ML20203F447

Application for Amend to Licenses DPR-57 & NPF-5,revising Tech Specs to Modify Operating Requirements for Rod Worth Minimizer & Rod Sequence Control Sys & Adding MAPLHGR Limits for New & Old Fuel Types.Fee Paid

ML20203F447
Person / Time
Site:	Hatch
Issue date:	04/15/1986
From:	Beckham J GEORGIA POWER CO.
To:	Muller D Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
Shared Package
ML20203F452	List: ML20203F447 ML20203F458
References
0429C, 429C, SL-550, TAC-61283, TAC-61284, NUDOCS 8604250158
Download: ML20203F447 (19)

Text

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Georgbibwer Company 333 Piedracnt Avenue

- Atlanta, Georgia 30308 Telephone 404 526-6526 Mailing Aiiress:

Fbst Office Box 4545 Atlanta, Georgia 30302 Georgialbwer L T. Gucwa TN af' men **YM 56?"m Manager Nuclear Safety and Ucensr.g SL-550 0429C April 15,1986 Director of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Attention: Mr. D. Muller, Project Director BWR Project Directorate No. 2 Division of Boiling Water Reactor Licensing U;S. Nuclear Regulatory Conunission Washington, D. C. 20555 NRC DOCKETS 50-321, 50-365 OPERATING LICENSES DPR-57, NPF-5 EDWIN I. HATCH NUCLEAR PLANT UNITS 1,2 TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS REVISIONS FOR RWM AND R5G5 OPLRATION, FUEL STORAGE REQUIREMENTS, FUEL ASSEMBLY DESIGN, MAPLHGR LIMITS, EDITORIAL GHANGES Gentlemen:

In accordance with the provisions of 10 CFR 50.90 as required by 10 CFR 50.59 (c)(1), Georgia Power Company (GPC) proposes to amend the Technical Specifications, Appendix A, of each of the Operating Licenses DPR-57 and NPF-5, respectively. The proposal would:

1. Modify the operating requirements for the Rod Worth Minimizer (RWM) and the Rod Sequence Control Systems.

e 2 Change the restrictions on fuel which can be stored in the spent fuel pools and incraase the flexibility of nuclear and mechanical designs for fuel assemblies.

3. Add MAPLHGR limits for a new fuel type and an old fuel type with a different channel thickness.

4. Make editorial changes to more clearly define themal limits with respect to channel thickness and barrier fuel.

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GeorgiaPower b Director of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Attention: Mr. D. Muller, Project Director Operating Reactors Branch No. 2 April 15,1986 Page Two I These proposed revisions will increase GPC's flexibility to choose among various operating strategies, particularly in regard to fuel cycle designs, and will eliminate the need to have the Control Rod Drop Accident analyzed each cycle.

Enclosure 1 provides a detailed description and safety evaluation of the proposed changes.

Enclosure 2 details the basis for our determination that the proposed changes do not involve significant hazards considerations.

Enclosure 3 provides page change instructions for incorporating the proposed changes. The proposed changed Technical Specifications pages follow Enclosure 3 Enclosure 4 provides reference documents letters which have not been previously submitted to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC).

Payment of the appropriate filing fee is enclosed.

In order to allow time for procedure revision and orderly incorporation into copies of the Technical Specifications, we request that the proposed amendment, once approved by the NRC, be issued with an effective date to be no later than 60 days from the date of issuance of the amendment.

Pursuant to the requirements of 10 CFR 50.91, a copy of this letter and all applicable attachments will be forwarded to Mr. J. L. Ledbetter of the Environmental Protection Division of the Georgia Department of Natural Resources.

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GeorgialherA  !

Director of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Attention: Mr. D. Muller, Project Director Operating Reactors Branch No. 2 April 15, 1986 Page Three Mr. J. T. Beckham, Jr. states that he is Vice President of Georgia Power Company and is authorized to execute this oath on behalf of Georgia l Power Company, and that to the best of his knowledge and belief, the i facts set forth in this letter are true.

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i GEORGIA POWER COMPANY i by: [

. T. Beckham, Jr. '

l Sworn to and subscribed before me this 15th day of April 1986 l V7

~ h , k 0)n Notary

' ~ '

f2 Public N AP7 IMM. C:ey*cn Co re, exces.a j g(g'ggemmiss.an Emres 12.1989 Dec.

l~ Enclosures c: Mr. J. P. O'Reilly Mr. H. C. Ni x , J r.

Senior Resident Inspector Dr. J. N. Grace (NRC-Region II)

Mr. J. L. Ledbetter l GO-NORMS l

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0429C 70077S

GeorgiaPower d ENCLOSURE 1 NRC 00CKETS 50-321, 50-366 OPERATING LICENSES DPR-57, NPF-5 EDWIN I. HATCH NUCLEAR PLANT UNITS 1,2 TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS REVISIONS FOR RWM AND RSCS OPERATION, FUEL STORAGE REQUIREMENTS, FUEL ASSEMBLY DESIGN, MAPLHGR LIMITS, EDITORIAL CHANGES BASIS FOR CHANGE REQUEST Proposed Change 1:

This proposed change would revise the operating requirements for the RWM and the Rod Sequence Control systems to include the use of the BPWS control rod withdrawal procedure during the first 50 percent of withdrawal. Specifically, the RWM will be used to enforce a BPWS for control rods when more than 50 percent of the rods are in the core From 50-percent rod density to 20-percent rated thermal power, the Rod Sequence Control System (RSCS) will still be required to ensure that rods are withdrawn in a Group Notch (GN) mode.

Background:

Some BWR/4s, including P1 ant Hatch, are Group Notch Rod Sequence Control System (GNRSCS) plants which neans that during a startup, each of the first 50 percent of the control rods can be withdrawn from its full-in to full-out position in one continuous motion. This procedure has two disadvantages -- the potential for fast period scrams and high rod worths l that would worsen a CRDA. Ther,e high rod worths mean that for every reload, an expensive and time-consuming analysis of the Reference loading Pattern must he performed to predict the results of a potential CRDA. If this CRDA calculation does not meet the Design Bases Safety Limit, then a new Reference Loading Pattern mast be chosen for that cycle and the analysis repeated. Redesigning the core simply to meet CRDA limits can increase fuel cycle costs by reducing batch average discharge exposures and inhibiting rod pattern development (to comply with thermal limits requirements), because the core configuration is less than optimal.

Some BWRs start up using a BPWS procedure (Reference 1) which restricts the first 50 percent of the rods withdrawn so that they are stepped out in a specified (banked) pattern. The rod worths resulting from this procedure are sufficiently low, and, based on statistical studies of maximum rod worths, a plant-specific analysis is unnecessary, because fuel would not exceed the required limits during a CRDA (Reference 2).

The advantages of a BPWS (i.e., less probability of short reactor periods that may result in Intermediate Range Monitor upscale scram trips, lower rod worths, and no plant-speci fic CRDA analysis) can be applied to 1

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GeorgiaIbwer[ ENCLOSURE 1 (Continued)

TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS REVISIONS FOR RWM AND RSCS OPERATION, FUEL STORAGE REQUIREMENTS, FUEL ASSEMBLY DESIGN, MAPLHGR LIMITS, EDITORIAL CHANGES BASIS FOR CHANGE REQUEST GNRSCS plants if the RWM is programmed to control rod withdrawals in a manner similar to which is practiced in the BPWS plants. In order to do this, the RSCS, which currently governs all rod withdrawals up to 20 percent rated thermal power, will not be the primary system to backup the operator until the rod density has been reduced to 50 percent. The RSCS may even be inoperable, if necessary, up until this time. The net result of these changes, however, will be lower rod worths from 100-percent to 50-percent rod density and continued low rod worths up to 20-percent rated thennal power.

Basis:

The proposed Technical Specifications change is designed to lower maximum rod worths during startup by requiring adherence to a BPWS for the removal of the first 50 percent of the rods from the core. Rod worths are reduced with the RWM-enforced BPWS, because the rods are stepped out rather than removed from full-in to full-out as can be done with RSCS only. From 50-percent rod density to 20-percent rated thermal power, rods will continue to be withdrawn in a GN mode as required by the RSCS.

The NRC concluded in its safety evaluation on this subject (Reference 2) that: "it is preferable for the GNRSCS plants to have the improved pattern control of the BPWS as monitored by the RWM for the first 50 percent of withdrawal" and that " Plants making the change will be able to take credit for the statistical analysis of the CRDA and will not have to analyze the event for reload."

Proposed Change 2:

The proposed change will remove from the Design Features Section (5.0) the spent fuel pool storage linear mass restriction of 15.2 grams of Uranium-235 per axial centimeter of fuel bundle. This change will remove restrictions on the mechanical features of fuel assemblies also described in Section 5.0. Specifically, the designation of the number of fueled rods, water flow path configurations, fuel cladding materials, active fuel length, uranium weight, and Uranium-235 enrichment would be deleted. This change is needed to allow for the use of NRC-approved fuel assemblies which may not conform to these restrictions but fully comply with the applicable safety requirements specified in the FSARs.

Background:

Recent BWR experience has shown that the availability for power production can be increased if operating fuel cycles are lengthened to 18 months or more. This increase is largely due to a reduction in the number of refueling outages. Longer fuel cycles, however, can only be 2

0429C 70017$

GeorgiaPower d ENCLOSURE 1 (Continued)

TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS REVISIONS FOR RWM AND RSC5 OPERATION, FUEL STORAGE REQUIREMENTS, FUEL ASSEMBLY DESIGN, MAPLHGR LIMITS, EDITORI AL CHANGES BASIS FOR CHANGE REQUEST

Background:

(Continued) accomplished if more highly enriched fuel is loaded into the core prior to each cycle. For this reason, Georgia Power Company (GPC) is actively considering the purchase of more highly enriched fuel than is currently being used at Plant Hatch.

In addition to loading higher enrichment fuel, it may be desirable at some time to include fuel that has a somewhat different mechanical design than is specified in the current Technical Specifications. Such assemblies might include more fueled rods, a differeat number of water rods, or a different water flow path in the bundle interior.

In order to accommodate these types of fuel at Plant Hatch, the Design Features sections of both unit's Technical Specifications must be changed. Currently, both Hatch 1 and hatch 2 Technical Specifications limit fuel that can be loaded into the cores to certain of the 7 x 7 and 8 x 8 fuel types which have been connercially available to date.

l Specifically, both Technical Specifications place a ilmit on the number of fueled rods and the number of water rods per fuel assembly. In I addition, Unit 2 Technical Specifications restrict the fuel enrichment to "a maximum average enrichment of 2.90 weight percent U-235."

Both Technical Specifications further prevent certain fuel loadings by placing an upper bound of "15.2 grams of Uranium-235 per axial centimeter" (of fuel bundle) on the assemblies which can be placed in the Spent Fuel Pool. This is in addition to both FSAR (References 3 and 4) and Technical Specifications cour'tments on Fuel Pool criticality whereby Keff 0.95 Historically, this restriction was imposed by the NRC when it issued the safety evaluation for high-density spent fuel racks

(Reference 5). The NRC reasoned that it was necessary to "... preclude the possibility of the Keff in the fuel pool from exceeding this 0.95 Ifmit without being detected..." if GPC should want to store in the spent fuel pool fuel bundles other than those described in GE's submittal on high density fuel racks (Reference 6). This, however, is at variance l

with the latest version of the NRC-approved General Electric Standard Application for Reactor Fuel (GESTAR II) in which the storage of fuel assemblies having linear masses in excess of 15.2 grams of Uranium-235 per axial centimeter were analyzed to have a spent fuel pool Ke rf below 0.95 when stored in the type of high-density fuel racks in use at Plant Hatch (References 6, 7, and 8).

The specific fuel which was considered for this safety evaluation is

! contained in Revision 7 of GESTAR !!. Other fuel designs not covered by

! this document will be reviewed by the NRC through generic fuel licensing l programs. If the fuel is generically approved by the NRC and if these Technical Specifications changes are also approved by the NRC, loading of i

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GeorgiaIbwer[ ENCLOSURE 1 (Continued)

TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS REVISIONS FOR RWM AND RSCS OPERATION, FUEL STORAGE REQUIREMENTS, FUEL ASSEMBLY DESIGN, MAPLHGR LIMIT 5, EDITORIAL CHANGES BASIS FOR CHANGE REQUEST

Background:

(Continued) these fuel types may then be evaluated by GPC under the provisions of 10 CFR 50.59. The purpose of this safety evaluation is to provide the necessary technical basis to justify broadening the language in the Technical Specifications to allow the use and storage of higher enrichment fuel and/or fuels of a different mechanical design.

l Basis:

The basis for relaxing restrictions specified in the Hatch 1 and Hatch 2 Technical Specifications on the type of fuel that can be loaded into the i cores and spent fuel pools, respectively, is the analysis perforred using l NRC-approved methods. Prior to the use of a new type of fuel assembly, each utility was required to show that the fuel was in compliance with the appitcable NRC safety requirements, such as spent fuel pool criticality, Emergency Core Cooling System, etc. This compliance check would consider pertinent factors, such as the bundle enrichment and l burnable poison combination, geometry, number of fuel and water rods, cladding material, and active fuel length. This analysis may take the

! form of a reference to a fuel vendor's generic analysis which is

! applicable to several BWRs, including Plant Hatch. Each reload licensing

! analysis report references the approved vendor document, and reloads may l be done under the provisions of 10 CFR 50.59 if there are no unreviewed safety questions. In the case where GE is the fuel vendor, as new fuel i designs are developed GE submits to the NRC a proposed GESTAR II i amendment containing information required by the Standard Review Plan.

l Upon NRC approval, an NRC safety evaluation is issued to GE, and GESTAR j may then be amended and referenced by the utility.

l This approach, consistent with that used by other LdR fuel vendors, gives

, GPC the freedom to use at Plant Hatch fuel which may have a somewhat i different mechanical or nuclear design than is currently in use, that is, as long as the fuel has been properly analyzed and shown to meet the appropriate NRC safety limits, and an NRC Safety Evaluation has been issued for the new design.

t As an example, all bundles which are currently included in the latest l approved version of GESTAR II should be usable at Hatch without any additional restrictions, such as the maximum of 15.2 grams of Uranium 235 per axial centimeter of fuel bundle. As noted in the Background section, this Ifnear mass ifmit was imposed to prevent an inadvertent increase in l spent fuel pool reactivity with now bundle types. However, as documented j in Section 3.3.2.1.4 of Reference 7, none of the assemblies included in 4

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Georgialbwer d ENCLOSURE 1 (Continued)

TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS REVISIONS FOR RWM AND R5CS OPERATION, FUEL STORAGE REQUIREMENTS, FUEL ASSEMBLY DESIGN, MAPLHGR LIMITS, EDITORIAL CHANGES BASIS FOR CHANGE REQUEST

Background:

(Continued)

GESTAR II would exceed the Spent Fuel Pool reactivity limit even though some do exceed this linear mass limit specified in the Hatch Technical Specifications.

Similarly, the Hatch 2 Technical Specifications place a 2.90 weight percent ceiling on the fuel bundle average enrichment of Uranium-235; however, GESTAR II contains descriptions of bundles with average enrichments higher than 2.90 which have received a generic NRC approval and can be safely used at Plant Hatch. This is partly due to the fact that the presence of Gadolinia in some fuel rods suppresses bundle reactivity for any given bundle exposure, enrichment, and lattice configuration. In addition, the higher enrichment (and higher exposure) fuel design will not significantly affect the average bundle decay heat once the fuel is placed in the spent fuel pool. The adequacy of the existing spent fuel pool cooling systems with the high-density fuel storage system installed was conservatively assessed in Reference 6 Therefore, restricting enrichment alone unduly hampers fuel designs, but does not directly address any safety concern. Thus, it is proposed that both Hatch 1 and Hatch 2 Technical Specifications be changed to state that the only fuel which can be loaded into the respective cores is fuel which has been fully analyzed with NRC-approved nethods and shown to conform to the applicable safety requirements stated in each Unit's FSAR. Also, since the limit on spent fuel pool reactivity (Ke rf less than or equal to 0.95) is completely sufficient to satisfy the NRC's safety concern, the restriction of 15.2 grams of Uranium-235 per axial centimeter of fuel bundle may be removed.

In conclusion, it is sufficient for safety purposes to show that any fuel assembly is in compliance with applicable NRC safety requirements in order to be used in the Hatch 1 and Hatch 2 cores and to be stored in the spent fuel pools. Such compliance can be shown by analysis using NRC-approved codes and methods. All other limits specified in the current versions of the Technical Specifications on the storage and use of fuel at Plant llatch are, therefore, unnecessarily restrictive and can be removed without compromising the health or safety of the public.

Proposed Change 3:

The proposed change will add MAPLHGR limits for a new fuel type and an old fuel type with a different channel thickness. These ere being added to increase the overall efficiency of the two units. The first will increase cycle lengths and reduce the number of refueling outages; the second will improve neutron economy.

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Georgia Power [ ENCLOSURE 1 (Continued)

TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS REVISIONS FOR RWM AND RSC5 OPERATION, FUEL STORAGE REQUIREMENTS, FUEL ASSEMBLY DESIGN, MAPLHGR LIMITS, EDITORIAL CHANGES BASIS FOR CHANGE REQUEST

Background:

l Georgia Power Company desires flexibility to improve the overall efficiency of Plant Hatch by using a new fuel type (BP8DRB299-80M) and using an old fuel type with a different channel thickness (P8DRB283-80M and BP80RB283-80M). The first fuel type will be used to increase cycle lengths, thereby improving plant efficiency by reducing the number of refueling outages. The change in channel thickness (from 100 mils to 80 mils) on the BP80RB283 fuel will increase the nmtron economy of the core. New MAPLHGR curves must be added to each unit's Technical Specifications in order to use these fuel types at Plant Hatch.

Basis:

General Electric performed the ECCS calculations for both of these fuel types using NRC-approved codes and methods and concluded that both conform to the licensing criteria described in 10 CFR 50.46 (Reference 9). The model s used to perform these analyses meet the requirements of 10 CFR 50, Appendix K.

In addition to the above standard analysis, GE has determined that any pressurized retrofit barrier fuel which is described in Revision 7 of the GESTAR II document (Reference 10) has the same MAPLHGR limits as identical fuel without the cladding barrier. According to Reference 9 Hatch 2 MAPLHGR limits are conservative for Hatch I since the Unit 2 ECCS analysis is more limiting than that for Hatch 1. Likewise, certain MAPLHGR limits, calculated for fuel with 80-mil channels, have been found to be bounding for fuel with 100-mil channels (Reference 9). Thus, some of the MAPLHGR limits included in this submittal, which were calculated for Hatch 2 fuel and/or fuel with 80-mil channels, have been conservatively applied to Hatch 1 and/or 100-mil channel fuel.

In conclusion, the acceptability of MAPLHGR limits for any fuel type is based on the analyzed compliance with the requirements of 10 CFR 50.46 The codes used for such analysis comply with the methodology specified in 10 CFR 50, Appendix X.

Proposed Change 4:

The proposed change would correct several editorial errors. A typographical error in the Bases section of Unit 2 would be corrected.

The vessel steam flow for LOCA (pg. B 3/4 2-2) would be corrected to read 10.96 x 100 lbm/h. Also, the Unit 2 flow-dependent MAPLHGR adjustment factor (MAPFACp) curve (currently Figure 3.2.1-10) which is incorrectly 6

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GeorgiaPower A ENCLOSURE 1 (Continued)

TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS REVISIONS FOR RWM AND RSC5 OPERATION, FUEL STORAGE REQUIREMENTS, FUEL ASSEMBLY DESIGN, MAPLHGR LIMITS, EDITORIAL CHANGES i BASIS FOR CHANGE REQUEST Proposed Change 4: (Continued) titled, would be revised. All other changes would clarify which thermal limits apply to which channel thickness for each fuel type and whether the limits apply to barrier or nonbarrier fuel or both.

Background:

For completeness and to complement Proposed Change 3, all MAPLHGR curves will be labeled with the channel type (s) to which they apply, and the designation for barrier fuel will be added where applicable.

Basis:

This change is administrative in nature to achieve consistency within the Technical Specifications. Plant design and operation are not impacted.

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Georgialbwer A ENCLOSURE 1 (Continued)

TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS REVISIONS FOR I l

RWM AND RSC5 OPERATION, FUEL STORAGE REQUIREMENTS, FUEL ASSEMBLY DESIGN, MAPLHGR LIMITS, EDITORIAL CHANGES BASIS FOR CHANGE REQUEST

REFERENCES:

Proposed Change 1

1. " Banked Position Withdrawal Sequence," NED0-21231, January 1977,

2. NRC Letter MFN-127-85, from Cecil 0. Thomas to J. S. Charnley,

" Acceptance for Referencing of Licensing Topical Report NEDE-24011-P- A, ' General Electric Standard Application for Reactor Fuel,' Revision 6, Amendment 12," October 11, 1985.

Proposed Change 2 3 Edwin I. Hatch Nuclear Plant-Unit 1 Final Safety Analysis Report.

4. Edwin I. Hatch Nuclear Plant-Unit 2 Final Safety Analysis Report.

5 " Safety Evaluation by the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Supporting Amendment No. 74 to License No. DPR-57 and Amendment No.

15 to License NPF-5 Georgia Power Company, et al., Edwin I. Hatch Nuclear Power Plant, Unit Nos. 1 and 2, Docket Nos. 50-321 and 50-366."

6 " Design Report and Safety Evaluation for High Density Fuel Storage System," NEDE-24076-P, November 1977

7. " General Electric Standard Application for Reactor Fuel,"

1EDE-24011-P-A-7, August 1985

8. Letter from J. P. Nibert (GE) to W. R. Hertz (SCS), "High Density Spent Fuel Storage Racks at Plant Hatch," January 10, 1985 Proposed Change 3

9. Letter CJP:86-076, from J. P. Nibert (GE) to L. K. Mathews (SCS),

"MAPLHGR Limits for Several Fuel Types," March 31, 1986,

10. " General Electric Standard Application for Reactor Fuel,"

NEDE-24011-P-A-7, August 1985 8

0429C 700776

GeorgiaPowerd ENCLOSURE 2 NRC DOCKETS 50-321, 50-366 OPERATING LICENSES DPR-57, NPF-5 EDWIN I. HATCH NUCLEAR PLANT UNITS 1,2 TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS REVISIONS FOR RWM AND RSC5 OPERATION, FUEL STORAGE REQUIREMENTS, FUEE TSSEMBLY DESIGN, MAPLHGR LIMITS, EDITORIAL CHANGES 10 CFR 50.92 EVALUATION Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.92, Georgia Power Company (GPC) has evaluated the enclosed proposed amendment of Plant Hatch Units 1 and 2 and has determined that its adoption would not involve a significant hazards consideration. The basis for this determination is as follows:

Proposed Change 1:

This proposed thange would revise operating requirements for the Rod Worth Minimizer (RWM) and the Rod Sequence Control systems to allow the use of Banked Position Withdrawal Sequence (BPWS) control rod withdrawal procedure during the first 50 percent of withdrawal. Specifically, the RWM will be used to enforce a BPWS for control rods when more than 50 percent of the rods are in the core. From 50-percent rod density to 20-percent rated thermal power, the Rod Sequence Control System (RSCS) will continue to be used to ensure that rods are removed in a Group Notch (GN) mode.

Basis:

This change is consistent with Item (ii) of the " Examples of Amendments that are Considered Not Likely to Involve Significant Hazards Considerations" listed on page 14,870 of the Federal Register, April 6, 1983. The proposed change introduces additional limits on rod movements not presently included in the Technical Specifications. Although the RSCS will not be required to be operational during the first 50 percent of the rod withdrawal, the RWM will still perform that safety function by limiting rods to be withdrawn to in-sequence rods. Therefore, the proposed change meets the Item (ii) requirements for an amendment involving no significant hazards considerations.

This change does not involve a significant increase in the probability or i consequences of an accident, because the use of the RWH to BPWS would mitigate the consequences of a Control Rod Drop Accident relative to the i use of withdrawal sequences permitted by current Technical Specifications. The change would affect no other accident scenario.

The possibility of a di f ferent kind of accident from any previously analyzed is not created, because the affected systems can only act to 1

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Georgialbwer[ ENCLOSURE 2 (Continued)

TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS REVISIONS FOR RWM AND RSCS OPERATION, FUEL STORAGE REQUIREMENTS, FUEL ASSEMBLY DESIGN, MAPLHGR LIMITS, EDITORIAL CHANGES 10 CFR 50.92 EVALUATION Basis: (Continued) block control rod withdrawal in case of operator error. No new accident types would be created by their malfunction.

The margin of safety defined in the Technical Specifications is not significantly reduced by this change, because the change mitigates accident consequences by introducing new restrictions on control rod movement.

Proposed Change 2:

The proposed change will remove the 15.2 grams of Uranium-235 per axial centimeter of fuel bundle limit on fuel storage, and remove restrictions on fuel bundles, number of fueled rods, water flow path configuration, fuel cladding materials, active fuel length, uranium weight, and Uranium-235 enrichment.

Basis:

This change does not involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident, because the fuel reliability of future fuel designs will be analyzed and shown to be equivalent to or better than that of the initial core. Also the behavior of all fuel under accident l conditions will be analyzed and shown to meet all applicable Safety Design Bases specified in the respective FSARs.

This change does not create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated, because the potential for such new events resulting from modification of the fuel design or enrichment will be considered and shown to be beyond design bases in approved generic fuel licensing acticns.

This change does not involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety, because spent fuel pool reactivity would still be 0.95, and the fuel assemblies would continue to conform to all FSAR Safety Design Bases and Technical Specifications governing fuel design and spent fuel pool reactivity. .

Proposed Change 3:

The proposed change would add MAPLHGR limits for a new fuel type and an old fuel type with a different channel thickness.

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l Georgialbwer[ ENCLOSURE 2 (Continued)

TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS REVISIONS FOR RWM AND RSCS OPERATION, FUEL STORAGE REQUIREMENTS, FUEL ASSEMBLY DESIGM, MAPLHGR LIMITS, EDITORIAL CHANGES 10 U R 50.9Z EVALUATION j i

Basts: (Continued)

This change is consistent with Item (ii) of the " Examples of Amendments that are Considered Not Likely to Involve Significant Hazards Considerations" listed on page 14,870 of the Federal Register, April 6, 1983. The proposed change introduces additional limits not presently included in the Technical Specifications, and, therefore, meets the Item (ii) requirements for an amendment involving no significant hazards considerations.

This change does not involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident, because the operating limits for the new fuel types were determined using approved methods, therefore, ensuring that all acceptance criteria for accidents were met. No changes in plant design or operating conditions that could affect accident probabilities are introduced.

The possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any previously analyzed is not created, because no changes in plant design or operation are involved, except for nuclear aspects of fuel design and

< fuel channel thickness. The fuel proposed for use is generically approved for BWR/4s.

The margin of safety in the Technical Specifications is not significantly reduced, because the fuel designs proposed for use are similar to those already in use at Plant Hatch, and because approved methods were used for determination of their operating limits.

Proposed Change 4:

This change will make various editorial revisions to correct two typographical errors and to delineate the channel thickness and barrier /nonbarrier applicability for each fuel type with respect to thermal limits. I Basis:

This change is consistent with Item (1) of the " Examples of Amendments that are Considered Not Likely to Involve Significant Hazards Considerations" listed on page 14,870 of the Federal Register, April 6, 1983 The proposed editorial change is made to achieve consistency throughout the Technical Specifications, and, therefore, meets the requirements of Item (1) for an amendment involving no significant hazards considerations.

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ENCLOSURE 2 (Continued)

Geobia Power [ TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS REVISIONS FOR RWM AND RSC5 OPERATION, FUEL STORAGE REQUIREMENTS, FUEL ASSEMBLY DESIGN, MAPLHGR LIMITS, EDITORIAL CHANGES 10 CFR 50.92 EVALUATION l

Basis: (Continued)

This change does not involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident, because it is editorial in nature and is intended to add clarity to the Technical Specifications.

The possibility of a different kind of accident from any previously analyzed is not created by this change, because plant design and operation are not affected. The margin of safety defined in the Technical Specifications is not significantly reduced by this change, because the plant safety analyses are not affected.

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GeorgiaPower d ENCLOSURE 3 NRC DOCKETS 50-321, 50-366 OPERATING LICENSES DPR-57, NPF-5 EDWIN 1. HATCH NUCLEAR PLANT UNITS 1,2 TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS REVISIONS ROR RWM AND RSCS OPERATION, FUEL STORAGE REQUIREMENTS, FUEL ASSEMBLY DESIGN, MAPLHGP LIMITS, EDITORIAL CHANGES PROPOSED CHANGES TO TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS The proposed revisions to the Unit 1 Technical Specifications (Appendix A to Operating License DPR-57) would be incorporated as follows:

Remove Page Insert Page X X 2 ---

Xi 3.3-5 3.3-5 3.3-6 3.3-6 3.3-7 3.3-7 3.3-16 3.3-16 3.3-17 3.3-17 3.11-1 3.11-1 3.11-2 3.11-2 3.11-3 3.11-3 3.11-4a 3.11-4a Figure 3.11-1 (Sheet 1) Figure 3.11-1 (Sheet 1)

Figure 3.11-1 (Sheet 2) Figure 3.11-1 (Sheet 2)

Figure 3.11-1 (Sheet 3) Figure 3.11-1 (Sheet 3)

Figure 3.11-1 (Sheet 4) Figure 3.11-1 (Sheet 4)

Figure 3.11-1 (Sheet 5) Figure 3.11-1 (Sheet 5)

Figure 3.11-1 (Sheet 6)

Figure 3.11-1 (Sheet 6) Figure 3.11-1 (Sheet 7)

Figure 3.11-1 (Sheet 7) Figure 3.11-1 (Sheet 8)

Figure 3.11-2 (Sheet 1) Figure 3.11-2 Figure 3.11-4 Figure 3.11-4 Figure 3.11-5 ---

Figure 3.11-6 Figure 3.11-5 Figure 3.11-7 Figure 3.11-6 5.0-1 5.0-1 5.0-2 5.0-2 1

0429C 700775

GeorgiaPower A ENCLOSURE 3 (Continued)

TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS REVISIONS ROR RWM AND R5G5 OPERATION, FUEL STORAGE REQUIREMENTS, FUEL ASSEMBLY DESIGN, MAPLHGR LIMITS, EDITORIAL CHANGES PROPOSED CHANGES TO TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS The proposed revisions to the Unit 2 Technical Specifications (Appendix A to Operating License NPF-5) would be incorporated as follows:

Remove Page Insert Page 3/4 1-14 3/4 1-14 3/4 1-15 3/4 1-15

'3/4 1-16 3/4 1-16 3/4 2-1 3/4 2-1 3/4 2-2 3/4 2-2 3/4 2-3 3/4 2-3 3/4 2-4a 3/4 2-4a 3/4 2-4b 3/4 2-4b 3/4 2-4c 3/4 2-4c 3/4 2-4d 3/4 2-4d 3/4 2-4e 3/4 2-4e 3/4 2-4f 3/4 2-4f 3/4 2-4g 3/4 2-4g 3/4 2-4h 3/4 2-41 3/4 2-4h 3/4 2-4j 3/4 2-41 3/4 2-4k 3/4 2-6 3/4 2-6 3/4 2-7 3/4 2-7 3/4 2-7a 3/4 2-7a 3/4 2-7b 3/4 2-7b 3/4 2-7c 3/4 2-7c 3/4 2-7d 3/4 2-7d 3/4 2-8 3/4 2-8 B 3/41-3 B 3/4 1-3 8 3/4 2-1 B 3/4 2-1 B 3/4 2-2 8 3/4 2-2 B 3/4 2-4 8 3/4 2-4 5-1 5-1 5-4 5-4 2

0429C 700775

LIST OF FIGURES Fieure Title 1.1 -1 Core Thernal Power Safety Limit Versus Core Flow Rate

, 2.1 -1 Reactor Vessel Water Levels i

4.1 -1 Graphical Aid for the Selection of an Adequate Interval Between Tests

4. 2-1 System Unavailability

3. 4-1 Sodium Pentaborate Solution Volume Versus Concentration Requirements

, 3.4-2 Sodium Pentaborate Solution Temperature Versus Concentration Requirements

3. 6-1 Change in Charpy V Transition Temperature Versus Neutron Exposure 1

3.6-2 Minimum Temperature for Inservice Hydrostatic and Leak Test 3.6-3 Minimum Temperature for Mechanical Heatup or Cooldown Following Nuclear Shutdown

3. 6-4 Minimum Temperature for Core Operation (Criticality) 3.11-1 (Sheet 1) Limiting Value for APLHGR (Fuel Type IC Types 1, 2, and 3) 3.11-1 (Sheet 2) Limiting Value for APLHGR (Fuel Types 80250, 8DR8265H.

P8DRB265H, and BP80R8265H) 3.11-1 (Sheet 3) Limiting Value for APLHGR (Fuel Types P80RB284H, 8P80RB284, and 80R183) 3.11-1 (Sheet 4) Limiting Value for APLHGR (Fuel Types 80R233, P80RB284LA, and BP8DRB284LA) .

, 3.11-1 (Sheet 5) Limiting Value for APLHGR (Fuel Types P80R8283 and BP80RB283) 3.11-1 (Sheet 6) Limiting Value for APLHGR (Fuel Type BP80RB299) 3.11-1 (Sheet 7) MAPFACp (Power Dependent Adjustment Factors to MAPLHGRs)

- - 3.11-1 (Sheet 8) MAPFACp (Flow Dependent Adjustment Factors to MAPLHGRs)

- 3.11-2 Limiting Value for LHGR (Fuel Type 7 x 7) 3.11-3 MCPRy (Flow Dependent Adjustment Factors for MCPRs) 4 3.11-4 MCPR Limit for All 8 x 8 Fuel Types for Rated Power and Rated Flow HATCH - UNIT 1 x v 9 - ,e---p. > - - - w.,y- ,- _ yw + - - - . sw-.y.i.-- -y- ~,---u -

- --e, - - - - w---,. -s- w - -+ - ,- v--gc m-r w -w-,e- 1.-r, -

LIST OF FIGURES (Continued)

Fiaure Title 3.11-5 MCPR Limit for 7 x 7 Fuel for Rated Power and Rated Flow 3.11-6 Kp (Power Dependent Adjustment Factors for MCPRs) 3.15-6 Unrestricted Area Boundary

6. 2.1 -1 Offsite Organization 6.2.2-1 Unit Organization 4

r HATCH - UNIT 1 xi

- ,_ , . - , . . -. _ _-,...-.-y -