alert duetotheMain Steam Line Break.
| |
| B. Site Area Emergency duetoHigh Drywell Pressure.
| |
| C. Alert duetothe Failure toScram.
| |
| D. Site Area Emergency duetoHigh RCSlodine Concentration.
| |
| Proposed Answer: C Explanation (Optional): SA6.1ALERT-Anautomatic ormanual scram fails toshut downthereactor as indicatedby reactor power >4%. This E ALaddresses a failure ofthe RPS toinitiate or complete an automaticormanual reactor scram that results ina reactor shutdown, andsubsequent operator manual actionstaken (Hard Card actions of initiating ARI) at the reactorcontrolconsoles to shutdown the reactor arealso unsuccessful. If the failure toshut downthe reactor isprolonged enough tocause achallenge toRPVwater levelorRCSheat removal safety functions, the emergency classification levelwillescalate toa SITE AREAEMERGENCY via EALSS6. (see attached EALsfor FailuretoScram). Thestudent will have todetermine from the current reactor power andHard Card actions thatthey areinanALERTdue tofailure toScram. Thestudent will have toreference the ECGbarrier table torealizethat the Main Steam Line Break hasbeen isolated (no classification duetomain steam linebreak). Thehigh drywell pressurewill bea 5-point ALERTnot anSAEandthe dose equivalent iodine isbelow thethreshold for declaration(See attached barrier tables).
| |
| | |
| 2021NRCWritten Examination Plausibility Justification:
| |
| A: Incorrect. DuetotheMSIVs isolating themain steam line breakoutsideofprimary containment would be isolated; therefore there would benodeclaration onthemain steam line break. IAW the barrier table (RB3.L), iftheMSIVdid not isolate than a declaration fora 5-point ALERTwould becorrect.
| |
| B: incorrect- With secondary containment maintained andradmonitors andarea temps stable,the break wouldnot cause anSAEtobedeclared. Barrier Table wouldgive only5 points ALERT (RB2.L).
| |
| C: Correct An automatic ormanual scram fails toshut downthe asindicated reactor byreactor power >4%andsubsequent operator manual actions taken (HardCard actions ofinitiatingARI) atthereactor control consoles toshutdown the reactor are also unsuccessful. Thendeclare anALERT(SA6.1).
| |
| D: Incorrect. TheRCSiodine didnot reach thelimit specified inFission Product Barrier Table (FB3.L).
| |
| Technical Reference(s'): EALS6-RPSFailure if (Attachnot previously provided)
| |
| Fission Product Barrier Table Proposed References tobeprovided toapplicants during examination: EALsandRALs without the attachments Learning Objective: ECG/E-Plan/Fire & Medical Questions:
| |
| Knowledge ofthe reasons for the following responses asthey apply tothe implementation ofsite emergency plan.
| |
| Question Source: Bank # 119580 Modified Bank # (Note changes orattach parent)
| |
| New Question History:
| |
| Question Cognitive Level: Comprehension orAnalysis 10CFRPart 55Content: 55.43(5)
| |
| Comments:
| |
| | |
| 2021NRCWritten Examination Facility: HopeCreek Vendor: GE ExamDate: 2021 ExamType: SRO Examination Outline Cross-reference: Level RO SRO Tier # 1 Group # 2 K/A # 2950122.1.25 4.2 Importance Rating K/AStatement: ConductofOperations: Abilitytointerpret reference such materials,asgraphs, curves, High etc.-
| |
| tables, Drywell temperature Question: SRO#84
| |
| | |
| 2021NRCWritten Examination Given:
| |
| a Theplant wasoperating at100%power.
| |
| When:
| |
| A large reactor c.oolantleak occurs.
| |
| * Suppression chamber pressure rapidly rises.
| |
| Current plant conditions:
| |
| Drywell sprayshave beeninitiated.
| |
| a Drywell pressureand temperature are lowering.
| |
| Ifthedrywell pressure andtemperature lowering results inentering theUNSAFEregion ofthe Drywell Spray Initiation Limit(DWT-P) curve, what action isrequired IAWemergency operating procedures?
| |
| A. Secure drywellsprays at9.5psig drywell pressure andlowering IAWHC.OP-EO.zz-0102, Primary Containment Control.
| |
| B. Secure alldrywell sprays whentheDrywell Spray Initiation Limit curve isreached IAWHC.OP-EO.zz-0102, Primary Containment Control.
| |
| C. Emergency Depressurize the reactor IAWHC.OP-EO.zz-0202, Emergency RPV Depressurization.
| |
| D. Continue drywell sprays untildrywell pressure approaches 0 psigIAWHC.OP-EO.zz-0102, Primary Containment Control.
| |
| Proposed Answer: D moist Explanation(Optional): Drywell spray operation beterminated bythetime drywellpressure decreases to0 psig toensure thatprimary containment pressure isnot reduced below atmospheri'c.
| |
| Maintaininga positive pressure precludes air intake through thevacuum relief system the tode-inert primary containment andalso provides a positive margin tothenegative design pressure oftheprimary containment.(See attached retainment override PCC-1 ofEOP-0102). Note that while operationof sprays drywell ispermitted downtopressures approaching 0 psig, theDrywell Spray Initiation Limit prohibits curve spray initiation atlowpressures. Thecurve isfor iniating Drywell sprays butnotfor securing Drywell sprays. This isdirectedfrom theretainment override (PCC-1).
| |
| Justification:
| |
| Plausibility A: incorrect. RHRisnot needed toassure adequate core cooling with theabove conditions.
| |
| Drywell sprays will continue untilreaching 0 psig IAWthe retainment (BEFORE override Drywell press reaches 0 psig, TERMINATE Drywell sprays) ofEOP-102 PCC-1. The9.5psig isthe threshold for suppression chamber pressure toallow Drywell sprays.
| |
| | |
| 2021NRCWritten Examination B: incorrect- TheDWT-P Drywell Spray curve Initiation isfordetermining toallow theparameters Drywell sprays, however, the curve does not define whentosecure from theDrywell sprays.
| |
| The retainment override (BEFORE Drywell pressreaches 0 psig, TERMINATE Drywellsprays) of EOP-102 PCC-1 directsthis action.
| |
| C: Incorrect-With theDrywell temperature below 340Fandlowering, IAWEOP-102 maintaining drywelltemperature below 340Fwill preclude entry into EOP-202 andEmergency Depressurizing thereactor.
| |
| D: Correct. Once initiated, DWsprays needonly besecured BEFORE DWpressure reaches0 psig. IAWEOP-102, PCC-1, Retainment Override (BEFORE Drywell press O reaches psig, TERMINATE Drywell sprays).
| |
| TechnicalReference(s): HC.OP-EO.zz-0102 FC (Attach if not previously provided)
| |
| Primary Containment Control Proposed References tobeprovided toapplicants during examination: DWT-Pcurve instem LearningObjective: Given plant conditionsand access tothe following curves determine the region of acceptable operation andexplain the bases for the curve Drywell Spray InitiationLimit QuestionSource: Bank # 33995 Modified Bank # (Note changes parent) orattach New QuestionHistory:
| |
| QuestionCognitive Level: Comprehension orAnalysis 10CFRPart 55Content: 55.43(5)
| |
| Comments:
| |
| | |
| 2021NRCWritten Examination Facility: HopeCreek Vendor: GE ExamDate: 2021 ExamType: SRO ExaminationOutline Cross-reference: Level RO SRO Tier # 1 Group # 2 K/A # 295010 AA2.02 Importance Rating 3.9 K/AStatement:Ability todetermine and/or interpret the following asthey apply toHIGH DRYWELL PRESSURE :Drywell pressure Question: SRO#85
| |
| | |
| 2021NRCWritten Examination Given:
| |
| a Theplant wasoperating at100%power.
| |
| When:
| |
| = An earthquake causes a Loss ofOffsite Power (LOP)coincident witha Loss ofCoolant Accident (LOCA).
| |
| AtT=0 minutes:
| |
| a All rods arefully inserted.
| |
| a All EDGsfailedto start.
| |
| = RPVLevel isbeing maintained between -30" and+30" withRCIC.
| |
| = RPVPressure isbeing maintained between 500and600psig bycycling SRVsas necessary.
| |
| = Suppression Chamber water level is 65inches, lowering 0.1inches/minute.
| |
| = Thecause ofthelowering level is being investigated.
| |
| = Drywell andSuppression Chamber pressures are15psig andrising1 psig /3minutes.
| |
| a Drywell temperature iscurrently 200F and rising 1F/3minutes.
| |
| = Suppression Pool Temperature iscurrently 165F andrising 1F/3 minutes.
| |
| AtT=10minutes:
| |
| a 'A' and'B' EDGSarerunning andloaded.
| |
| a TheReactor Operator (RO) that reports the"A" RHR loop and "B"Core Spray Loopsare running andavailable.
| |
| = TheOperators inthe field report that the FLEXDiesel Pump hoses are being run.
| |
| Which ofthe following actions isrequired for these conditions?
| |
| A. Exit HC.OP-EO.zz-0105, RPVControl- HPCI/RCIC Only& HC.OP-EO.zz-0106, Primary Containment Control-HPCl/RCIC Only. EnterHC.OP-EO.zz-0209, Rapid RPVDepressurization. Rapid RPVDepressurization isRequired.
| |
| B. Enter HC.OP-EO.zz-0101, RPVControl & HC.OP-EO.zz-0102, Primary Containment Control andtake containment controlactions.
| |
| C. MakeuptotheSuppression Pool with Service Water fromtheFLEXDiesel pump.
| |
| D. Vent theDrywell IAWHC.OP-EO.zz-0318, Containment Venting.
| |
| Proposed Answer: B
| |
| | |
| 2021NRCWritten Examination Explanation (Optional): EOP-106, Primary Containment Control-HPCl/RCIC OnlyPCC-10andEOP-105,Reactor Pressure are designed to work Vessel Control-inconjunction HPCI/RCIC tooptimize the Only RC-11 useofsteam-driven Retainment injection (see Overridesattached) systems, andmanage containment parameters without theuseofmotor-driven systems, theexit criteria contained inthe override stepare identical. Thisoverride sends theoperator toEOP102which directs themitigating strategy for events where motor-driven RPVinjection systems areavailable. Inthis circumstance it is also likely that forced suppression pool cooling andcontainment spray systems (drywell sprayto control drywell pressure) will also beavailable; EOP-102 provides strategies that usethese mitigation tools tomaintain primary containment Drywell viability, pressure andtemperature along with Suppression pool parameters.
| |
| Plausibility Justification:
| |
| A: Incorrect. With RPVlevel above -185 inches, Drywell temperature below 340*F, and Suppression Chamber pressure below PSP, rapid depressurization isNOTrequired.
| |
| B: Correct Override step PCC-10 sends theoperator toEOP102 which directs themitigating strategy for events where motor-driven RPV injection systems are available. inthis circumstance isalso it likelythat forcedsuppression pool cooling andcontainment spray systems will also beavailable; EOP-102 provides strategies that usethese mitigation toolsto maintain primary containment viability.
| |
| C: incorrect- Theinformation given inthestemis the hoses have been run for theFLEXDiesel Pump, sothis option isnotyetready toimplement.
| |
| D: Incorrect. IAWEOP-106, DW/P-33 Retainment Override step states JF Drywell pressure reduction isrequired torestore andmaintain adequate core cooling or reduce the total offsite radiation dose, THENVENTPrimary Containment. This isNOT required with thegiven and current conditions.
| |
| Technical Reference(s): HC.OP-EO.zz-0106 FC (Attach if not previously provided)
| |
| HC.OP-EO.zz-0105 FC Retainment Overrides Proposed References tobeprovided toapplicants during examination: none Learning Objective: Given plant conditions, recognize the entry conditions forthe Primary Containment Control HPCI/RCICONLY Emergency Operating Procedure IAW HC.OP-EO.zz-0106.
| |
| Question Source: Bank # 152011 Modified Bank # (Note changes orattach parent)
| |
| New Question History:
| |
| Question Cognitive Level: Comprehension orAnalysis 10CFRPart 55Content: 55.43(5)
| |
| Comments:
| |
| | |
| 2021NRCWritten Examination Facility: HopeCreek Vendor: GE ExamDate: 2021 ExamType: SRO Examination Outline Cross-reference: Level RO SRO Tier # 3 Group#
| |
| K/A # 215005A2.08 Importance Rating 3.4 K/AStatement: Ability (a) to predict theimpactsof the following onthe AVERAGE POWER RANGE MONITOR/LOCAL POWER RANGEMONITOR SYSTEM ;and(b) basedonthose predictions,useprocedures tocorrect,control,ormitigate the consequences ofthose abnormal Faulty conditions: orerraticoperation ofdetectors/systems.
| |
| Question: SRO#86
| |
| | |
| 2021NRCWritten Examination Given:
| |
| a Theplant isoperating at100%rated power.
| |
| a With norods selected onthe rod display, thefollowing alarmisreceived:
| |
| > LPRMUPSCALE (C3-D5) a The operator confirms thatoneLPRMisupscale asshown onthePPCOD-8(Plant Process Computer).
| |
| Whatsubsequentaction will have tobetaken IAWHC.OP-AB.IC-0004, Neutron Monitoring, after bypassing the failed LPRM and what isthe for requirement APRMoperability?
| |
| A. Direct thereactor engineer toevaluate thefailedLPRM.
| |
| APRMoperability requires a minimum of4 LPRMsperlevel.
| |
| B. Reset thetripped RPS channel.
| |
| APRMoperability requires a minimum of3 LPRMsper level.
| |
| C. Direct thereactor engineerto evaluate the failedLPRM.
| |
| APRMoperability requires a minimum of3 LPRMsper level.
| |
| D. Reset thetripped RPSchannel.
| |
| APRMoperability requires a minimumof 4 LPRMs perlevel.
| |
| Proposed Answer: C Explanation (Optional):Seeattached HC.OP-AB.IC-0004 andT.S.3.3.1, ReactorProtection System Instrumentation.
| |
| Plausibility Justification:
| |
| A: Incorrect.'lAW T.S. 3.3.1, anAPRMchannel isinoperable ifthereareless than 3 LPRM inputs perlevelorless than 20LPRMinputs toanAPRMchannel.
| |
| B: Incorrect-There isnoRPStrip forLPRMinputs (administrative operability concern, T.S.3.3.1).
| |
| C: Correct-IAWAB.IC-0004 subsequent action C.3(See theREwill attached), have toevaluate thefailed T.S.
| |
| LPRM.There 3.3.1,anAPRMchannel isnoRPStrip for isinoperable LPRMinputs ifthere (administrative arelessthan operability 3 LPRMinputs concern).
| |
| perlevel IAW orless than20LPRMinputs toanAPRMchannel.
| |
| D: Incorrect. There isnoRPStrip forLPRMinputs operability (administrative concern. IAWT.S.
| |
| anAPRMchannel 3.3.1, isinoperable ifthere arelessthan3 LPRMinputs perlevel orless than 20LPRMinputs toanAPRMchannel.
| |
| Reference(s):
| |
| Technical HC.OP-AB.IC-0004 Neutron (Attachif notpreviously provided)
| |
| Monitoring T.S. 3.3.1 Table/Notes Reactor Protection System Instrumentation
| |
| | |
| 2021NRCWritten Examination Proposed References tobeprovided toapplicants during examination: none Learning Objective: Given a scenario ofapplicable conditions andaccess toTechnical Specifications:
| |
| Select those sections whichareapplicable tothe LPRMS/APRMS Evaluate LPRM/APRMoperability and determine required actions applicable to the APRMS (SRO Only)
| |
| Explain the bases forthoseTechnical Specifications associated with APRMS the IAWHCGS Technical Specifications.
| |
| Explain thereasons for howplant/system parameters respond whenimplementing Neutron Monitoring.
| |
| Question Source: Bank # #882019NRC ModifiedBank# (Note changes parent) orattach New Question History: NRC2019 Question Cognitive Level: Comprehension orAnalysis 10CFRPart 55Content: 55.43(2,5)
| |
| Comments:
| |
| | |
| 2021NRCWritten Examination Facility: HopeCreek Vendor: GE ExamDate: 2021 ExamType: SRO Examination Outline Cross-reference: Level RO SRO Tier # 2 Group# 1 K/A # 263000 A2.01 Importance Rating 3.2 K/AStatement: (a) to predict Ability theimpactsof the following ontheD.C. ELECTRICAL DISTRIBUTION ;and(b) based onthose predictions, use procedures tocorrect, or control, mitigate theconsequences ofthose abnormal conditions or operations: Grounds Question: SRO #87
| |
| | |
| 2021NRCWritten Examination Given:
| |
| = Theplant isoperating at85%power.
| |
| When:
| |
| = A loss ofthe10D410, 1E125VDCbusoccurs.
| |
| = The DC supply breaker (72-41022) tothe AD481 Invertertrips open.
| |
| = Theapplicable abnormal procedures have been entered.
| |
| = Thecause of the10D410, 1E125VDC busloss isa ground confirmed bytheClass 1E Ground Ammeters inthemain control roomandlocal indications.
| |
| a Repairs areinprogress for the10D410, 1E125VDC bus.
| |
| Whatisthemostlimiting, if any, Technical Specification action required?
| |
| [Reference attached)
| |
| A. Enter a tracking LCO. No Technical Specification LCOentry isrequired.
| |
| B. Re-energize the10D410 within 2hours orbeinatleast HOTSHUTDOWN withinthenext 12hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within thefollowing 24 hours.
| |
| C. Re-energize the AJ481 within 8 hours orbeinatleast HOTSHUTDOWN withinthe next 12hours andinCOLD SHUTDOWN within thefollowing 24 hours.
| |
| D. TheAD481must bemadeOPERABLE within7 days orbeinatleast HOT SHUTDOWN within thenext 12hours andinCOLD SHUTDOWN within the following 24hours.
| |
| Answer:
| |
| Proposed B Explanation (Optional):"Energized" 120VACdistribution panels[A-D)J48[1/2)require thepanels tobe energized proper totheir voltage from theassociated inverter viainverted inverterusing DCvoltage, ACsource, thenormal orClass 1Ebackup ACsource via voltageregulator attached (See schematic and OPERABLE table). i require nverters thea ssociated 120 VAC panels distribution tobe
| |
| ([A-D)J48[1/2))
| |
| poweredbytheinverter withoutput voltage within tolerances, andpower input from totheinverter the associated station battery.Duetotheloss ofthe'A' channel 1E125VDC TS3.8.3.1 distribution, actionb (seeattached) would beentered and would be most limiting (2hours). The student will have t oanalyze the3.8.3.1 tableanddetermine thattheDCdistribution isthemost limiting.
| |
| TheAD481willbedeclared inoperable (7days), however the AD481isstill energized with the normal andbackupACpower.
| |
| Justification:
| |
| Plausibility A: incorrect. Duetotheloss ofthe'A' channel 1E125VDC TS3.8.3.1 distribution, action b (see attached)would beentered andwould bemostlimiting (2hours).
| |
| B: Correct-Duetothe fact thattheDCneeds tobeavailable forthe AD481inverter tobeoperable, the CRSwould beinthe action dfor restoring theinverter within7 days.However;with theloss ofthe'A'channel 1E125VDC distribution, TS3.8.3.1 action b (seeattached) would be entered andwould bemostlimiting (2 hours).
| |
| | |
| 2021NRCWritten Examination C: Incorrect. TheAD481 isstillenergized withthenormal andbackup ACpower..
| |
| D: Incorrect. Duetothe fact that theDCneeds tobeavailablefor theAD481invertertobe operable, theCRSwould beintheaction dfor theinverter restoring within7 days.
| |
| However;with theloss of the'A' channel 1E125VDC and would bemost.Iimiting (2 distribution,TS3.8.3.1action b (see would attached) be entered .
| |
| hours). .
| |
| Technical Reference(s): T.S.3.8.3.1 OnSite PwrDistribution(Attach ifnotpreviously provided)
| |
| HC.OP-SO.PK-0001 DCSOP HC.OP-AB.zz-0136 Loss ofInverter HC.OP-AB.zz-0150 125VDC Malfunction ProposedReferences tobeprovided toapplicants during examination: T.S.3.8.3.1 Objective: Given Learning a D.C. electrical load. a.Determine the power supply tothe load. b. Evaluate the effect ofa loss ofD.C. power foreach component Source: Bank Question #
| |
| Modified Bank# (Note changes orattach parent)
| |
| New X Question History:
| |
| Question Cognitive Level: Comprehension orAnalysis 10CFRPart 55Content: 55.43(2)
| |
| Comments:
| |
| | |
| 2021NRCWritten Examination Facility: HopeCreek Vendor: GE ExamDate: 2021 ExamType:SRO Examination OutlineCross-reference: Level RO SRO Tier # 2 Group# 1 K/A # 223002 2.4.49 Importance Rating 4.4 K/AStatement: Emergency Procedures /Plan: Ability toperform without reference to procedures thoseactions that require immediate operation ofsystemcomponents andcontrols.
| |
| PCIS/Nuclear Steam Supply Shutoff System.
| |
| Question: SRO#88 Given:
| |
| = Theplant wasoperating at100%power.
| |
| When:
| |
| = A valid-38" RPVLevel NS4(Nuclear Steam Supply ShutoffSystem) signal is received.
| |
| = Allapplicable procedures have been entered.
| |
| = Theplant operator (PO) that reports theRWCUsystem didnot isolate.
| |
| = Whenattempting toclosetheBG-HV-F001., RWCUINBOARD ISOLATION, the valve didnotmoveinthe closeddirection.
| |
| Whataretherequired actions IAWplant procedures?
| |
| A. BG-HV-F004, RWCUOUTBOARD ISOLATION mustbeclosed and deactivated within 4 hours.
| |
| B. BG-HV-F100, F101,andF106RWCU SUCTION ISOLATIONS must be closed anddeactivated within 1hour.
| |
| C. BG-HV-F100, F101,andF106RWCUSUCTION ISOLATIONS must be closed anddeactivated within4hours.
| |
| D. BG-HV-F004, RWCUOUTBOARD ISOLATION mustbeclosed and deactivated within1hour.
| |
| Proposed Answer: A
| |
| | |
| 2021NRCWritten Examination Explanation (Optional):With aVALlD-38" NS4signal IAWthe in, abnormal procedure for Primary Containment, HC.OP-AB.CONT-0002, theimmediate operatoractions (I.O.A)are toclose either a
| |
| redundant isolation valve ortomanually close the valve thatdid not isolate (F001). Since theprimary containment isolation istohave oneinboard andoneoutboard, theF004would bethe isolation valve that needs to be isolated, if not already isolated. Because ofthe failure ofthe F001 to isolateona valid isolation signal, the action toclose anddeactivate the redundant valve (F004) isrequired IAWTechnical Specifications 3.6.3 (seeattached).
| |
| Plausibility Justification:
| |
| A: Correct. Withthe failure ofthe INBOARD containment valve F001, theI.O.A istoCLOSE the redundant OUTBOARD valve F004. Thesuction valves F100, 101.and 106'are redundant along (see valves attacheddrawing) totheF001, with theF001. Therefore containment however allthree isNOTisolated.
| |
| valvesareinboard Thefailure ofcontainment oftheF001will have the CRSenter T.S.
| |
| 3.6.3 and take the action toisolatethe penetration and (F001F004) and deactivated the isolated valve (F004) within 4 hours.
| |
| B: Incorrect-totheF001, Thesuction however valves all three F100, 101.and 106areredundant valves are inboard ofcontainment along (see valves attached with drawing) theF001Therefore containment isNOTisolated. Thefailure of the F001will have theCRSenter T.S. 3.6.3andtake theaction toisolate the penetration (F001and F004) anddeactivated the isolated valve(F004) within 4hours.
| |
| C: Incorrect-tothe F001, Thesuction however valves all three F100, valves 101.and 106are redundant areinboard ofcontainment along (see valves attached with theF001.
| |
| drawing)
| |
| Therefore containment isNOTisolated.
| |
| D: Incorrect. Thefailure ofthe F001 willhave theCRSenter T.S. 3.6.3 and take the action to isolate thepenetration (F001 andF004) anddeactivated theisolated valve (F004) within 4hours.
| |
| (see attached T.S.3.6.3).
| |
| Technical Reference(s): HC.OP-AB.CONT-0002 Primary Cont. (Attach if not previously provided)
| |
| HC.OP-SO.SM-0001 IsolationsSys.
| |
| T.S. 3.6.3 PCIVs Proposed References tobeprovided toapplicants duringexamination: none Learning Objective: Frommemory, recall theimmediate Operator Actions for Primary Containment.
| |
| Question Source: Bank #
| |
| ModifiedBank # (Note changes orattach parent)
| |
| New X Question History:
| |
| Question Cognitive Level: Memory orKnowledge 10CFRPart 55Content: 55.43(5)
| |
| Comments:
| |
| | |
| 2021NRCWritten Examination Facility: HopeCreek Vendor: GE ExamDate: 2021 ExamType: SRO Examination Outline Cross-reference: Level RO SRO Tier # 2 Group# 1 K/A # 300000 2.4.11 Importance Rating 4.2 K/AStatement: Emergency Procedures/Plan: Knowledge procedures.
| |
| ofabnormalcondition Instrument Air Question: SRO#89
| |
| | |
| 2021NRCWritten Examination Given:
| |
| = Theplant isinOPCON 4 having just completed Refueling Operations.
| |
| = TheRefueling Cavity isbeing decontaminated.
| |
| When:
| |
| = The Control Roomreports theFUELPOOLCOOLING SYSLEAKAGE HIalarm has been received.
| |
| = TheRad Pro Supervisor reports a small amount ofwater coming from the Fuel Pool Shield Blocks.
| |
| Which ofthe following is thecause of thiscondition A AND Whatisthe bases behindthe procedural requirementsfor this condition - (2).?
| |
| A. (1) Thenormaland emergency air supplies tothe seals ofthe inner andouter Fuel Pool gates have failed.
| |
| (2) Toensure removal of 99% of the assumed 10%iodine gapactivity released from the rupture ofan irradiated fuel assembly.
| |
| B. (1) TheFuel Pool Gate andShield Blockseals normal airsupply hasfailed.
| |
| Theemergency bottles must be manually aligned tosupply the seal.
| |
| (2) Ensure a large heatsink isavailable andadequatetime isprovided to initiate alternate methods capable of heat removal.
| |
| C. (1) Thenormal airsupplies tothe seals ofthe inner andouter Fuel Pool Gates have failed. Theemergency bottles mustbe manually aligned tosupply the seals.
| |
| (2) Toensure removal of99%ofthe assumed 10% iodine gap activity released from therupture ofanirradiated fuel assembly.
| |
| D. (1) Thenormal andeme'rgency air supplies totheseals ofthe Fuel Pool gate andShield Block have failed.
| |
| (2) Ensure a large heat sink isavailable andadequate time isprovided to initiate alternate methods capable ofheat removal.
| |
| Answer:
| |
| Proposed A Explanation (Optional):
| |
| Seeattached AB.COOL-0004 subsequent operator action A.3andT.S. Bases Water 3.9.9 Spent Level- Fuel Pool.
| |
| Plausibility Justification:
| |
| A: Correct. Duetothe fact that the emergency bottles will automatically provide airtothe seals andtheseals arestill leaking both thenormal andemergency air supply hasfailed. Sufficient water depthisneeded toremove 99%ofthe assumed 10%iodine gapactivity released fromthe ruptureofanirradiated fuel assembly.
| |
| B: incorrect- Emergency bottles arenormally aligned toautomatically provide air itfhepressure ofthe normal supply lowers below a setvalue (Approx. 35#). Sufficient water depth isneededto 99%ofthe 10%iodine from
| |
| ~-
| |
| remove assumed gapactivity released therupture ofanirradiated fuel assembly.
| |
| | |
| 2021NRCWritten Examination C: Incorrect- Emergency bottles arenormally aligned toautomatically provide airif thepressure of the normal supply lowers below a set value (Approx. 35#).
| |
| D: incorrect. Theshield blocks donothave pressurized seals. TheEmergency bottles are normally aligned toautomatically provide airifthepressure ofthenormal supplylowers a below set value(Approx.35#). Sufficient water depth isneeded toremove 99%ofthe assumed10%
| |
| iodine gapactivity released from the rupture ofanirradiated fuelassembly.
| |
| Technical Reference(s):HC.OP-AB.COOL-0004 Fuel Pool (Attachifnot provided) previously Cooling T.S. bases 3.9.9 Water Level- Spent Fuel pool ProposedReferences tobeprovided toapplicants during examination: none Learning Objective: Given a system orcomponent thatis either physically connected to or required for support oftheInstrumentAir System or emergency instrument air compressor, assess theinterrelationship QuestionSource: Bank# 72069 Modified Bank# (Note changes parent) orattach New QuestionHistory:
| |
| QuestionCognitive Level: Memory orKnowledge 10CFRPart.
| |
| 55Content: 55.43(2,5) .
| |
| Comments:
| |
| | |
| 2021NRCWritten Examination Facility: HopeCreek Vendor: GE ExamDate: 2021 ExamType: SRO Examination Outline Cross-reference: Level RO SRO Tier # 2 Group # 1 K/A # 218000 2.2.44 Importance Rating 4.4 K/AStatement: Equipment Control: Ability toverify tointerpret control roomindications the status andoperation ofa system, andunderstand how operator anddirectives actions effect plant andsystemconditions: ADS Question: SRO#90
| |
| | |
| 2021NRCWritten Examination Given:
| |
| = Thereactor scrammed from 100%power duetoa LOPcoincident with a LOCA.
| |
| = All EDGsstarted; however busses 10A401, 10A402, 10A403, and10A404 all have buslockouts (due toground faults).
| |
| Currentplant conditions:
| |
| = Reactor pressure is400psig andlowering.
| |
| = Reactor water level.hasreached -130 inches andisstabilizing.
| |
| = RCICisinjecting atrated flow.
| |
| = HPCIisinjecting and reaching rated flow.
| |
| = Drywell pressure is 7.5 psig andslowly rising.
| |
| Which oneofthefollowing isthe status of the ADS(Automatic Depressurization System) valves andwhat actions arerequired to be directed?
| |
| A. TheADSvalves areNOT available, inhibit ADSandcontinue toevaluate the level legofHC.OP-EO.zz-0105, RPVControl -
| |
| HPCI/RCIC Only.
| |
| B. TheADSvalves areavailable, enter HC.OP-EO.zz-0209, Rapid RPV Depressurization, andopen upto five SRVs toreduce RPVpressure to150 -
| |
| 250psig.
| |
| C. TheADSvalves areNOTavailable, enter HC-OP-EO.zz-0209, Rapid RPV Depressurization, anduseAlternate Depressurization Systems torapidly depressurize theRPV.
| |
| D. TheADSvalves areavailable, inhibitADSandcontinue toevaluate the level leg ofHC.OP-EO.zz-0105, RPVControl -
| |
| HPC1/RCIC Only.
| |
| Proposed Answer: D Explanation (Optional): Automatic ADSinitiation isprevented byplacing theADSINHIBIT switches in theINHIBIT position. ADSactuation canimpose asevere thermal transient ontheRPVand may complicate effortstocontrol RPVwater level. If only steam-driven systems (HPCI/RCIC) areavailable for ADSactuation injection, maydirectly- lead toloss ofadequate core cooling andsubsequent core damage.
| |
| Automatic initiation ofADSistherefore prevented. However; the SRVsthat five arepartof the ADSsystem arestillavailable formanual operation.
| |
| Plausibility Justification:
| |
| A: Incorrect. TheADSvalves areavailable (theauto ADSfunction isNOTavailable buttheSRVs canbemanually opened). Duetothe current RPVlevel stabilizing above -185 inches,entry into EOP-209 isnotrequired atthis (see time attached flow charts).
| |
| B: incorrect- Duetothe currentRPVlevel stabilizingabove -185 inches,entry EOP-209 into isnot requiredatthis (see time attached flow charts).
| |
| C: Incorrect- TheADSvalves are available (the auto ADSfunction isNOTavailable buttheSRVs canbemanually opened).
| |
| D: Correct. TheADSvalves areavailable (the autoADSfunction isNOTavailable butthe SRVs canbemanually opened). Although noRHRorCore Spray systems areavailable, HPCIand RCICareboth preferred systems andoperating. With level just below -129 ADSmustbe inches, inhibitedandthen thelevel situation (see evaluatedattached flow charts).
| |
| | |
| 2021NRCWritten Examination Technical Reference(s): HC.OP-EO.zz-0105FCRPVControl if notpreviously (Attach provided)
| |
| HC.OP-EO.zz-0209FC Rapid Depressurization Proposed References tobeprovidedtoapplicants examination: none during Learning Objective: Given anystep oftheprocedure,describe the reason forperformanceofthat step and/or expected response system to
| |
| 'control manipulation bythat prescribed step.
| |
| Question Source: Bank # 120331 ModifiedBank # changes (Note parent) orattach New Question History:
| |
| Question Cognitive Level: Comprehension orAnalysis 10CFRPart 55Content: 55.43(5)-
| |
| Comments:
| |
| | |
| 2021NRCWritten Examination Facility: HopeCreek Vendor: GE ExamDate: 2021 ExamType:SRO Examination Outline Cross-reference: Level RO SRO Tier # 2 Group # 2 K/A# 215002 A2.03 Importance Rating 3.3 K/AStatement: Ability (a) to predict theimpacts of the following onthe RODBLOCK MONITOR SYSTEMand(b)
| |
| , basedonthose predictions, useprocedurestocorrect, control, ormitigate theconsequences ofthoseabnormal conditions oroperations: Lossofassociated reference APRMchannel: BWR-3,4,5 Question: SRO#91
| |
| | |
| 2021NRCWritten Examination Given:
| |
| = Theplant isoperating at45%power during startup.
| |
| a reactor
| |
| = Control Rod30-31 isselected, which islocated inthecenter ofthe core.
| |
| = MCPR is at1.7.
| |
| Then: . .
| |
| = APRM Channel 'B' fails full downscale.
| |
| (1)Determine thestatus ofRBMChannel 'B',AND (2)Which ofthe following is a requiredaction, if any, IAWTechnical Specifications?
| |
| [Reference attached)
| |
| A. (1) Automatically bypasses rod block inputs.
| |
| (2) Verify the reacto'r isnot operating ona Limiting Control RodPattern AND restore RBM'B' to OPERABLE within24hours.
| |
| B. (1) Generates a downscale tripandrod block.
| |
| (2) Noaction required due to RBM Channel 'B' OPERABLE.
| |
| isstill C. (1) Generates anINOPtrip and rod block.
| |
| (2) Verify the reactor isnot operating on a LimitingControl RodPattern AND restore RBM'B' toOPERABLEwithin 24hours.
| |
| D. (1) Automatically shifts toAPRMChannel 'D' forits reference APRM input.
| |
| (2) Noaction required duetoRBMChannel'B' isstillOPERABLE.
| |
| Proposed Answer: A Explanation (Optional):TheAPRMfailing downscale will cause thereference signal to beless than 30%,thereby bypass~ingtheRBM.NoRBMtrips orRodBlocks canoccur. TheAPRM must be bypassed usingtheJoyStick inorder for theReference APRMtransfer tooccur. With the given conditions the'B'APRMwill have tobebypassed for theRBMChannel 'B'toseethe'D' APRM. The'B' beINOPERABLE RBMwill untilthe reference 'D'APRMis the.reference APRMfor the'B'.RBM. (see attached ofAPRMreferences).
| |
| table Seeattached T.S. 3.1.4.3 andthe COLR(MCPR) for RBM operability.
| |
| Plausibility Justification:
| |
| A: Correct. 'B'RBMwill automatically bypass allrod blocksandtrips duetotheprimary reference APRM'B' failing downscale with a signal of<30%.The'B' RBMwill beINOPERABLE until the reference'D'APRMisthereference APRMfor the'B' RBM.Theactions of3.1.4.3a willbe applicable with thegiven MCPRvalue (see of< 1.75 attached).
| |
| B: Incorrect TheAPRMfailing downscale willcause thereference signal tobeless than 30%,
| |
| therebybypassing the RBM.NoRBMtrips orRodBlocks canoccur. The'B' RBMisinoperable.
| |
| C: Incorrect-TheAPRMfailing downscale willcause thereference signal tobeless than 30%,
| |
| therebybypassing the RBM.NoRBMtrips orRodBlocks canoccur. There isalso noINOPtrip generatedfrom the bypassed RBM
| |
| | |
| 2021NRCWritten Examination D: incorrect. TheAPRMfailing downscale will cause thereference tobeless signal than 30%,
| |
| thereby theRBM.TheAPRMmust bypassing bebypassed inorder for theReferenceAPRM transfer tooccur.
| |
| The'B' RBMwill beINOPERABLE until thereference'D'APRMisthe reference APRMfor the'B' RBM.With MCPR< 1.75, theactions of3.1.4.3a beapplicable.
| |
| will TechnicalReference(s): T.S. 3.1.4.3 RBM/COLRSect. 5.2-5.5 (Attachif not provided) previously HC.OP-SO.SF-0002 RBMOperations Proposed References tobe provided toapplicants duringexamination: T.S. 3.1.4.3 RodBlock MonitorandSections 5.2-5.5pages of 10-15 theCOLR LearningObjective: Given ascenario ofapplicable operating conditions and access to theTechnical Specifications:
| |
| Select thosesections which are applicable tothe RodBlock Monitor (RBM) System Evaluate RodBlock Monitor (RBM)
| |
| System operability anddetermine required actions based upon system inoperability.
| |
| QuestionSource: Bank #
| |
| Modified Bank# (Note changesorattachparent)
| |
| New X QuestionHistory:
| |
| QuestionCognitive Level: Comprehension orAnalysis 10CFRPart 55Content: 55.43(2,5)
| |
| Comments:
| |
| | |
| 2021NRCWritten Examination Facility: HopeCreek Vendor: GE ExamDate: 2021 ExamType:SRO Examination OutlineCross-reference: Level RO SRO Tier # 2 Group# 2 K/A # 290003 2.4.31 Importance Rating 4.1 K/AStatement:Emergency Procedures /Plan: Knowledge ofannunciator alarms,indications, orresponseprocedures. Control RoomHVAC Question: SRO#92
| |
| | |
| 2021NRCWritten Examination Given: .
| |
| = Theplant wasoperating at100%rated power.
| |
| When:
| |
| ~
| |
| = A pipe breakcauses avalid high drywell pressure of8 psig.
| |
| Then:
| |
| = Two(2) hours after the LOCAsignal isreceived, smoke isdetected inthe outside air supply tothe Control Room.
| |
| = HC.OP-AB.HVAC-0002, ControlRoomEnvironment wasentered.
| |
| Currentplant conditions:
| |
| = Thecontrol roomhasbeen evacuated andcontrol isestablished attheRemote Shutdown Panel (10C399).
| |
| = Thereactor hasbeen depressurized toless than 80psig with SRV's andRCIC.
| |
| = 'A'RHRisinSuppression Pool Cooling.
| |
| (1) Which ofthe following describes theControl Area Ventilation System response andany required operator actions IAWHC.OP-AB.HVAC-0002, Control RoomEnvironment?
| |
| (2) Whatloop oftheRHRSystem will beused toachieve Cold Shutdown, andwhat isthe maximum cooldown rate IAWHC.OP-IO.zz-0008, Shutdown from Outside the Control Room?
| |
| A. (1) CAVSremains inthe Outside Air Mode. Operator action is required toplace CREFinRECIRC.
| |
| (2) 'A'RHRwill besecured fromSuppression Pool Cooling andplaced in Shutdown Cooling with a cooldown rate that will NOT.exceed 100F/Hour.
| |
| B. (1) CAVSremains intheOutside Air Mode. Thesmokewill be removed bythe CREFUnits. Operator action isrequired toisolate the CAVS.
| |
| (2) 'A'RHRwill besecured fromSuppression Pool Cooling andplaced in Shutdown Cooling with a cooldown rate that will NOTexceed 90F/Hour. ..
| |
| C. (1) CAVSremains intheOutside Air Mode. Thesmoke willberemoved bythe CREFUnits. Operator action isrequired toisolate theCAVS. <
| |
| (2) ' RHR B' beplaced will in Shutdown Cooling with a cooldown rate that will NOTexceed 100F/Hour.
| |
| D. (1) CAVSremains intheOutside Air Mode. Operator action isrequired toplace CREFinRECIRC.
| |
| (2) RHRwill
| |
| '-B' beplaced inShutdown Cooling with a cooldown rate that will NOTexceed 90F/Hour.
| |
| Proposed Answer: D
| |
| | |
| 2021NRCWritten Examination Explanation (Optional): Smokeentering thecontrol roomisa retainment override CAVSand toisolate place CREF inRECIRC (See attached HC.OP-AB.HVAC-0002). With t c he room ontrol evacuatedand control at theRemote Shutdown Panel, the CRSwould order the'A' RHRpumptoremain in Suppression Pool Cooling modeandplace the'B' RHRpumpinShutdown Cooling withacooldownrate of< 90*F/Hour. (See attachedHC.OP-IO.zz-0008).
| |
| Plausibility Justification:
| |
| A: Incorrect. IAW the retainment override ofAB.HVAC-0002, the CREFunit would havetobe taken toRECIRC. 'A'RHRwould remain inSuppression Pool Coolingand'B' RHRwould be placed inSDCwith a cooldown rate of<90F/Hour.
| |
| B: Incorrect- CREFunits are notdesigned toremove smoke. CAVSisautomatically isolated onthe LOCAsignal (8 psig drywell pressure). 'A' RHRwould remain in Suppression PoolCooling and 'B' RHR would beplaced inSDC.
| |
| C: Incorrect- CREFunits arenot designed toremovesmoke. CAVSisautomatically isolated ontheLOCA signal (8psig drywell pressure). 'B' RHRwould beplaced inSDC with a cooldown of<90*F/Hour.
| |
| rate D: Correct. IAWthe retainment override ofAB.HVAC-0002, the CREFunit would havetobetaken toRECIRC. RHRwould
| |
| 'B' beplaced inSDCwith acooldown rate of<90F/Hour.
| |
| Technical Reference(s): HC.OP-AB.HVAC-0002 Contro Room (Attach if not previouslyprovided)
| |
| Environment HC.OP-IO.zz-0008 Shutdown from Outside the Control Room HC.OP-SO.GK-0001 CAVS Proposed References tobeprovided toapplicants during examination: none Learning Objective: Frommemory, describe the response of the Control Area VentilationSystem toany ofthefollowing conditions:
| |
| LOCA Apply Precautions, Limitationsand Notes while executing theSHUTDOWN FROM OUTSIDE THECONTROL ROOM.
| |
| ~'
| |
| Question Source: Bank #
| |
| Modified Bank # (Note changesorattachparent)
| |
| New X Question History:
| |
| Question Cognitive Level: Memory orKnowledge 10CFRPart 55Content: 55.43(5)
| |
| Comments:
| |
| | |
| 2021NRCWritten Examination Facility: HopeCreek Vendor: GE ExamDate: 2021 ExamType: SRO - -
| |
| Examination Outline Cross-reference: Level RO SRO Tier # 2 Group# 2 K/A # 272000 2.4.30 importance Rating 4.1 K/AStatement: Emergency Procedures /Plan; Knowledge ofevents related tosystem operation /statusthatmustbereported tointernal organizations orexternal agencies, such as thestate, theNRC,orthe transmission system operator: Radiation Monitoring.
| |
| Question: SRO#93 Given:
| |
| = TheplantisinOperational Condition 4 forReactor Vessel disassembly.
| |
| When,duetothe mishandling oftheReactor Vessel headinsulation package:
| |
| a All 3 channels ofRefuel Floor Exhaust Radiation MonitoringSystem (RMS) alarm HIGH ontheRM-11.
| |
| PrimaryContainment System Isolation (PCIS) responds asdesigned.
| |
| Withtheaboveconditions andIAW10CFR50.72, what isthe earliest reporting requirement, If any?
| |
| A. 1hour report B. 4hour report C. 8 hour report D. NOTreportable Proposed Answer: C
| |
| | |
| 2021NRCWritten Examination Explanation (Optional):Seeattached RAL11.3, theRALbasis for 11.3 System Actuations, which includes a iistofreportable systems.
| |
| Plausibility Justification:
| |
| A: Incorrect. With allthree Refuel Floor Exhaust Radiation Monitors inHighalarm, EALRA2.2 Abnormal RadLevels would bereviewed. Duetothe fact that there isnoirradiated fuel damage, therewould the benoneed NRCis not warranted.
| |
| tomakeanECGcall attached (see EAL), thereforethe1hour to report B: Incorrect- The 4 hour report (11.3.1) would bevalid iftherewasa ECCSactuation, however; the High Radsignaifrom theRefuel Floor Exhaust Monitors Radiation isnotsetpoint for anyECCS actuation.
| |
| C: Correct Valid actuation of listed systemslisted intheRAL11.3 Basis.TheRFERMS responded toavalid Hiradiation condition duetothemishandled insulationpackage. The actuations Rad/PCIS werenot actuation part isreportable (11.3.3).
| |
| (see ofa pre-planned test attached RAL). Therefore, theHigh D: Incorrect- lfthe student decides that the actuation is invalidthen thereport would notbe required. 10CFR50.72 does notrequire an event report for invalid actuations ofanyofthe systems listed intheRALBasis 11.3. 10CFR 50.73 allows telephone notificationtotheNRC operations center within sixty days (see 11.3.4).
| |
| attached Technical Reference(s): RAL11.3.3 (Attach if notpreviously provided)
| |
| RALBasis 11.3 System Actuations EALRA2.2 Proposed References tobeprovided toapplicants during examination: EALsandRALs without the attachments Learning Objective: ECG/E-Plan/Fire & Medical Questions:
| |
| Knowledge ofthereasons forthefollowing responses asthey apply tothe implementation ofsite emergency plan.
| |
| Question Source: Bank# 34118 -
| |
| Modified Bank# (Note changes orattach parent)
| |
| New Question History:
| |
| Question Cognitive Levei: Comprehension orAnalysis 10CFRPart 55Content: 55.43(5)
| |
| Comments:
| |
| | |
| 2021NRCWritten Examination Facility: HopeCreek Vendor: GE ExamDate: 2021 ExamType: SRO Examination Outline Cross-reference: Level RO SRO Tier # 3 Group #
| |
| K/A # 2.1.45 Importance Rating 4.3 K/AStatement: ConductofOperations: Abilitytoidentify andinterpret diverse indications to validate the responseofanother indicator.
| |
| Question: SRO#94
| |
| | |
| 2021NRCWritten Examination Given:
| |
| = Theplant wasoperating at100%power.
| |
| When:
| |
| = A loss of10A1107.2KV Busduetoa busdifferential overcurrentoccurred during the previous shift.
| |
| Current plant conditions:
| |
| = Theplant has subsequently stabilized at55%power.
| |
| = TheReactor Operator performed panel walkdowns toassess plantstatus afterthe transient.
| |
| = Whenperforming the next hourly panel walkdown theReactor Operator notices that CorePlate dPindication and steam flow indication arelower thanthey werelast hour.
| |
| = HC.OP-AB.RPV-0003, Recirculation System/Power isentered.
| |
| Oscillations Asthe control roomsupervisor what actions do youtake IAWHC.OP-AB.RPV-0003?
| |
| A. Declare the jetpumps inoperable,and commence a unit shutdown per HC.OP-IO.zz-0004, beinhot shutdown within 12hours.
| |
| B. Direct thereactor operator toperform HC.OP-ST.BB-0007, Recirculation Jet PumpOperability -
| |
| Single Loop Daily.
| |
| C. Direct thereactor operator toperform HC.OP-ST.BB-0001, Recirculation Jet PumpOperability.
| |
| D. Declare the jetpumpsinoperable, andimmediately inserta full scram, beinhot shutdown within onehour.
| |
| Answer: B Proposed (Optional):
| |
| Explanation Theplant isinsingle loop operation duetoloss ofthe'A' Recirc pumpon the ofpower loss (10A110 7.2Kv bus). With theloss oftherecirc. pump, thecore platedPindication would lower toduetothetotal core flow lowering. Reactor power would lower duetothelowering oftotalcore flow.
| |
| Steam flowwould lower duetoReactor power lowering. The multipleindications that thecrew would observe duetothe transient would benormal for the given transient. Theabnormal procedure havetheCRSdirect would the jet pumpoperability surveillance for single loop operations.
| |
| Justification:
| |
| Plausibility A: Incorrect. (see IAWRPV-0003 attached), ifthe jet pumps areinoperable then a normal plant shutdown IAW10-0004 inHotShutdown within would bedirected 12hours. Duetothe andIAWtech fact that these (see specs attached) arenormal theplant multiple would indications to be support thegiven reactor power transient, theCRSwould only direct aJet Pumpoperability surveillance IAWRPV-0003.
| |
| B: Correct- Duetothe fact that these arenormal multiple indications tosupport thegiven reactor power transient, theCRSwould only direct a Jet Pumpoperability surveillance IAWRPV-0003.
| |
| With theloss ofthe 'A' Recirc pump(10A110 7.2Kvsupply tothe VFD), thesingle loop jet pump operability surveillance would bedirected.
| |
| | |
| 2021NRCWritten Examination C: incorrect-With thelossofthe'A' Recirc pump(10A110 7.2Kvsupply totheVFD), single the loop jet pumpoperability surveillance would bedirected theST.BB-0001 not for normal twoloop operations.
| |
| D: incorrect. If the pumps jet areinoperable then a normal shutdown plant IAW10-0004would be directed and IAW tech (see specs attached) theplant wouldbeinHotShutdown 12hours.
| |
| within Technical Reference(s): HC.OP-AB.RPV-0003 Recirculation (Attach if notpreviously provided)
| |
| HC.OP-ST.BB-0007 Single Loop (Jet)
| |
| T.S.3.4.1.2 Jet Pumps ProposedReferences tobeprovidedto applicants during examination: none Objective: Explain Learning theparameters that arecompared todetermine jet pump operability and identifysymptoms ofajet pump failure QuestionSource: Bank # 2016NRCExam Modified Bank# (Note changes parent) orattach New QuestionHistory: 2016NRCExam QuestionCognitive Level: Memory orKnowledge 10CFRPart 55Content: 55.43(5)
| |
| Comments:
| |
| | |
| 2021NRCWritten Examination Facility: HopeCreek Vendor: GE ExamDate: 2021 ExamType: SRO Examination OutlineCross-reference: Level RO SRO Tier # 3 Group#
| |
| K/A # 2.2.11 Importance Rating 3.3 K/AStatement: Equipment Control: Knowledge of the process for controlling temporary design changes.
| |
| Question: SRO#95 Whichofthefollowing modifications would beinstalled IAWCC-AA-112, Temporary Configuration Changes?
| |
| A. Installation ofa pressuregauge onaninstrument tapsduring the conduct ofa system pressure test.
| |
| B. Installation ofajumper toperform a periodic surveillance test.
| |
| C. Jumpering ofa battery cell.
| |
| H~ookup hose'to D. ofanair supply a station air manifold during maintenance.
| |
| Proposed Answer: C Explanation All (Optional): distracters arenotconsidered Temporary Modifications asdescribed inCC-AA-112 (See CC-AA-112).
| |
| attached PlausibilityJustification:
| |
| A: Incorrect. Covered aspart ofatestandisnota temporary modification.
| |
| B: Incorrect- Covered aspart ofsurveillancetesting andisnotatemporary modification.
| |
| C: Correct- IAWCC-AA-112 jumperingofa battery cell isNOTconsider anexclusion from a
| |
| change.
| |
| temporary D: Covered incorrect. asmaintenance andisnota temporary modification.
| |
| | |
| 2021NRCWritten Examination Technical Reference(s): CC-AA-112 notpreviously if (Attach provided)
| |
| Temporary ConfigurationChanges Proposed References tobeprovidedtoapplicants examination: none during Learning Objective: Provided access tocontrolroom references. Determine theapproved review andextension requirements for installed Temporary change Configuration packages IAW CC-AA-112 Question Source: Bank #
| |
| ModifiedBank # (Note orattach changes parent)
| |
| New X Question History:
| |
| Question Cognitive Level: Memory orKnowledge 10CFRPart 55Content: 55.43(3)
| |
| Comments:
| |
| | |
| 2021NRCWritten Examination Facility: HopeCreek Vendor: GE ExamDate: 2021 ExamType: SRO Examination Outline Cross-reference: Level RO SRO Tier # 3 Group #
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| K/A # 2.3.6 Importance Rating 3.8 K/AStatement: Radiation Control: Ability toapprove release permits.
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| Question: SRO#96 Given:
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| = Theplant isinOperational Condition 3 Hot Shutdown,going toCold Shutdown.
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| = Thereason for shutdown wasexcessive unidentifiedRCSleakage.
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| plant Current conditions:
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| = Reactor pressure isat920psig.
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| = Drywell Oxygen isat2.5%.
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| concentration
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| ~
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| = Primary Containment Gaseous Effluent Release permit hasbeen obtained.
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| = De-inerting will begin at0700ondayshift 02/21/21 .
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| AstheCRS,youare given the attached Valve Permit Form2 from theNCOfor review.
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| Basedonthereview oftheValve Form2 andIAWOP-HC-103-105, Permit Administrative Control ofContainment Atmosphere Control (GS) Valve Open Time, y should ou
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| [Referenceattached)
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| A. not approve it.Theho~urs authorized thisdateshould be24.
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| B. approve it aswrittensince only 17hours remaininthe day.
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| C. not approve it.Thehours available this dateshould be410.
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| D. approve aswritten it since 410hours will notexceed anylimits.
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| Proposed Answer: A
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| 2021NRCWritten Examination
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| -,-----a=am= wawage-s, OPHC103105 Revision 1 m Page9of9 !
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| FORM2 T 'jj q
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| SECTION A A Date: 02/21/21 NOTE: This permit isvalid only until 2400 ofthis date Effluent Permit #: 21-001 SECTION B HOURSVALVES/LINES OPENPREVlOUS Maxallowed YEAR(Note 1) j Calculate Total Hours Open (1) for 365days (Admin Limit)452hrs Previous During Year (NOTE 1) a m
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| a DATE NUMBER OFHOURS (2)Totalprevious year(NOTE1) &
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| Hours available this date(line 1minus line 2) h 10/24/20 14.0 Hours authorized this date (24 hoursorthe m g hours available thisdate whichever is less) 37g 12/14/20 8.0 NCOperforming calculation Date/Time 12/15/20 9.0 J.Smith 02/21/21/ 0600 ,
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| SM/CRS verificationandauthorization Date/Time j .
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| SECTION C VALVE/LINE OPENTIME(Note 2)
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| STARTTIME STOPTIME TOTALHOURS l1 Tirne atwhich valve/Iine wasopen orCondition 1,2, Time atwhichvalvellinewasclosedor Totalnumber ofhours valve/line $
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| or3wasentered with valvelline open Condition4 or5wasentered with valveline opened this cycle M opened (NOTE3) @
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| 3 Totalnumber ofhours valves/line open this permit . . - -
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| NCOperforming calculations - Date/Time -
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| [ SM/CRS permit Closing Date/Time -
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| (; NOTE1:Theprevious year includesthe periodfrom 2400ontoday's date back to0001 onthe samedate one g yearearlier.
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| NOTE 2:Completed Form2should befiledinthe AP-104 binderin theControl Room.
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| NOTE3:Whencomputing the total hours (round uptothe nearest0.5 hrortothe nearest 1.0 br)
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| 2021NRCWritten Examination Explanation (Optional):Seeattached section ofOP-HC-103-105 andForm2.
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| Plausibility Justification:
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| A: Correct. Thehours authorized this date should be24. Perdirection inOP-HC-103-105. (See attached Form 2Section B)
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| B: Incorrect- The hours authorized thisdate should be24. Perdirection inOP-HC-103-105.
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| C: Incorrect- The hours authorized this date mayexceed the actualhours remaininginthe dayfor which thepermit was prepared. However; thehours should be24hours orhours on available this date, whichever isless.(See attached Form2 Section B).
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| D: Incorrect.The hoursshould be24hours orhours available, whichever isless.
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| Technical Reference(s): OP-HC-103-105 (Attachif not previously provided)
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| GSValve Open Time Proposed References tobeprovided toapplicants during examination: OP-HC-103-105Form 2 Valve Permit Learning Objective: Evaluate Containment Inerting and Purge System operability anddetermine required actions based upon system inoperability.
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| ~
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| Question Source: Bank# 111231 ModifiedBank# (Notechanges parent) orattach New Question History:
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| Question Cognitive Level: Comprehension orAnalysis 10CFRPart 55Content: 55.43(1)
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| Comments:
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| 2021NRCWritten Examination Facility: HopeCreek Vendor: GE ExamDate: 2021 ExamType: SRO Examination OutlineCross-reference: Level RO SRO Tier # 3 Group #
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| K/A # 2.4.40 Importance Rating 4.5 K/AStatement: Emergency Procedures/Plan: Knowledge ofSROresponsibilitiesinemergency plan implementation.
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| Question: SRO#97 hasjust AnAlert beendeclared. IAW,NC.EP-EP.zz-0102 , Emergency Coordinator Response, whenispersonnel accountability performed?
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| A. Always during anAlert.
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| B. AttheShift Manager/Emergency DutyOfficer(EDO) discretion during the Alert.
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| C. .
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| During theAlertONLYiffuel damage hasoccurred or.high radiation levels are identified.
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| D. During theAlertONLYona loss ofoneormorefuel barriers.
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| Proposed Answer: B Explanation Seeattached (Optional): NC.EP-EP.zz-0102, Emergency Coordinator Response.
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| Plausibility Justification:
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| A: Incorrect.isatthediscretion It oftheEmergency Coordinatortoimplement accountability when level inanAlert butit isrequiredattheSAEorGElevel.
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| B: Atthe Correct- Alert level the SMorEDO(depending onwhoistheECatthe time), can implement accountability IAWEP-EP-102.
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| 2021NRCWritten Examination C: Incorrect- Thestudent could decipher that theaccountability until isoptional the isduetoa Alert high radiationcondition orif fuel damage occurs.
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| D: incorrect. Thestudent could decipher that the isoptional accountability until ofthe thelevel Alert elevates toa higher point Alert from thefuel barrier table.
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| TechnicalReference(s): NC.EP-EP.zz-0102(Q) Emergency(Attach if previously not provided)
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| Coordinator Response Proposed References tobeprovided toapplicants during examination: none LearningObjective: ECG/E-Plan/Fire & Medical Questions:
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| Knowledge ofthe reasons for following the responses asthey apply tothe implementation ofsite emergency plan.
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| Question Source: Bank# 34190 Modified Bank # changes (Note parent) orattach New Question History:
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| Question Cognitive Level: Memory orKnowledge 10CFRPart 55Content: 55.43(5)
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| Comments:
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| 2021NRCWritten Examination Facility: HopeCreek Vendor: GE ExamDate: 2021 ExamType:SRO Examination Outline Cross-reference: Level RO SRO Tier # 3 Group#
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| K/A # 2.1.23 Importance Rating 4.4 K/AStatement: Conduct ofOperations: Ability to perform specificsystem andintegrated plant procedures during modesofplant all operation.
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| Question: SRO#98 -
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| Given:
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| = Theplant isinOperational Condition 4 with preparations toenter Operational Condition 5.
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| = Allsystems andequipment required toenter Operational Condition 5 areoperable.
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| = ReactorPressure Vessel(RPV) Metal Temperatures arebeingrecorded ona 30minute interval.
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| = Alldepartments havesigned forthesystem requirements toenter Operational Condition 5IAWHC.OP-IO.zz-0005, Cold Shutdown toRefueling.
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| oneofthefollowing Which personnel grants permission tobeginde-tensioning ofthefirst RPV HeadStudiAWHC.OP-IO.zz-0005, Cold Shutdown toRefueling?
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| A. Refueling Outage Manager B. Shift Manager (SM) '
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| C. WorkControl SRO D. Shift Operations Manager (SOM)
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| Proposed Answer: B
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| 2021NRCWritten Examination Explanation (Optional):Seeattached Caution ofHC.OP-IO.zz-0005, Cold ShutdowntoRefueling.
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| Plausibility Justification:
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| A: Incorrect. Eventhough therefueling outage manager hasresponsibilitiesfortheentire outage execution, therefueling outage manager isnotanactive NRClicense TheShift holder. Manager has the ultimate responsibility ofthe plant andtheconfiguration oftheplant systems and operations andtherefore anymodechanges.
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| B: Correct The Shift Manager isanactive NRClicense holder, andIAWHC.OP-IO.zz-0005 isthe authorizing manager tode-tension thefirst headboltandenter OPCON5.This authorization can also comefromthe on duty CRS;however that isnotoneofthechoices. Byprocedure the sign off isSMICRS.
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| C: Incorrect- TheWorkControl SRO isalso anNRClicensed holder however andonshift, the Work Control SRO would n otbein the position of CRS,therefore the W ork SRO Control would not authorize themodechange.
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| D: incorrect. TheSOMisalso anNRC license holder, however, theSOMwillnotbepart oftheshift compliment andtheresponsibility would fall onthe Shift (SM/CRS) IAWHC.OP-lO.zz-0005.
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| Technical Reference(s): HC.OP-IO.zz-0005(Q) (Attach notpreviously if provided)
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| Cold Shutdown toRefueling Proposed References tobeprovided toapplicants during examination: none Learning Objective:Apply Precautions, Limitations andNotes while executing theCOLDSHUTDOWN TO REFUELING Integrated Operating Procedure.
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| Question Source: Bank#
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| Modified Bank# (Notechangesorattachparent) .
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| New X Question History:
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| Question Cognitive Level: Memory orKnowledge 10CFRPart 55Content: 55.43(6)
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| Comments:
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| 2021NRCWritten Examination Facility: HopeCreek Vendor: GE ExamDate: 2021 ExamType:SRO Examination OutlineCross-reference: Level RO SRO Tier # 3 Group#
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| K/A # 2.2.7 Importance Rating 3.6 K/AStatement: Equipment Control: Knowledge of the process forconducting special or infrequent tests.
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| Question: SRO#99 Given:
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| = Theplant isoperating at100%power.
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| a hasbeendetermined It that work mustbeperformed onthe 6A Feedwater Heater level controller.
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| a Thework could resultinanunplanned load of50MWe.
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| reduction Theevolutionis (1) . .
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| IAWWC-AA-105, WorkActivityRisk Management.
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| IAWOP-AA-108-110, Evaluation ofSpecial Tests the (2) shall conduct orEvolutions, theHeightenedLevel ofAwareness/Infr,equent Plant (HLA/IPA)
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| Activity briefing priorto performing a special test orevolution.
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| A. (1) a production risk activityandanHLA/IPA briefisrequired (2) Control RoomSupervisor (CRS), ordesignee B. (1) NOTa production riskactivity but anHLA/IPA brief isrequired.
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| (2) Responsible SeniorLine Manager (SLM),
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| ordesignee C. (1) NOTa production riskactivity but anHLA/IPA brief isrequired.
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| (2) Control RoomSupervisor (CRS), ordesignee D. (1) a production activity risk anda HLA/IPA briefisrequired (2) Responsible SeniorLine Manager (SLM),
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| ordesignee
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| 2021NRCWritten Examination Proposed Answer: D Explanation (Optional): IAWWC-AA-105Step -
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| 2.7defines productionrisk as>20MWe activity (see attached). Then anHLA/IPA willbeperformed andconducted bythe SLM ordesignee IAWOP-AA-108-110step 4.3.3 (seeattached).
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| Plausibility Justification:
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| A: Incorrect.The 30MWe change inload would'constitute a production risk'activity whichwould require anHLA/IPA review andbriefing; however thepre-jobbriefwillbeconducted bythe responsible SLM or designee. Theoperations management (SM/CRS) shall ENSURE required plant conditions are maintained asrequired for thespecialtest orevolution.
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| B: Incorrect- The30MWechange inload TheSLMorhis would constitute CONDUCT a productionrisk (see activity attached WC-AA-105). designee shall a HLA/IPA briefing toperforming prior thespecial test orevolution (seeattached OP-AA-108-110).
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| C: Incorrect- The30MWechange inload would constitute a productionriskactivity.
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| Theoperations management (SM/CRS) shall ENSURE required plant conditionsaremaintained for asrequired thespecial test orevolution.
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| D: Correct. The30MWechange inload wouldconstitute a productionrisk activity whichwould require anHLA/IPA review andbriefing. TheSLM or his designee shallCONDUCT a HLA/IPA briefing prior toperforming thespecial test orevolution.
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| Technical Reference(s): WC-AA-105, WorkActivity Risk (Attach if notpreviouslyprovided)
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| Management OP-AA-108-110, Evaluation ofSpecial Tests orEvolutions Proposed References tobeprovided toapplicants during examination: none Learning Objective: Determine ifanactivity meets the criteria for a Special Test orEvolution. IAWOP-AA-108-110. .
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| Question Source: Bank #
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| Modified Bank# (Note changes orattachparent)
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| New X Question History:
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| Question Cognitive Level: Memory orKnowledge 10CFRPart 55Content: 55.43(3)
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| Comments:
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| | |
| 2021NRCWritten Examination Facility: HopeCreek Vendor: GE ExamDate: 2021 ExamType: SRO Examination Outline Cross-reference: Level RO SRO Tier # 3 Group#
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| K/A # 2.4.6 Importance Rating 4.7 K/AStatement: Emergency Procedures/ Plan: Knowledge ofEOPmitigation strategies.
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| Question: SRO#100
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| 2021NRCWritten Examination Given:
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| = Theplant wasoperating at100%power.
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| When:
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| e A Large Break LOCAoccurred intheDrywell concurrent witha LOP.
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| Current plant conditions:
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| Only 'C'EDG is running.
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| Allcontrol rods are fully inserted.
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| e WideRange RPV level indicator LR-623A isreading +20" andlowering.
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| WideRange RPVlevel indicator LR-623B isreading -55" andlowering.
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| e Drywell pressure is29 psig andrising.
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| e Drywell temperature is350"F andrising.
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| a Reactor pressure is10psig and steady.
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| a Suppression Pool Level is80" and rising.
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| e Suppression Chamber pressureis 30 psigandrising.
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| e 'CRHRPumphasbeeninjectingLow Pressure Coolant Injection (LPCI) flow for3 minutes.
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| Based ontheabove conditions, which oneofthe following actions isrequired IAWemergency operating procedures? [Reference attached)
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| A. Continue LPCI injectionandcontinue inall control legs ofHC.OP-EO.zz-0101, RPVControl.
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| B. Stop LPCIinjection, emergency depressurize thereactor pressure vessel IAW HC.OP-EO.zz-0202, Emergency RPVDepressurization and then resume LPCI injection.
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| C. Continue LPCIinjection andenter HC.OP-EO.zz-0206, RPV Flooding.
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| D. Continue LPCIinjection, emergency depressurize the reactor pressure vessel IAWHC.OP-EO.zz-0202, Emergency RPVDepressurization andthen enter HC.OP-EO.zz-0206, RPVFlooding.
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| Proposed Answer: C (Optional):
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| Explanation Channels A ANDB ofthe Wide, Narrow andUpset RPVwater level instruments provide themost reliable indications. RPVlevel instrumentation channels A andB have beendesigned with minimal,vertical-rundrops intheDrywell. Therefore, these channels areleast affected byelevated Drywell temperature. EOPCaution 1defines conditions under which neither thedisplayed value nor the trend indicated ofRPVwater level canberelied upon. With High drywell temperature andlowRPV
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| : pressure, per EOPcaution 1level isunreliable. Therefore RPVlevel itisnot known andRPVflooding is IAWEOP-206 required RPVFlooding asthemitigation strategy. Toassure adequate core cooling the
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| 'C' RHRpumpwould continue intheLPCI modeofoperation.
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| 2021NRCWritten Examination Piausibility Justification:
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| A: Incorrect. RPVflooding isrequired. Pressure Control LegofEOP-101 isexited whenEOP-206 is required. This override sends the operator toEOP-206 which directs themitigation strategy for RPV flooding (See attached EOP-101 RC/L-2 Retainment Override).
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| B: Incorrect-With thecurrent conditions, theretainment override would betaken from EOP-101 to enter EOP-206 andflood the vessel (open5 SRVs). Theemergency depressurization would occur iflevel is known andcannot bemaintained above -185" IAWEOP-101. LPCI injection would notbesecured toassure adequate core cooling.
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| C: Correct- RPVflooding isrequired. Pressure Control LegofEOP-101 whenEOP-206 isexited is required. This overridesends the operator toEOP-206 which themitigation directs strategy for RPVflooding. LPCIinjection would notbesecured toassure core adequate cooling.
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| D: Incorrect. With thecurrent conditions, theretainment override wouldbetaken from EOP-101 to enter EOP-206 andflood the vessel (open 5 SRVs).
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| Technical Reference(s): HC.OP-EO.zz-0101 RC/L-2 if not (Attach previously provided)
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| HC.OP-EO.zz-0206 RPV Flooding EOP-CAUTION #1 Proposed References tobeprovided toapplicants during examination: EOP-CAUTION #1 Learning Objective: Given anystep oftheprocedure, describe the reason for performance ofthat step and/or expected system response to control manipulations prescribed bythat step.
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| Question Source: Bank# 120175 Modified Bank# (Note changesorattach parent)
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| New Question History: . .
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| Question Cognitive Level: Comprehension orAnalysis 10CFRPart 55Content: 55.43(5)
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| Comments:
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| ...}}
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