05000331/FIN-2013004-03: Difference between revisions
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| identified by = NRC | | identified by = NRC | ||
| Inspection procedure = IP 71111.15 | | Inspection procedure = IP 71111.15 | ||
| Inspector = A Boland, C Pederson, C Phillips, K O, | | Inspector = A Boland, C Pederson, C Phillips, K O'Brien, L Kozak, P Lougheed, R Zimmerman, S Ortha, Shaikhc Lipa, L Haeg, R Murray, V Myers | ||
| CCA = P.2 | | CCA = P.2 | ||
| INPO aspect = PI.2 | | INPO aspect = PI.2 | ||
| description = A finding and apparent violation of Technical Specification (TS) Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO) 3.5.3, Condition B was self-revealed for the licensees failure to perform an immediate operability determination (IOD) in accordance with licensee procedures on June 21, 2013, when a RCIC system turbine speed indicator in the main control room was found degraded. Specifically, the licensee failed to consider the degraded speed indication indicative of a problem within the RCIC EG-M circuitry (failed voltage-dropping resistor) that resulted in the inoperability of RCIC on August 22, 2013, when the RCIC turbine tripped on overspeed during postmaintenance surveillance testing. The licensee documented the issue in CR 01898931. Corrective actions included the replacement of the voltage-dropping resistor for the RCIC EG-M power supply, a review of extent of condition, and performing appropriate post-maintenance testing. The inspectors determined that the licensees failure to perform an immediate operability determination in accordance with licensee procedures on June 21, 2013, when a RCIC system turbine speed indicator in the main control room was found degraded was a performance deficiency, because it was the result of the failure to meet a procedure requirement, and the cause was reasonably within the licensees ability to foresee and correct and should have been prevented. The performance deficiency was determined to be more than minor and a finding because it impacted the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone attribute of equipment performance and adversely affected the cornerstone objective of ensuring the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. Specifically, the performance deficiency resulted in the inoperability of the RCIC system from June 21 through August 24, 2013. The inspectors evaluated the finding in accordance with IMC 0609, Appendix A, The Significance Determination Process (SDP) for Findings At-Power, Exhibit 2 for the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone. The inspectors answered Yes to the screening question under the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone Does the finding represent an actual loss of function of at least a single Train for > its Tech Spec Allowed Outage Time OR two separate safety systems out-of-service for > its Tech Spec Allowed Outage Time?, since the finding represented an actual loss of a safety function of a single train (RCIC) for 64 days, which is greater than the TS allowed outage time of 14 days. Therefore, a detailed risk evaluation was performed using IMC 0609, Appendix A. A Significance and Enforcement Review Panel (SERP) preliminarily determined this finding to have low to moderate safety significance (White). The inspectors determined that the performance characteristic of the finding that was the most significant causal factor of the performance deficiency was associated with the cross-cutting aspect of Problem Identification and Resolution, having Corrective Action Program components, and involving the licensee thoroughly evaluating problems such that the resolutions address causes and extent of conditions, as necessary. This includes properly classifying, prioritizing and evaluating for operability and reportability conditions adverse to quality. Specifically, the licensee did not fully evaluate the impact of the degraded RCIC turbine speed indicator on the operability of the RCIC system. The failure to fully evaluate and take corrective actions resulted in the RCIC system being in an inoperable condition for approximately 64 days. | | description = A finding and apparent violation of Technical Specification (TS) Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO) 3.5.3, Condition B was self-revealed for the licensees failure to perform an immediate operability determination (IOD) in accordance with licensee procedures on June 21, 2013, when a RCIC system turbine speed indicator in the main control room was found degraded. Specifically, the licensee failed to consider the degraded speed indication indicative of a problem within the RCIC EG-M circuitry (failed voltage-dropping resistor) that resulted in the inoperability of RCIC on August 22, 2013, when the RCIC turbine tripped on overspeed during postmaintenance surveillance testing. The licensee documented the issue in CR 01898931. Corrective actions included the replacement of the voltage-dropping resistor for the RCIC EG-M power supply, a review of extent of condition, and performing appropriate post-maintenance testing. The inspectors determined that the licensees failure to perform an immediate operability determination in accordance with licensee procedures on June 21, 2013, when a RCIC system turbine speed indicator in the main control room was found degraded was a performance deficiency, because it was the result of the failure to meet a procedure requirement, and the cause was reasonably within the licensees ability to foresee and correct and should have been prevented. The performance deficiency was determined to be more than minor and a finding because it impacted the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone attribute of equipment performance and adversely affected the cornerstone objective of ensuring the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. Specifically, the performance deficiency resulted in the inoperability of the RCIC system from June 21 through August 24, 2013. The inspectors evaluated the finding in accordance with IMC 0609, Appendix A, The Significance Determination Process (SDP) for Findings At-Power, Exhibit 2 for the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone. The inspectors answered Yes to the screening question under the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone Does the finding represent an actual loss of function of at least a single Train for > its Tech Spec Allowed Outage Time OR two separate safety systems out-of-service for > its Tech Spec Allowed Outage Time?, since the finding represented an actual loss of a safety function of a single train (RCIC) for 64 days, which is greater than the TS allowed outage time of 14 days. Therefore, a detailed risk evaluation was performed using IMC 0609, Appendix A. A Significance and Enforcement Review Panel (SERP) preliminarily determined this finding to have low to moderate safety significance (White). The inspectors determined that the performance characteristic of the finding that was the most significant causal factor of the performance deficiency was associated with the cross-cutting aspect of Problem Identification and Resolution, having Corrective Action Program components, and involving the licensee thoroughly evaluating problems such that the resolutions address causes and extent of conditions, as necessary. This includes properly classifying, prioritizing and evaluating for operability and reportability conditions adverse to quality. Specifically, the licensee did not fully evaluate the impact of the degraded RCIC turbine speed indicator on the operability of the RCIC system. The failure to fully evaluate and take corrective actions resulted in the RCIC system being in an inoperable condition for approximately 64 days. | ||
}} | }} | ||
Latest revision as of 00:20, 22 February 2018
| Site: | Duane Arnold  |
|---|---|
| Report | IR 05000331/2013004 Section 1R15 |
| Date counted | Sep 30, 2013 (2013Q3) |
| Type: | Violation: White |
| cornerstone | Mitigating Systems |
| Identified by: | NRC identified |
| Inspection Procedure: | IP 71111.15 |
| Inspectors (proximate) | A Boland C Pederson C Phillips K O'Brien L Kozak P Lougheed R Zimmerman S Ortha Shaikhc Lipa L Haeg R Murray V Myers |
| Violation of: | Technical Specification - Procedures Technical Specification |
| CCA | P.2, Evaluation |
| INPO aspect | PI.2 |
| ' | |