ML20249C720

Dpv Panel Rept Concerning 980325 Dpvs

ML20249C720
Person / Time
Issue date:	06/12/1998
From:	Jocelyn Craig, Dey M, Flack J NRC
To:
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ML20249C707	List: ML20249C706 ML20249C715 ML20249C720 ML20249C724 ML20249C725
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NUDOCS 9807010086
Download: ML20249C720 (72)

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t Differing Professional View ,

Panel Report i

Concerning the March 25,1998 Differing Professional Views Su amitted i by l Monideep K. Dey l r

uSLO dohn W. Craig, Chairmarf L c/ulu

' Date n k l3 V J'ohn H. Flack, DPV Pdnel ihmber Date l TL} .  % 6 /o/c i Richard H. Wessman, DPV Panel Member Date

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r Differing Professional View Panel Report Conceming the March 25,1998 Differing Professional Views Submitted by Monideep K. Dey

1. Background

This report discusses the review of the Differing Professional Views (DPVs) dated March 25, 1998, submitted by Monideep K. Dey (Attachment 1) to Malcolm R. Knapp, Acting Director, Office of Nuclear Regulatory Research. Following receipt of the DPVs, a Panel was tasked to review the DPVs in accordance with NRC Management Directive 10.159, " Differing Professional Views or Opinions." The Panel members were John W. Craig, Chairman, Richard H.

Wessman, and John H. Flack.

The fire protection regulations for operating nuclear power plants have been the subject of considerable review and discussion for several years. These reviews considered revising fire protec6a regulations as part of the staff's effort to eliminate requirements that were thought to be marginal to safety (SECY-92-263), and these regulations were discussed by the Regulatory Review Group (SECY-94-003). SECY-96-134, dated June 21,1996, " Options for Pursuing Regulatory Improvement in Fire Protection Regulations for Nuclear Power Plants" (Attachment 2), provides a summary of activities related to the revision of the fire protection regulations.

Additionally, documentation of these activities also includes AEOD/S97-03, "Special Study, Fire Events - Feedback of U.S. Operating Experience," June 1997, and Draft NUREG-1521,

" Technical Review of Risk-Informed, Performance-Based Methods for Nuclear Power Plant Fire Protection Analyses," March 1998. More recently, SECY-97-127, " Development of a Risk-Informed, Performance-Based Regulation for Fire Protection at Nuclear Power Plants," dated October 9,1997, (Attachment 3) discussed the staff's actions to develop a more risk-informed, performance-based structure for fire protection regulations for nuclear power plants. Following review of SECY-97-127, the Commission directed the staff to complete certain actions including briefing the Commission on industry feedback on their interest u a new fire protection rule and the staff's observations and conclusions related to fire modeling, probabilistic risk assessment (PRA), fire protection functional inspections, and other related information. In response to Commission direction, the staff prepared SECY-98-058, also entitled: " Development of a Risk-Informed, Performance-Based Regulation for Fire Protection at Nuclear Power Plants" (Attachment 4). SECY-98-058 reported on recent staff and industry activities, including industry's view that a new rule was neither desired or necessary at this tirne, and provided three options and a recommendation for Commission action. The three options, were:

(1) On an expedited schedule, develop a performance-based, risk-informed fire protection regulation to replace the existing regulation.

(2) Defer rulemaking at this time and continue work with the National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) and the industry to develop a performance-based, risk-informed consensus standard.

(3) Maintain the existing fire protection regulations and guidance.

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F The staff recommended that the Commission approve Option 2. The staff also briefed the Commission on recent fire protection issues and SECY-98-058 on March 31,1998.

As a result of considering the options that the staff discussed in SECY-98-058, Monideep K. Dey submitted his DPVs.

11. DPV Summary Mr. Dey's DPVs were transmitted in his March 25,1998, memorandum, Attachment 1. He i discussed severalissues related to the need and reasons for an option not included in SECY-l 98-058. The memorandum also recommended publishing draft NUREG-1621, " Technical Review of Risk-Informed, Performance-Based Methods for Nuclear Power Plant Fire Protection Analyses." The DPVs are summarized below.

' The first DPV discusses the usefulness of currently available methods for risk-informed, performance-based fire protection analyses. The DPV asserted that [1] there " . .is a compelling need for flexibility in several areas of fire protection.. "; and [2]". . . currently available risk-informed, performance-based methods can be applied now without the need for further research in several areas of NRC's fire protection requirements. .On the basis of this conclusion, deferment of rulemaking is not recommended."

The second DPV discussed adopting risk-informed, performance-based methods through rulemaking. SECY-98-058 discussed several options related to revising the fire protection regulations, but the DPV recommends a different option, not discussed in SECY-98-058.

Specifically, the DPV recommended that the Commission [1] issue a statement that current fire protection programs are mature and that a mandatory comprehensive regulatory guide for current requirements that would rebaseline current programs would not be issued, [2] initiate a performance-based, risk-informed fire protection rulemaking, [3] eliminate Appendix R to 10 CFR Part 50, [4] develop and implement fire protection performance objectives, and [5]

grandfather current programs, stating that these programs are in compliance with the new rule if they have in compliance with the requirement in their license.

The DPV also discusses draft NUREG-1521, in which Mr. Dey was a substantial contributcc As characterized in the DPV, NUREG-1521 is a review conducted as part of the staff's effr to improve regulations and provides an assessment of risk-informed, performance-based me...ods for fire protection analyses that have become available since the issuance of NRC fire protection requirements. The DPV recommends that this document be published in final form.

Ill. Summary ofissues Reviewed by the DPV Panel The Panel reviewed the SECYs discussed above, various aspects of staff activities related to risk-informed, performance-based initiatives, including the final policy statement on the use of PRA methods in nuclear regulatory activities (SECY-95-126). The Panel held discussions with Monideep K. Dey, representatives of the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR), Office of Nuclear Regulatory Research (RES), the Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI), and representatives of

the National Fire Protection Association (NFPA). A summary of the key issues reviewed and the Panel's findings is presr,nted below.

A. Safety Significance Although not discussed in the DPV, the Panel reviewed the potential safety significance of the issues contained in the differing view in the overall context of the fire protection measures currently in place at operating reactors. Specifically, the DPV Panel sought to assess whether or not there was a current safety issue that needed to be addressed.

The fire protection requirements for nuclear power plants include the following:

. Establishment of a fire protection program

. Performance of a fire hazards analysis

. Establishment of fire protection features for areas containing or presenting a fire hazard to structures, systems, or components important to safety

. Provision of an alternative or dedicated safe-shutdown capability in areas where protection features cannot ensure safe-shutdown capability.

These fire protection requirements have been implemented at all operating nuclear power plants. As summarized in draft NUREG-1521, depending on the plant vintage and other plant-specific considerations, plants are generally committed to all or portions of Appendix A to BTP APSCSB 9.5-1 and portions of Appendix R to 10 CFR Part 50, or they were reviewed to SRP Section 9.5-1 and the appropriate section of Appendix R. Pursuant to Generic Letter (GL) 86-10 " Implementation of Fire Protection Requirements," licensees were authorized to incorporate the fire protection program and major commitments, including the fire hazard analysis, by reference in the FSAR. Exemptions, when reviewed and approved by the staff, allow acceptable alternatives to the prescriptive provisions of 10 CFR 50.48 and Appendix R. Each plant maintains a fire protection program plan that has been reviewed, and approved. Site specific implementation and related activities are inspected by the NRC staff. The Panel also reviewed various aspects of fire protection regulations, including recent enforcement data and Individual Plant Examination for External Events (IPEEEs) to determine whether there is a need to improve the level of fire safety at nuclear power plants.

The DPV Panel discusced the issue of safety significance with knowledgeable members of the NRR Plant Systems Branch, who have had a long-time association with the fire protection issue. Their perception is that there is an adequate assurance of safety established by the current regulations and that staff inspection activities provide an appropriate level of monitoring.

From time to time, certain technical issues may be identified, ranging from the Thermo-Lag issue to the " hot shorts" issue, but that current regulatory actions in response to these types of issues are reasonable. IPEEE evaluations have also provided additional assurance that previously unidentified plant-specific vultierabilities would be identified and addressed by licensees.

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The NRC has conducted studies and developed information regarding fire risk at nuclear power plants. Some of this experience is summarized in Draft NUREG-1521, which contains several conclusions related to fire risk. It states that fire risk assessments have generally estimated that the core-melt frequency caused by fire is currently in the range of 1E-4 to 1E-5 per reactor year, and implementation of the NRC fire protection requirements has generally reduced the j l vulnerability from fire by about 1 order of magnitude. Additionally, this NUREG notes that a {

comparison of fire events in the pre-Appendix R period (1965-1985) with fire events in the subsequent period shows that event frequencies have declined slightly, while the assessed 1 safety significance of events has also declined.

The NRC PRA Policy Statement encourages the use of PRA in regulatory matters to the extent supported by state-of-the art methods and data. The Policy Statement also requires that dsting rules and regulations wall be complied with unless these rules and regulations are revised." The DPV sh.c-* n:t the staff has not accepted arguments based on licensee proposals to resolve Therrao-Lag issues is consistent with the PRA Policy Statement.

Licensees cannot and should not use PRA arguments as the sole basis for not meeting NRC's rules and regulations. [ Note: Compliance with existing rules and regulations includes exemptions approved by the exemption process as well as changes made by licensees without staff approvalin accordance with 10 CFR 50.59.]

The staff has recently completed and forwarded SECY-98-015, " Final General Regulatory Guide and Standard Review Plan for Risk-Informed Regulation of Power Reactors," to the Commission. Regulatory Guice 1.174 and Chapter 10 of the Standard Review Plan, contained in SECY-98-015, provide general guidance to both reactor licensees and NRC staff on the use PRA information in making regulatory decisions on plant-specific licensing basis changes.

Guidance documents have also been developed for application of PRA techniques to specific areas including in-service testing, in-service inspection, quality assurance, and technical  !

specifications. An application guide for making risk-informed fire protection program changes, however, has (to date) not been developed. Such a guide could be beneficial to both the NRC staff and nuclear industry should future fire protection program changes be warranted.

FINDING: The Panel concludes and the staff, including Mr. Dey, and industry representatives agreed that current fire protection regulations provide an adequate level of fire safety. Each representative stated an opinion that changes to fire protection regulations are not necessary to maintain an adequate level of fire safety. While actions and improvements at individual plants have been identified, a review of the IPEEEs and the information contained in the Enforcement Action Tracking System for the period January 1,1995, to May 6,1998, does not indicate the need for revisions to the regulations to maintain or ensure an adequate level of safety.

B. Currently Available Methods and Potential Fire Research Th( application of PRA methods to assess fire risk at nuclear power plants stems back to 1975 when a probabilistic analysis of the Browns Ferry fire had been included in an appendix to the WASH 1400 study. Since that time, fire PRA studies have been performed on approximately half of tne U.S. nuclear power plants, primarily as part oflicensees'IPEEE process. In addition, the NRC staff has performed four full-scope fire PRA studies as part of the NUREG-1150 and Risk Methods integration and Evaluation Program, and a number of limited-scope studies that supported the USI A-45 [ Decay Heat Removal Reliability) resolution process. These stt: dies demonstrate that fire PRA methodology can be used to uncover severe accident vulnerabilities and identify cost-effective safety enhancements to protect plants against fires.

As discussed in SECY-96-134, the staff's review of fire risk analysis and modeling concluded that, as a result of limitations in several areas, the state of technology was not adequate to codify and implement quantitative performance goals for fire protection. Limitations primarily stem from the need to rely on expert judgment to address phenomenological and modeling uncertainties intrinsic to fire PRAs. For example, there are significant uncertainties in fire initiation frequencies, operator effectiveness in fire fighting and response to fires, fire propagation and suppression models, failure thresholds of safety systems and components, and reliability of fire suppression systems. RES is currently assessing the need to address these limitations as part of ongoing research activities, in addition, limited data also restrict the ability to quantify fire risk assessments, although some progress has been made on consolidating fire initiating event data as part of a recent AEOD special study (AEOD/S97-03).

Both activities should lead to more consistent fire PRA results.

These uncerta'nties would need to be addressed to support the development of quantitative performance (,oals and criteria and to enable the staff and licensees to determine whether such goals had been met. Ongoing staff activities to work with NFPA and future research are expected to he;p provide the information that will be necessary to make the transition from the current regulations to performance-based fire protection regulations. Risk information can provide important insights on the likelihood and impact of fire on plant systems and can aid in assessing a plant's capability to mitigate fires through the identification of success paths. Fire PRAs also help to focus resources on protecting critical safety equipment and training licensee staff to respond to risk-significant fire scenarios. However, in order for fire risk assessment information to be used explicitly within a performance-based regulatory framework as proposed by the DPV, the NRC staff will need to develop guidance and criteria that link the application of PRA results to the regulatory process. To date this has not been done. Although NUREG-1521 provides an overview of the applications of risk-informed, performance-based methods to a number of areas of fire protection, the study did not provide the criteria needed to implement a generic process within a regulatory framework, nor did it sufficiently address the uncertainties associated with such an application.

FINDING: The DPV Panel concludes that the available methods are not adequate to support the elimination of existing fire protection regulations and the implementation of a performance-l based regulation. Rather, current methods could be used in specific areas. Significant additional work, including research, would be necessary to resolve or limit the impact of the

< limitations discussed above. Although risk information should be used (consistent with the Commission's PRA Policy Statement) to assess the robustness of fire protection features and assess the impact of small changes on plant risk, the panel believes that current methods are not adequate to provide a basis for replacing existing fire protection regulations.

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C. Usefulness and Need The DPV stated that "A differing view is offered that there is a compelling need for flexibility in several areas of fire protection requirements, . . ." The Panel reviewed the potential usefulness of and need for revisions to the fire protection regulations. While this is an area that has been discussed in several SECYs as a candidate for regulatory improvement, the Panel believes that, absent a safety need or basis for revising these regulations, it is the licensees who are best able to define the usefulness and need of potential revisions. On May 5,1998, NEl sent a letter to Chairman Jackson that clearly defined industry views on potential revisions to the fire protection regulations (Attachment 5). This letter stated that "The fire protection rulemaking should be canceled rather than deferred," and that "The NRC should continue to support, as does industry, the National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) process to develop NFPA 805, a consensus standard for performance-based fire protection." Additionally, NEl stated that "If future changes to the NRC's fire protection requirements are promulgated, they should preserve the option for licensees to comply with existing requirements, including approved exemptions."

One aspect of the DPV that was discussed as a basis for the need to revise the existing fire protection regulations was the number and nature of exemptions to these regulations that have  !

been approved by the staff. The Panel believes that these regulations, which include requirements that are easily met during design (e.g., separation of equipment), are difficult to meet after a plant has been built. The exemptions demonstrate that licensees have had and continue to have flexibility to meet these regulations. The NEl letter vsa stated that:

"After more than 15 years of experience applying the fire protemion regulations in 10 CFR 50.48 and Appendix R, the nuclear power industry has established processes that have been effective in reducing the likelihood and consequences of fire-initiated events. Inasmuch as these rules were promulgated after the construction of most plants, the provisions for exemptions and deviations has been no small contributor to this effectiveness."

The DPV Panel formed a general opinion on the existing regulations from its review of the SECYs and related fire protection documents. The regulations appear to be somewhat cumbersome and licensees have requested a large number of exemptions to deal with various aspects of these regulations. Nevertheless, they are workable and, as discussed in Item A, above, are providing an adequate level of fire safety.

FINDING: The DPV Panel concludes that there is not a compelling need for, nor a clearly defined benefit from, the suggested revisions to the fire protection regulations. Industry's l statement that the " status quo" should continue to be an option included in any potential rulemaking in this area reflects the absence of a (or limited) need for, or benefit from revision of the fire protection regulations.

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D. Options for Revising Fire Protection Regulations The Panel reviewed the options to revise fire protection regulations discussed in SECY-98-058 and both options contained in the DPV. The first option described in the DPV stated that a new rule should be promulgated and that "This rulemaking option can be developed by eliminating Appendix R and revising 10 CFR 50.48 to clearly establish one set of performance objectives for fire protection that would be applicable to alllicensees. Current programs would be grandfathered to be in compliance with the new rule if they are in compliance with the prescriptive requirements referred to in their license conditions."

The second option described in the DPV stated that development and issuance of a proposed rule to establish performance objectives and acceptance criteria that would be used in pilot applications and to deve'op a consensus standard that could be endorsed by a regulatory guide. This approach is different from eliminating existing fire protection regulations and promulgating a new rule, and it is somewhat different from other options discussed in SECY 058. This option would not defer rulemaking. Rather, the approach includes issuance of a proposed rule that would t;erve as a reference or a foundation for pilot programs and development of consensuu standards. Mr. Dey believes that development and issuance of a proposed rule would be more expedient than the options discussed in SECY-98-058 to implement performance-based fire protection regulations.

One member of the DPV Pinel contacted a representative of the National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) regardirig initiatives involving performance-based fire protection for nuclear power plants. The NFPA is providing leadership in the development of NFPA 805,

" Performance-Based Standa d for Fire Protection for Light Water Reactor Electric Generating Plants." NRC and industry representatives are participating in this effort. A final draft of this standard is expected to be avallable in late 1998.

The May 5,,1998, letter from NEl also discussed potential rulemaking. NEl stated that "If future changes to the NRC's fire protaction requirements are promulgated, they should preserve the option for licensees to comply with existing requirements, including approved exemptions."

Industry's views are expressed by NEl's letter of May 5,1998, industry stated its conclusion that the potential rulemaking should be terminated, not deferred.

The Panel notes that implement ng the current fire protection regulations required a very significant expenditure of staff arid industry resources. Based upon this experience and ongoing staff activities to develop risk-informed approaches in areas such as inservice inspection of piping and graded quality a3urance, the Panel believes that significant resources would be required if either of the t.uggested approaches were implemented.

FINDING: The DPV Panel concle es that the choice of which option to pursue is a management decision concerning ;tilization of resources, in this case, it includes consideration of how and at what rate the staff st oeld move forward to the transition from current fire protection regulations to more risk- nfoimed, performance-based regulations. This choice includes consideration of the option s discossed in SECY-98 058 as well as potential variations on those options such as those suggested ey Mr. Dey. The Panel believes that working to develop a consensus standard will be an efficsnt and effenive option for both the NRC and 7

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industry. Promulgation of a new performance-based rule would require the expenditure of significant staff and licensee resources. Development of a consensus standard prior to promulgation of a new rule should result in an efficient utilization of those resources.

E. Completing Draft NUREG-1521 The DPV recommended that draft NUREG-1521 be completed and published; and that the review of exemptions contained in this NUREG, including the staff's basis for approving the exemption requests, be utilized in developing performance objectives for the suggested new performance-based fire protection regulations.

FINDING: NUREG-1521 was discussed in item A above. This draft NUR G has been reviewed by the staff and subsequently revised, based upon staff comments. This intemal peer review process enhanced the clarity and content of the draft NUREG. The DPV Panel concludes that making the document available to outside experts for peer review prior to issuing the final version would further enhance the quality and benefit of this document.

IV Panel Recommendations Based on the review of the DPV and associated information, including NUREG-1521, the panel makes the following recommendations:

A. The NRC staff should continue to work with NFPA to develop a performance-based consensus standard. Once a reasonable standard has been developed, a pilot study should be performed to assess the practicality of applying such a standard.

B. Draft NUREG-1521 should be issued for peer review and public comment. Industry representatives should be given an opportunity to comment on the document prior to

, final issuance. The information contained in the document could then be used by the industry and staff.

C. The staff should coordinate fire protection and fire risk research with the EPRI, NFPA l and representatives of the nuclear industry. Research activities should include reducing uncertainties associated with the application of PRA techniques and underlying assumptions to fires at nuclear power plants.

D. An approach for using fire PRA in risk-informed decisions on plant-specific changes to the current licensing basis should be developed consistent with RG 1.174.

I Attachments to the Differing Professional View PanelReport concerning 1

i the March 25,1998, Differing Professional Views Submitted by Monideep K. Dey.

Attachment 1 -

March 25,1998, Memorandum from M. Dey to M. Knapp Attachment 2 -

SECY-96-134 Attachment 3 -

SECY-97-127 Attachment 4 -

SECY-98-058 Attachment 5 -

May 5,1998, Letter from R. Beedle to Chairman Jackson

,, "'c oq ATTACHMENT 1

a. = k UNITED STATES

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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION WASHINGTON. D.C. 20555 4 001

,o March 25,1998 I

Memorandum for: Malcolm R. Knapp, Acting Director j Office of Nuclear Regulatory Research From: Monideep K. Dey, Senior Nuclear Engineer hy4 Regulation Development Branch Division of Regulatory Applications, RES

SUBJECT:

DIFFERING PROFESSIONAL VIEWS FOR IMPROVING THE EFFECTIVENESS OF NRC FIRE PROTECTION REGULATIONS Attached, please find a submittal per NRC Management Directive 10.159, " Differing Professional Views or Opinions (DPVs)." In this submittal, I offer my best professional judgments conceming the Commission's strategic objective for implementing risk-informed, performance-based, or risk-informed, less-prescriptive, approaches in NRC's regulatory process for fire protection. The attachment contains two related but separate DPVs: the first regards the usefulness of currently available methods for risk-informed, performance-based fire protection analyses for improving decisionmaking in the regulatory process; the second pertains to the approach for adopting these methods through rulemaking, and the need for considering the former issue in order to formulate a well-founded approach to rulemaking. I have also suggested an approach to formulating a research prbgram in support of the adoption of further .

risk-informed, performance-based methods in the future, and " lessons learned" from this initiative for fire protection for future programs to improve regulatory effectiveness in other areas of NRC regulations. These suggestions are in addition to the DPVs.

Pursuant to Handbook 10.159 (B) (4) (e), I request that these differing professional views be made available to the public with my name included. Please note that I am the sole submitter of these DPVs. I believe the DPVs and attachments can be released in their entirety under the Freedom of information Act.

Although I have not exhausted all other informal means through discussions for resolving my concerns, I am submitting my views as DPVs because I believe their consideration will benefit the Commission in its deliberation on approaches to improve the effectiveness of NRC fire regulations proposed by the staff in the slides forwarded to the Commissionon for its briefing on Performance-Based / Risk-Informed Fire Protection on March 31,1998, and contained in a draft i

Commission paper, " Development of a Risk Informed, Performance-Based Regulation for Fire l

Protection at Nuclear Power Plants." On this basir, as well as because of the priority of this l subject matter in the Commission's strategic objectives for the agency, I request an expedited review of the DPVs before the Commission briefing on March 31,1998, or that my views be forwarded directly to the Commission for its consideration before the briefing. The Commission's direct consideration of these views, which would be a departure from the process outlined in Handbook 10.159 (B) (4) (e), could be justified given the importance of the subject matter to the Commission's goals, and could close the subject issues in an expedited manner.

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Distribution J. - A. Murphy, DRA/RES S. Bahadur, RDB/DRA/RES N. P. Kadambi, RDB/DRA/RES M. W. Hodges, DST /RES T. L. . King. DST /RES M. A. Cunningham, PRAB/ DST /RES l

N. O. Siu, PRAB/ DST /RES l G. M. Holahan, DSSA/NRR L. B. Marsh, SPLB/DSSA/NRR C. E. Rossi, SPD/AEOD

S. Treby, OGC A. Singh, ACRS T. Hiltz, OEDO B; Holian, OCM/SJ A.T. Hsia, OCM/ND T. L. Chan, OCM/GD J. E. Beall, OCM/EM g,.., ..

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Differing Professional Views for Improving I the Effectiveness of NRC Fire Protection Regulations Submitted by M. Dey, RES l

Summary Two related but separate differing views are offered concerning the Commission's strategic objective for implementing risk-informed, performance-based, or risk-informed, less-prescriptive approaches in NRC's regulatory process for fire protection. The first differing professional view (DPV) regards the need and usefulness of currently available methods for risk-informed, performance-based fire protection analyses for improving decisionmaking in the regulatory process. The second pertains to the approach for adopting these methods through rulemaking, and the necessity for considering the former issue in order to formulate a well-founded approach to rulemaking.

Background

A rulemaking to adopt risk-informed, performance-based methods in NRC's regulatory structure for fire protection was initiated as early as August 26,1992, when the Commission approved a staff recommendation to initiate rulemaking contained in SECY-92-263. Several communications have passed between the staff and Commission since that date: SECY-93-028, SECY-94-090, SECY-96-134, SECY-97-127, and stgffrequirements mem_oranda (SRMs) on -

these SECY papers. These SECY papers mainly dealt with the policies and framework for the rulemaking.

In SECY-94-090, the staffinfomied the Commission that it initiated a study in July 1993 to support development of the rule, the study would contain a technical review of risk-informed, performance-based methods for fire protection, in SECY-97-127, the staff proposed to complete certain tasks and these studies before developing a rulemaking. In the SRM on SECY-97-127, dated September 11,1997, the Commission directed the staff to complete the current research and study by the end of 1997, and then brief the Commission.

Differing Professional View I: Usefulness and Need for Currently Available Methods for Risk-Informed, Performance-Hased Fire Protection Analyses for Improving Decisionmaking in the Regulatory Process A. Summary of Prevailing Staff View In slides forwarded to the Commissioner for its briefing on Performance-Based / Risk-informed l

l Fire Protection on March 31.1998, and in a draft Commission paper," Development of a Risk j informed, Performance-Based Regulation for Fire Protection at Nuclear Power Plants," the staff I

considered three options and recommended the one that would defer the risk-informed, performance-based rulemaking on the basis (among others) of the low number of new exemption requests being submitted, the current flexibility available to the licensees for plants that have adopted the standard fire protection license condition to make plant modifications without prior NRC staff approval, and the limitations associated with the current technology for fire hazard assessment.

For the purpose of formulating the options and making a recommendation, the staff did not consider it essential to complete and conclude the above-mentioned studies conducted to support the evaluation of rulemaking approaches and options, although it had indicated in SECY-97-127 that those tasks would have to be completed in order to formulate a rulemaking.

B. Description of Submitter's Views and Consequences if Position Not be Adopted by the Agency Needfor Flexibility: A differing view is offered that there is an compelling need for flexibility in several areas of fire protection requirements, and that these areas are amenable to currently available (without the need for further research) risk-informed, performance-based methods that can provide new or improved insights for fire protection analyses, and a more systematic process to judge the acceptability of alternate approaches. This view is offered on the basis of results of the staff's ongoing study over the last five years, draft NUREG-1521," Technical Review of Risk-Informed, Performance-Based Methods for Nuclear Power Plant Fire Protection Analyses,"

which is attached, k -

Draft NUREG-1521 contains a comprehensive analysis of more than 900 exemptions to Appendix R requested in the past by licensees. Although the exemption process served as an alternate means to meet the prescriptive requirements in Appendix R, licensees only chose to pursue the exemption process when the costs for compliance with the prescriptive requirements were excessive. During the period when the large number of exemptions was granted, there were no clear performance objectives established by which the licensee (or the staff) could judge the acceptability of alternate approaches. Very few exemption requests are currently submitted because of the lack of performance objectives and acceptance criteria, and high uncertainty of whether they will be approved. Given this degree of regulatory uncertainty, licensees in most cases now choose to incur the costs to comply with the prescriptive requirements unless costs are excessive.

As summarized in SECY-96-134, the Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) and other industry groups l acknowledged that although a number oflicensees can pursue fire protection changes through 10 CFR 50.59, they cannot pursue important changes under that rule. Licensees that must comply with Appendix R or with clear license requirements to have certain Appendix R features cannot f change these requirements without exemptions or license amendments. Moreover, NEl and 1 others stated that, in cases in which an exemption or license amendment is not required, the lack {

of guidance on the acceptability of alternative approaches and history of NRC enforcement of 2 j i

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fire protection requirements has caused licensees to adopt a highly conservative approach to determining whether a proposed change would constitute an unreviewed safety question under 10 CFR 50.59.

Since 1992, the issue regarding the use T nermo-Lag to comply with the prescriptive barrier-rating requirements in Appendix R has been a significant challenge to the Commission.

Although the Commission considered a number of options for resolving this issue on the basis of safety, it felt that a new rule should not be considered as a means to resolve the Thermo-Lag issues. As more recent experience shows, there are potentially other latent issues in Appendix R, owing to the prescriptive nature of the regulation, that could present the Commission with challenges similar to the Thermo-Lag issue. The staff has not accepted arguments based on probabilistic risk assessments and fire models in licensee proposals to resolve the Thermo-Lag issue based on safety and risk significance resulting in significant costs to licensees without a commensurate safety benefit. A performance-based regulation would clearly provide greater flexibility to the resolution of such issues.

Availability ofMethods: Draft NUREG-1521 reports on a technical review of risk-informed, performance-based methods for fire protection analyses that have become available since the NRC issued fire protection requirements in 1980, and that can improve the regulatory system by providing improved insights and organizing a systematic process for evaluating alternate approaches to implementing NRC fire protection performance objectives. The experience with NRC requirements was reviewed to identify opportunities for the application of risk-informed, performance-based methods and the availability of these methods was determined in a parallel review. The findings of these reviews were used to cpnduct trial applicatio,ns of risk-informed, -

performance-based methods to selected areas of requirements for fire protection contained in Appendix R to 10 CFR Part 50. These applications, or case studies, assess the usefulness of the results and insights gained from risk-informed, performance-based methods in improving regulatory decisionmaking-in evaluating potential alternative means ofimplementing NRC fire protection safety objectives while accounting for uncertainties in the results of these methods.

Drafl NUREG-1521 concludes that currently available risk-informed, performance-based methods can be applied now without the need for further research in several areas of NRC's fire protection requirements to improve decisionmaking and provide a systematic process for examining alternatives. On the basis of this conclusion, deferment of rulemaking and revision of the Commission's previous decision to pursue an expedited rulemaking is not recommended.

Deferment would only prolong the uncertainties and problems associated with current fire regulations, and would postpone achievement of regulatory excellence in an area in which distinct opportunities exist.

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Differing Professional View II: Option for Revising Fire Protection Regulations l

A. Summary of Prevailing Staff View In slides forwarded to the Commissionon for its briefing on Performance-Based / Risk-Informed Fire Protection on March 31,1998, and in a draft Commission paper," Development of a Risk Informed, Performance-Based Regulation for Fire Protection at Nuclear Power Plants," the staff considered three options and recommended the one that would defer the performance-based, risk-informed rulemaking while the staff would work with the National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) and the industry to develop a performance-based, risk-informed consensus standard for fire protection for nuclear power plants. Since a revised rule under this option would provide licensees with an alternative to the existing fire protection requirements, no backfitting concerns would be associated with this option.

In parallel with the NFPA effort, the stafTwould develop a comprehensive regulatory guide that consolidates the existing staff positions, interpretations, and guidance related to fire protection, and would allow for the use of performance-based, risk-informed methods.

B. Description of Submitter's Views and Consequences if Position Not be Adopted by the Agency An alternate option is recommened that would accomplish the Commission's objectives in a more effective and expedited manner without the need to defer rulemaking and deviate from the Commission's previous direction in this area. Two isgues need to be addressed in order to implement an effective and efficient transition to a risR-iiiformed,'performa~nce-based regulatory structure for fire protection. These are discussed below.

1. Industry opposition to rulemaking: An interest in revising NRC's fire protection regulations is evident in industry's petition (submitted in response to a framework established in SECY-94-090) to add r. new Appendix S to 10 CFR Part 50 that would allow licensees to choose a less-prescriptive regulatory framework. Industry has consistently maintained that a move to a risk-informed and less-prescriptive regulatory framework should be optional to licensees, and this was industof's basis for submitting Appendix S, which it indicated was consistent with the policy established through SECY-94-090. Recently, industry reversed its interest and support for a rule when members of the staff revealed their preliminary plans to the industry at the October 1997 NEI Fire Protection Forum that a new rule would mandate all licensees to rebaseline their programs to a new set of prescriptive requirements. Industry does not see any safety benefit that could justify the significant costs that would be involved in rebaselining f current fire protection programs, and has concluded that its continued support for the rulemaking, given the risks and regulatory uncertainty introduced by such plans, cannot 1 be justified.

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1 It is important to note the Commission's specific experience that is relevant to this issue.

In the early 1980s, the Commission initiated a rulemaking to revise Appendix J to 10 CFR Part 50, " Primary Reactor Containment Leakage Testing for Water-Cooled Power Reactors," to (among other objectives) resolve interpretive questions and reduce the number of exemption requests. A revised rule, which attempted to clarify earlier prescriptive requirements, was proposed in 1986 (51 FR 39538), but it caused controversy and became the subject of almost 10 years of extensive debate. In 1993, the Commission directed the staff to terminate the effort and, in February 1995, the NRC withdrew this revised prescriptive rule and proposed a performance-based option to the prescriptive requirements in Appendix J (60 FR 9635), which could be voluntarily adopted by licensees. In the same year, in September 1995, the final rule was issued (60 FR 49495) with a performance-based option. This experience indicates that considerable resources and time can be consumed in debates about controversial prescriptive requirements (with little or no safety benefit), and that a direct transition to a risk-informed, performance-based regulatory structure is more effective.

On this basis, it is recommended that the Commission issue a clear statement that (1) it does not intend to expend its scarce resources in prolorged debates over prescriptive fue protection requirements and rebaselining currently mature fire protection programs in a rulemaking and, therefore, does not intend to pursue the development of a comprehensive i I

regulatory guide for current prescriptive requirements; and (2) the objective of the rulemaking is to provide licensees with the Dexibility to adopt a risk-informed, performance-based regulatory framework, if they choose to adopt it. This rulemaking option can be developed by eliminating Apppdi3 R and revising .10 CFR 50.48 to ~

clearly establish one set of performance objectives for fire protection that would be l applicable to all licensees. Current programs would be grandfathered to be in compliance with the new rule if they are in compliance with the prescriptive requirements referred to in their license conditions. These license conditions could be maintained since the rulemaking will establish clear performance objectives and guidance on what changes to the 6m protection programs and degree of Hexibility in implementing the new rule would be acceptable. Since current licensees would not have to take any actions unless they choose to, there would not be any backfit concerns. Although this approach maintains current differences between fire protection programs based on when they were licensed, it is consistent with the objective of performance-based regulation to allow alternate means ofimplementing regulatory safety objectives. Cunent exemptions would be eliminated since they would be acceptable attemate means for implementing the perfomiance objectives of the new rule, and there should be very few exemptions in the future because of the Dexibility afforded by the new regulation.

Industry support for this initiative can be regained with these clearer and beneficial objectives. The Commission's decision on this specific miemaking initiative has the potential for innuencing industry's general readiness to embark, and support the Commission in the future, on its strategic objective to make NRC regulations more risk-5

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informed and performance-based. Industry may adopt a cautious approach to the transition and withhold support to revising regulations since, in industry's view, rulemakings may expose licensees to ic risk of having to rebaseline their current programs without any safety benefits. As is the case for fire protection, in many other l

areas, revising the Commission's regulations will be the most efficient and effective method for clearly moving to a risk-informed, performance-based framework.

2. Establishing clear performance objectives and criteria: In SECY-96-134, the staff ouilined its expectations for a comprehensive performance-based and risk-informed fire protection regulation. Some notable expectations were that the revised rule will focus on establishing regulatory safety objectives and acceptance criteria, and details of technical methods for measuring orjudging the acceptability oflicensees' perfonnance will be provided in a regulatory guide. The staff also noted that the Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards (ACRS), in its review of the NEI petition for Appendix S, expressed its views thn performance-based regulations developed from risk considerations should contain clearly stated objectives with demonstrable perfomiance requirements, and that Appendix S was deficient in that it did not meet these expectations. The staff, and subsequently the Commission, rejected the petition because it had not met these and other expectations formulated by the staff.

On this basis, it is recommended that rulemaking not be deferred until an industry standard is developed, but that a proposed rule should be oeveloped first to establish clear performance objectives and acceptance criteria, and that industry should be asked at that point to conduct pilot programs and develop gconsensus standard that could be endorsed ~

in a regulatory guide ifit meets the objectives stated in the rule. This approach would be consistent with Public Law 104-113 and Office of Management and Budget Circular A-119 that encourages the adoption of national consensus standards by Govemment agencies to cany out their policy objectives or activities. On the basis of earlier staff considerations (see SECY-94-090 and SECY-96-134), it is recommended that an industry standard not be codified in a rule but endorsed in a regulatory guide to encourage and allow flexibility for other innovative proposals for implementing the performance objectives in the new rule.

The study documented in draft NUREG-1521 should be completed and published, and the comprehensive review of exemptions, including staff considerations for granting exemptions in the past, and the application potential of risk-informed, performance-based methods in areas of fire protection requirements should be used for developing the performance objectives of the new rule.

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Concluding Remark:

In order to ensure an effective and efficient transition to a risk-informed, performance-based l

regulatory framework for fire protection, it is recommended that the Commission adopt a l decisive means through rulemaking to break from the current prescriptive framework without the expenditure of any further resources to attempt to fix the current prescriptive framework.

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l. I I I Suggestions Approach to Formulating a Fire Research Program j l

l Given the limited funds available for research, an efficient means of formulating and utilizing l research is suggested. Currently, the method being used for fonnulating a research plan is to collect and prioritize a list ofissues from NRC staff regarding weaknesses and limitations of fire probabilistic risk assessments (PRA) and models. An alternative would be to develop a list of applications (either for addressing safety issues or providing flexibility in implementing NRC safety objectives) that would be directly related to the Commission's goals. Scoping snalyses f

can then be conducted to determine how risk-informed, performance-based methods may be used to obtain results that would improve decisionmaking for these goals, and to identify weaknesses and limitations in the methods that could be addressed in a research program. Once the research is conducted, the findings can then be used to improve the capability of the methods for the specific purposes identified in the scoping analyses. This approach will facilitate deriving and establishing performance measures to monitor the success of the research program in meeting specific performance goals.

" Lessons Leamed" for Future Initiatives To Imorove Regulatory Effectiveness The initiative to move to a risk-informed, performance-based regulatory framework for fire protection has consumed a significant amount of the agency's resources over almost six years, and has revealed some challenges and obstacles the 4Conunission will face .in implementing its ,

policies in Direction setting Issue 12 (DSI-12). It is suggested that a " lessons learned" study be conducted for this initiative to benefit initiatives in other areas of the Commission's regulations in the future. A couple ofimportant lessons that are immediately apparent follow:

Draft NUREG-1521 which is a technical review conducted by the Office of Nuclear Regulatory Research (IGS) has cost the agency more than $ 1 million and 3 FTE, and is not yet finalized. A major obstacle to finalizing this document has been the extensive number of comments submitted by the program office staff who disagree with (1) the nee'd to change the current regulatory structuse and (2) the conclusions of the study.

Although some comments from the program office should be solicited for such a study,it is suggested that a certain degree ofindependence and authority be provided to RES (consistent with the Commission's direction on DSI-22) in making recommendations for improving regulatory effectiveness. Independent assessments are a critical element of a program to achieve regulatory excellence.

Several issues relating to institutional inertia and culture, and training of staff, may be more important than the technical issues for adopting risk-informed, perfonnance-based methods. These issues are the natural tendency of cognizant, experienced staffin specific technical areas to want to maintain the current regulatory system they have administered 1

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.o for several years (in some cases for their entire careers), and their hesitancy to acknowledge the need for improvement and change.

l l 1 will be glad to be interviewed and provide further comments if such a study is conducted.

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ATTACHMENT 2

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POLICY lSSUE (Notation Vote)

June 21, 1996 SECY-96-134 FOR: The Commissioners FROM: James M. Taylor, Executive Director for Operations

SUBJECT:

OPTIONS FOR PURSUING REGULATORY IMPROVEMENT IN FIRE PROTECTION REGULATIONS FOR NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS PURPOSE:

To provide a progress report and to obtain Commission approval to implement a rulemaking option for regulatory improvement in fire protection regulations for nuclear power plants.

SUMMARY

This paper provides the progress made to date in the development of a risk-informed and performance-based regulation for fire protection, and requests Commission approval of pecific staff recommendations for the rulemaking. The  :

current regulatory framework, review of basis for revising fire protection regulations, and staff expectations for a risk-informed and performance-based regulation are initially discussed. The major technical, policy, and legal issues discussed are the state of the art of risk-informed and performance-based fire protection methodology, the development of a regulatory fratnework that would allow implementation of such methods given their state of the art, a Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) petition that proposed one way to transition to a risk-informed and performance-based regulatory framework, and the legal framework necessary to correct and avoid regulatory gaps or inconsistencies in the regulations while allowing flexibility to use new requirements and technical methods, or continued compliance with current regulations. An assessment of fire risk analysis and modeling technological advancements, NOTE: TO BE MADE PUBLICLY AVAILABLE WHEN THE FINAL SRM IS MADE AVAILABLE CONTACTS:

Moni Dey, RDB/DRA/RES or Patrick Madden, SPLB/DSSA/NRR (301) 415-6443 (301) 415-2854 .

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The Commissioners summary analysis of the NEI petition, and discussion of options are presented -

to address the major issues. The staff recommends pursuing the rulemaking, and a transition to a risk-informed and performance-based regulatory framework in a manner different than that proposed by NEI, because the industry proposal does not meet the objectives and criteria established by the Commis"sion.

BACKGROUND: ,

In a Staff Requirements Memorandum (SRM), dated August 26, 1992, the Commission approved a staff proposal in SECY-92-263, " Staff Plans for Elimination of Requirements Marginal to Safety," dated July 24, 1992, to eliminate requirements marginal to safety that impose unnecessary regulatory burdens on licensees. Some fire protection requirements were identified for this effort as being potentially overly prescriptive. Recommendations for revising fire protection requirements, to make them less prescriptive and more performance-based, were also identified in a regulatory review conducted by the Committee to Review Generic Requirements (CRGR) (see SECY-92-141),'by the Regulatory Peviw Group (RRG) (see SECY-94-003), and in a staff Report on the Reassessment' a che NRC Fire Protection Program, dated February 27, 1993 (see SECY-93-143). The staff, in SECY-93-028 dated February 5, 1993, provided a progress report and infermed the Commission of proposed policies and a framework for eliminating requirements marginal to safety. The staff subsequently discussed the policies and framework with the public and industry at a workshop in April 1993 (see NUREG/CP-0129). The staff then requested Commission approval of the policies, framework, and plan of action in SECY-94-090, " Institutionalization of Continuing Program for Regulatory Improvement," dated March 31, 1994. The Commission provided its approval in an SRM dated May 18, 1994 (on SECY-94-090). Later, the Commission provided (in an SRM dated June 27, 1994, on SECY-94-127) guidance to the staff in pursuing rulemaking while dealing with Thermo-Lag issues. The Coramission stated "...the Commission has approved the staff recommendation to proceed as planned with the development of a performance-based fire protection rule.

This should be pursued by the staff as part of its continuing program for regulatory improvement and/or once a request for rulemaking is recei.ved. The Commission felt that the new rule should not be considered a means to resolve the Thermo-Lag issues."

In SECY-94-l?7, dated May 12, 1994, the staff informed the Commission of industry's intent to file a petition and the staff's plan for reviewing the petition. On February 2,1995, NEl on behalf of the nuclear power industry, submitted a petition for rulemaking and requested the NRC to amend 10 CFR 50.48 and proposed adding an Appendix 5 to 10 CFR Part 50. NEI stated that its proposed Appendix S would provide a flexible alternative to the current fire protection requirements in Appendix R to 10 CFR Part 50. NEI characterized Appendix S as a safety-neutral performance-based alternative to Appendix R. NEI also stated that Appendix S would result in burden relief and cost savings to the industry. On June 6,1995, the staff published (60 FR 29784) the notice of receipt of the NEI petition, including 13 questions on topics the staff considered important for a proposed rulemaking. The comment period closed on September 30, 1995. Subsequently, the staff solicited (60 FR

l The Commissioners 57370) public discussion generally on the rulemaking in the RuleNet project in -

January and February 1996.

To prepare this paper, the staff reviewed the NEI petition, the comments submitted by the Advisory Committee for Reactor Safeguards (ACRS), the comments submitted in response to the Federal Register notice of Receipt of Petition, the RuleNet record, and other background information.

1 DISCUSSION:

Current Regulatory Framework and importance of Fire Protection Current Framework ,

To mitigate the adverse effects of nuclear power plant fires, each operating reactor has an NRC-approved fire protection program. When properly implemented and maintained, these programs provide reasonable assurance that potential fires will not adversely affect reactor safety. A typical reactor fire protection program consists of fire barriers, safe shutdown system separation, fire detection systems, fire suppression systems and equipment, administrative controls and procedures, and trained personnel. A properly designed, implemented, and maintained program provides reasonable assurance, through.a defense-in-depth approach, that a fire will not prevent the performance of necessary safe plant shutdown functions.

The fire protection requirements for nuclear power plants are derived from GDC 3 of Appendix A to 10 CFR Part 50, 10 CFR 50.48, and for plants operating before January 1,1979, certain provisions of Appendix R to 10 CFR Part 50.

Hence, there are two groups of plants to consider. The first group consists of 60 plants that were licensed to operate before January 1, 1979. Selected provisions of Appendix R to 10 CFR Part 50 apply to this group of plants. The second group consists of the plants that were licensed to operate after January 1, 1979, and Appendix R does not apply to these plants. The Commission, when it promulgated Appendix R (on February 19, 1981), tecognizi.d that there would be unique plant conditions whereby the fire proteetion features identified by Appendix R would not significantly enhance the level of fire safety already provided by the licensee. Therefore, in those cases when a' fire hazard analysis could adequately demonstrate that the alternative fire .

protection features provided an equivalent level of fire safety to that  !

required by Appendix R, the licensee could apply for an exemption under the i provisions of 10 CFR 50.48 (c)(6). Thus, the exemption process provided an  ;

alternative means of allowing flexibility to meet the performance objectives '

of Appendix R.

On April 24, 1986, the staff issued Generic Letter (GL) 86-10, " Implementation of Fire Protection Requirements." In this GL the staff provided a process that- allowed licensees to make changes to their plant-specific fire protection

. programs without prior NRC approval. Specifically, the NRC requested that each licensee incorporate its NRC-approved fire protection program,-including the fire hazards analysis and major commitments that form the fire protection j program basir,- into its Final Safety Analysis Report and adopt a standard fire

-protection-license condition. After the licensee completed this licensing l

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, The Commissioners action, it could change its fire protection program without prior approval of .

the Commission provided those changes did not adversely affect the ability to achieve and maintain safe shutdown in the event of a fire or did not require an exemption. GL 86-10 also provided staff interpretations of Appendix R and clarified when exemptions were required. To date, 96 plants have aBopted the standard fire protection license condition. Attachment 1 includes a detailed summary of the history and description of the regulatory framework for reactor fire protection.

Importance of Fire Protection In their " Report on the Reassessment of the NRC Fire Protection Program,"

dated February 27, 1993, the staff recognized the importance of fire protection features at plants. The report referred to an NRC-sponsored study,

" Fire Risk. Scoping Study - NUREG/CR-5088," that concluded that plant modifications made as a result of Appendix R requirements reduced core damage frequencies at some plants up to a factor of ten. However, some risk assessments still show that fire events are risk significant and that fire induced core damage frequencies can be comparable to internal events, and that fires can contribute as much as 50 percent to the plant's overall core damage frequency.

Insights of the risk significance of fire scenarios will also be forthcoming from the individual plant examination for external events (IPEEE) program (fire is categorized as an external event in PRAs). Information on this has been provided to the Commission in SECY-96-088 dated April 29, 1996. The staff's review of licensee submittals on the IPEEE program was recently initiated, and risk insights will be compiled as the reviews are completed.

Review of Basis For Revising Fire Protection Regulations to Enhance Flexibility and Improve Regulatory Efficiency Previous Reviews -

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The potential benefits of revising the fire protection regulations while maintaining an adequate level of fire protection was reviewed by the RRG, as well as by the staff in its " Report on the Re-assessment of the NRC Fire Protection Program" (SECY-93-143). The RRG recommended revising the regulations for fire protection to make them more performance-based and issuing guidance to clarify that other alternative methods of compliance can be developed and be acceptable.

The staff's review of the regulations in the " Report on the Re-assessment of the NRC Fire Protection Program" included a finding that the current requirements and guidelines were developed before the staff or the industry had the benefit.of PRAs for fires and before there was a significant body cf operating experience. This report recommended that NRR support the activities in the NRC Office of Research relating to a potential revision for the fire protection regulation. The report also stated that a revised 10 CFR'50.48 (and perhaps elimination of Appendix R to 10 CFR Part 50) could accomplish the following: 1) establish a more reactor-safety oriented fire protection rule,

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The Commissioners  !

2) add appropriate flexibility in some areas, 3) eliminate the potential for -

confusion, 4) better cover shutdown conditions, and 5) codify the appropriate role and limitations for fire watches.

The NRC program for Elimination of Requirements Marginal to Safety ' identified fire protection regulations as candidates that could be made more effective by decreasing their prescriptiveness and providing flexibility to licensees. The staff proposed that some of the prescriptive requirements were potentially unnecessarily conservative and could be eliminated or replaced with safety l objectives without any adverse impact on safety. The staff also identified an opportunity for making the fire protection regulations more focused based on risk significance, thereby improving the efficiency of the overall fire protection program. ,,

Current Review The recommendations previously identified for making the fire protection regulatory framework more efficient, and risk-informed and performance-based are still valid. In addition, there are two other related reasons that support revising the fire protection regulations:

1. Since Appendix R was issued, about 850 alternative fire protection approaches or exemptions, which were evaluated by the staff and determined on a plant-specific bases to provide an equivalent level of fire safety, have been granted. The Commission recognized during its promulgation of Appendix R requirements that exemptions would be required to provide alternative means for complying with the regulation.

{ The staff now believes that it can develop a simpler and more efficient s fire protection regulation, which would allow flexibility and facilitate jtheuseofalternativeapproachestomeetthefiresafetyobjectives, aithout the need for exemptions.

2. As described above, an inconsistency exists in the regulatory framework for fire protection for plants licensed before and after 1979.- The plants licensed before 1979 are required to comply with the sections of Appendix R specified by 10 CFR 50.48(b) and would require exemptions if they were to pursue alternatives to these fire protection requirements outside the scope of previously-granted exemptions. Generally, most of these exemptions were narrowly written to approve a specific plant configuration as part of the exemption. Therefore, the exemption does not constitute either an approval for the applicant / licensee to depart from the relevant requirements of Appendix R for other parts or the plant not specifically included in the exemption, or a broad-based approval for other plants to rely on' the same rationale for ~an exemption. Plants licensed after 1979 were not required to comply with Appendix R but have implemented guidance on methods equivalent to that ,

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in Appendix R, and therefore these plants have the option of d implementing changes to their programs without prior staff approval in accordance with GL 86-10. -

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The Commissioners l Staff Expectations for a Comprehensive Per6 rmance-Based and Risk Informed -

Fire Protection Regulation 1

On the basis of its reviews of current regulations and the determination that there is a potential for regulatory improvement, the. staff had informed the Commission of preliminary criteria it had developed for a performance-based-and risk-informed regulatory approach for rulemakings (including fire protection) in SECY-93-028.- The staff discussed them at a public workshop in

. April 1993, and subsequently proposed final criteria to the Commission in SECY-94-090. These criteria were: 1) Revised rules will focus on establishing regulatory safety objectives and acceptance criteria without prescribing the methods or hardware necessary to accomplish the objective.

The main aim of a performance-based regulatory approach is to allow licensees the flexibility to use cost-effective methods for implementation of the objectives, 2) The regulatory objective will be derived, to the extent feasible, from risk ~ considerations and in relationship to safety goals,

3) Details of technical methods for measuring or judging the acceptability of licensee's performance relative to the regulatory objectives will be p'rovided in regulatory guides. To the extent possible, approved industry standards and guidance will be endorsed in this regard, 4) Collective industry efforts (NEI, Electric Power Research Institute, Owner's groups) should maintain some degree of standardization, 5) The new rules will be optional for current licensees

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and thus licensees can decide to remain in compliance with current regulations, 6) The scope of the revision will not be limited to regulations, but will address the body of regulatory practice, e.g., Standard Review Plan, inspection procedures, technical specifications, and other regulatory documents, 7) Performance-based regulatory approaches should provide incentives for' innovation, and 8) The following issues with regard to the proposed rulemaking activities (including fire protection) need to be addressed in the process: (i) can the new rule and its implementation yield an equivalent level of, or have an insignificant adverse impact on, safety; (ii) can the regulatory / safety objective (qualitative or quantitative) be established in a manner to allow a common understanding between licensees and the NRC on how the performance or results will be measured or judgedy and (iii) can the regulation and implementing documents be developed in such a manner that they can be objectively and consistently inspected and enforced against. The Commission approved the framework for risk-informed and performance-based regulations that included these criteria in an SRM dated May 18, 1994 (SECY-94-090).

The staff will also develop the performance-based and risk-informed methods in a manner that complements the existing deterministic approaches and supports l the traditional defense-in-depth philosophy. Consistent with the risk j significance of fire events, the " Report on the Reassessment of the NRC Fire  !

Protection Program," and the resulting Fire Protection Task Action Plan, the i staff will review operating experience and will address a variety of fire safety issues. JIf the staff identifies significant issues or new requirements that should be included in the fire protection regulations, it will inform the gmmission. .- .

The ACRS, in its review of the NEl petition to amend NRC's fire protection regulations in a letter dated September 15, 1995, expressed their views on the l

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the view that. performance-based regulations developed from risk considerations should include clearly stated objectives with demonstrable performance requirements (expressed in either deterministic or probabilistic terms),

flexibility in the methods that the licensee is permitted to use to~ meet the performance goals or criteria (the methods should be supported by operational data and experimental results), and that the regulatory body must have a valid means to establish that the performance criteria have been met.

The views expressed by the ACRS support the criteria developed earlier by the stafftstated above. The staff affirms that the criteria established for developing a performance-based and risk-informed fire protection rule, should be met by any rule proposed by the induftry or developed by the staff.

Assessment.of Fire Risk Analysis and Modelina Technological Advancements Per staff commitments in SECY-94-090, the staff is studying the current state of the art of fire modeling and risk-informed approaches to fire safety in nuclear and general building industries in this country and abroad. For the general building industries, the staff noted some progress in Japan, New Zealand, Canada, United Kingdom, Sweden, and Australia in adopting performance-based means of certifying alternative building designs within the framework of the prescriptive requirements. Some countries have revised their building codes to utilize performance language to allow alternative design methods that may be used to establish equivalency to the prescriptive building code requirements. Advanced performance-based fire analysis methods, i.e.,

fire models and risk-informed approaches, are being develcped and have been applied to special projects on a limited basis where compliance with the prescriptive regulations (still maintained as an option in the guidance documents) would be costly or prohibit new design features. The staff is evaluating the potential applicability of these programs to nuclear power plants.

France is pursuing development of performance-based and risk-informed fire protection approaches in their nuclear program. Both the technical support

- organization (Institute of Protection and Nuclear Safety of the French Atomic Energy Commission) and the utility (Electricity de France) have programs to enhance the current generation of fire computer codes used in fire PRAs and are conducting experiments to generate data for fire code validation and input for fire PRAs. The staff is also evaluating the potential applicability of these programs to.U.S. nuclear power plants. The programs for developing and implementing performance-based fire protection programs in the countries cited above have required-the investment of a considerable amount of resources and engineering talent.

On the basis of its review of the state of the art of risk-informed performance-based methods for fire protection, the staff believes that the current state of technology in several areas limits the ability to codify and implement quantitative performance goals for fire protection at nuclear power plants at this time. For example, there are significant uncertainties in fire initiation frequencies, operator effectiveness in fire fighting and response to fires, fire' propagation and suppression models, failure thresholds of

l The Commissioners l safety systems and components, and reliability of fire suppression systems.

These uncertainties could make it very difficult to establish quantitative performance goals and criteria, and for licensees to demonstrate that such goals had been met. ,

Review of NEl Petition The NEI petition requested the Commission to add flexibility for implementing current fire protection program requirements by decreasing the prescriptiveness of the regulations and considering the use of recent advances in fire PRA and sciences as a means to establish performance-based requirements. NEI claimed that the proposed new Appendix S would provide a more flexible alternative to the current fire protection requirements without reducing protection of public health and safety. The petitioner claimed that the technical content of this propond appendix is evolutionary and includes functional acceptance criteria for corresponding detailed requirements in Appendix R that could be voluntarily adopted in whole or in part by 1icensees; and NEI claims that this. approach will allow cost-effective implementation of the safety objectives of Appendix R without reducing safety. Attachment 2 includes a summary of the petition.

In a letter dated September 15, 1995, the ACRS found the rule proposed in the NEl petition deficient in that it did not meet the expectations of the ACRS for a performance-based regulation based on risk considerations.

The staff received comments from 17 organizations and individuals on its notice of receipt of the NEI petition. Comments were divided in terms of the support for the objective and the proposed methods in the petition. Industry groups, a standards organization, and licensees generally indicated support for the petition, while public interest groups, a consulting firm, and some iMividuals questioned the need and motivation for the petition and the n turity of fire modeling and PRAs proposed. Comments received on RuleNet on the rulemaking in general were similar in nature and extent. A summary and categorization of the public comments is included in Attachment 3.

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The staff has reviewed the NEI petition, ACRS and public comments received on it, and the RuleNet record and concluded that the proposed revision to 10 CFR 50.48 and the new Appendix S as a whole does not meet the staff's criteria, discussed earlier, or form a basis for an extensive risk-informed and performance-based fire protection rule. In addition, it is not clear how the proposed rule would provide the level of safety achieved by the current regulation, or even if the proposed rule would provide reasonable assurance of an adequate level of safety. NEl claimed that its proposed rule is performance-based in that the ability to shutdown the reactor following a fire is the ultimate goal. NEl contended that its proposed rule provides for compliance with GDC 3 through continued compliance with Appendix R or through the implementation of the proposed alternative approaches in Appendix S.

However, NEI did not recognize that Appendix R addresses only a portion of the fire protection program features needed to satisfy GDC 3. The proposed rule, therefore, is not adequate to meet the intent of GDC 3. The staff also found a number of technical issues with the fire protection rule proposed by NEI.

For example, the proposed rule allows fire damage to both trains of equipment

The Commissioners needed for hot shutdown. It also may adversely affect fire protection defense -

in depth because it eliminates. minimum requirements (e.g., for fire barriers, automatic suppression, administrative controls, etc.) that the staff believes should be considered even in a performance-based and risk-informed regulation.

For these reasons, the staff concluded that the rule proposed by NEl, revised 10 CFR 50.48 and Appendix S should be rejected.

The staff does not disagree with the intent of the NEI petition to achieve enhanced flexibility and commensurate burden reduction in the fire protection area. This objective was established by'the staff, as described earlier, in its reports on the Reassessment of the NRC Fire Protection Program, the CRGR Special Review, the Regulatory Review Group Recommendations, and the Regulatory Improvement program before NEI docketed its petition. esamethe

proposal by NEI to establish revised re'quirements that may be voluntarily' acoptea Dy. licensees is also consistent with the policy of the Regulatorf Uyruvement program r However, Ntl'$ proposed 10 C W 30 48 ano Appendix 5 have faileo to meet tne objectives and criteria listed-earlier for a proposed performance-based and risk-informed regulation.

Fire Protection Regulatory Improvement Options Options Based on the review of the NEI petition, ACRS and public comments received on it, the RuleNet record, and the above discussion, the staff believes there are two viable options with regard to fire protection regulations:

1. Make no changes to the current fire protection regulations.

Discussion: All operating nuclear power plants have NRC approved fire protection programs which meet GDC 3 and 10 CFR 50.48. The plants licensed before 1979, comply with different sections of Appendix R depending on the issues that required resolution at each plant. The current regulatory framework (GL 86-10 license condition and the 10 CFR 50.59_ process) provides most plants with a mechanism for flexibility required to make changes to their fire protection programs as long as these changes do not result in an unreviewed safety question or adversely affect the ability to achieve and maintain the reactor in a safe shutdown condition. Note, however, that for plants licensed to operate prior to January 1, 1979,_this approach would not eliminate the need for exemptions when the licensee chooses to use an alternative approach in lieu of meeting the-prescriptive requirements of the applicable sections of Appendix R. Under this option, the staff would (1) issue guidance for using 10 CFR 50.59 to make fire protection program changes and (2) deny the NEI petition.

2. . Revise 10.CFR 50.48 and' modify or= remove Appendix R.

Discussion: Under this option, Appendix R may be modified or removed as -

a regulation, and 10 CFR 50.48 would be revisad-te fecn iteto the use of per4rmance-based and risk-informed methods h y are develope Q This option is consistent with the Commission's PRA7el-irSratement. It

The Commissioners will allow implementation of PRA technology to the extent supported by .

the state of the art in PRA methods and data and in a manner that complements the Commission's deterministic approach and supports the traditional defense-in-depth philosophy. The revision to 10 CFR 50:48 would incorporate existing fire safety objectives for nurinar nower-plant fire protection programs and reference a regulatory cuidesin order; to establish a consistent regulatory framework for plants licensed

]iiffhe and after 1979. In developing this option, the staff will 4ddress any regulatory gap or inconsistency that could be potentially created by the modification or removal of Appendix R. The regulatory framework and methods acceptable to the staff for meeting the requirements of GDC 3 and 10 CFR 50.48 contained in the Standard Review Plan and Branch Technical Positions (that are substantially similar to Appendix R) would be included in the regulatory guide as appropriate.

Therefore, this modification would not compromise the safety beneficial actions implemented as a result of Appendix R. _ ,

As discussed above, the state of the art of fire modeling and risk assessment methods is not sufficiently developed to support codification of quantitative performance goals for fire protection at this time because it would be difficult to demonstrate compliance with such goals.

However, significant regulatory improvement can still be achieved now while retaining the qualitative approach of 10 CFR 50.48 as the rule is revised. The regulatory guide (discussed above) would provide for the use of risk informed and performance-based approaches as they are developed by industry without the need for future rulemaking.

This option would also establish a uniform fire protection regulation for all plants and should eliminate the need for future fire protection exemptions. The development of the regulatory guide would ho haced on current St afrfire nrotection guidance and the requirements of

_ Appendix R,' _ including any genge haene fnr alternativeTiTe protection approacnes granted unoer tne Appendix R exemption process. Inis would allo ~w thE application of limited risk-informed and performance-based approaches consistent with exemptions that already have been granted and that can be adequately supported by proven technological advancements.

As with Option 1, the staff would include guidance (in the regulatory guide) in this option with respect to the application of the 10 CFR 50.59 process to fire protection program implementation. Under this option, NEI's proposed revision to 10 CFR 50.48 and the new Appendix S would be rejected.

l Thermo-Lag 1

In an SRM, dated June 27, 1994, the Commission approved the staff recommendation to proceed with the development of a performance-based fire l protection rule while requiring compliance with existing NRC requirements with consideration of requests for exemptions currently permitted by regulations.

In that SRM, the Commission also stated that it felt that the new rule should not be considered as a means to resolve the Thermo-Lag issues. LiceT1 sees have submitted their schedules and plans to establish compliance by resolving the i

Thermo-Lag fire barrier issues with the staff. The staff is addressing these l

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The Commissioners issues on a plant-specific basis. Option 2, revising 10 CFR 50.48, " Fire ,

Protection," removing the current Appendix R regulatory requirements, and )j developing a comprehensive regulatory guide would not require a change to this course of action. ,

STAFF RECOMMENDATION: 3 Option The staff recommends adoption of Option 2. The initial implementation of the revised regulation would allow certain licensees added flexibility, 1 '

specifically thor,e plants licensed prior to January 1,1979, in that they will be able to make changes to their approved fire protection program under 10 CFR 50.59 without the need to seek prior Commission approval (i.e, request an exemption for the use of an alternative approach that provides a level of fire safety equivalent to that required by Appendix R). This approach would rovide guidance. and would also provide an incont Wp, tn industry for- further

. e eluum.mr n+ the PRA and fire modeling tools nopded to suDDort more, extensive perfonnance-based and ~~

risk-informed fire protection regulatory

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,d determinations.

The staff will keep up to date on emerging information related to fire protection at nuclear power plants including operating experience, and will ,

continue efforts to improve fire risk assessment methodologies and to evaluate the validity of fire environment modeling and equipment vulnerability data as resources permit. These efforts will support continued staff decision making on fire issues, and will provide guidance to industry and allow the staff to be responsive to any industry ini+! aves to develop innovative fire protection programs.

The development of future performance-based and risk-informed approaches will  ;

be largely dependent on the industry efforts to advance fire PRA and reduce its uncertainties, develop and validate mdels that address nuclear power plant fire problems, and develop the operational and experimental data needed to make responsible fire protection decisions. The revision to the_Pegulation will be developed so that it will allow the implementation of performance-based and risk-informed approaches as they are developed and proposed by the industry and licensees and accepted by the staff without the need for future rulemaking.

The' revisions to the regulations and the regulatory guide will be developed so.

that--any new approaches..would only be. adopted-on a voluntary basis-by licensees. ' Licensees that have an NRC-approved fire protection program will not need to take any additional action, unless they choose to do so,., If the .

staff identifies significant issues or new requirements that would need a backfit analysis, it will provide to the Commission a plan and schedule for those actions at that time.

4 The Commissioners The advantages of Option 2 are: -

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• A consistent fire protection regulatory framework will be created for all plants.

• The new regulation should eliminate the need for future, exemption requests.

• :The revised regulation and new guidance should enhance flexibility.and l reduce regulatory burden without an adverse impact on safety.

• . The revised regulation will allow the industry more latitude to develop performance-based and risk-informed approaches to focus efforts on risk-significant fire protection activities.

• The new regulatory guide will clarify the staff's fire protection program expectations, consolidate previous staff fire protection, guidance and positions and establish the criteria for making fire protection program changes using the 10 CFR 50.59 process.

W NEI Petition Based on discussions presented earlier in the paper, the staff recommends the Commission reject NEI's proposed revision to 10 CFR 50.48 and the new Appendix S. A complete disposition of the petition will be included in the statement of considerations of the proposed rule.

SCHEDULE:

If the Commission approves Option 2, the staff would develop a rulemaking plan consistent with Management Directive 6.3 for Commission approval by the end of 1996. A proposed rule (revision to 10 CFR 50.48 and accompanying regulatory guide) would be provided to the Commission by the end of 1997. If the staff identifies any significant issues or additional alternatives to firq.-

protection regulation they will be provided for Commission approval.

RESOURCE IMPLICATIONS:

i' Resources for this program are included in the Five-Year Plan.

COORDINATION:

-The Office of' General Counsel has no legal objection to this paper. The staff has provided to the ACRS a copy of this paper for their information.

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The Commissioners -

RECOMMENDATION:

That the Commission approve.the staff recommendations for action on the NEI petition and rulemaking option, presented herein. .-

A a s M. Ta or.

E cutive Director for Operations Attachments:

1.- Fire Protection Program Guidance and. Requirements .

2. Summary of NEI Petition

3. Summary of Public Comments Commissioners' comments or consent should be provided directly to the Office of the Secretary by COB July 8. 1996.

Commission Staff Office comments, if any, should be submitted to the Commissioners NLT July 1, 1996, with an information copy to the Office of the Secretary. If the paper is of.such a nature that it requires additional review and comment,

-the Commissioners and the Secretariat should be-apprised of when comments may be expected.

DISTRIBUTION:

Commissioners OCAA ~

OIG -

OPA OCA ACRS ASLBP.

EDO SECY l

OGC 3

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Attehmerit i NRC Fire Protection Program Guidance and Requirements History and Development O

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NRCFireProtectionProspamGuidanceandRequirements HistoryapdDevelopment

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History  ;

I, l General Design Criteria (GDC) 3 of Appandix A to 10 CFR Part 50 reciuires that structures, systems,andcomponentsimlortanttosafetybedesignedand located to minimize the probability ant adverse effects of fires and explosions, that noncombustible and he ; resistant material be used whenever practical, and that fire detection and uppression systems be provided to minimize the effects of fires on structhes, systems, and components important to safety. In the 1970s, safety evaluations based on GDC 3 served as the justification for AEC and early NRC acce )tance of fire protection programs.

However, because of the lack of ,implemgn ation guidance, the level of fire protection provided by a plant was typic.11y found adequate if it complied with applicable local fire codes and rect ;ved an acceptable rating from its insurance underwriter. As a result, the ' ire safety features imposed on commercial nuclear power plants were very similar to those imposed on conventional fossil-fueled electric power generation stations.

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Browns Ferry Fire j 2

On March 22, 1975, a fire occurred at Unitil of the Browns Ferry Nuclear Power j Station (licensee - Tennessee Valley At thon ity). Tae fire began in a bank of cable trays in an area of the cable spr;eadi g room where the trays passed through a penetration in a wall separating he cable spreading room from the reactor building. ThegreatestamountoffYedamageoccurredontheopposite side of the penetration in an area of the retctor building approximately 40 feet (12.2 meters) by 20 feet (6.1 meters).

• Althouga damage was limited to a relativelysmallareaoftheplant,morethak1600cablesroutedin117 conduits and 26 cable trays were affected, an of those, 628 cables were safety related. Thefiredamageexperiencedbyelectricalpowerandcontrol anddegradedtheoperator'scapabilitytomon}porthestatusoftheplant. systems impe Because of the loss of multiple safety systerj operators were requi. red to initiate emergency repair actions to restore rt quired systems so tirat the reactor could be brought to a safe shutdown co dition.

Investigationsofthecauseandpossibleconsebencesofthiseventonthe health and safety of the public demonstrated trit the occupant life safety and property protection concerns of the major nucleir fire insurance underwriters did not sufficiently encompass nuclear safety iuues, particularly with regard to the potential for fire damage to cause the fdolure of redundant tiains of systems and components important to the safe shQ down of the reactor.

Consequently, the NRC special review team that investigated the possible cause and potential effects concluded that fire protec} ion requirements for nuclear power plants must be expanded to include the addhional objectives of ensuring nuclear safety. I t

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Two recommendations made by the Special Review Group that investigated the Browns Ferry fire pertained to assurance that the fire protection programs at l operating nuclear power plants conform to GDC 3. One of the recommendations -

I was that NRC should develop specific guidance for implementing GDC 3. The other was that NRC should make a detailed review of the fire protection program at each operating plant, comparing it to the guidance develo.hed pursuant to the above recommendation.

Fire Protection Guidelines for Nuclear Power Plants in May 1976, the NRC issued Auxiliary and Power Conversion Systems Branch (APCSB), Branch Technical Position (BTP) 9.5-1, " Guidelines for Fire Protection for Nuclear Power Plants," which applied to plants that filed for a construction permit after July 1,1979. This BTP incorporated the fire protection recommendations from the Browns Ferry fire special review team. In addition, the NRC developed Appendix A to BTP 9.5-1, " Guidelines for Fire Protection. for Nuclear Power Plants Docketed Prior to July 1,1976." This appendix established a minimum level of fire protection at older operating plants without significantly affecting the design or operation of the plant.

The intent of these new fire protection guidelines was to establish a ' fire protection program that is based on a defense-in-depth philosophy.

By the late 1970s, the majority of operating plants had completed their analysis and had implemented most of the fire protection program requirements of Appendix A to APCSB BTP 9.5-1. In most cases, the fire protection modifications proposed by the licensees were found acceptable by the staff.

In certain cases, technical disagreements developed between certain licensees and the NRC staff and several plants refused to adopt certain fire protection program recommendations contained in Appendix A to APCSB BTP 9.5-1. Even though certain fire protection program issues were contested by only a few plan?.s, the NRC determined that the issues were a potential generic problem and rulemaking war, deemed necessary to resolve these problems and assure the full implementation of the Commission's policy with respect to fire protection. Therefore, to resolve the 17 generic fire protection issues at 32 plants, the NRC amended its regulations and issued 10 CFR 50.48, " Fire Protection," and Appendix R, " Fire Protection Icogram for Nuclear Power Plants operating Prior to January 1, 1979" (45 FR 36082).

10 CFR 10.48 and Appendix R to 10 CFR Part 50 In its original proposal for Appendix R, the staff intended these requirements to be applicable only to settle the APCSB BTP 9.5-1 Appendix A open fire protection issues. Thus, the staff had not originally intended the provisions of Appendix R to require additional modification of previously approved fire protection features. However, during the rulemaking process the Commission determined that the requirements of Sections Ill.G, Ill.J. and 111.0 of Appendix R were of such safety significance that they would be applied to all plants.

On November 19, 1980, the NRC published in the Federal Register the final version of 10 CFR 50.48, to ensure that each plant has a fire prote_ction program, and Appendix R to 10 CFR Part 50 (45 FR 76602), to ensure

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satisfactory resolution of disputed issues. As stated in 10 CFR 50.48(a), in part, the fire protection program is to limit fire damage to structures, systems, or components important to safety so that the capability to safely .

shut down the plant is ensured. Appendix R concerns only a luited number of issues since the general requirements relating to fire r,rotection were already set forth in GDC 3 and the NRC guidance documents. Specifically, the provisions of Appendix R are divided into two categories: (1) Sections III.G, III.J, and III.0, which were backfit to all plants operating prior to January 1,1979, regardless of whether or not alternatives to the specific requirements of these sections previously had been approved by the staff; and (2) all other sections, which were backfit to certain plants operating prior to January 1, 1979, to resolve items that previously had not been approved by the staff as satisfying the provisions of Appendix A to BTP APCSB 9.5-1.

Appendix R Exemption Process .,

The Commission, when it promulgated the Appendix R fire protection requirements, recognized that there would be unique plant conditions where the fire protection features identified by Appendix R would not greatly enhance the level of fire safety already provided by the licensee. Therefore; in those cases when a fire hazard analysis could adequately demonstrate that the alternative fire protection features provided a level of fire safety equivalent to that required by Appendix R, the licensee could apply for an exemption under the provisions of 10 CFR 50.48(c)(6).

Fire Protection Guidelines for Plants Licensed after January 1,1979 For plants licensed to operate after January 1,1979, the staff reviewed the fire protection programs during the licensing process. Therefore, as discussed in Generic Letter 86-10, there was no need to backfit Appendix R to plants licensed to operate after January 1,1979. NUREG-0800, " Standard Review Plan" (SRP), Section 9.5-1, " Fire Protection Program," incorporates the guidance of BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Appendix A to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, and the criteria of Appendix R to 10 CFR Part 50. Therefore, licensees can also implement the guidance contained in Section 9.5-1 of the SRP to establish a fire protection program that complies with 10 CFR 50.48 and GDC 3. ,-

Burden Relief - GL 86-10 License Condition In Generic Letter (GL) 86-10, " Implementation of Fire Protection Requirements," dated April 24, 1986, the NRC requested licensees to adopt a standard license condition for fire protection. As part of this process, the NRC requested licensees to incorporate their fire protection program that had been approved by the NRC, including the fire hazards analysis and major commitments that form the basis for the fire protection program, into their Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR). Once the process was completed, and the license condition was implemented, the provisicas of 10 CFR 50.59 would apply directly for changes the licensee desires to make in the fire protection program. In this context, the determination of the involvement of an unreviewed safety question defined in 10 CFR 50.59(a)(2) would be made based on the " accident ... previously evaluated" (i.e., the postulated fire in the fire hazard analysis for the fire area affected by the change). Therefore,

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licensees that have adopted the standard license condition for fire protection may make changes to the approved fire protection program without prior approval of the Commission only if those changes do not adversely affect the -

ability to achieve and maintain safe shutdown in the event of a fire.

Currently, 96 of 110 operating reactors have the standard license condition for fire protection and can make the necessary operational fire pro,tection program changes without seeking prior Commission approval.

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Attachment 2 Sumary of NEI Petition 1

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Summary of NEI Petition The following is a summary of the petition for rulemaking received from NEI.

A complete notice of receipt of the petition was published on June 6, 1995 (60 FR 29784).

NEI (the petitioner) requested that the NRC amend the regulations in 10 CFR Part 50 that govern fire protection at nuclear power plants. The petitioner believes that significant strides have been made in the fire sciences and that licensees' fire protection programs have matured since the current NRC fire protection requirements in 10 CFR 50.48 and Appendix R to 10 CFR Part 50 were adopted. The petitioner also noted that the NRC has gained nearly two decades of experience in reviewing licensee fire protection programs and requested that the NRC adopt a more current and less prescriptive approach to fire protection that builds on the defense-in-depth concept used to establish the existing requirements. NEI cited the "NRC Program for Elimination of Requirements Marginal to Safety," published on November 24, 1992 (57 FR 55157), and a separate initiative entitled " Reducing the Regulatory Burden on Nuclear Licensees," published on June 18,1992 (57 FR 27187), as examples in which the NRC proposed amending its regulations to continue efforts to eliminate requirements that are marginal to safety and to reduce the I regulatory burden when the benefit realized is not commensurate with the resulting cost. The petitioner also noted that the NRC's Regulatory Review Group (RRG) identified the existing rule on fire protection as one of the regulations that should be improved.

The petitioner proposed an amendment to 10 CFR 50.48 and the addition of a new appendix that it believes will provide a more flexible alternative to the current fire protection requirements in Appendix R to 10 CFR Part 50. The petitioner claimed the new appendix is evolutionary, includes functional acceptance criteria fcr corresponding detailed requirements in Appendix R that could be voluntarily adopted in whole or in part by licensees, and would not reduce public health and safety in any way. The petitioner believes this 3 performance-based approach would allow cost-effective implementatiorf of the l safety objectives of Appendix R without reducing safety. The proposed changes envisioned by the petitioner include the development of a new guidance document, to be developed by industry concurrent with promulgation of the revised rule. The petitioner noted that the NRC uses a defense-in-depth approach to fire protection for nuclear power plants that includes key elements of protection, detection, and suppression within a fire protection program to attain the required objective of prote: ting the safe shutdown capability of the plant. However, the petitioner believes that the current requirements are too prescriptive because they apply equally in all plant areas without providing a mechanism for determining the actual fire hazard and risk significance in each area. The petitioner stated that its proposed rule provides for licensees and NRC resources to be better focused toward the objective of achieving and maintaining safe shutdown in the unlikely event of fire. _

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ilEl acknowledged that a prescriptive rule was necessary in 1980 because nuclear power plant fire protection technology was relatively new at that time. However, the petitioner believes that those fire protection standards .

have been difficult to implement consistently for nuclear power plants and noted that the f4RC has granted more than 1,200 exemptions after the inception of the rule. The petitioner believes that the difficulty in implementing the standards results not only from the prescriptiveness of the current ~ rule but also because fire protection standards in other industries are directed primarily toward protection of life and property, whereas fire protection at nuclear power facilities focuses on preserving the plant's safe shutdown capability to adequately protect the public health and safety.

The petitioner noted that other Federal agencies, such as the General Services Administration (GSA), have enhanced their fire protection regulations based on recent advances in fire modeling techniques. The petitioner alleges that GSA uses fire modeling to identify fire safety risks and develop performance-based approaches.for achieving adequate levels ef prutection. The petitioner also noted that the Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards has briefed the Commission on the development of performance-based approaches to fire '

protection at nuclear power plants in the United Kingdom and Canada. The petitioner contended that the RRG has specifically recommended that probabilistic safety assessment techniques be used to develop fire protection regulations that are more performance-based. The petitioner indicated agreement with the RRG on the general philosophy of focusing on key objectives related to measurable performance in order to permit resources to be applied to and attention centered on activities most directly related to protection of the public health and safety.

The petitioner claimed that its proposed rule and Appendix would provide less prescriptive alternative requirements corresponding to each section of Appendix R to 10 CFR 50, and burden relief is requested in all these areas.

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d Attachment 3 Sumary of Public Coments 6

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d Summary of Public Coments On June 6,.1995, the staff published (60 FR 29784) the notice of receipt of the NEI petition, including 13 questions on topics the staff considered important.for the rulemaking. The comment period closed on Septemb~er 30,

. 1995. Subsequently, the staff solicited (60 FR 57370) public discussion on the rulemaking in the RuleNet project in January and February 1996.

Public comments on NEI Petition The staff received comments from seventeen organizations and individuals that may be grouped as follows: 6 licensees, 2 industry organizations, I fire protection consulting firm, I standards, organization, 2 public interest groups, and 5 individuals.

Most of the comments that were received are directly related to the 13, specific areas for public coment as presented in the Federal Register notice.

One industry group, one standards organization, and six licensees indicated general support for the petition. One public interest group and two individuals believe that this petition represents a decrease in overall safety that is not appropriate for such an important aspect of nuclear plant safety.

Two public interest groups, a consulting firm, and one individual indicated that the apparent motivation for the petition is the desire to avoid the difficult and expensive compliance issues caused by the deficiencies discovered in fire barriers such as Thermo-Lag. A standards organization, a licensee, and a consulting firm provided the ;taff with options for the rulemaking. The following are summaries of comments on some of the topics for comment identified by the staff.

1. Scope of Proposed Rule and Exclusion of New Requirements Most of the comments received on this topic essentially agreed with the focus of the petition for rulemaking on the safe shutdown function only.

A consulting firm disagreed with the pctition's focus, stating.that requirements should be included for safe shutdown and safety Telated systems.

An industry group stated that regulatory requirements should be limited to circumstances that are necessary to provide reasonable assurance of

. adequate protection, unless a backfit analysis supports additional l requirements. The commenter stated that 15 years of experience with the

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current rule suggests .that a backfit analysis would not support the inclusion of additional equipment and requirements in a revised rule.

NEl stated that further regulations to explicitly address other fire protection functions will not provide a significant safety benefit and new requirements are neither necessary or warranted. Other comments received on this topic concurred with the existing policy of separating regulatory action for new fire protection issues from efforts to improve i regulatory efficiency. One utility indicated it was very concerned that an attempt to simultaneously deal with "new safety issues" would cause needlen additional delays or even thwart the much needed revisions of the existing regulations.

2. Demonstration of Safety-Neutrality of Proposed Rule NEI referred to the plant-specific nature of a PRA, the lack of an -

approved systematic fire risk assessment, and the difficulty of quantifying the level of safety under the current prescriptive fire regulations in its deferral of a meaningful quantitative compprison.

' NEI and several other commenters believe the issue should not be equivalency with Appendix R, but whether the proposed rule and the associated licensee compliance measures will provide adequate protection of public health and safety. NEI cites the current regulation that requires fire barriers to meet certain explicit criteria on fire duration, even for plant areas where fire hazards cannot sustain fires for the specified duration, as an example that exceeds measures required for adequate protection of public health and safety. Also, the requirement to plan for worst case fire scenarios that may not be realistic is cited as another example. One. industry group indicated that. alternatives to current requirements that can provide sufficient assurance of adequate protection exist and that NRC has affirmed,this proposition many times by approving exemptions that deviate from the specific features identified in Appendix R. One utility advocated the use of the safety evaluation process of 10 CFR 50.59 to determine the impact of fire risk. One commenter concluded that the proposed approach is expected to be safety positive in comparison to Appendix R, reasoning that the operators are currently procedurally constrained to use less reliable systems.

A consulting firm, on the other hand, believes that sufficient technical justification must be provided to move away from the current regulatory approach. Until NEI provides information concerning the safety neutral question, no member of the public can adequately comment on their proposal -- either to support or constructively criticize. One individual expressed concern that the use of PRA to compare approaches to fire safety is not a well established practice. A rational methodology needs to be developed for this demonstration. If not, neither the regulators nor the regulated will be assured that the demonstration has been performed soundly. ,-

3. Implementation Guidance NEI states it is proceeding to develop implementation guidance, and the details of the document will be discussed with the NRC staff throughout its development to facilitate NRC review. One licensee noted that the maintenance rule was promulgated without any guidance and serves as a precedent for this proposed rule. Other commenters cited the ACRS review of the NEI petition and concurred with the ACRS criticisms, which include the petition's lack of probabilistic requirements and the extensive use of non-quantitative language. NEI stated that it is impractical to generically address the implementation details of risk-based models in a rule,- and NEI continues to believe a guidance document is the best approach to provide details.

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a In response to the NRC request for specific information on advances in the fire sciences end PRA that would support this petition, NEI notes that the ' intent of the proposed rule is to provide the flexibility to -

use any techniques that may be available now or at a later time consistent with guidelines to be provided in the guidance document. One model. that is presently available is the Fire Induced Vulnerability Evaluation (FIVE). NEI also referred to several analytical models for assessing fire.

Other commenters indicated the present state of the art of fire modeling

• could generally be characterized as " primitive." Some commenters also had reservations about the present capabilities of PRA. One commenter quoted the ACRS statement that, given the uncertainties in the state of the art, fire PRAs cannot be the sole basis for regulatory requirements.

Other commenters discussed their' desire for. rigorous testing or. concerns about the _ difficulties of verifying and validating generic models for plant-specific applications. NEI stated that the availability of experimental data to support the development or use of fire modeling techniques is not crucial and indicated the sensitivity and uncertainty analyses of PRA models such as IPEs can be used to yield meaningful insights. NEI believes the NRC does not need to perform prior review and approval of specific modeling techniques other than through concurrence with examples that might be cited in the guidance document.

One commenter foresees unspecified difficulties with the specification of fire modeling methods in a new rule. The National Fire Protection Association believes the ANSI-accredited voluntary standard process will ensure a thorough review and technical analyses of issues during the development of a standard.

4. The Availability of Other Processes for Burden Relief Both NEI and another industry group acknowledged that a number of licensees can pursue fire protection chances through 10 CFR 50.59. They stated that, although some of the changes proposed by the petitioner may be performed by some licensees under 10 CFR 50.59, important as the proposed changes cannot be performed under Section 50.59.~ Licenseespects of that must comply with Appendix R or clear license requirements to have certain Appendix R features cannot change these requirements without exemptions or license amendments. They stated that the numerous exemptions requested indicate the need for flexibility in the regul ation. Moreover, they state that, in cases when an exemption or license amendment is not required, the history.of NRC enforcement of fire protection requirements has_ caused licensees to adopt a highly i

conservative approach to determining whether a proposed change would constitute an unreviewed safety question under 10 CFR 50.59. They stated that even when there is no safety significance to a contemplated change, licensees have been reluctant to expose themselves to the possibility of enforcement for implementing such a change. One utility also indicated that experience has shown that the exemption process is a cumbersome, labor-intensive process. NEI stated that maintaining the current fire protection regulations simply because available-mechanisms l

4 for limited burden relief to some licensees exist would be inconsistent with the goal of regulatory improvement. They cite SECY-93-143, the

" Reassessment of the NRC Fire Protection Program" report that stated revision of current regulations could "... eliminate the potential for ,

confusion and conflict between 10 CFR 50.48 and GL 86-10.. .." NEl urged the staff to implement a revision to the regulations that wou]d have a more comprehensive effect on reducing regulatory burden. -

Two commenters believe efficiencies can be achieved with limited changes to the existing rule or by development of criteria for determining acceptable technical alternatives to assure safe shutdown. One of the commenter; stated that regulatory relief is provided by allowing licensees to assess changes to the fire protection program via the 10 CFR 50.59 process. The NFI proposed rule does not provide additional relief to to licensees safely shut down.with respect to evaluating the impact on the ability Another commenter indicated the preferred mechanism is to update the rule based on current staff practices and shift the focus to inspection.

5. Evolutiona y Approach versus Comprehensive Modification of Fire .

Regulatius In response to this question, NEl stated that the petition provides for an adequate evolutionary approach by maintaining the structure of the current regulation while allowing progression toward a more functional approach. Ho m er, NEl noted the staff's interest in perhaps revising the general requirements of 10 CFR 50.48 so that it would incorporate the general objectives of the proposed rule (with the details of the proposed rule ioentified in an industry guidance document). One utility indicated concern that the significant effort expended by NEl and member utilities approach.

will be discarded in the hopes of finding a marginally better Another utility believes additional guidance could negate the need to revise the current rule. A consulting firm recommended changes to NEI's rule aimed at regulatory stability founded in current policies that remain relevant, such as flexibility to substitute functionally equivalent approaches as new knowledge and technology becomes available, simplification of the existing regulation to provide a better balance with inspection and enforcement policy, and greater focus on safety matters.

Comments Received on RuleNet The staff conducted a pilot project using the computer-based Internet technology to enhance public participation during the rulemaking process. The aim is-to use advanced technologies that may helo the consensus building process among the public, industry, and other interested parties. This pilot project was conducted as part of the National Performance Review RegNet project aimed at further democratization of the citizen-government interface by enhancing public participation in government decisionmaking.

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4 Significant discussions in 3 phases over a 4-week period were conducted on a number of topics on the rulemaking. In the first phase, the topics of specific ~ interest to the staff were identified for solicitation of written comments (see above) and were posted on RuleNet for discussion. In the second ,

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phase, a synthesis of issues raised by commenters were categorized and alternatives for resolution of these issues were solicited. In the third phase, a sumary of RuleNet discussions was posted to provide participants a chance to agree or modify the staff conclusions. A complete evaluation of the RuleNet process will be provided to the Comission separately in the near future. The discussions were constructive and provided the' staff with greater ,

insights of commenters views than could be achieved by a one-time submittal of written coments. The following is the staff's sumary of discussions on RuleNet.

Regulatory Flexibility No participant advocated that rulemaking was necessary as a resolution to a public health and safety deficiency in the existing rule. Rather, some participants endorsed rulemaking as necessary to provide licer. sees with more flexibility in implementing fire protection regulations (although there was no agreement on how this should be done). Other participants thought that certain benefits could be achieved by working within the existing rule, for example, by ensuring that staff interpretations of the existing rule were consistent or by ensuring that NRC enforcement guidance recognizes that not all fire protection requirements are equal in contributing to safety. Others did not believe that licensees could demonstrate that they were complying with the existing rule, and therefore, no rulemaking should be undertaken until this demonstration is made.

Risk.And Fire Modeling There was general consensus that risk information and fire modeling can be beneficial in developing a regulation to focus licensee activities on safety-significant activities in order to improve the cost-effectiveness of plant fire protection programs without adversely affecting safety. However, to develop such a rule would require the necessary risk and fire models.

Fire Protection Requirements -

There was general consensus that fire protection requirements are not all equal in their contribution to safety, and fire protection features should be

" graded" or " binned" according to their relative importance to plant safety.

For example, activities for Appendix R to 10 CFR Part 50 and Appendix A to BTP 9.5.1 should be differentiated, the fire threat for each fire area should be defined,.and protection should be provided based on the threat rather than equal protection across the board.

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ATTACHMENT 3 e f***%,

s.

RULEMAKING ISSUE (NEGATIVE CONSENT)

June 19, 1997 SECY-97-127 EDE The Commissioners FROM L. Joseph Callan Executive Director for Operations

SUBJECT:

DEVELOPMENT OF A RISK-INFORMED, PERFORMANCE-BASED REGULATION FOR FIRE PROTECTION AT NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS PURPOSE 1

To present the actions the staff will undertake to de{eloy a.rulemaking for transitioning to a more risk-infermed, performance-based structure for fire protection regulation at nuclear power ~

plants.

BACKGROUND-On June 21,1996, the starf submitted a paper to the Commission (SECY-96-134) on, " Options for Pursuing Regulatory improvement in Fire Protection Regulations for Nuclear Power Plants."

Following a substantive discussion of issues, two options for pursuing regulatory improvement through or without rulemaking were presented. The staff recommended the approach to regulatory improvement through rulemaking.

In a Staff Reo.uirements Memorandum (SRM), dated October 2,1996, the Commission approved the staffs recommendation for regulatory improvement through rulemaking and included the following specific directions to the staff:

A plan (including milestones and schedules) for transitioning fire regulations to a more risk-informed, performance-based structure should be developed. The plan should identify key elements as well as obstacles that must be overecme to make progress; 4 l

CONTACT: M. Dey, RES NOTE: TO BE MADE PUBLICLY AVAILABLE WHEN (301) 415-6443 THE FINAL SRM IS MADE AVAILABLE mkd@nrc. gov b -

2

- Weaknesses in Probabilistic Risk Analysis (PRA) methods and operational data should be identified along with ongoing research activities to address weaknesses (if any). The

• uncertainty" issue should be explicitly addressed;

- Preliminary IPEEE insights-gained should be factored into rulemaking in this area;

• Risk-informed, performance-based approaches should only be utilized where specifics are amenable to such methods; and

. Issues such as inspection and enforcement in implementation of such a rule should be considered in a manner consistent with the Commission's preliminary views on Direction Setting issue 12 regarding Risk-Informed, Performance-Based Regulation.

Following receipt of the SRM on SECY-96-134, the staff informed the Commission (in the Semiannual Report on the Status of the Thermo-Lag Action Plan and Fire Protection Task Action Plan, dated October 31,1996) that it would include its review of several potential safety issues in the Fire Protection Task Action Plan (FPTAP) in its plan for the fire protection rulemaking. The list included those issues recommended for further study (e.g., adequacy of operability requirements for post-fire safe shutdown equ:pment and adequacy of fire barrier surveillance requirements) and other confirmation issues in FPTAP (e.g., adequacy of manual fire fighting) that have not been completed to date, in an SRM, dated January 22,1997, the Commission provided guidance on ernerging policy issues from PRA Implementation Plan activities asgogi_ated with risk-informed, performance-based regulation which are pertinent to this rulemaking. In the SRM, the Commission included -

direction that the staff should, in its development of risk-informed guidance and review of applications regarding risk-informed initiatives, evaluate safety impacts of proposed changes in an integrated manner including the use of risk insights to identify areas where requirements should be increased or improvements could/should be implemented. In this regard, the Commission stated that the staff should encourage licensees to use risk assessments for purposes of improvement that may require additional activity or effort on their part, as well as relaxation, in order to realize the full benefit of risk assessments.

DISCUSSION:

The additional activities to ev?Jate safety impacts of the proposed changes in an integrated manner including the use of risk insights to reduce regulatory burden as well as identify areas where requirements should be increased or improvements could be implemented will require ,

more staff work than originally planned. The staff has specifically identified tasks, and delivery I dates for products that are needed to develop the rulemaking consistent with staff proposals and Commission directives (discussed above) subsequent to the SRM, dated October 2,1996, on SECY-96-134.

The staff expects that the development of the rulemaking to allow the implementation of performance-based, risk-informed methods based on currert risk information and state of the art of fire sciences will be limited because of existing limitations of methods (as indicated in SECY-96134). Therefore, in parallel to the development of the rulemaking, the staff will  !

l l

3 develop a research plan to advance the state of the art of fire modeling and fire risk analysis methods. The research plan will address the methods, data needs, and uncertainties. The staff will propose a second phase of revisions to the fire regulations to the Commission at a later date if the results of the research program indicate that a revision is appropriate. Attachment 1 includes charts that illustrate the staff's upcoming actions for the rulemaking plan for the first phase of revisions to the fire regulations:

Tasks To Be Comoteted Before Develonino the Rulemakino

1. Identify strengths and weaknesses in current fire PRA and fire modeling methods for use in developing an appropriate high level strategy for the rulemaking plan for adopting such methods.

[RES/ DST, October 1997]'

2a. Perform an analysis of past exemption requests to identify areas where risk-informed, performance-based analyses (qualitative or quantitative) were used to justify the submission and approval of the exemptions;

[NRR/DSSA, September 1997]

26. Based on the above analysis, develop performance criteria that could be incorporated into a rulemaking plan and which envelop the technical basis for the approval of the exemptions; g_ _

[RES/DRA, October 1997]

3. Based on IPEEE reviews to date, other fire PRA information, and on an analysis of exemptions (Task 2) and case studies being conducted in areas where exemptions have been granted, determine potential areas in the fire regulations (e.g. fire protection systems maintenance, test, and surveillance, and fire protection of safe shutdown capability) for application of risk-informed, performance-based methods, in lieu of current deterministic and prescriptive methods, in order to provide flexibility to licensees, eliminate requirements marginal to safety, and reduce regulatory burden.

[RES/DRA, October 1997]

4. Review vulnerabilities identified in the IPEEE program to determine any generic vulnerabilities in plant fire protection programs that need to be addressed through rulemaking. Analyze the plant-specific disposition of potential fire safety issues (Attachment 2) currently being examined in IPEEEs and confirm (or otherwise) the staffs initial analysis and conclusions documented in NUREG reports (e.g. NUREG-1472, NUREG-1364) that generic requirements for the disposition of these issues are 1

I

'This identifies the completion date and responsible organization for the action. An internal staff report will be developed for each milestone identified in this paper.

1

I l

4 not warranted. The analysis will be based on 24 submittals that the staff expects to have reviewed by September 1997. This analysis will be updated once all the IPEEE submittals have been reviewed, and used for preparing the proposed rule.

[RES/pST, December 1997]

V (M.

S. A, Evaluate potential fire safety issues identified from FPTAP (Attachment 2) and determine if any are candidates for rulemaking, and those that need further research.

Those issues requiring further research will be addressed in the fire research program

[dl discussed above. The issues currently being addressed in the IPEEE program will be covered under Task 4; 4t"3 / C)!

Based on the special study on " Fire Events - Feedback of U.S. Operating Experience" ,

determine the impact on performance of systems needed for plant safe shutdown resulting from component failure associated with fire. Identify any potential risk significant issues regarding the programs that should be addressed through rulemaking, based on feedback of U.S. operating experience.

[RES/DRA, December 1997]

6. Review results of pilot Fire Protection Functional inspections and develop insights regarding opportunities for the adoption of risk-informed, performance-based approaches;

[NRR/DSSA, December 1997]

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7. Review and evaluate initiatives for developing performance-based fire standards by professional organizations (e.g. National Fire Protection Association) to determine ~

whether these initiatives could support the transition to a risk-informed, performance- -

based regulatory structure.

[RES/DRA, December 1997)

8. Review and evaluate the information obtained from the public in the RuleNet record from early 1996 for suggested regulatory approaches (e.g. a " graded" approach to -

developing a fire protection program to focus on risk significant protection features);

[RES/DRA, December 1997]

9. Develop a final position on the potential safety issue on threats from fires during shutdown conditions. The proposed rule for Shutdown and Fuel Pool Operations is due to the Commission by July 31,1997. The rule, as currently drafted, proposes that licensees include in the fire protection plan provisions to minimize the frequency of fires during shutdown operation and their potential consequences in those areas where a fire could impair the decay heat removal system in operation. The current plan is to publish a proposed rule for public comment in September 1997 for a 90-day period.

[NRR/DSGA, March 1998)

5

10. Determine the mechanism for application in this rulemaking of the guidance being developed as part of the PRA Implementation Plan for an approach for using PRA in risk-informed decisions on plant-specific changes to the current licensing basis;

[RES/DRA, December 1997)

11. Based on inputs from the above tasks, develop a rulemaking plan that will include the type and nature of the performance criteria, and the range of performance-based, risk-informed analysis methods that would be used to demonstrate compliance with the performance criteria. A draft plan will be developed before a public workshop (see Task 12 below), and finalized based on comments received at the workshop;

[RES/DRA, June 1998)

12. Conduct discussions on a draft rulemaking plan at a public workshop and solicit input from allinterested parties. Explore the possibility of conducting this dialogue with the industry and public in electronic forums such as RuleNet.

[RES/DRA, January 1998]

The rulemaking plan that reflects comments received at the public workshop will be submitted for Commission review and approval by June 1998. The plan will also include a range of possible actions and outcomes based on the evaluqtion of critical rulemaking issues such as

~

mandatory versus voluntary licensee implementation oTthe revised rule, and maintaining the same scope and level of protection as current requirements or establishing broader scope and achieving a higher level of protection with the rule revision. Furthermore, the rulemaking plan will include a schedule for the proposed and final rulemaking.

The staff is continuing to address the Thermo-Lag issues on a plant-specific basis. Staff work on the activities described in this paper will not require a change to this course of action. In addition, the staff has not identified significant fire safety issues that require prompt action l

through rulemaking.

This paper describes the staff's efforts for regulatory improvement for fire protection regulation of nuclear power plants. The status and outcome of the various tasks will be monitored by NMSS as this information may relate to consideration for fire protection regulatory guidance for

[ fuel cycle facilities licensed under Part 70.

RESOURCES:

Resources to conduct these rulemaking activities are included in the budget. Approximately 3 FTE and $ 230 K will be required to complete the specified tasks and develop the rulemaking plan by FY 1999. Approximately 2 FTE and S 200 K will be required over one and one-half l years to develop the final rule.

l L_____ .

'9 6

l l COORDINATION:

l.

The Office of General Counsel has no legal objection to this paper, and the Chief Financial Officer has no objection to the resources identified in this paper. The staff has provided a copy of this paper to the ACRS for their information.

In order to coordinate the efforts of several organizations that will be involved in this effort, I have formed an inter-Office Working Group and Steering Committee for this effort. Attachment 3 lists the members of these groups.

RECOMMENDATION:

i- Unless otherwise directed by the Commission, the staff plans to proceed as described above.

L. Jcgeph Callan Executive Director For Operations

Attachment:

As stated-SECY NOTE: In the absence of instruction 4 ccr the-contrary,- SECY will -

notify the staff on Monday, July 7, 1997 that the Commission, by negative consent, assents to the action proposed in this paper. 4 DISTRIBUTION:

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Attachment 2 List of Potential Fire issues

1. Other modes of ooeration'- Current fire protection requirements provide protection for equipment necessary to take the plant from 100% power operations to hot standby / shutdown and do not address other plant modes of operation (including degraded, shutdown, and refueling modes).

Therefore, cold shutdown systems are presently not required to be protected against fire damage.

The risk significance of this gap needs to be evaluated.

2. Fire imoact on reactor safetv'- The risk significance of fire-induced reactor transients caused by fire damage to cables (e.g., electrical faults), and balance-of-plant fire risks (e.g., turbine failures and fires; failures of station transformers), and other plant events which have the potential to cause a fire and a related plant transient needs to be evaluated.

3. Hot Shorts - Hot shorts in faulted cables may be a potential mode of component damage and are not fully addressed by current risk assessment methods. These faults may result in the application of power to unpowered circuits, the application of destructive voltages to lower power-voltage circuits, false instrument readings, or the simulation of a switch closing. These failure modes and their risk significance need to be evaluated.

4. Smoke imoact on reactor safetv'- Assessment of smoke propagation and its affect on manual fire fighting operations, its impact on plant shutdown equipment operability and manual operator actions (human errors of omission and commissiqp) cay.be needed. Manual fire fighting ,

effectiveness was identified by GI-148.

5. Testina/comoensatorv measures - The need for additional guidance for surveillance testing / compensatory measures related to risk sensitive fire mitigation / protection features and post-fire safe shutdown functions (e.g., fire protection features which are the most risk important in assuring mitigation should be tested and inspected at a higher frequency than others) should be evaluated.

6. Main control room / cable soreadina room fire interaction analysis methods * - Current methods for analysis of either main control room or cable spreading room fire scenarios do not directly address fire growth and smoke development, fire-induced spurious equipment operations / interactions, operator actions of either omission or commission, and determine if shutdown equipment controlled from outside the main control or cable spreading rooms is fully capable of performing its intended shutdown function. Methods to better address these issues needs to be developed to examine their risk significance. This item is related to GI -147.

7. Fire detection methods - The analysis of fire detection effectiveness and timing is critical to fire mitigation and fire brigade and operator response. Therefore, it is critical to understand detection system design limitations and their potentialimpact on detector response and notification.

Enhanced analytical tools should be developed to model and predict fire detection.

'This issue is currently being addressed in the rulemaking for shutdown and fuel pool operations.

• This issue is currently being addressed in the IPEEE program.

2

8. Analysis of exolosive electrical faults - Current fire scenario evaluation tools are unable to predict the type of explosive fire events associated with a high energy electrical fault. Such faults have been experienced during switchgear-initiated fire events. Given the importance of switchgear to plant operations and the relative importance of switchgear fire scenarios in risk assessment, improvements in analysis methods in this area may be needed.

9. Reliability of fire barriers * - Methods for the analysis of fire barrier systems are not fully developed (fire barriers between adjacent fire areas). In typical fire analysis, these barriers are assumed to be 100% reliable for their full ASTM E-119 fire endurance time rating for any postulated fire threat.

This assumption, in all cases may not be justified for fire scenarios involving certain active fire barrier elements such as, fire doors and fire dampers, and for areas involving "high hazard" fire sources (e.g., diesel generator rooms, turbine buildings). Further development of these tools is necessary.

10. Broken or leakino flammable aas lines * - Flammable gas lines may be present in areas that are near safety-related equipment and a leaking line could potentially jeopardize plant safety. This item is related to GI-106 and needs to be evaluated for risk significance.

11. Eauioment orotection from fire suooression system actuation * - Actuations of fire suppression systems have caused damage to safety-related equipment, indicating that some equipment may not be adequately protected from the effects of fire suppression and some areas may not be adequately sealed. This issue is related to GI-57, and its risk significance needs to be evaluated.

12. Seismic / fire interactions * - During a seismic event, fires may occur and sources of fire water may be lost, causing a significant reduction in fire protection in addition automatic fire detection systems may be affected by a seismic event and g~fire protection features may become dislodged

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and inoperable. The significance of this interaction needs to be determined.

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Attachment 3 Members of the Steering Committee and Working Group Steering Committee

1. Joseph A. Murphy, Director, DRA:RES, Chair

2. M. Wayne Hodges, Director, DST:RES

3. Gary M. Holahan, Director, DSSA:NRR

- 4. Charles E. Rossi, Director, SPD:AEOD

5. William J. Olmstead, Associate General Counsel, OGC Working Grouo

1. Moni Dey, Senior Nuclear Engineer, RDB:DRA:RES

2. Nathan Siu, Senior Level for PRA, PRAB: DST:RES 3.- Ed Connell, Senior Fire Protection Engineer, SPLB:DSSA:NRR

4. Jim Houghton/Hal Omstein*, Plant Systems Engineer, RRAB:SPD:AEOD

5. Geary Mizuno, Senior Attorney, OGC

6. Rex Wescott, Senior Fire Protection Engineer, SPB:FCSS:NMSS' '

6 ,. .

l 2Panicipation will be on a consultation basis.

dPanicipation will be as necessary to obtain information and insights that could be used I

for regulatory guidance for fuel cycle facilities.

L________________.__._.-___._. - . . _ . _ . - - - - . . - . - - . - .

ATTACHMENT 4 l

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[53IEG '*,

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\...../

I RULEMAKING ISSUE I

(Notation Vote)

March 26.1998 SECY-98-058 EDE: The Commissioners l FROM L. Joseph Callan Executive Director for Operations

SUBJECT:

DEVELOPMENT OF A RISK-INFORMED, PERFORMANCE-BASED REGULATION FOR FIRE PROTECTION AT NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS (WITS 9200197)

PURPOSE:

To respond to the staff requirements memorandum (SRM) dated September 11,1997, related to SECY-97-127. " Development of a Risk-Informed, Performance-Based Regulation for Fire .

I Protection at Nuclear Power Plants."

BACKGROUNQ:

On June 19,1997, the staff submitted SECY-97-127, which described the action:;it would pursue to develop a rulemaking for transitioning to a more risk-informed, performance-based structure for fire protection regulation of nuclear power plants. The benefits for this approach could be to evaluate the safety-impact of proposed plant changes in an integrated manner to reduce regulatory burden, and to identify areas where requirements should be increased.

SECY-97-127 also stated that a research plan would be developed to coordinate additional research to advance the state of the art in fire modeling and fire risk assessment methods.

In the associated SRM dated September 11,1997, the Commission directed the staff to prepare an expedited schedule for rulemaking and transfer the responsibility for the rulemaldng effort from the Office of Nuclear Regulatory Research (RES) to the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR). The Commission also directed the staff to complete the current research CONTACT: Edward A. Connell, SPLB/DSSAINRR NOTE: TO BE MADE PUBLICLY AVAILABLE (301)415-2838 AT COMMISSION MEETING ON 3/31/98

The Commissioners 2 and study by the end of calendar year 1997 and to expedite the resolution of issues necessary to formulate a rule that will eliminate the need for most exemptions granted under Appendix R to 10 CFR Part 50. Finally, the Commission directed the staff to brief the Commission on the feedback from the Office of the General Counsel on backfit implications; industry feedback on the interest in a new rule; and all findings, observations, and conclusions related to fire modeling, probabilistic risk assessment (PRA), fire protection functional inspections (FPFI),

individual plant examination of external events (IPEEE) results, and other relevant information.

DISCUSSION:

In accordance with the SRM of September 11,1997, the responsibility for the rulemaking effort has been transferred from RES to NRR. The staff is assessing the need for future additional research activities to complete any longer term items, or improvements to regulatory guidance in support of further risk-informed efforts. Additional research will be performed cooperatively with industry, when possible. An expedited schedule for rulemaking has been developed that would result in a draft rule and a draft regulatory guide being published for public comment 12 months after Commission approval to proceed, with a final rule and regulatory guide being submitted to the Commission in 18 months. The schedule with milestones is attached.

In accordance with the Commission's direction the staff has solicited industry feedback on their interest in a new rule. As part of this effort, the staff met with representatives of the Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) at a public meeting on November 5,1997. At this meeting, NEl presented the preliminary results of its survey of all Chief Nuclear Officers of operating reactors concerning the proposed rulemaking. The survey indicates that the industry positions are: (1) j a new rule is neither desired nor necessary to assure safety; (2) industry will participate if rulemaking proceeds; (3) the rulemaking schedule must allow adequate time for completion of support elements, such as the FPFI and IPEEE programs, and (4) the use of risk / performance techniques has promise. If rulemaking proceeds, industry would prefer the option of continued compliance with the existing regulations, such as Appendix R to 10 CFR Part 50, including the existing approved exemptions, and the exemption approval process specified in 10 CFR 50.12. I The survey results also provided industry's proposed alternatives to rulemaking. These are:

(1) better communication with NRC to avoid differing interpretations; (2) more guidance on the

)

j preparation of engineering evaluations, such as those performed under 10 CFR 50.59 and I Generic Letter (GL) 86-10 " Implementation of Fire Protection Requirements," (3) comprehensive clarification of the existing rule, staff positions, and various guidance documents, and (4) more allowance for risk significance evaluation within the current rule.

Representatives of NEl also presented these preliminary results at a meeting of the Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards (ACRS) on November 7,1997, and formally provided the j l results to the staff in a letter dated December 11,1997, to the Executive Director for Operations. Representatives of NEl provided additional detail on the results of the survey and their proposed interactions with the staff at a meeting of the ACRS fire protection subcommittee i on January 22,1998.

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4 The Commissioners 3 in a letter to Chairman Jackson dated November 7,1997, George D. Miller, President of the National Fire Protection Association (NFPA), advised the Commission that NFPA is developing a performance-based standard for the fire protection of light-water reactors. The NFPA's position is that the NRC should adopt the standard, scheduled to be completed in May 2000, consistent with the direction provided in U.S. Government Circular Office of Management and Budget A-119 and Public Law 104-113 that encourages the adoption of national consensus standards by Government agencies to carry out their policy objectives or activities. Fire protection engineers from NRR participate on the technical committee that is writing the NFPA standard. The goal of the proposed standard, specific to reactor safety, is to minimize the probability and effects of fires and explosions such that the facility can be safely operated without undue nsk to the health and safety of the public and the environment. Representatives of NFPA presented their plan for the development of a performance-based fire protection standard for nuclear power plants at a' meeting of the ACRS fire protection subcommittee on January 22,1998.

At the ACRS meeting on November 7,1997, the Union of Concerned Scientists (UCS) and the Nuclear information and Resource Service (NIRS) presented their positions concerning the proposed fire protection rulemaking effort. These positions are: (1) the NRC should pursue rulemaking aimed at irnplementing fire protection regulations that apply equally to all its licensees; (2) risk-informed fire protection regulations should not be adopted if they reiy on deficient risk assessments; (3) the NRC staff must fully document the technical basis for existing fire protection regulations as part of the rulemaking process, and (4) until the final fire protection rule is implemented, the existing fire protection regulations must be rigorously enforced.

OPTIONS:

On the basis of the feedback received from NEl, NFPA, NIRS, and UCS, the staff has developed three options related to the fire protection rulemaking effort for consideration by the  !

Commission. As part of the evaluation, the staff has included the feedback from the Office of l General Counsel on backfit implications of each option. l Option 1 On an expedited schedule, develop a performance-based, risk-informed fire protection regulation to replace the existing regulation. As part of this effort, the staff would develop a comprehensive regulatory guide that would provide for prescriptive and performance-based, risk-informed alternatives for compliance with the new rule.

j Option 2 Defer rulemaking at this time. Rather, under this option, the staff would work with the NFPA and the industry to develop a performance-based, risk-informed consensus standard for fire protection for nuclear power plants. The staff could endorse the consensus standard in a rulemaking to serve as an attemative method of meeting NRC fire protection requirements. If the NFPA standard was determined not to be acceptable, the staff could pursue other l

t The Commissioners 4' .

performance-based, risk-informed rulemaking options. In parallel with the NFPA effort, the staff would devehp a comprehensive regulatory guide that consolidates the existing staff positions, interpretations, and guidance related to fire protection, and would allow for the use of performance-based, risk-informed methods.

Option 3 Maintain the existir>g fire protection regulations and guidance.

EVALUATION:

Option i Under Option 1, the staff would develop a new fire protection rule based on experience to date as outlined in the attachment if the Commission approves this option, the staff would solicit additional public and industry feedback during public meetings, and through Federal Reaister notices, as appropriate. (Based on planned interactions with the public and the industry, the staff would not conduct the publ;c workshop described in SECY-96-134. On the basis of its past experience with fire protection issues, the staff believes that the elimination of the workshop at this point in the rulemaking process would not restrict participation by allinterested parties.) It is expected that because these requirements would be performance-based and risk-  ;

informed, they could result in an improvement to our current regulatory approach to fire protection in that they will offer licensee's flexibility in meeting the safety objectives associated with fire protection, while also assessing fire risk from a broader basis that extencs beyond the current design bases. Option 1 would provide a single set of licensing requirements for all operating reactors. It would also eliminate all of the existing exemptions from Appendix R to 10 CFR Part 50 and would eliminate the need for most future fire protection exemptions.

It is important to note that the Commission, when it promulgated Appendix R (February 19,1981), recognized that there would be unique plant conditions under which the fire protection features identified by Appendix R would not significantly enhance the level of fire safety already provided by the licensee. Therefore, in those cases in which a fire hazard analysis could adequately demonstrate that the aRernative fire protection features provided an equivalent level of fire safety to that required by Appendix R, the licensee could apply for an exemption under the provisions of 10 CFR 50.48(c)(3). Thus, the exemption process provided an alternative means of allowing flexibility to meet the performance objectives of Appendix R.

Currently, the staff reviews approximately 10 exemption requests per year, the majority of which relate to the resolution of the Thermo-Lag issue. Licensees are permitted to make changes to their fire protection program without prior NRC approval, provided the change does not adversely affect the ability to achieve and rnaintain safe shutdown in the event of a fire or did not require an exemption, if the licensee has adopted the standard fire protection license condition described in GL 86-10. As noted above, industry has indicated it opposes any rulemaking, if rulemaking proceeds, industry prefers an approach that retains the option of continued compliance with the existing regulations, such as Appendix R to 10 CFR Part 50,

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The Commissioners 5 k l

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including the existing approved exemptions, and the exemptioh approval process specified in 10 CFR 50.12. However, they have indicated their support forkhe NFPA proposal to develop a performance-based, risk-informed standard that will be endorsId by the NRC as an acceptable (although not mandatory) alternative to 10 CFR 50.48 and App ndix R.

One approach would be for the staff to develop a risk-informed, wrformance-based rule that would be imposed as an acceptable alternative to the current rePilation. Because it would not be mandatory, it would not constitute a backfit under 10 CFR 50p09. However, if a risk-in'ormed, performance-based rule was made mandatory, the ruld would constitute a backfit as defined in 10 CFR 50.109. It may be difficult to demonstrate thathhe rule falls within either the co'npliance exception or the adequate protection exceptions of S!ction 50.109(a)(4)(l)-(iii).

Accordingly, a backfit analysis would have to be prepared demonltratir,g that the rule constitutes a cost-justified, substantial increase in safety. It is und 9ar at this time if the staff would be able to acceptably demonstrate that these enteria could { e met.

Opt,on 2 L

Optiion 2 could also achieve the benefits associated with adopting i{ performance-based, risk-informed approach to fire protection. If the Commission determines %at the NFPA standard currently under developmer.1 provides adequate protection of public{ ealth and safety, and represents an acceptable alternative to the current fire protection red Jiations, it could be adopted in a future rule as an alternative to the existing prescriptive thquirements, consistent with the Commission's policy specified in Direction Setting Issue (DSh 13, "The Role of industry." The existing staff guidance related to fire protection is curr(ntly contained in numerous branch technical positions, generic communications, internpl memorandums, and NUREG reports. Under this option, this guidance, and new or revisec1guic'ance on areas that the public, the staff, and the industry determine would benefit from adt itional clarification, would be provided in a single comprehensive regulatory guide. The propose ! guide would allow the use of performance-based, risk-informed methods, as they mature, coi sistent with the guidance provided in Regulatory Guide 1.174, "An Approach for Using 9 rot:abilistic Risk Assessment in Risk-Informed Decisions on Plant-Specific Changes to t' e Current Licensing Basis," to satisfy the existing fire protection requirements. The experier f.e cained from the FPFis and IPEEEs would be considered in the development of the prop :sec' guide and NFPA standard.

Under Option 2, any rulemaking would provide licensees an alternative ti the current fire protection requirements set forth in 10 CFR 50.48 and 10 CFR Part 50, / opendix R (a comparable example would be 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix J, which incluo as two options either of which can be chosen for meeting the requirements for primary reactor ontainment leakage testing for water cooled power reactors). Accordingly, under that rulemak og there would be no backfitting concerns associated with this option.

A potential drawback, however, for any consensus standard approach is th potential for the standard not to meet the Commission's expectations or needs, as well as the potential for schedule slippage. If the Commission approves this option, the staff woulo keep the Commission informed and would consider alternatives if it became necessey.

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The Commissioner 4 6 1

At the ACRS Fire Protect on Subcommittee meeting on January 22,1998, and the ACRS full committee meetir g 01 Merch 2,1998, representatives of NEl and NFPA indicated their support for pursuing Option 2. The representative from NElindicated at the March 2,1998, ACRS meeting that industry opposes any rulemaking. If any rulemaking activity proceeds, industry prefers an approach that retains the option of continued compliance with the existing regulations, such as 10 CFR 50.48 and Appendix R to 10 CFR Part 50, including the existing approved exemptions, and the exemption approval process specified in 10 CFR 50.12.

Option 3 l

Option 3 would maintain the existing regulatory requirements and guidance without change. j If the Commission approves Option 3, the staff would cancel the performance-based, risk-informed fire protection rulemaking. In addition, the staff would not prepare the fire protection regulatory guides described under Options 1and 2. The staff would continue to participate in the developmer:t of the NFPA standard described under Option 2; however, it would not endorse the NFPA standard through rulemaking or a regulatory guide. Nevertheless, the NFPA standard, when completed, may specify performance-based and risk-informed tools and methods that the licenseea could use in the future to support (1) requests for exemptions from the existing requirements, and (2) fire protection program changes that currently do not j require prior NRC review and soproval as discussed under Option 1. Since Option 3 preserves j the existing regulatory requirerrents, there would be no backfitting concerns.

With Options 2 and 3, a minor nilemaking to revise Section Ill.M of Appendix R to j 10 CFR Part 50 would be purstod to resolve the combustible penetration seal issue as  ;

proposed in SECY 96-146, " Technical Assessment of Fire Barrier Penetration Seals in Nuclear L Power Plants." This rulemaking, which would likely be considered a relaxation, would not constitute a backfit.

RESOURCES: ,

The Office of Nuclear Reactor Re-pulation (NRR) resources for completing the activities described in Option 1 are estimatad to require a total of 2 FTE over 2 years (FY 1998 and j FY 1999 at 1 FTE per year) and SS00K (FY 1998). The resources for completing the activities l described in Option 2 are estimatei1 to require a total of 1 FTE and $270K (FY 1998). No additional resources are required br Option 3. The NRR resources (FTE and dollars) for either Option 1 or Option 2 are not budgHed and would have to be reprogrammed. NRR will revise I its Operating Plan to reflect necestary resource changes, completion of new activities,

The Commissioners 7 and the shift in priorities. This redirection would attempt to minimize the impact on other high priority tasks but may still have an affect on NRR fire protection activities such as NRR participation in the review of the remaining IPEEE submittals. Additionally, potentialimpacts may result from the need to assign key NRR fire protection expertise to the rulemaking and / or the development of the regulatory guide. The dollars would have to be reprogrammed from lower priority agency work.

The Office of Nuclear Regulatory tesearch (RES) has budgeted $500K in FY 1998 and $400K in FY 1999 for improving both fire nodels and risk assessment techniques. The staff is assessing the need for future additional research activities to complete any longer term items, or improvements to regulatory guidance in support of further risk-informed efforts. Additional resources, if necessary, will be addressed in the upcoming FY 2000 budget review.

Resource requirements for other NRC offices that may potentially support NRR activities in this area (e.g., OGC) are also dependent upon the option chosen, are expected to be minimal, and thus have not been quantified.

COORDINATION:

The Office of the General Counsel has no legal objections to this paper, and the Chief Financial Officer has reviewed this paper for resource implications and has no objections. The staff has provided a copy of this paper to the ACRS for information.

RECOMMENDATION:

Based primarily on the potential benefits that could be c'srived from a broad-based industry effort to product a comprehensive performance-based and risk informed standard, the staff recommends that the Commission approve Option 2. This approach has the potential for leveraging considerable fire protection expertise toward this effort.

L. Joseph Callan Eyjutive Director for Operations

Attachment:

Detailed Schedule with Milestones for Option 1.

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Commissioners' completed vote sheets / comments should be provided_directly )

to the Office of the Secretary by COB Friday, April 10, 1998, 1 Commission Staff Office corments, if any, should be submitted to the Commissioners NLT April 3, 1998, with an information copy to the Office of the Secretary. If the paper is of such a nature that it requires additional review and comment, the Commissioners and the Secretariat  !'

should be apprised of when comments may be expected.

DISTRIBUTION:  !

Commissioners l OGC OCAA  ;

OIG .j OPA j OCA ACRS CIO CFO j EDO SECY j l

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ATTACHMENT Fire Protection Rulemakino Exoedited Schedule (Oction 1)

Milestones

1. Three Months after Commission Approval to Proceed (a)-Information briefing for ACRS - Fire Protection Subcommittee.

(b) - Meetings with public and industry.

2. . Three Months After Completion of Milestone 1 (a)- Complete regulatory framework document (rule straw man and performance-based, risk-informed regulatory guide outline).

(b)- Brief the ACRS Fire Protection Subcommittee (c)- Brief CRGR (d) - Provide interested parties (e g., Nuclear Energy Institute and the public) with the proposed regulatory framework (consistent with DSI-13).

3. Three Months After Completion of Milestone 2 (a)- Complete the draft rule and performance-based, risk-informed regulatory guide j based on feedback obtained during Milestone 2.

(b)- Brief the ACRS Fire Protection Subcommittee.

(c)- Brief CRGR (d)- Brief ACRS Full committee.

4. Two Months After Completion of Milestone 3  ;

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(a)- Submit a draft rulemaking package to the Commission for approval to issue for public comment.

(b)- Brief the Commission on the draft rulemaking package (if requested).'

5. One Month After Completion of Milestone 4 (a)- Publish rulemaking package for public comment.

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6. Three Months After Completion of Milestone 5 (a)- Public comment period closes.

7. Two Months After Completion of Milestone 6 (a)- Complete resolution of public comments.

(b)- Prepare proposed final rule and regulatory guide

8. Orte month After Completion of Milestone 7 (a)- Brief ACRS Fire Protection Subcommittee (b)- Brief CRGR (c)- Brief ACRS Full Committee

9. One month After Completion of Milestone 8 (a)- Submit proposed final rule and regulatory guide for Commission approval.

(b)- Brief Commission (if requested).

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ATTACHMENT 5

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sc(t!:s !sEr5r s; .

Rolph E. Seedle May 5,1998 The Honorable Shirley Ann Jackson Chairman U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20555-0001

SUBJECT:

Fire Protection Requirements

Dear Chairman Jackson:

After more than 15 years of experience applymg the fire protection regulations in 10 CFR 50.48 and Appendix R, the nuclear power industry has established processes that have been effective in reducing the likelihood and consequences of fire-initiated events.1 Inasmuch as these rules were promulgated after the construction of most plants, the provision for exemptions and deviations has been no small contributor to this effectiveness. The industry sees no safety benefit in replacing 10 CFR 50.48 and Appendix R with a new fire protection rule.

The fundamental objectives of the fire protection regulations are clear: prevent the l occurrence, detect the initiation, and mitigate the consequences of a fire. Even if a new rule is crafted, the objectives are unlikely to change. Licensees can ill afford to implement a new rule that would prompt a lother resource-intensive, iterative process that wo :ld iesult fro ~ a new rule.

In lieu of rulemaking, a more helpful effort would be one that focuses on those aspects of the guidance underlying the requirements that have been the subject of continuing debate and interpretation. A review of existing guidance, with subsequent clarification in a comprehensive document, should be the first step  ;

toward resolving outstanding issues and avoiding future differences. )

l An example of the need for clarifications is in the area of fire-induced circuit failures, often characterized as " hot shorts." In a March 2 letter to regional administrators, the Director of the Office of Enforcement characterized the industry {

as having a " misunderstanding" of the requirements. Other staff communications

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l 1 U.S. NRC Haport AEOD/S97-03. Fire Events-Feedback on U.S. Operating Experience.

June 19,1997.

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,, The Honorable Shirley Ann Jackson May 5,1998 Page 2 have used the terms " confused" and "inewrect and inconsistent" in connection with industry positions on this issue. Contrary to this assertion, the industry l interpretation and understanding of existing requirements has been largely consistent throughout the licensee community. Indeed, the NRC staffimplicitly approved these interpretations in Safety Evaluation Reports on plant safe-shutdown programs.

Another area offering opportunities to improve fire protection program efficiency is the application of risk informed and performance-based concepts. NRC staff and industry should interact to establish specific goals, methods, and criteria for applying these concepts within the context of Regulatory Guide 1.174 and the current fire protection regulations. Licensee application of risk informed and performance-based concepts should not require licensees to rebaseline fire protection programs, as NRC staff have indicated would be necessary with a new rule.

It is essential that the industry participate extensively in the development and review of any new guidance to ensure that licensees and NRC staff have a common understanding. The resulting guidance document should prove usefulin resolving compliance and potential generic safety issues.

In summary, the following elements, ifincluded in the Commission directive to the NRC staff, could lead to more effective and efficient fire protection programs:

• The fire protection rulemaking should be canceled rather than deferred.

If future changes to the NRC's fire protection requirements are promulgated, they should preserve the option for licensees to comply with existing requirements, including approved exemptions. ,

a The NRC and industry should undertake a comprehensive effort to consolidate and clarify existing guidance, including that contained in Generic Letter 8610.

This activity should be coupled with a task to establish clearly-understood criteria for applying risk informed and performance-based concepts.

The NRC should continue to support, as does industry, the National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) process to develop NFPA 805, a consensus standard for performance-based fire protection, j The NRC and the industry should undertake cooperative research to resolve impediments to regulatory acceptance of risk-informed and performance-based fire protection methods.

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i The Honorable Shirley Ann Jackson May 5,1998 Page 3 We look forward to continued dialog with the NRC as this important issue moves  !

forward.

Sincerely, r

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Ralph E. Beedle RB/FAE/edb c: The Honorable Greta Joy Dicus, Commissioner, NRC The Honorable Nils J. Diaz, Commissioner, NRC The Honorable Edward McGaffigan, Jr., Commissioner, NRC Mr. L. Joseph Callan, EDO/NRC Mr. Samuel J. Collins, NRR/NRC Dr. Brian Sheron. NRIUNRC Mr. Gary M. Holahan, NRR/NRC Dr. Robert L. Seale, ACRS

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