05000313/FIN-2016001-06: Difference between revisions
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| identified by = Licensee | | identified by = Licensee | ||
| Inspection procedure = | | Inspection procedure = | ||
| Inspector = A Barrett, B Tindell, J Choate, M Tobin, N O | | Inspector = A Barrett, B Tindell, J Choate, M Tobin, N O'Keefe | ||
| CCA = N/A for ROP | | CCA = N/A for ROP | ||
| INPO aspect = | | INPO aspect = | ||
| description = Title 10 CFR 50.65(a)(4), states in part, that before performing maintenance activities (including but not limited to surveillance, post-maintenance testing, and corrective and preventive maintenance), the licensee shall assess and manage the increase in risk that may result from the proposed maintenance activities. Contrary to the above, before performing maintenance activities on February 24, 2016, the licensee failed to assess and manage the increase in risk that resulted from maintenance activities in the switchyard. Specifically, the licensee performed maintenance on the supervisory control circuits associated with the startup transformer breakers during the Unit 2 forced outage. This work had already begun when Entergy executives on a fleet call questioned the impact of maintenance on the breakers that supply power to safety-related buses while Unit 2 is shutdown. Further review indicated that the impact was more extensive than previously thought. For immediate corrective actions, control room operators contacted the switchyard coordinator and rescheduled the supervisory control circuit work. Because the finding affects the licensees assessment of risk associated with performing maintenance activities, NRC Manual Chapter 0609, Attachment 4, Initial Characterization of Findings, dated June 19, 2012 directs significance determination using NRC Manual Chapter 0609, Appendix K, Maintenance Risk Assessment and Risk Management Significance Determination Process, dated May 19, 2005. The finding was determined to be Green because the incremental core damage probability deficit was less than 1E-6 and the incremental large early release frequency probability deficit was less than 1E-7. A senior reactor analyst estimated incremental core damage probability deficit to be 1.9E-8 for Unit 1 and 1.2E-8 for Unit 2 using the Standardized Plant Analysis Risk models for Unit 1 (Revision 8.19) and Unit 2 (Revision 8.26) run on SAPHIRE, Version 8.1.2. The licensee entered the issue into the corrective action program as Condition Report CR-ANO-C-2016-00908. Licensee-identified violations are not assigned cross-cutting aspects. | | description = Title 10 CFR 50.65(a)(4), states in part, that before performing maintenance activities (including but not limited to surveillance, post-maintenance testing, and corrective and preventive maintenance), the licensee shall assess and manage the increase in risk that may result from the proposed maintenance activities. Contrary to the above, before performing maintenance activities on February 24, 2016, the licensee failed to assess and manage the increase in risk that resulted from maintenance activities in the switchyard. Specifically, the licensee performed maintenance on the supervisory control circuits associated with the startup transformer breakers during the Unit 2 forced outage. This work had already begun when Entergy executives on a fleet call questioned the impact of maintenance on the breakers that supply power to safety-related buses while Unit 2 is shutdown. Further review indicated that the impact was more extensive than previously thought. For immediate corrective actions, control room operators contacted the switchyard coordinator and rescheduled the supervisory control circuit work. Because the finding affects the licensees assessment of risk associated with performing maintenance activities, NRC Manual Chapter 0609, Attachment 4, Initial Characterization of Findings, dated June 19, 2012 directs significance determination using NRC Manual Chapter 0609, Appendix K, Maintenance Risk Assessment and Risk Management Significance Determination Process, dated May 19, 2005. The finding was determined to be Green because the incremental core damage probability deficit was less than 1E-6 and the incremental large early release frequency probability deficit was less than 1E-7. A senior reactor analyst estimated incremental core damage probability deficit to be 1.9E-8 for Unit 1 and 1.2E-8 for Unit 2 using the Standardized Plant Analysis Risk models for Unit 1 (Revision 8.19) and Unit 2 (Revision 8.26) run on SAPHIRE, Version 8.1.2. The licensee entered the issue into the corrective action program as Condition Report CR-ANO-C-2016-00908. Licensee-identified violations are not assigned cross-cutting aspects. | ||
}} | }} | ||
Revision as of 23:23, 21 February 2018
| Site: | Arkansas Nuclear  |
|---|---|
| Report | IR 05000313/2016001 Section 4OA7 |
| Date counted | Mar 31, 2016 (2016Q1) |
| Type: | NCV: Green |
| cornerstone | Mitigating Systems |
| Identified by: | Licensee-identified |
| Inspection Procedure: | |
| Inspectors (proximate) | A Barrett B Tindell J Choate M Tobin N O'Keefe |
| Violation of: | 10 CFR 50.65(a)(4) 10 CFR 50.65 |
| INPO aspect | |
| ' | |