ML21243A239
| ML21243A239 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | 07007003, 07007004 |
| Issue date: | 08/26/2021 |
| From: | Lodge T, Taylor W Beyond Nuclear, Law Offices of Terry Jonathan Lodge, Law Offices of Wallace L. Taylor, Ohio Nuclear Free Network (ONFN) |
| To: | NRC/OGC, US Federal Judiciary, Court of Appeals, for the District of Columbia Circuit |
| References | |
| 1911767, 21-1162 | |
| Download: ML21243A239 (6) | |
Text
USCA Case #21-1162 Document #1911767 Filed: 08/26/2021 Page 1 of 6
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT
OHIO NUCLEAR-FREE )
NETWORK and BEYOND NUCLEAR, ) Case No. 21-1162
Petitioners, )
- v. )
UNITED STATES NUCLEAR )
REGULATORY COMMISSION and the UNITED STATES OF )
- AMERICA,
)
Respondents.
)
PETITIONERS STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
Petitioners Ohio Nuclear-Free Network and Beyond Nuclear (Petitioners)
seek review of the June 11, 2021 Approval Letter from the NRC to American
Centrifuge Operating, LLC (ACO), and all other documents by which the NRC
approved the HALEU Project respecting the following issues:
- 1) That the amendments to the underlying ACO licenses were not properly
authorized by the Commission.
- 2) That the Commission wrongfully and unlawfully failed to discharge its
USCA Case #21-1162 Document #1911767 Filed: 08/26/2021 Page 2 of 6
legal and non-discretionary duty to consider whether granting the license
amendments could be inimical to the common defense and security of the United
States or the health and safety of the public, as required by the Atomic Energy Act,
particularly 42 U.S.C. §§ 2077(c)(2) and 2099 (AEA), which mandates
identification of all reasonable alternatives that could eliminate or mitigate those
risks.
- 3) That the Commission wrongfully and unlawfully prepared only an
Environmental Assessment/Finding of No Significant Impact (EA/FONSI),
instead of an Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) for the HALEU Project, in
contradiction of the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), § 102(2)( C)
(42 U.S.C § 4332(2)( C)), as well as pertinent NRC regulations and Council on
Environmental Quality (CEQ) regulations.
- 4) That the HALEU Project is the beginning of an integrated full-scale
application of Centrus centrifuge technology and was segmented into pieces to
avoid EIS scrutiny of the larger, overall HALEU development and manufacturing
plan, in violation of NEPA.
for defense applications which have not been adequately disclosed nor analyzed,
either in the ACO application documents or in the NRC approval-related papers.
USCA Case #21-1162 Document #1911767 Filed: 08/26/2021 Page 3 of 6
- 6) That environmental justice implications of the project, arising from the
mining and processing of uranium, the production of HALEU and HEU as part of
the HALEU Project, and the disposition of wastes from the Project were not
disclosed and analyzed as required by NEPA, NRC regulations, and the
Presidents executive order.
- 7) That past industrial nuclear enrichment processes along with careless
handling and disposal practices of wastes, have caused radioisotopes, including
transuranic nuclear wastes, to be dispersed widely across the Portsmouth Site and
to offsite locations in three counties. These isotopes pose a threat to worker health,
public health and the environment. There is not an adequate analysis in ACOs
application of the possibilities of further contamination events from plant
operations associated with producing HALEU.
the project is likely to be desirable for theft, trafficking and terrorist uses, none of
which is comprehensively addressed in the EA/FONSI. HALEU is comparatively
easy to enrich to HEU concentrations and could be used as a source of fissionable
explosive material for thermonuclear weapons as well as for dirty nuclear
bombs. The HEU generated as part of the HALEU Project could be used, without
further enrichment, in nuclear bombs. Despite the adaptability of HALEU and
USCA Case #21-1162 Document #1911767 Filed: 08/26/2021 Page 4 of 6
HEU to weaponization, the NRC did not conduct a nuclear weapons proliferation
assessment prior to approving the license changes, contrary to the requirements of
- 9) Centruss Revised License Application (RLA) request does not match
the scope of the HALEU project, which is supposedly to construct and operate 16
total centrifuges. The Licensee (ACO) proposes to install centrifuges in
increments in the American Centrifuge Plant up to a capacity of 3.8 million SWU
(Separative Work Units) production annually. The RLA envisions far more than
16 centrifuges.
enrichment levels, which are unprecedented at the Portsmouth Site. Uranium that
is 25% enriched comprises HEU under the AEA. The enrichment levels
envisioned by the project pose unresolved questions concerning safety and
criticality. The Lead Centrifuge Cascade license, SNM-7003, was issued in 2004
following the NRCs publication of an EA/FONSI with a Safety Evaluation
Report. Six Lead Cascade centrifuges malfunctioned and crashed during
operations in 2011 in a project that had been scrutinized only in an EA/FONSI,
instead of an EIS. The 25% enrichment to create HEU which will be allowed in
this HALEU feasibility project is well above the 10% level examined in the 2006
USCA Case #21-1162 Document #1911767 Filed: 08/26/2021 Page 5 of 6
EIS for the American Centrifuge project. That project proposed producing
enriched uranium for identified commercial purposes. Since that time, no entity in
the United States has used gaseous centrifuges to enrich beyond 10%.
- 11) That the EA/FONSI does not adequately discuss or consider alternatives
to the HALEU project, in violation of NEPA.
- 12) That the analyses of criticality and measures to mitigate the potential for
inadvertent criticality are inadequate under both the AEA and NEPA.
- 13) That the NRC licensing approval documents fail to identify and analyze
cumulative effects on the HALEU plan of other Special Nuclear Material
production, enrichment and remediation activities taking place at the Portsmouth
Site, such as the processing of depleted uranium, the ongoing demolition of
contaminated structures, and disposal of radioactively contaminated material in an
onsite landfill, which is geologically connected to the water table beneath.
- 14) That a Programmatic EIS is warranted, based upon the actual scope of
the HALEU Project.
/s/ Terry J. Lodge Terry J. Lodge, Esq.
316 N. Michigan St., Suite 520 Toledo, OH 43604-5627 (419) 205-7084 Fax: (419) 932-6625 Email: tjlodge50@yahoo.com
USCA Case #21-1162 Document #1911767 Filed: 08/26/2021 Page 6 of 6
/s/ Wallace L. Taylor Wallace L. Taylor Law Offices of Wallace L. Taylor 4403 1st Ave. S.E., Suite 402 Cedar Rapids, Iowa 52402 319-366-2428 Fax: 319-366-3886 E-mail: wtaylorlaw@aol.com
Co-Counsel for Petitioners
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on this 26th day of August, 2021, I served the foregoing Statement of the Issues upon the following via electronic mail and via deposit of the foregoing document in the Courts electronic case filing system, which according to its protocols would automatically notify all counsel of record:
Eric Vincent Michel, Attorney:
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555-0001 Eric.Michel2@nrc.gov
Andrew Averbach, Esq., Solicitor U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555-0001 andrew.averbach@nrc.gov
/s/ Terry J. Lodge Terry J. Lodge Co-Counsel for Petitioners