ML21243A239

08.26.21 Statement of Issues (DC Cir.)(Case No. 21-1162)

ML21243A239
Person / Time
Site:	07007003, 07007004
Issue date:	08/26/2021
From:	Lodge T, Taylor W Beyond Nuclear, Law Offices of Terry Jonathan Lodge, Law Offices of Wallace L. Taylor, Ohio Nuclear Free Network (ONFN)
To:	NRC/OGC, US Federal Judiciary, Court of Appeals, for the District of Columbia Circuit
References
1911767, 21-1162
Download: ML21243A239 (6)

Text

USCA Case #21-1162 Document #1911767 Filed: 08/26/2021 Page 1 of 6

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

OHIO NUCLEAR-FREE )

NETWORK and BEYOND NUCLEAR, ) Case No. 21-1162

Petitioners, )

v. )

UNITED STATES NUCLEAR )

REGULATORY COMMISSION and the UNITED STATES OF )

AMERICA,

)

Respondents.

)

PETITIONERS STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES

Petitioners Ohio Nuclear-Free Network and Beyond Nuclear (Petitioners)

seek review of the June 11, 2021 Approval Letter from the NRC to American

Centrifuge Operating, LLC (ACO), and all other documents by which the NRC

approved the HALEU Project respecting the following issues:

1) That the amendments to the underlying ACO licenses were not properly

authorized by the Commission.

2) That the Commission wrongfully and unlawfully failed to discharge its

USCA Case #21-1162 Document #1911767 Filed: 08/26/2021 Page 2 of 6

legal and non-discretionary duty to consider whether granting the license

amendments could be inimical to the common defense and security of the United

States or the health and safety of the public, as required by the Atomic Energy Act,

particularly 42 U.S.C. §§ 2077(c)(2) and 2099 (AEA), which mandates

identification of all reasonable alternatives that could eliminate or mitigate those

risks.

3) That the Commission wrongfully and unlawfully prepared only an

Environmental Assessment/Finding of No Significant Impact (EA/FONSI),

instead of an Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) for the HALEU Project, in

contradiction of the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), § 102(2)( C)

(42 U.S.C § 4332(2)( C)), as well as pertinent NRC regulations and Council on

Environmental Quality (CEQ) regulations.

4) That the HALEU Project is the beginning of an integrated full-scale

application of Centrus centrifuge technology and was segmented into pieces to

avoid EIS scrutiny of the larger, overall HALEU development and manufacturing

plan, in violation of NEPA.

5) That the HALEU Project will produce unobligated enriched uranium

for defense applications which have not been adequately disclosed nor analyzed,

either in the ACO application documents or in the NRC approval-related papers.

USCA Case #21-1162 Document #1911767 Filed: 08/26/2021 Page 3 of 6

6) That environmental justice implications of the project, arising from the

mining and processing of uranium, the production of HALEU and HEU as part of

the HALEU Project, and the disposition of wastes from the Project were not

disclosed and analyzed as required by NEPA, NRC regulations, and the

Presidents executive order.

7) That past industrial nuclear enrichment processes along with careless

handling and disposal practices of wastes, have caused radioisotopes, including

transuranic nuclear wastes, to be dispersed widely across the Portsmouth Site and

to offsite locations in three counties. These isotopes pose a threat to worker health,

public health and the environment. There is not an adequate analysis in ACOs

application of the possibilities of further contamination events from plant

operations associated with producing HALEU.

8) That HALEU (and Highly-Enriched Uranium, or HEU) produced by

the project is likely to be desirable for theft, trafficking and terrorist uses, none of

which is comprehensively addressed in the EA/FONSI. HALEU is comparatively

easy to enrich to HEU concentrations and could be used as a source of fissionable

explosive material for thermonuclear weapons as well as for dirty nuclear

bombs. The HEU generated as part of the HALEU Project could be used, without

further enrichment, in nuclear bombs. Despite the adaptability of HALEU and

USCA Case #21-1162 Document #1911767 Filed: 08/26/2021 Page 4 of 6

HEU to weaponization, the NRC did not conduct a nuclear weapons proliferation

assessment prior to approving the license changes, contrary to the requirements of

the AEA and NEPA.

9) Centruss Revised License Application (RLA) request does not match

the scope of the HALEU project, which is supposedly to construct and operate 16

total centrifuges. The Licensee (ACO) proposes to install centrifuges in

increments in the American Centrifuge Plant up to a capacity of 3.8 million SWU

(Separative Work Units) production annually. The RLA envisions far more than

16 centrifuges.

10) Uranium enrichment in the HALEU cascade will be conducted to 25%

enrichment levels, which are unprecedented at the Portsmouth Site. Uranium that

is 25% enriched comprises HEU under the AEA. The enrichment levels

envisioned by the project pose unresolved questions concerning safety and

criticality. The Lead Centrifuge Cascade license, SNM-7003, was issued in 2004

following the NRCs publication of an EA/FONSI with a Safety Evaluation

Report. Six Lead Cascade centrifuges malfunctioned and crashed during

operations in 2011 in a project that had been scrutinized only in an EA/FONSI,

instead of an EIS. The 25% enrichment to create HEU which will be allowed in

this HALEU feasibility project is well above the 10% level examined in the 2006

USCA Case #21-1162 Document #1911767 Filed: 08/26/2021 Page 5 of 6

EIS for the American Centrifuge project. That project proposed producing

enriched uranium for identified commercial purposes. Since that time, no entity in

the United States has used gaseous centrifuges to enrich beyond 10%.

11) That the EA/FONSI does not adequately discuss or consider alternatives

to the HALEU project, in violation of NEPA.

12) That the analyses of criticality and measures to mitigate the potential for

inadvertent criticality are inadequate under both the AEA and NEPA.

13) That the NRC licensing approval documents fail to identify and analyze

cumulative effects on the HALEU plan of other Special Nuclear Material

production, enrichment and remediation activities taking place at the Portsmouth

Site, such as the processing of depleted uranium, the ongoing demolition of

contaminated structures, and disposal of radioactively contaminated material in an

onsite landfill, which is geologically connected to the water table beneath.

14) That a Programmatic EIS is warranted, based upon the actual scope of

the HALEU Project.

/s/ Terry J. Lodge Terry J. Lodge, Esq.

316 N. Michigan St., Suite 520 Toledo, OH 43604-5627 (419) 205-7084 Fax: (419) 932-6625 Email: tjlodge50@yahoo.com

USCA Case #21-1162 Document #1911767 Filed: 08/26/2021 Page 6 of 6

/s/ Wallace L. Taylor Wallace L. Taylor Law Offices of Wallace L. Taylor 4403 1st Ave. S.E., Suite 402 Cedar Rapids, Iowa 52402 319-366-2428 Fax: 319-366-3886 E-mail: wtaylorlaw@aol.com

Co-Counsel for Petitioners

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that on this 26th day of August, 2021, I served the foregoing Statement of the Issues upon the following via electronic mail and via deposit of the foregoing document in the Courts electronic case filing system, which according to its protocols would automatically notify all counsel of record:

Eric Vincent Michel, Attorney:

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555-0001 Eric.Michel2@nrc.gov

Andrew Averbach, Esq., Solicitor U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555-0001 andrew.averbach@nrc.gov

/s/ Terry J. Lodge Terry J. Lodge Co-Counsel for Petitioners